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Abstract
This thesis sociologically analyses the development of consumer credit within the
United States and the forms through which it has been governed and regulated. It is
demonstrated that, as the consumption of goods and services came to play an
increasingly important role in the mediation of social life during the first half of the
20th century, consumer credit grew in scale and form, funded by mainstream finance
capital. As articulated by economists, such credit was justified as 'productive', an
essential element in the facilitation of mass consumption now seen as a fundamental
corollary of mass production. The state, through legislation and new initiatives,
sought to protect, direct and manage the market for credit in the interests of
nurturing a wider social wellbeing. It is suggested that by the 1920s the instalment
plan, underpinned by the 'conditional sale' contract form, represented a new,
paradigmatic form of credit. With it, lenders channelled credit to consumers through
carefully calibrated, bureau-legal processes which served to discipline and regulate
credit use and repayments to prevent default losses. From the 1960s, with the
cultural critique of mass society and the rise of new modalities of consumption
concerned with lifestyle and self-identity, the widened size and scope of credit is
demonstrated. Tracing the institutional development of the credit card, it is
contended that this created a new paradigm of credit as a personalised, mobile
resource to be drawn upon by individuals in the increasingly autonomous, market-
derived living of their lives. Permeated by the political rationality of neo-liberalism,
it is elaborated how the state's regulation of credit has shifted on the basis of its
perceived responsibility to promote this individualised, 'enterprising' mode of life. It
is also detailed how lenders, tasked with governing the threat of non-repayment
across whole populations of credit consumers, have increasingly come to deploy
large-scale risk technologies and sophisticated credit reporting systems that trace the
recorded actions of individuals in using credit. Finally, it is shown how consumers
have become governed to manage the uncertainties related to their consumption
choices and resources based upon the inculcation of a reflexive self-government
over their own credit conduct.
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Introduction
Beautiful credit! The foundation of modern society. Who shall say that
this is not the golden age of mutual trust, of unlimited reliance upon
human promises? That is a peculiar condition of society which enables a
whole nation to instantly recognize point and meaning in the familiar
newspaper anecdote, which puts into the mouth of a distinguished
speculator in lands and mines this remark: "1 wasn't worth a cent two
years ago, and now lowe two millions of dollars".
Mark Twain, The Gilded Age
'A Peculiar Condition of Society'
Perhaps one of the most over-cited quotes in English literature whenever the topic of
debt is mentioned is in Hamlet when the pompous Polonius sternly cautions his son
Laertes to 'neither a borrower nor a lender be'. Aside from the words of the bard,
Gelphi and Labruyere note some seventy proverbs which enjoin the receiver against' .
the perils of lending and indebtedness, from the American' a bad loan is like a
broken mirror' to the rather ambiguous Persian injunction that 'debts are husbands to
men' (2000: 177-8). Beyond such homely wisdom, debt and credit, borrowing and
lending, have proven extremely problematic activities that since the dawn of
humanity have attracted the active intervention of the social body to frame its
occurrence and course. The Code of Hammurabi, the first written corpus of laws
etched on a two metre high stele, regulated the form and substance of credit
agreements throughout the duration of the Babylonian empire from 1800 B.C. It
bound maximum interest rates, required that loans of any kind had to be drawn up in
the presence of a public official, specified in detail the process of pledging collateral
for loans, permitted servitude for debt up to a maximum of three years and mandated
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that repayment was null and void in the event that the lender violated any of the
code's terms (Homer, 1963: 25-31; Gelphi and Labruyere, 2000: 3-4).
In Ancient Greece from the 7th century B.C., in the wake of a new wave of
commercialisation, the influential political and economic reforms of Solon, and the
emerging pre-eminence of Athens, the great philosophers elaborated a theoretical
condemnation of interest. Plato rejected commercialism as a degrading detraction
from affairs of state while Aristotle's analysis of money concluded that both interest
and profits from trade were illegitimate by virtue of the fact that money was
unproductive, a barren means of exchange rather than a productive capital which
could not be held to 'naturally' attract a return. Only agriculture was held by
Aristotle to be the true source of wealth. Despite this elitist intellectual opposition,
however, credit remained an integral part in trading, manufacturing, agriculture and
state affairs in Greece (Gelphi and Labruyere, 2000: 4-8).
In early Christianity, the doctrine of usury was articulated to outlaw virtually all
forms oflending. Whereas the 'Deuteronomic double standard' had allowed the
charging of usury to strangers but not to one's brother, the new universalistic
Christian church held this distinction to be unconscionable (Nelson, 1969: 3-28).
Even as European trade and commerce recovered in the 11th and 1th centuries, the
doctrine of usury 'weighted heavily on the consciences of political and Church
leaders and of merchants and bankers' and fundamentally shaped the progress of
economic affairs until the Reformation (Homer, 1963: 71). At the same time though,
a new theory of interest, as opposed to usury, was elaborated which articulated the
reasonableness of a charge upon money, not for its use but as a form of
compensation in the event of delayed repayment. This was soon extended to cover
the administrative cost of making loans, to defray the opportunity cost of the money
loaned as well as for compensating the risk of lost principal (Homer, 1963: 73-4;
Gelphi and Labruyere, 2000: 34-7).
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In the fourteenth century, the Church attempted to alleviate problems of poverty
through the raising of money and provision of interest- free loans while, in the
century that followed, charitable pawnshops known as montes pietatis became
established by Church and municipal authorities around Italy to alleviate the
suffering contrived by extortionate pawnbrokers (Homer, 1963: 78-9; Hudson, 1982:
25-7; Gelphi and Labruyere, 2000: 42-5). In 1515, the Lateran Council finally
legitimised the charging of interest on such transactions on the basis of it being a
compensation for administrative expense. In the 16th century, with the promulgation
of the Reformation and Luther's declaration that a Christian man 'was free, under no
obligation to observe dead Mosaic ordinances' (Nelson, 1969: 29), usury now took
the form, not of a complete prohibition on interest-taking, but of interest that was
excessive or exploitative. Within Britain, as Hoppit (1990) shows, the expansion of
public, commercial and personal forms of indebtedness within the tumultuous period
between the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries sparked ongoing,
vigorous debates on the ethics, morality and practicality of borrowing in all its
forms, from the corruption inherent in the emerging permanent national debt to the
extortionate rates of interest charged by pawnbrokers and Jewish moneylenders.
Although loans have always been made for personalised use, consumption as a
particularly distinctive domain arose only with the emergence of wage labour and
the separation of home life from workplace under capitalism. In doing so, it came to
represent a site integral for the reproduction oflabour and of capital itself yet, at the
same time, denoting a sphere characterised by the threat of devourment and
destruction of productive potential (Reith, 2005: 230). It is the conflation of this
ambivalent sphere with the particular characteristics of credit that, perhaps, serves to
inject consumer credit with the profoundly problematic cultural understanding it has
endured since its inception, a contradiction most clearly evident within the United
States. The New World has represented, on the one hand, a young dynamic society,
progressive and industrialised, free from the constraints of its colonial forbears.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, it also became one of the most resolutely
consumerised, with novel developments in retailing, commercial distribution, and
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advertising, as well as consumer credit, promulgating and feeding on the longings
and desires of individuals as consumers. Yet, at the same time, the Puritan legacy of
industry, frugality, asceticism and service, secularly exemplified by Benjamin
Franklin has long been held as the core element at the cultural heart of the United
States. Still to this day, long after Jeremy Bentham's 'In Defence of Usury' had won
the argument for the ending of usury ceilings in Britain by 1859, most individual
states in the US continue to impose some form of interest or usury ceiling in credit
contracts. It is for these reasons that the United States provides the specific historical
context for this thesis.
In his extraordinary contribution to our understanding of the development of
consumer credit within the United States, cultural historian Lendol Calder (2002)
argues that two polar 'myths' have driven the conceptualisation of consumer credit.
On the one hand, the myth of credit as the' great democratiser' presents credit as
being a social equaliser, of promoting higher standards of living amongst the masses
and allowing all to enjoy the realisation of their consumerist desires. While President
of Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson remarked in 1903 that the automobile
would bring socialism to America as everyone would want one but not everyone
could afford one. On the contrary, it was the commercial organisation of credit
instalment plans which was to accomplish this task of individualised personal
fulfilment. In the early decades of the twentieth-century, economists such as Edwin
R.A. Seligman (1927), and Evans Clark (1930) gave intellectual respectability to this
myth, reframing foundational concepts such as 'production' and 'consumption',
'luxuries' and 'necessities' to show that consumer instalment selling was socially
beneficial. In the post-war era, commercial economist Clyde Phelps (1954, 1955)
presented instalment credit as being an essential component in the dynamic of a
rising standard of living, fruitfully straddling the two pillars of mass production and
mass consumption. More recently the redoubtable Alan Greenspan as Chairman of
the Federal Reserve linked the growth and distribution of American prosperity to a
flexible, competitive, technologically-intensive consumer credit marketplace,
cautioning a role for government regulation only in creating a level playing field
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where individual initiative is respected.' Today, many economists are relatively
cautious about the development of consumer credit yet trust to innovation and
freedom of individuals and markets to ensure optimal outcomes (e.g. Maki, 2002;
Bostic, 2002).
The other perhaps more culturally potent myth surrounding consumer credit has
been the 'myth of lost economic virtue'. As Calder (1999) notes, the 'under-
consumptionists' of the 1920s saw the approaching Depression as a necessary period
of retrenchment in compensation for the economic growth supplied by the
'borrowed' wealth of consumer instalment credit. Decades later, in the late 1950s,
the likes of Galbraith (1985) linked the development of consumer credit to the
creation of a new host of 'needs of the second class', contrived by the advertising
and sales industry to fabricate demand for goods not physically required by
individuals. Within this spirit, through a muckraking expose of the consumer credit
industry, Hillel Black (1962) attacked the mindless hedonism of consumers
nourished by new forms of credit, especially among those who could least afford it.
He also excoriated the heedless profit mongering of financial institutions and
retailers, the calculated invasiveness of credit bureaus and bill collectors, the luring
of children into debt as a 'normal' practice, and the particular exploitation of the
poor. For Black, it is not credit itself which is the problem so much as its
development as a rapacious industry within itself combined with the development of
a new class of indigent debtor, new forms of 'on-the-cuff living and the growing
pervasiveness of an 'economic immaturity' where debt outweighs savings. In this
witches brew of commercial and consumer greed, immorality, deception and
diminished competition were perceived to flourish, not least serving the propaganda
aims of America's Cold War enemy.
Undeniably, the most prominent and thoughtful exponent of this myth oflost virtue
has been Daniel Bell's The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism first published in
1975. Following Weber's argument that thought, conduct and social structure are
interlinked and are characterised in developed Western societies by instrumental
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rationality, Bell (1996) argues that the 20th Century has seen a massive divergence in
the character of the social structure and culture with the former adhering to
bourgeois precepts of efficiency, functionality and best means to given ends while
the latter has, in essence, become autonomous from the social structure,
characterised by ever-greater anti-rationalism and subjectivism. Bourgeois authority
has been challenged and undermined and its puritan culture deemed old-fashioned
and arcane to the point of indefensibility. Accordingly, for Bell, social position and
cultural styles no longer correspond. Increases in discretionary income, greater
education and social permissiveness have disjointed the correspondence of social
position to cultural style as people become free to select their own cultural tastes and
lifestyle, aided by the percolation of the life-styles of the elite to the many via mass-
media forms.
The rise of mass consumption and the incorporation of more social groups in the
consumption of so-called luxuries is, for him, the key to understanding why culture
has changed. This change, he suggests, can be derived back from certain specific
innovations in the techno-economic structure: the application of electricity, the
development of assembly line production, the rise of segmented marketing, new
means of transportation and communications and lastly, the emergence of instalment
credit which Bell thinks so radically undermines the so-called 'Protestant fear of
debt'. The final factor is summed succinctly in Bell's belief that 'the trick of
instalment selling was to avoid the word "debt" and to emphasise the word "credit'"
(1996: 69). The cumulative effect of these developments is that work and the
concomitant accumulation of wealth as reward remain, no longer, the primary social
values as emulative consumption and display come to dominate the cultural order.
Ultimately the social structure, and capitalism itself, becomes gradually weakened as
the motivational system upon which it is built gives way to new forms of hedonism.
Therefore, as it would seem, the rise of consumer credit within capitalism exists as
one of the contributory factors that is leading to a diminishment of the puritan ethic
and an increase in wanton consumption within a process that is fundamentally
damaging to the underlining cultural basis that makes capitalism possible.
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More recently, David Tucker's (1991) The Decline of Thrift in America has argued
along similar lines that the growth of personal indebtedness was part of a grand shift
in national mindset stemming from the beginning of the zo" century but gathering
particular from in the aftermath of World Ward 2. This cultural change, 'from saving
to spending', however, exists not merely at the level of the individual but is reflected
at the level of state macroeconomic management as well, from the popularity of
Keynesian deficit interventionism to the 'supply-side' economics of Reagan and also
the Monetarist School of the 1980s which advocated government retrenchment for
stable prices, higher growth and the promotion of entrepreneurialism yet ignored the
need for the fostering of traditional moral virtues upon which, Tucker claims,
economic survival and development rely.
In the 1960s, sociologist David Caplovitz (1968) saw an inextricable link between
the development of a new affluent society and the increasing use of credit. However,
he perceived this not merely as an outgrowth of economic development or new
consumer culture but as the long term outcome of the changing occupational
structure characterised by the growth of a new secure, salaried middle class.
Whereas, he argued, the wealth of the older ascetic entrepreneurial middle class was
grounded on capital, investment and profit engaged within the market, the new white.
collar class employed in the vast bureaucratic edifices of mass society were
characterised by job security, salaried stability and a predictable trajectory of
occupational advancement. It was this latter factor, in particular he argued, which
would provide the higher future income needed to bridge the pressing consumerist
needs of the present amongst a class that was increasingly consumer conscious.
However, the few more contemporary sociologists who have explicitly examined
consumer credit have concentrated on the thesis of an evaporating cultural heritage
played out against wider societal dislocation. In a self-conscious examination of the
fate of the contemporary American middle-class, Sullivan et al. (1989, 2000) and
Williams (2004) link current economic prosperity to the expansion of consumer debt
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and position a causal link between rising bankruptcy rates and the changing social
conditions of the middle class. For them, the profound social dislocations and
widened economic inequality of the 1970s and 80s, particularly through the
depredations of Reaganomics, have imperilled the economic position of the middle
class already racked by rising divorce and remarriage rates, lack of medical
insurance and the increased burden of homeowners hip. While increasing equity,
rising homeownership rates across all population segments have driven up levels of
personal debt, increasing vulnerability and recourse to bankruptcy. In this mix too
are seen the exacerbating effects of rising material expectations, the lure of
marketing and 'a change of attitude among Americans over the past twenty years or
so that permits this unprecedented accumulation of debt' (Sullivan et al., 2000: 25).
Rising personal debt thus serves as both a dynamic cause and effect of the
downward social mobility of the American middle class.
To the pot of cultural and economic changes, George Ritzer (1995) adds the
proliferating technological form of the credit card as a temptation to imprudence,
appearing in the minds of individuals, as he sees it, at a greater, more abstract
remove from the tangible value of cash. Through this mechanistic relationship,
credit card companies' profit-seeking business practices, aggressive marketing
campaigns and promotion of expensive services such as ATM cash advances are
held to have seduced legions of consumers into a state of crippling indebtedness to
which consumers themselves contribute through their 'unrestrained consumption'
and 'compulsive' tendencies (Ritzer, 1995: 68). Schor (1998), too, posits a
fundamental link between rising indebtedness, the insatiability of escalating
emulative consumer wants and the proliferation of expensive forms of plastic credit
which seemingly erode the link between getting and spending. She reprovingly cites
one psychology experiment where participants exhibited an 'almost Pavlovian'
response to spending more after being exposed to some subtly positioned Mastercard
logos (1998: 73).
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For Robert Manning, consumer credit represents an 'erosion of the traditional
cognitive connect, or fiscal equilibrium between household income and consumption
decisions' (2000: 105). Through a nuanced historical account, he traces the
dissolution of this link between 'getting and spending' to the end of the nineteenth
century and the emergence of a new consumerist culture built around the stimulation
of a desire rooted in imaginative consciousness. Although battered further in the
twentieth-century by the economic excesses of the roaring twenties, the cultural
brake of the Depression and the calculated post war solidity of social life sustained
by a new welfarist Federal state preserved the essential integrity of this cultural ethic
until the 1970s. However, again, the financial onslaught of profit hungry institutions,
the 'psychological optimism of affluence' and the egotistical consumerism that was
to follow were key components in finally dissolving the threads of the old 'cognitive
connect'. Like Sullivan et al. and Williams, he sees the relentless increase in debt
over the 1980s as a product of the relentless marketing of credit card debt within a
context where the unyielding desire for the symbols of middle class consumption
(higher 'spending') clashed with the reality of material uncertainties caused by
polarising wealth, corporate downsizings, unemployment and rising rates of divorce
(lower 'getting'). Manning, like Tucker, does not point the finger solely at the
consumer but identifies the rise also of corporate and government thriftlessness,
forming what he sees as a grand 'triangle of debt' elevating the contemporary
national economy at the cost of future prosperity (2000: 31-65).
Yet, not all concerned analysts have approached the development of consumer credit
forms within these explanatory conventions. In his commentary on James Mill,
Marx ([1844a] 1975) himself took the development of credit to be a logical
extension in the progress of the system of money under capitalist relations. A credit
relation, for Marx, was fundamentally still a money transaction, with value being
displaced from its inscription within paper or metal to its incision within the very
being of the human subject. Even in benevolent, non-usurious lending from a rich
man to a poor one, the financial return with interest is grounded in the very human
essence of the borrower and all his potential, as well as the implicit force guaranteed
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by law. In borrowing between relatively equal economic actors, credit too represents
money elevated to an 'ideal form'; value forsakes its physical incarnation and comes
to reside in the social being of the borrower and the form of relations between
individuals. However, although seeming to bring a new intimacy to human relations,
credit simultaneously alienates them in profound ways for, in such a transaction, the
worth of an individual comes to be morally assessed not in human terms but in
economic ones. It provides, fundamentally, a new means of accumulation for those
in possession of capital and a new mode of degradation for those without, fostering
mutual deception and deceit and a new level of estrangement amongst individuals
under capitalism. Credit, then, is not the symptom of a breakdown in capitalism but
rather the manifestation of a new strengthened phase.
Writing in the 1970s, Jean Baudrillard (1998) updated this position in his analysis of
consumption. Contemporary consumption he posited was not hedonistic or anomie
but, counter-intuitively, a field increasingly penetrated by the rationalising logic of
capitalism. Rather than a mode of instant gratification, he suggests that the
development of credit represents a 'regime of enforced saving', a new variant of
Puritanism that disciplines individuals in their new crucial role as consumers, albeit
under the guise of self-fulfilment, in much the same way that factory bosses once
regulated labour. More recently, analysing the development of consumer credit
within America up until the 1950s, Calder (1999) describes how individuals' flows
of income became regularised by their removal from individual control and their
subjection to legal-bureaucratic processes to which individuals willingly, and gladly,
came to subject themselves. Puritan self-denial, self-restraint and self-control in
accumulating resources, he argues, were subsumed by budget plan restraint
characterised by the external fetter and control of the contractual obligations of sale.
Yet, what Calder fails to elaborate on as Baudrillard does is that contemporary
consumer credit, at least, is not experienced as a field of repression or enforced
control. On the contrary, its use is fundamentally acted upon and experienced as the
essence of freedom, albeit a freedom that is always governed.
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Outline of the Argument
It seems that sociology has fallen into a position of treating consumer credit en
masse as a thing, a novel manifestation of amorality, of capitalist greed and
exploitation, of social fragmentation and (middle-class) cultural dissolution. What I
attempt within this thesis is to present a sociological alternative where credit is
treated as a social process rather than as a symptom of something else; a dynamic
field which, as Lendol Calder shows, has a history and genealogy stretching back to
at least the 19th century. In a sense, as we will see, credit has always been seen as a
problem in need of a solution; at the same time, often being presented as a solution
to an array of other problems.
The central argument of this thesis can be stated as follows: in our complex, late-
modem societies, the economic prerogatives of capitalism have become tied to the
continuous generation, satisfaction and regeneration of consumer wants and desires
while the individual's sense of self and sociability have become indelibly linked to
the self-realising possibilities of marketed forms of consumption and credit. At the
same time, the use of credit has become closely monitored and regulated from
outside and inside the individual through governing processes which act upon and
through the individual's means and capacity for self-constraint. In addressing what I
believe to be this fundamental and under-analysed condition, I avoid a retracing of
the means by which consumer credit is conceived as a universal pathway towards an
all-embracing economic citizenship for all. Neither do I attempt to measure the
degree to which our so-called consumer societies have somehow lost an older,
simpler cultural economic virtue where what was consumed was conditioned only
by the resources that one possessed. More broadly, I also make no attempt to assess
the significance of national consumer indebtedness in the United States or
elsewhere, its long-term sustainability within a context of historically low interest
rates, and how it might affect, or be affected by, changing global economic and
political power relations.
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The ambition of my argument is, on one level, quite modest. Eschewing 'grand
theory' , it hopes to show in the 'messy reality' of consumer credit provision the
changing ways in which consumers are governed within consumer credit
transactions. Yet, at the same time, such a modest ambition requires a broad scale
and scope of analysis. In this regard, it is influenced by the legacy of Foucault and
informed by the emergence of a 'govemmenalist' approach to the analysis of power
implicated within social relations. Governmentality emphasises the continuous
inventiveness and resourcefulness of authorities, whether individuals, institutions or
diverse actors acting under the power rubric of the state, towards understanding and
framing the actions of others, economic processes or the course of perceived
problems and issues.
Therefore, the scope of this thesis encompasses the specific historical contexts of
consumption and the role of consumers, where needs, wants and desires for goods
engender satisfaction, pleasure and meaning for individuals. It connects with the
ways capitalist enterprise has come to embrace consumer lending as a source of
profit - whether directly, by specialist lenders offering credit, or in the form of
retailers facilitating deferred payment as a means of enhancing sales. Here, the
shifting, changing technologies within which the freedom of credit consumers is
addressed and acted upon is presented as being particularly important, involving as
we will see, the deployment of such elements as form-filling, legal contracts, the
systematic organisation of time, bureaucratic tabulation, information sharing and
systematic modes of assessment which invoke the power of expertise and wider
material technologies. Finally, the government of credit is shown to be bound, in a
more conventional sense, to the political rationalities and programmes of the liberal
state. These conceive of credit provision and legislatively shape and direct it in
historically contingent ways - such an intervention proving crucial for framing the
legal possibilities of the lending process.
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What I wish the reader to take away at the end of this thesis is an understanding of
the degree to which consumer credit has become a nexus point in 'late modem'
societies, a key lynchpin interlinking processes of identity formation through
consumption and the continuous creation of profit and reproduction of capital. It is
also a site of conflicting political significance perceived to be in need of state
intervention, whether to nurture and encourage 'economic enterprise', promote
'social inclusion', or protect the rights of a generic constituency of 'consumer'. At
this stage, the reader can perhaps guess why the United States was chosen as the area
of enquiry for this thesis: it was, of course, where consumer credit was born and
where it has developed to the greatest degree. However, such advancement has not
only been achieved in 'dollar terms', of debt outstanding, but by other indices too:
the sheer volume and range of credit contracts American households possess; the
dependency upon a sophisticated credit reporting network; the complexity,
advancement and coverage of the credit scoring systems used by creditors; the
American polity's array of specialist, continuously updated and revised legislation;
and the degree to which its citizens have come to conceive of and act upon
themselves as consumers in need of credit. Yet, the areas examined and the
arguments raised have a wider salience for all Western societies and, increasingly,
the successfully developing countries of South America and Asia that have
embraced a consumer 'buy now, pay later' ethic either serviced by domestic capital, .
or imported from the United States.
The complexity and detail of material examined in this thesis does not preclude the
discernment and identification of those wide-scale changes that have occurred within
and through the field of consumer credit. As consumer goods came to play an
increasing role in the mediation of social life during the first half of the 20th century,
consumer credit grew in scale and form to attract mainstream finance capital.
Despite a recurrent social fear about 'consumer debt', credit generally came to be
seen as something positive, if not essential, to social life and individual freedom.
The state, in general, moved from a strategy of repression through usury interest rate
caps to one of protection and management in the interest of promoting a wider social
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wellbeing. By the 1920 and 30s, the conditional sale instalment credit form
represented the paradigmatic form of credit. With it, lenders channelled credit to
consumers through carefully calibrated bureau-legal processes which served to
discipline and regulate credit use and repayments to prevent losses due to non-
repayment.
During the 1960s and 70s, against the backdrop of a hollowing out of political
endeavour, the forsaken possibilities of collective action and belief, and the
fragmentation of social life, credit has continued to swell in size and reach. Its
paradigmatic form, it is suggested, is now the credit card - a personalised, mobile
resource to be drawn upon by individuals in the increasingly autonomous, market-
derived living of their lives. For its part, the state's regulation of credit has shifted on
the basis of its perceived responsibility to promote this 'enterprising' mode oflife.
Lenders, who now have become tasked with governing whole populations of credit
consumers, have become progressively more reliant upon large-scale risk
technologies, the unimpeded constitution and circulation of data about individual
ability to make choices as well as the reflexive, self-governing capabilities of
consumers themselves.
The content of this thesis is divided into four main chapters, a summary of whose
aims are outlined below.
In Chapter 1, through a sociological examination of historical studies analysing the
development of emergent forms of credit in the 19th and 20th centuries, we will
attempt to trace the socio-genesis of the consumer and the formation of new
modalities for their government. We will explore how out of the fiery cauldron of
industrialisation, immigration and urbanisation of the mid_19th century, new forms
oflender began to proliferate to meet the borrowing needs of a new urban
workforce. Mirroring the growth of labour with wages as its primary means of
subsistence, emergent salary lenders began to make loans less on the security of
tangible capital that characterised traditional pawnbroking and increasingly around
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the abstract conception of future wages. On this basis, these creditors deployed new
means for acting upon the actions of borrowers, locking them within habitual
temporal practices, relying upon their embedded position within the community as
well as fabricating a web of legal artifice and subterfuge to insist upon repayment
through a legal framework where such lending was almost certain to be illegal under
the strict state usury laws of the time.
In the latter half of the 19th century, the middle class and elites, deriving from a
moral evangelical Christian tradition, became increasingly concerned by the
apparent fragmentation of society propelled by industrialisation and the rise of
anomie urban landscapes deprived of a coherent system of moral regulation. The so-
called 'loan shark' menace of the salary lenders encapsulated this sense of
dissolution as the elite resolved to act through the setting up of Remedial Loan
lenders inspired by the historical European tradition of low cost, religious or
publicly-run pawnshops. As the new century dawned, a nascent social scientific
sensibility within the spirit of Progressivism began to empirically analyse the
problem, giving a new weight and density to the phenomenon under scrutiny. Its
evocative studies and efforts prompted and promoted new imaginative forms of state
intervention beyond the failures of philanthropy, an intervention that would radically
alter the terms and possibilities of personal borrowing.
Historically, the instalment selling of goods as a form of credit attracted significantly
less authoritative attention than that of cash borrowing. Increasingly developed by
retailers within the 19th century to promote the sale of consumer goods including
manufactured furniture, pianos and sets of encyclopaedia to the new middle classes,
it existed outside the ambit of the usury laws with little coercive regulation of
borrower repayment. Later, more downscale instalment selling among cheap
furniture stores and its extension to the marketing of the new sewing machine to
women prompted a generalised anxiousness about indebtedness, loss of
independence and exploitation, a synecdoche for an insecure patriarchal middle class
deeply-uneasy at the increasing commercial and social flux of the 19th century.
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Yet, as we will see, credit found new respectable conduits in the development of
department stores and national mail order businesses. The expansion of instalment
selling by mail order provides an interesting case study in the development of credit.
Just at the new department store form conjured imaginative longings for urban
dwellers, catalogue merchants increasingly brought the pleasures of image and
desire to increasing swatches of a newly unified, still predominantly rural nation. In
the new century, it was instalment selling mail order firms which, faced with the
demands and difficulties of governing consumers at a physical remove, attempted to
inscribe a conception of their field of subjects through increasingly detailed and
refined application forms and questionnaires, tools which represented the world 'out
there' in the credit offices of these retailers.
By the 1920s, the development of the mass-produced automobile embodied new,
profound shifts in American society. Personal transit shrank the boundaries of time
and space while the built environment itself - housing, work and leisure - became
moulded to the possibilities of automotive transport. Its manufacture wrought and
perfected changes to new production and working conditions while the car itself
became the ultimate symbol of a new form of consumption. The car proved equally
instrumental in the development of mass personal finance in the 20th century as new..'.
specialised intermediaries harnessed mainstream financial capital for the profitable
exploitation of consumer desire and the giant industrial manufacturers, particularly
General Motors, funnelled valuable capital to ensure a continuous ready demand for
the products streaming from their assembly lines. Yet, in its early stage, car
ownership remained a largely middle-class phenomenon, with credit being engaged
in a new temporal, legal bureaucratic matrix that disciplined excited, consuming
desire to ensure prompt, regular repayment.
In Chapter 2, we pick up our analysis in the shifting discourses and ethics of debt
circulating around the emerging system of mass consumer credit. Increasingly,
personal debt was justified as 'productive', an essential element in the facilitation of
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a mass consumption being imbricated within the American Way as a necessary
corollary to mass production. Crucially, with the legacy of the New Deal and the
growth in the reach and scope of the federal state, such mass credit became an object
of regulation - as part of the new grand regulation of the banking sector and more
directly, through the imposition of wartime controls by the Federal Reserve which
made consumer credit a calculable mechanism in the service of the national interest.
Yet, just as the post-war 'affluent society' came under sustained attack from cultural
critics as well as a capitalist vanguard of organisational theorists, advertisers and
marketers, a revolutionary form of credit began to take root as the emblem of a new
consumerism - the credit card. As we will examine through an analysis of its
institutional development and the particular ways through which it has become
marketed today, the credit card has come to embody a personalised, malleable credit
resource to be drawn upon by consumers in the fulfilment of their wants and desires;
a form of credit that, as I will demonstrate, has become moulded to, and an essential
part of, the formation of contemporary consumer lifestyle.
Within the shifting context of the later 20th century, disillusionment with mass
society and disaffection with New Deal welfarism and economic interventionism
were met with the rise of new, individualising political rationalities ofneo-
liberalism. Responding to this, credit market deregulation and liberalisation have
become key political strategies for freeing the field of choices available to the
consumer. Yet, as we shall see, this does not imply that the state has not continued to
intervene heavily within credit markets. Through an analysis of the work oflegal
scholars, behavioural economists and others, we will explore how the so-called
Truth-in-Lending Act 1968 represented a new legislative template for the
government of credit that sought, not to direct the functioning of the market as in the
past, but to shape the autonomy of consumers. It attempted to layout the ways
consumers were advertised to, and the format of the legal credit contracts they
signed-up to in order that they might be better informed, more rational, and more
suitably equipped as consumers. Ultimately, it attempted (unsuccessfully it has been
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argued) to programme consumers to be the kinds of individual economic actors
political authorities imagined they should be.
The expansion of the market for credit, characterised by diffuseness and the broad
reach of personal choice, took place against the development of new regulatory
mechanisms by lenders. As we will examine, the growth of an electronically-
mediated industry of credit reporting came to systematise the identity of all
consumers via a virtual 'credit identity', inscribing the exercise of their credit
choices in such a way which provided lenders the possibility of acting upon them for
profitable ends. At the same time, it also opened up new ways for credit consumers
to conceive of themselves in relation to the fulfilment of their consumption
ambitions. To these ends, we will draw upon an array of material including privacy-
rights analysts, information sharing advocates, relevant legislative initiatives and
recent theoretical literature on the sociology of surveillance.
In Chapter 3, we examine in detail the development of credit scoring technologies by
institutional lenders, in conjunction with statisticians and operations researchers,
which emerged most notably in the 1970s and 1980s for the regulation of consumer
borrowers. Drawing together an analysis of technical papers, conference papers and
other sources on credit scoring and informed by recent sociological and
criminological theory on the constitution and deployment of risk as a form of
actuarial technology, this chapter traces the emergence of such governing
mechanisms in the development of a national market for consumer credit and the
emergence of the population as the key locus of analysis for lenders. As we shall
see, such technologies interlinked with particular concerns of the state to make credit
available as a universal right of every citizen contingent only on their ability to
police their own desires and choices and, more broadly, to direct and manage the
course of their own lives. The risk-based assessments constituted in an expertly
legitimated credit scoring system proved an attractive mechanism. Risk allowed
market entitlement to be emptied of the old moral baggage attached to sanctioning
decisions made on the basis of class, race and gender; instead, a new 'morality'
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predicated individual market freedom on the basis of 'objective', statistical relations
discerned within populations of consumers.
As will be demonstrated, credit scoring systems gradually became knitted within the
institutional fabric of consumer lenders, presented by its expert advocates as distinct
from, fairer, more controllable and more efficient than lender sanctioning systems
pejoratively referred to as being based on 'judgemental' decision-making. Yet,
today, credit scoring represents anything but a homogeneous, unified progressive
technology. Its experts continuously grapple with systematic uncertainties, 'risks',
which are perceived to impair its effective attribution of consumers as risks. They
also formulate alternative, competing approaches and epistemologies for the creation
of scoring models that seem to have their own endemic advantages and difficulties,
models that offer only situational rather than paradigmatic superiority.
Notwithstanding, risk as a technology has filtered into more and more areas within
the commercial practices of consumer lending, its strategic advantages in governing
a multitude of consumers increasingly leading to the conception of individuals as
risks in a host of new, diffuse ways. The tactical government of risk has altered too
in recent years, with individuals constituted as risks being acted upon in new ways
emphasising the scope of individual responsibility.
,',
While credit markets are inclusionary and expansionary in their quest for higher
revenues and profits, the attribution of risk by lenders serves ultimately to exclude. It
would seem that the constitution of individuals as relative risks always presupposes
those who will be 'too risky' to profitably engage. Those representing an excessive
likelihood of failure, be it because of their seemingly inadequate job, income,
neighbourhood, history of credit use and performance will tend to be marginalised
by lenders, ignored, denied the general benefits of choice within the mainstream
credit market. Yet, even here the market intervenes to fill the vacuum of need and
desire, want and desperation nurtured by the oxygen of credit. As we will examine
through an analysis of a range of social scientific empirical studies, newly ascendant
payday lenders, pawnbrokers and 'rent to own' retailers offer an ersatz alternative to
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credit cards and personal loans for the poor and the marginalised, but in ways that
make no pretence that such consumers can or are in a position to govern themselves.
They generate coercive practices redolent of their 19th century forebears, compelling
a regime of repayments that exact the considerable price of triple-figure interest rates
for the privilege of their borrowing services. These fringe borrowers represent the
obverse of the self-determining neo-liberal ideal; poor and marginalised they lack
the material and systemic potential for free choice, a lack invoked by economists as
being irrational but subjectable to educative intervention.
In Chapter 4, we examine recent developments in the government of consumer
credit, in particular, new forms which emphasise the individual's responsibility to
reflexively govern themselves. This will involve a case-study of Fair Isaac
Corporation and their development of an internet-based service that allows
consumers to purchase their attributed credit score under a particular type of generic
credit scoring system known as 'FICO' and helps guide consumer conduct in
relation to their credit use.
In the last several years, consumers have increasingly become concerned with
managing their own credit conduct in light of this FICO risk attribution, and credit
scores more generally. Through an analysis of key documentary material, consumer' .
advice leaflets and informational brochures, we will attempt to demonstrate how a
technology deployed for governing a population in terms of risk has become
reoriented as a technology for subjective self-government under conditions of
uncertainty. Whereas the deployment of risk by lenders in credit scoring engenders a
calculated probability of default for the management of financial losses, the adoption
of risk as an identity by consumers induces them to pursue certain actions in using
credit for the purposes of optimising their ongoing credit use. Risk in this sense
allows the consumer to manage the uncertainty they experience in relation to future
credit consumption, not by rendering it calculable, but by permitting them to contain
it through the operation of a strict regimen of the self.
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Following this, we will investigate how the opportunity for this form of self-
government has been marketed as a commodity for the personal management of
consumption uncertainty. To this end, we will draw upon an analysis of the publicity
material and marketing campaign of Fair Isaac for its new suite of consumer
focussed products as well as other related data sources including press releases and
company magazine articles. Itwill be argued that consumers are persuaded to deploy
these security commodities in order to manage prudentially the uncertainty related to
their consumption choices and resources, pervasive uncertainties which are held to
threaten the individual consumer's ability to sustain an ongoing ability to use credit.
Yet, not only are consumers directed in certain specific ways to be responsible for
their own consumer choices, they must also be responsible for ensuring their credit
identities are free from errors and discrepancies intrinsic to the system itself.
The final section of this chapter examines in some detail the explosive growth of
another uncertainty or 'risk' that the contemporary consumer is tasked with
defending against - the phenomenon of 'identity theft'. In plotting its criminalisation
by the state in law as well as the documenting of its supposed explosive growth
across the United States, it is suggested here that the individual has become
governed to prudentially manage themselves in light of this risk, a risk which is held
to lie not only within the malevolence of other envious consumers but within the
very dynamism of the consumer credit system itself. Through an analysis of
educational documentation of the Federal Trade Commission, institutional lenders,
consumer peer support groups, identity theft experts in media and self-help books, it
will be argued that the individual is tasked with lowering their risk exposure to this
crime by engaging in a prudent, self-conscious management of their personal
information. Finns such as Fair Isaac also supply security commodities that allow
consumers to track their credit score and analyse changes to their credit identities,
permitting them a resolute line of defence against becoming a victim of this novel
crime. By ensuring their credit identity remains free of the tribulation of identity
theft, consumers may be assured of protecting and defending their consuming
ambitions.
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Yet, as I will tentatively argue, perhaps the 'risk' of identity theft, and its treatment
and prevention, most clearly manifests not a new risk at large in the world or a
heightened sensitivity towards it but the contemporary fears of a society emptied of
collective political ambition and preoccupied about the fulfilment of individuated,
marketed choice.
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Notes
I See for example Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan at the Economic Development Conference
of the Greenlining Institute, 11October 1997, San Francisco CA
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Chapter 1. From 'My Uncle' to Alfred Sloan: The
Sociogenesis of Consumer Credit
In its political, economic and cultural domination of the world, sometimes we forget
just how new an economic and political entity the United States is. Under the
populist administration of Jefferson, the 1803 Louisiana Purchase from France
vastly extended the borders of this fledgling nation, doubling its size and removing
the French colonial presence on its western flank. New territory became open for
settlement and access was realised to the Mississippi river greatly enhancing
possibilities for transport and trade. With the end of hostilities between Great Britain
and the defeat of Napoleon in Europe, the United States began a rapid process of
expansion beyond the Frontier, forcibly moving Indian tribes and culminating in
conflict with Mexico in 1846, which won control for the Republic over Oregon,
California and Texas. Although a single political entity unthreatened by external
nation-states, the United States did not represent a particularly unified one. The
regional economic disparities between an industrialising, commercial North and an
agrarian, slave labour-based South, reflected in opposed political interests, along
with relatively underdeveloped chains of interdependence in trade and exchange and .
a relatively weak central state apparatus made for an unsteady centralisation over the
monopolisation of the means of violence and taxation. The violent and peaceful
agglomeration of territory within a federal, political administration represented by
war and state accession treaties were offset by the centrifugal processes wherein
states asserted their rights over the Republic's, the 'parliamentarization' of these
competing political interests becoming sheared in the upsurge of violence of the
Civil War of 1861 to 1865 as eleven states seceded from the Union.
Yet, crucially, the contestation of war was to playa crucial role in shaping and
binding the form of the state and the domain of a national economy. The pragmatic
need for an industrial power to transport troops and resources led to an enforced
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standardisation of track gauge within the emerging network of railroads straddling
the country. This was consummated by the first transcontinental route under the
Pacific Railroad Act 1863, the greatest commercial endeavour which had yet been
attempted and financed, novelly, through private bond issuances (Stover, 1961).
Later in 1883, the coordinating requirements of the national rail network and
burgeoning commercial trade led to the harmonisation of time zones across the
continent. With the first form of long-distance instantaneous communication that
deconstructed the American continent's boundaries oftime and space, the Pacific
Telegraph Act 1860 coordinated virtually all competing telegraph companies in the
construction of a cross-national telecommunications system for the administration of
modern combat (Thompson, 1947). Meanwhile, the financial exigencies of fighting
a protracted 'total' war mobilising the wider civilian population, industry and a
centralised bureaucracy led to the enactment of the National Currency Act. This
replaced local bank-issued notes that had been more or less backed by gold with the
first homogenous circulated paper currency, the 'greenback', directed through
nationally chartered banks and secured on the basis of government debt being
incurred to finance the war (Trescott, 1963; Updike, 1985). In addition to the banks,
the Treasury department also raised financing through the sale of bonds to small
holders through a extensive, patriotically-infused professional sales campaign
organised by financier Jay Cooke (Hall, 1982: 243-4). Thus in a large-scale war
caused by the relative weakness and fractiousness of the state, the insufficient
political, economic and logistical integration of a regional division oflabour
between agriculture and industry energised both the administrative organisation of
the state, its capacity to exert a binding monopoly over the means and deployment of
violence while integrating the continent through the spread of a centralised monetary
regime and the extension and rationalisation of transport and communication. More
SUbtly, the war also fused the United States' elite towards the possibilities of
nationally-focussed organisation beyond their immediate hinterlands, embedding,
more profoundly, a wider acceptance of the institution of the market (Hall, 1982).
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The post-Civil War era also elevated the corporation as the pre-eminent mode of
commercial organisation. Reserved initially within the capital-intensive transport
sectors, the increasing scope of industry compelled more industries to adopt its
formalised bureaucratic form as they expanded, necessitating external financing
through stock offerings and nascent investment banks as opposed to individual
private capital, thus increasingly differentiating the functions of ownership and
professional management (Porter, 1973: 12-13). Out of this centralisation and
concentration of capital emerged a new generation of capitalists in the expanding
loci of industry including the likes of Cornelius Vanderbilt in railroads, John D.
Rockerfeller in oil, Andrew Carnegie in steel and J.P. Morgan in banking; labelled
less than affectionately as the 'robber barons', these Gilded Age tycoons assumed
unparalleled personal wealth and immense, unprecedented economic power through
competition and combination. With this new industrial revolution, the United States
became increasingly urbanised, attracting an influx of migrant labour from its own
rural areas as well as Europe to its metropolitan manufacturing centres. Before the
Civil War, some 5 million new immigrants had entered the country in this 'first
wave' rising to ten million in the 'second wave' between the end of the Civil War
and 1890 (Jones, 1992: 153). While cities began to incorporate more and more
outlying communities within their municipal borders, there was also a simultaneous
outflow of the rich middle class to new developing suburban communities, away
from the perceived vice and squalor of urban centres (Jackson, 1985).
This explosion of industrial activity was premised on the subordination of nature, the
separation of human experience from land, and the triumphal creation of an
autonomous nature by, and of, man. Under the conditions of urban life, wage labour
and factory production, immigrants and internal migrants experienced an alienation
from both traditional community structures and the symbiotic relationship of land
and worker (Ewen, 1985; Ewen and Ewen, 1992). The extolling of a unifying ideal
of' Americanization' to harness these diverse peoples was premised on a
fundamental change in how the individual was to think of themselves: gone was the
careful husbandry of land to subsist a future, obliterated, to be replaced by the
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imposition of factory discipline, wage labour and money as the material lubricant of
market life. This bracketing off of nature and the elevation of industrial progress was
reflected in the dissolution of the home as the centre of production, relocated to new
concentrations of factories and plants and its reconstitution as an arena of
consumption through which individuals were to find meaning and fulfilment.
Within the United States, borrowing money and buying goods and services over
time was an intrinsic part of agricultural and commercial life from colonial times;
indeed as Calder (1999) points out, cash represented a relatively scarce resource in
the 18th and early 19th centuries and much trade was secured on the basis of credit
and barter. Yet within the context of an industrialising, increasingly urbanised but as
Robert Wiebe (1967) terms it, an acutely 'distended' social context, new forms of
personalised credit in the form of cash borrowing and new goods purchased in
temporal increments increasingly began to implant and penetrate the consumption
practices of the emerging working and middle classes. Yet, rather than charting an
increasing 'indebtedness' or the cultural loss of a mythical puritan thrift brought
about the onset of a rapacious 'consumer society' , as so many sociologists seem
content to report, this chapter sets out to explore the disparate genealogy of
consumer credit from the 19th century until the present, in particular, its inextricable
relationship to the development of consumption and how individuals, in different
ways, have been understood as consumers of credit. A running theme throughout is
the historically different ways that the shifting field of consumer credit was
understood to be in need of 'government'. Drawing on Foucault's (1983, 1991)
definition of government as 'the conduct of conduct', I attempt to elucidate how
creditors have attempted to manage the financial uncertainty of repayment by
consumers and how the state, regional or federal, has undertaken to regulate both
lenders and consumers in order to promote wider objectives of stability and
wellbeing. The concept of government, though, is not merely a synonym for
'control' or 'manipulation' but captures, at different levels, the relative autonomy of
lenders and consumers to act within a field of possibilities but yet whose freedom to
do so-has been programmatically shaped and moulded in historically specific ways.
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Fishing/or Sharks: The Government of Small Loans in the Late 19'h
and Early 2(/h Century
Pawnbroking, or a Visit to 'My Uncle'
Within urban centres from the 17th century, pawnbrokers played a crucial role in
providing the means of material survival for the working classes. In terms of its
history, pawnbroking has a long lineage stretching back to medieval times where,
despite Church hostility, Italian merchant families such as the Lombards supplied
pawning services to sections of the aristocracy, often to finance military campaigns.
From the 15th century onwards, charitable pawnshops known as mons pietatis were
organised in northern Italy by a Franciscan religious order which lent sums of
money at low interest to small artisans and struggling tradesmen, financed by church
taxation, grants and donations - this form of lending later spreading in modified
form to Germany, France and Belgium (Hudson, 1982: 25-7).
Within Britain, specialised pawnbroking to the masses was as Hudson remarks, 'a
child of the industrial revolution'. Up to the latter half of the 17th century,
pawnbroking had been indistinguishable from that of banker or goldsmith but with
the rapid urbanisation of a new mercantile economy, it increasingly developed as a
specialised enterprise servicing the labouring poor, providing a means for
individuals to secure small sums of money by pledging a wide array of goods such
as clothing, furniture and work tools. A series of acts from the middle of the 18th
century regulated its operations, specifying compulsory registration of pawnshops
and exemption from general usury limits, that is, maximum interest rates that could
be charged. As Tebbutt details, with bare subsistence incomes and pronounced
matertal insecurity, especially given the irregularity of employment, the pawnbroker
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(sardonically referred to as 'My Uncle') provided a critical means for 'bridging the
gap' of survival, particularly in the wake of such buffeting events as illness, lay-off
or bereavement (1983: 12-4). Given such small margins, these acute events often
forced individuals into unending cycles of pledging and redemption as pay-days and
rent-days came and went. Therefore, chronic poverty and material uncertainty made
pawnshops an often integral part of working class habitus which conceived of goods
purchased as potentially pawnable assets and consigned saving as an unconscionable
luxury - 'insecurity of income and the physical conditions of life thus combined to
produce a distinct outlook of which pawning was an integral part' (p. 19).
Within these conditions, pawnbroking endured much social opprobrium, its
practitioners often associated with the practice of an immoral trade operating in
direct contravention of puritan values of thrift while pledgers were labelled feckless
and improvident, the inability to live within one's means bundled with other
perceived working class habits such as drunkenness to illustrate the inherently
flawed capacity of the poor to live up to the demands of self-restraint and reason,
attributes set out under liberalism as the preconditions for freedom (c.f. Valverde,
1996). However, the characteristic mode of British liberalism never endorsed the
charitable or municipal pawnshops, the mons pietatis, that were popular in many
European countries for, despite the middle class's profound disdain for the act of
pawning, it was held to at least compel self-reliance on the part of the borrower,
accommodating individual weakness and mandating responsibility on the part of the
improvident for the conditions within which they found themselves while ensuring
that they would not become a burden upon the ratepayer (Tebbutt, 1983).
Within the United States, pawnbroking traces a history from the earliest colonial
settlements but, as in Britain, its more widespread dissemination in the 19th century
depended upon the development of densely populated urban centres that arose with
industrialisation (Patterson, 1899: 256). Although, as we saw, recourse to the
pawnshop was a product of the vicissitudes and marginality of industrial life,
nevertheless as Patterson describes it, the cycle of pledging and redemption followed
29
weekly patterns that mirrored the payment of wages and the periodic nature of
household expenses, most importantly, rent. Monthly patterns reflected the often
seasonal nature of employment and variable need for goods - for example, the
warmer weather of the summer months led to an upsurge in the pledging of winter
clothing to be redeemed later in the year (1899: 273-80). In the records of a famous
New York pawnshop, Simpson's, for 1 April 1935, a whole panoply of items offered
as pledges is recorded, from a silver and gold watch to a piece of cashmere, corsets,
a telescope, even a lace (Simpson et al., 1954: 29).
The terms of pawnbroking were governed by a patchwork of state and municipal
laws that varied in scope and intensity depending on the geographical concentration
of urban areas, such disparate governance reflecting the fragmented, relatively un-
integrated nature of the wider American state (Patterson, 1899; Levine, 1913; Raby,
1924). However, most of the state statues regulating pawnbroking provided for
interest rates that were above individual state usury ceilings to permit legal
pawnbroking but perceived sufficiently low so as to prevent the grievous
exploitation of the borrower. Pawnbrokers too were free to levy additional fixed
charges for 'inspection', 'insurance' and 'storage' which inflated the real interest
rates paid by borrowers. Pawning was thus constituted as a distinctive type of
borrowing which, despite the predominant cultural stigmatisation of personal
indebtedness, was recognised legally as a necessary evil, the exercise of a form of
individual self-reliance and forced providence by urban wage labourers.
However, the problems that the disparate pawnbroking regulations of this early
period attempted to counter were not only the condition of the pawner but the
challenge posed to the law by theft facilitated by pawnbroking (Oeltjen, 1991: 68;
Caskey, 1994: 20). Within America's enlarged cities, the growing flux and
anonymity of social life was reflected in the concern that valuable and untraceable
goods could so easily be converted into cash and sold on by the pawnbroker at
public auction, providing a ready outlet for the proceeds of larceny, perhaps even
with the complicity of the pawnbroker (Levine, 1913; Raby, 1924). The enforcement
of licensing, registration and bonding of pawnbrokers was 'to afford some assurance
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that those who are permitted to conduct the business are persons of good character
and responsibility and not likely to act in wilful collusion with thieves' (Raby, 1924:
5).
Figure 1.1 19th Century American Pawnbroker in Augusta, Georgia. Note the famous three balls
above the canopy, the traditional moniker of the pawnbroking trade. Source: University of Miami,
School of Education.
The specification of systematic ticket receipts for articles pledged sought to impose a
traceability within the pledging transaction. Similarly, requirements that individual
items pledged be registered with police authorities, sometimes even including a
physical description of the pledger, existed as a means for producing a web of
visibility by which individual municipalities and states could locate all pawn
transactions in order to minimise broader threats to private property. Even the
limitation of opening hours was seen as an effective means of ensuring that 'burglars
or highwaymen who operate in the dead of night shall not have the opportunity to
dispose of their loot as quickly as it is obtained' (Raby, 1924: 6). Both pledgers and
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pawnbrokers were thus viewed within a miasma of immorality and illegality, the
regulation of which manifested a broader concern of the elites for the burgeoning
social disorder that seemed to accompany the growth of America's industrial cities.
Chains of Lenders, Borrowers in Chains
Distinctive changes, though, were to take place in consumer lending between the
1870s and 1880s. According to Robinson and Nugent, advertisements began to
appear in newspapers which offered money on furniture loans but 'without removal',
creating a distinctively new form oflending based not on the physical pledge of
goods but on the pledge of the good's legal title, a form of credit that became known
as 'chattel lending'. 'By this time the pawnbroker seems to have been superseded
entirely in the field of furniture loans by the chattel mortgage lender' (1935: 40). In
the advertisements that Robinson and Nugent analysed, sums of money between two
hundred and five hundred dollars were offered on the security of such items as
furniture, pianos and diamonds, amounts that were almost certainly aimed at
relatively affluent sections of the population. With the rise of chattel lending for
significant sums, advertisements also increasingly emphasised confidentiality and
discretion within the transaction now enabled by the more abstract nature of the
lender's claim over the collateral. Increasingly, borrowing was becoming more
feasible for the middle classes who were able to evade the logistical difficulty of
transporting pledges, maintain the use within their homes of the goods with which
they sought to relay their social status and assure themselves that their borrowing
was auricular.
During the 1880s and 90s a more separate branch of lending developed, secured on
the basis of wage assignment, that is, on a legal title to the future wages of the
borrower, and quickly growing to become the most popular form of lending
(Robinson and Nugent, 1935; Haller and Alviti, 1977; Shergold, 1978). Such 'salary
lending' represented a further abstraction in the nature of the security of the loan,
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divorced from a specific good and relocated instead onto the future income flows of
the borrower. With the spread of wage labour under industrial capitalism, personal
lending became, for the first time, a direct corollary ofthe worker's sole major asset
- intangible unearned future income - rather than a specific volume of tangible
capital pledged as security. Initially, such lending depended on the lender being able
to reliably identify the occupation and means of the borrower. In consequence, loans
tended to be channelled towards city employees or the employees of firms whose
payroll records the lender could illegally gain access through bribery. According to
Haller and Alviti, borrowers from salary lenders were married, almost by definition
steadily employed regular employees such as clerical civil servants, insurance clerks
and railroad workers. Calder argues that, where pawnbrokers tended to concentrate
on the lower end of the borrower market, working class individuals living a marginal
existence, salary lenders serviced those sections of the middle class whose incomes
did not quite match up to their middle class consuming ambitions (1999: 52).
However, Haller and Alviti demonstrate that salary loans were sought for relatively
exceptional circumstances that did not necessarily distinguish them from the
pawnbroker, for example in addition to 'holiday' and 'Christmas money', loans were
sought to finance a house move, to pay a rent advance or to finance medical
treatment (1977: 128).
Borrowers were attracted through the use of advertising in daily newspapers and
also, far more commonly, through the distribution of notices and handbills.
Customers were also funnelled by friends and acquaintances offered commissions by
lenders to direct trade towards them. Lenders themselves tended to locate their
offices within city centres close to concentrated areas of employment, particularly
the railroads, and near financial districts where they assumed officious sounding
titles to impart a veneer of legitimacy to their operations. However, such offices
were located very discretely in secluded, plainly furnished upstairs premises which,
it is suggested, helped them avoid the attentions of law enforcement officials and
provided for little in the way oflost capital if the office were raided and closed
down.,
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With the shift towards more abstract forms of security in legal title, and even more
so in terms of unearned future salary, the actions of the borrower became of
increasing concern to the lender - as such, the focus on the value of the collateral by
the lender was displaced by a heightened concern to more intensively govern the
repayment actions of the individual borrower through the medium of time (see
Robinson and Nugent, 1935; Nugent, 1941; Haller and Alviti, 1977; Shergold,
1978):
1. In advance, the individual filled out lengthy forms specifying personal
information such as address, occupation, payday, relatives and neighbours,
property and other credit obligations. As well as assessing this information
for its accuracy themselves, the lender typically consulted with the payroll
clerk at the borrower's employer to verify the individual's personal
background and wage rate. The individual might also be required to furnish
the names of two guarantors who would supposedly be responsible for the
debt in the event of non-repayment.
2. During the course of repayment, the principal and interest outstanding might
be amalgamated and re-payment sought in weekly or monthly amounts.
More common though was the 'extension-plan' where the full-loan
repayment fell due after a month but which could be rolled-over for a period
of up to six months on payment of the interest portion of the loan. Both of
these strategies closely governed the repayment actions of the borrower, but
towards different ends. Whereas the former was aimed at allowing the
individual to sequentially pay down the loan in a calculable way, the latter
tended to keep the borrower in debt in such a manner that they would be
obliged to pay interest as long as possible without making inroads into
paying off the principal. The lender thus bound the borrower to their
repayment obligation through fixing them to a particular physical and social
~ location and locking the repayment schedule to the wages of the individual,
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often contriving to 'farm' the client into an ongoing indebtedness that proved
profitable to the lender.
3. Finally, in the aftermath of default, the creditor could formally apply to
garnish, or legally appropriate a portion of the borrower's ongoing wages or,
for a chattel loan, exercise their legal title over the security in the possession
of the borrower and seek a court order to claim it. However, these were really
options of last resort with less formal methods being preferred to coerce
payment based on the social stigma of debt. Through this, lenders chasing
late-payers would reveal in diverse, but increasingly less subtle ways, how
the borrower had fallen behind in their payments. One of the more infamous
means was the employment of a 'Bawlerout' by the lender, typically a
female, who would openly and loudly castigate the borrowing family'S
reputation before the neighbourhood or at their place of work. Most
damaging for the individual though, in the case of salary loans, was the threat
of wage garnishment proceedings for 'the attitude of many employers
contributed greatly to the security of the lender. Many employers took the
attitude that an employee who borrowed on his salary must be a hapless
spendthrift whose debt to the loan company was good evidence that he was
an unreliable employee' (Robinson and Nugent, 1935: 70). In such an event,
the borrower might quickly find himself out of a job.
The lender thus governed the timeliness of repayments less by formal legal
mechanisms of contract than by the social stigma within which indebtedness was
held, for both chattel and salary lenders essentially operated outside the law,
charging interest rates that were in excess of that permissible under state usury
ceilings of around 6% per year. With the former case, interest was charged at around
10% per month for amounts under fifty dollars, declining slightly for larger amounts.
For salary lenders, around double the chattel rate was the norm. Repayment terms
varied by lender and tended to be set on a flexible basis depending on the needs of
the individual applicant; commonly, loans were agreed for the period of a month
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with the option to extend this term up to six months after which the loan could be
repeatedly renewed on payment of an extra charge (Robinson and Nugent, 1935: 56-
9).
Yet, in spite of the illegality of these activities, the business developed rapidly from
the 1880s through relatively lax enforcement (Wassam, 1908: 41-2; Robinson and
Nugent, 1935: 45-7; Nugent, 1941: 5-6). An increased pace and breadth of press
advertising reflected the increasing concentration of lending in specific cities while a
significant expansion in the scope of individual lenders occurred with the
development of office-chains across the country. The first to follow this path was
Frank J. Mackey, a chattel lender whose firm would later go on to be the mainstream
Household Finance Corporation. However, more striking were the chains formed by
salary lenders such as John Mulholland and the notorious Daniel H. Tolman,
reflecting the scale of demand for this form of lending despite the higher interest
rates it charged. Mulholland, from his beginnings in Kansas City, invested both the
profits of his firm and the proceeds of a private stock issue to operate over one
hundred offices nationwide. Similarly, Tolman extended his operations to sixty-three
cities in both the United States and Canada, developing such innovations as the
employment of women in his branches to defuse irate male customers. Later, in
1913, he was in fact imprisoned for usury by a New York court (Grant, 1992: 83-4).
Thus, as a commercial practice, chattel and salary lending of the late 19th century
operated in an uncertain place between artifice and reality. Such lenders operated
outside the law and yet conducted their business by way oflegal form-filling and
contracts through which the individual committed their property or earnings against
the value of a loan, despite the fact that such an agreement should have proven
impossible to enforce in the courts. They engaged in expensive print advertising,
located in financial districts and proclaimed the size of their loan capital, and
sometimes the scope and 'respectability' of their operations, but occupied the actual
practice oflending in cramped dingy surrounds that might at any moment have been
raided-by the police. They were also one of the first exponents of the national chain-
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store method which would prove essential to the operation of consumer-oriented
enterprises into the 20th century and yet such a method was essential for lenders to
grow if they were to avoid un-wanted legal attention in anyone location. Despite
this expansion but given its dubious legal status, small loan lending remained a
relatively un-capitalised industry; in other words, it was financed by individual
lenders themselves through whatever capital they could personally raise between
themselves, partners and acquaintances and through the ongoing generation of
profits from invested lending activities rather than from an influx of conventional
commercial capital (Robinson and Nugent, 1935: 62).
As American cities attracted increasing numbers of workers from the rural
hinterlands and new immigrants from the Eastern and Southern European continent
for manual labour (Jones, 1992) - industrial labourers who were cut off from the
land and reliant on the continuity of their wages for survival - commercial small
loan lending grew in its reach and scale of operations to service their needs,
becoming increasingly commercially organised and profitable but yet outside the
formal sanction of the law. It provided a resource for individuals that both filled
specific needs and wants when income was inadequate but yet depended on the
regularity and continuity of wages for repayment and profit. The fact that the
industry was able to expand as it did suggests, significantly, both its necessity for
urban workers as well as its capacity to produce a profitable investment through the
effective temporal and bureaucratic regulation of these borrowers.
Tailing the Shark: Philanthropic Lending
During the first half of the 19th century, the spectre of the industrial poor presented a
stark challenge to the problem of liberal government. Classical liberalism had
conceived of the economy and wider civil society as natural domains where free
subjects acted in their own interests and whose natural dynamism and impulse the
state must carefully uphold and defend while simultaneously abstaining from an
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outright intervention that would denature them. In the work of Adam Smith and
David Ricardo, poverty was conceived as a wellspring from which needs were
realised, the limitless external counterpoint propelling the creation of wealth through
the economy (Procacci, 1991). Yet poverty, fostered by those very economic
processes on an industrial scale, had not only failed to disappear but had grown,
becoming entrenched within the urban cores of Western societies, its presence
contrasting with the growing wealth and refinement of a bourgeois elite, its
proliferation suggestive of a wilful opposition and threat to its supremacy. As such,
the idea of an ingrained, stubborn pauperism became articulated as a menace; an
intensification of poverty beyond inequality, a quantitative lack of resources, to
moralised qualitative difference - a difference standing in opposition to the
maintenance of social order. Now it seemed, not only was labour insufficient to de-
pauperise the population, the labour process itself was now seen to be threatening
social disorder and mass demoralisation (Dean, 1991; Harrison, 1997). As Donzelot
(1980) demonstrates, the problem for government was how it could actively resolve
this problem of an entrenched pauperism without inflating the role of the liberal state
to such an extent that it violated its self-imposed commandment to limit its own
activities. Associated with this, there was also the problem of how to govern
effectively the working classes which accumulated within cities, to infuse them with
a sense of responsibility for their own condition, to nurture and foster them in a
positive fashion.
One early mechanism of intervention, according to Donzelot, was philanthropy. This
was pursued not merely as a simple private intervention within the problems of the
poor but a deliberate strategy of charting a course between economic affairs and the
delimited sphere of the state. In the United States, the final third of the 19th century
saw the proliferation of the Charity Organisation Movement as a diffuse voluntary
response by the middle class to the 'moral decay and social disintegration of the
masses' (Boyer, 1978: 144). Although the problems of poverty were held to be
endemic to character, it was felt that adherence to the habits of the puritan ethic -
discipline, order, punctuality - could habituate the poor in positive ways (Ewen,
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1985: 78). With the spread of small loan lending towards the end of the 19th century,
recognition became accorded to the plight of the small borrower and the expense of
borrowing. The problem was not that such individuals were not outside the labour
process; on the contrary, borrowing, by definition, was dependent on the ability of
workers both to earn and freely dispose of their wages (Nugent, 1941). The specific
problem, as it became articulated, was that workers had become dependent upon the
chattel or salary lender; that in response to certain pressures they had temporarily
borrowed money but, in doing so, had become systematically trapped in a cycle of
indebtedness, servicing ever greater interest payments without being able to repay
the original amount. Itwas from such a position of lost independence that they sank
evermore fully into poverty (Wassam, 1908: 11-13; Ham, 1909: 10-11).
To combat this emergent problem, charitable efforts were marshalled, generally by
local religious groups through fund-raising efforts, which lent on the basis of
nominal or no interest. However, these enterprises were unstable, requiring frequent
fundraising to supply capital and the sustained efforts of the 'benevolently inclined'
to keep them going (Robinson and Nugent, 1935; Shergold, 1978). More profound,
though, to the government of small loan lending were the philanthropic 'Remedial
Loan Societies' which were set up in various cities across the United States from
1859, the most famous of which was the Provident Loan Society of New York
(Patterson, 1899; Nugent, 1932). The Provident was opened in New York in 1894 by
banker James Speyer who attempted to import the idea of municipal pawnshops, the
mons pietatis, he had seen at work in Europe. Itwas operated by a voluntary board
oftrustees which oversaw all the terms of the Provident's operation and attracted the
membership and funding of America's economic elite, including the likes of J.P.
Morgan, Gustav H. Schwab and Cornelius Vanderbilt. However, what distinguished
the Provident was the commercial nature of its philanthropically-intended
investment, organised as it was through tradable bonds and instruments known as
Certificates of Contribution which, at the discretion of the board" were interest-
bearing up to a defined limit. Its lending form was that of a pawnbroker, offering
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cash in exchange for pledges of goods of variable sizes but at interest rates which
were significantly below those charged by conventional, small loan rivals.
Figure 1.2 Specimen $500 Gold Bond issued by the Provident Loan Society of New York, 1901. The
bond was literally payable in gold. Source: Scripophily Certificate and Bond Traders.
The Provident along with other remedial organisations which established themselves
across the country in the latter half of the 19th century, lending relatively small sums
on the basis of pledges and chattel loans, represent a philanthropic strategy that
articulated for the first time the problem of small loan lending as a distinctly social
problem in need of remedy. Its mushrooming growth indicated that individual state
responses of repression through unfeasibly low usury ceilings which limited the
interest which could be charged, were ineffective while its spread and intensification
demonstrated its need among working class and some middle class households to
survive the exigencies of an industrial urban life beset by the unforeseen and the
40
unexpected, whether illness, eviction or lay-off. As the century drew to a close,
indebtedness to the small loan lender was now seen less as a matter of personal
character failing on the part of the supposedly autonomous borrower than as a
complex symptom or product of the social environment within which they were
located (c.f. Boyer, 1978: 198-9). Small loan lenders, though, were increasingly
characterised as 'loan sharks' who encapsulated this distorted environment,
ensnaring and entrapping individuals faced with legitimate financial emergency into
a degraded and destructive state of indebtedness, often with the connivance of
corrupt police, courts, municipal public servants and payroll employees:
How can men be so reckless as to borrow from these agencies that are
everywhere known as sharks, leeches and remorseless extortioners? It is
clear that these concerns cater to a need that is in some part real and
unavoidable, that the majority of borrowers have been overtaken by sudden
emergencies which under their standard of living cannot be met out of
income. To such, an easy and quick means of relief seems acceptable at any
price, especially if no other and more reasonable source of assistance is at
hand (Ham, 1914: 1).
As such, small loan borrowers were seen as being vulnerable rather than culpable,
the victims of their own material deprivation, perhaps also their 'short-sightedness'
and 'gullibility' (Nugent, 1941: 3), or their unwarranted 'improvidence and
extravagance' (Ham, 1911 cited in Calder, 1999: 129) that, in tum, made them ripe
for exploitation in the rapacious lending practices of the sharks.
The Provident and its kind represented a bourgeois response to the material
difficulties of poverty, tracing an independent line between both the perceived
natural workings of the market and the administrative ambit of individual states.
Although it invoked private capital and even potentially offered a financial return on
investment, the latter was of secondary importance, for both the investor and board,
to the-primary goal of maximising the number of small loans it could offer. At the
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same time, commercial capital and a relatively formal organisational structure
allowed it to be a sustainable enterprise, to continue to act in a predictable and
calculable fashion for its philanthropic purposes without serving as a drain upon the
pocketbooks of its wealthy benefactors. Commercial capital also allowed the
Provident and others attain scale which would make it possible for them to provide
effective competition to other small loan lenders.
On the other side of the liberal coin, remedial lending existed outside the ambit of
state authorities, both in terms of its financing and administrative organisation.
Indeed, the only action required of individual states was that they pass whatever
requisite 'enabling' legislation was required to permit such organisations to exist
(Robinson and Nugent, 1935: 83). In many ways, small loan lending served
perfectly the philanthropic ideal of promoting autonomy within the population
towards which it was targeted; those whom were to be helped were not being made
subject to charity or handouts and thus would not be fostered into a condition of
ongoing dependence inimical to liberalism. On the contrary, the act of borrowing
would help them to sustain their own independence, allowing them to meet demands
upon their resources through the mortgaging of their future wages upon which they
would pay a 'fair' rate of interest. However, remedial lenders were by their nature
paternalistic, concerned not only with supplying funds on the basis of what was
thought to be a reasonable price but, as Ham relates, with a specific regard as to
whether the loan would be a 'good thing' for the borrower (1909: 37). The remedial
institution also offered the possibility of re-moralising the individual borrower by
encouraging them to become savers, inculcating the ethic of thrift to preserve them
from future indebtedness and promote their autonomy (see Donzelot, 1980):
Among the many services rendered the public by The Economy [a remedial
lender based in Cleveland, Ohio] is its Savings Department, in which 5% is
paid on certificates of deposit. The borrower is encouraged to form the
savings habit, and many of our depositors are those who were once
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borrowers, a fact that emphasizes the perfect understanding existing between
The Economy and its patrons (Ham, 1914: 3).
In terms of a response to the perceived 'small shark evil', remedial lending can be
seen as an attempt to counter existing lenders by targeting the same elements of the
population, paralleling their operations and imitating their mechanisms but under a
philanthropic spirit which sought to relieve the difficulties of the poor for what was
held to be their best interests and the interests of the common good rather than
exploiting them for profit. It sought to eradicate, or at least limit the problem, by
means of the market, charging a sustainable rate of interest sufficiently below that
inflicted by the 'sharks' in order to competitively drive them out of business. This
strategy aimed to rid urban centres of a debilitating institutional menace that
corrupted the wider social environment, substituting in its place a benevolent,
enlightened alternative that would properly assist the needy and steer them back to a
state of financial self-reliance and moral propriety. The market though was not the
end but the means, not an autonomous domain for the realisation of profit and the
reproduction of capital but a technically expedient mechanism invoked to alleviate
this newly distinctive social danger.
Taming the Shark: Expertise, the State and the Small Loan Laws
By the turn of the century, the small loan issue became increasingly subject to
philanthropic interest. In 1907, the Russell Sage Foundation was founded with the
express purpose of improving the 'social and living conditions' of American
citizens; towards these ends it engaged researchers of the nascent social sciences in
the professional study of those conditions through which it hoped to direct its
ameliorative efforts. Among its early targets included low-income housing, urban
planning, social work and labour reform but it was in the arena of small lending that
it established its early reputation (Glenn et al., 1947; Anderson, 2005). It enlisted
two geaduate students of Columbia University who carried out research on the issue
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of consumer borrowing - Clarence Wassam (1908) on the salary-lending business
and Arthur Ham (1909) on the chattel loan business.
The employment of two research fellows suggests a new departure in systematic
philanthropic intervention centred on the importance of expertise in the production
of knowledge about, and articulation of, social problems. Expertise, according to
Miller and Rose, represents the 'social authority ascribed to particular agents and
forms of judgement on the basis of their claims to possess specialized truths and rare
powers' (1990: 2). As such, it helps square the circle ofliberalism, of the need to
regulate without unduly interfering within those areas that the state sought to govern
through exercising a monopoly over a specific area of knowledge with which the
state could act through, and in concert with, to achieve its aims. In relation to the
issue of small loan lending, the deployment of a social scientific expertise by the
Russell Sage organisation helped rationalise and augment their influence over the
phenomenon, to constitute it through the fieldwork of Ham and Wassam as a 'real'
social problem with empirically discernable effects and subjectable to dispassionate
scientific consideration with which to inform a calculated intervention. The
relatively closed and rarefied nature of such knowledge could thus ordain their
articulated strategies special significance and legitimacy with regard to the problem.
In the wake of the publication of his research, Ham became engaged in what were
termed the 'campaigns' or 'crusades' against the 'loan sharks': giving speeches,
writing newspaper columns and even composing a filmed screenplay which
impassionedly cited the illegal practices of the industry; petitioning papers not to
carry such advertising; offering advice and legal referral to victims who wrote to
him as well as attempting to persuade employers not to accept the garnishment of a
defaulter's wages (Glenn et al., 1947; Carruthers et al., 2005: 5-6). Such a campaign
seems to have had much in common with the morally charged temperance and
sexual purity campaigns which, as Hunt (1999) demonstrates, became more prolific
within American cities after the Civil War. In particular, both attracted the
favourable attentions and funding of the capitalist elite while on a pejorative level,
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the association of urban problems like prostitution with disease and plague resonated
with the small lender's moniker as a shark infesting urban waters, primordially
attracted to the blood seeping from the wounds of the indigent. Just as with the
seediness of the saloon and the lasciviousness of the prostitute, the loan shark's
perceived role as irresistible seducer and preying, vicious atavistic menace embodied
the seeming fluidity, disorder and danger that the established but insecure middle
classes felt towards urban life in the closing decade of the 19th century (c.f. Hunt,
1999: 128). The response of such campaigns were therefore 'urgent expressions of
the self-assertion of upper and middle classes, who both feared the consequences of
rampant urbanism and yet were committed to accelerated economic development
which caused precisely the social problems that they feared' (p. l31).
However, as Arthur Ham accepted, campaigning alone would be insufficient to
combat the problem of loan-sharking given how expansive and ingrained it had
become (1909: 8). To understand why, the small loan lending problem has to be set
within the context of the Progressive movement within the United States.
Progressivism was a contradictory endeavour, lacking any fixed coherence or sense
of purpose as a political movement (Filene, 1970). Yet, as historians have argued, it
is more apt, rather, to conceive of it as a disparate shifting alliance of middle class
reformers and moral campaigners which gathered force through the 1900s. They did
not view urban space or capitalism itself as being inherently negative; what
motivated their challenge to rethinking the purposes of government was the sheer
scale and scope of change wrought by the Gilded Age with its extensive
industrialisation and urbanisation: the destruction of competition and the excessive
centralisation of economic power and wealth within the hands of the industrial
plutocrats; the misery of labour and urban living conditions; the open conflict and
bloody suppression provoked by unionised labour in the Pullman, Haymarket and
Homestead strikes of the 1880s and 90s; the political and cultural upheaval produced
by a 'third wave' of new immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe; and the
corruption of the polity by the party machine, commercial monopoly 'interests' and
city boss garnering the votes of immigrant waves in exchange for the granting of
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favours (Hofstadter, 1955; Wiebe, 1967; Buenker, 1977; Boyer, 1978; Chambers,
1980; Jones, 1992; Foote, 2003).
Within its rhetoric of attacking economic and political 'interests', the solution that
Progressivism embodied was the extension of technologies of administrative control
through the paradigm of 'organisation' which could both ensure collective fairness
while preserving the essential aspect of individual and market freedom (Hofstadter,
1955; Hamilton and Sutton, 1989). In one ofthe most enduringly successful
initiatives from the era, state legislatures, increasingly displacing the courts in the
moulding of law, overlaid the antagonism of employer worker liability claims with
the enactment of the first risk-based workman's compensation schemes that
provided automatic compensation to workers for work-related accidents (Lubove,
1967; Weinstein, 1967; see also Defert, 1991).
Similarly, the creation of diverse organisations from voluntary settlement houses, the
National Consumers League to new federal regulatory agencies such as the Federal
Trade Commission were aimed at conciliation and rational planning between
individuals and enterprises without recourse to heavy-handed state intervention; as
Hamilton and Sutton remark, 'their task was to be administrative in nature rather
than law making and law enforcing: they were to maintain the "natural" social order
of society' (1989: 32). Intrinsic, too, to Progressivism was science and the formation
of enclosed boundaries of expertise devoted to selfless service, objectivity and
efficiency (Burnham, 1977: 20), which were both applied to and elaborated within
the 'social' problems being encountered - science provided a rational claim to truth,
a privileged objective knowledge that stood above the claims and contestation of
politics but instead could be applied by its elitist promulgators to the non-partisan
resolution of urban labour problems (O'Connor, 2001: 25-6). However, the new
social science that gathered momentum rejected the old voluntarism of independent
autonomous actors and embraced systems of explanation rooted in diverse,
contradictory modes of explanation such as heredity, environment, culture, stimulus-
response, and the subconscious, explanations unified by the fact that they 'seldom
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located causation close to the surface of events or in the conscious, willing minds of
individuals' (Haskell, 2000: 251).
The moralising campaigns against urban vices such as prostitution or drinking were
not opposed to a sober, rational Progressivism but were actually a significant
dimension of its wider reforming impulse (Boyer, 1978; Chambers, 1980). All
Progressive reforms, as such, were moral if not implicitly religious in intent,
connecting the unbearable labouring and living conditions of the working masses
with the proliferation of drunkenness and urban vice. Similarly, anti-saloon and anti-
prostitution organisations carne to increasingly rely on the objectivity-claiming
instruments of statistics and sociological study to ground their cause and formulate
their strategic purpose. Itwas within this framework that the Russell Sage studies,
although committed to philanthropic remedial lending and the 'crusades' to drive out
the 'sharks', recognised that:
1. Demand for small loans was extensive but which existing legal lending
institutions could or would not satisfy, in the process, creating a large black
market of illegal lenders.
2. Small loan lending was profitable, could still be profitable at rates
significantly lower than those charged among illegal lenders but was simply
not feasible at the usury limits of most states. While usury ceilings permitted
relatively large scale commercial and business lending for large sums to be
profitable, the labour and operational costs associated with the loan of small
amounts made such lending prohibitively costly.
3. Usury ceilings were easily evadable and, iatrogenically, not only did not
keep down costs for small borrowers but harmed them by contributing to
higher interest rates within the black market.
4. Most crucially, not only were more remedial lenders required but legislation
was needed to permit a profit-making small loan business industry to be
established.
(see Robinson and Nugent, 1935: 87-8)
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As Glenn et al.'s retrospective analysis attests:
Itwas clear that the small loan business was an essential element in our
financial machinery, to meet the needs of the large part of the population
who could not give the kinds of security required by banks. Limited-dividend
companies could never be numerous enough, or large enough, to fill the
demand. If the commercial business could be regulated and purged of its
abuses, it would meet a genuine social need and would become a respected
part of the modem economy (1948: 142).
According to Burnham (1977), one of the features that distinguished late 19th
century reforms from their Progressive incarnations was the rather sudden shift from
'negative' reportage to 'positive' conceptualisation. Rather than merely criticising
institutional interests or exposing the misery of poverty, the new mindset of the
Progressives sought to imagine and conceive of an ameliorated future. Therefore
although Arthur Ham and the Russell Sage organisation were intimately involved in
remedial lending, it was felt ultimately to be failing in its purpose to drive the loan
sharks out of business and philanthropically prop up the desperate borrower; in a
strategic shift, their attention thus turned to the politicisation of the small loan
problem, not to eliminate and supplant the sharks, but to calculably control the legal
conditions under which they acted in order to tame them and thus widen the
possibility of paternalistic protection of borrowers. Not legal repression or
philanthropy but only the careful organisation of the 'economic' was held to be
sufficient to solve this now manifestly 'social' problem (Neifeld, 1941).
Given the highly decentralised and divided structure of the United States political
and legal administration, usury limits nominally limiting small loan lending were
enshrined in law by individual states and so would have to be amended on an
individual basis. As Carruthers et al. (2005) demonstrate, the wider problem of a
lack of legal harmonisation between states began to be tackled from the late 1880s
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when the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, an
organisation composed of practicing professional lawyers, advocated legislative
templates or 'model laws' for enactment by individual states to promote inter-state
trade and commerce. Later, this organising endeavour was one of the main forces
behind the setting up of the short-lived National Bar Association in 1888
(Brockman, 1966). Within this vein, Ham began to formulate the basic features of a
model law which states could draw upon in legislating for small loan lending
(Nugent, 1933; Robinson and Nugent, 1935; Anderson, 2005, Carruthers et al,
2005). Its general terms were that a lender could charge a maximum interest rate of
2-3% per month which Ham 'scientifically' determined, through the laboratory of a
remedial lender, to be the optimum interest rate for small loan lending (as opposed
to the typical 6% per year that most states recorded), but to do so they would have to
be licensed, to submit a bond, be subject to legal supervision by a state regulator and
would be prohibited from charging any additional fees or charges to clients to
surreptitiously inflate the mandated interest rate. In addition, it detailed specific
penalties to deter legal breaches by those registered. Following some legislative
action by states from 1911 on the small loan question, New Jersey enacted the Egan
Act in 1914, for the first time incorporating all the provisions sought by Ham.
With the ongoing highlighting ofloan sharking within American cities, constituted
as a social problem through the campaigns and philanthropic endeavours, states
began to respond within a rationality of Progressive liberalism through the
mechanism oflaw in a way that did not seek to interfere within the economy nor
undermine the autonomy of the family but which would ensure the security of both
within a collective framework. However, it did not do so independently but, as Rose
(1993) predicts, in a manner which accorded expertise a vital new role for in passing
the Egan Act, the New Jersey legislature specifically sought the advice and
assistance of Ham and Russell Sage in the drafting of the legislation (Robinson and
Nugent, 1935: 103). Based on their reputation, their accumulated knowledge, their
documented analysis and social scientific credentials, the employment of Ham and
his Russell Sage division by state authorities produced an alliance whereby the
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former could realise their ambitions of combating the loan shark problem through
the liberalising usury ceilings while the latter could intervene to secure the common
welfare, aiding sizeable elements of the working classes entrenched in expensive
debt, thereby diffusing a political threat through social amelioration while justifying
such intervention of the basis of having an access to 'truth'.
Lenders generally opposed regulatory efforts and in 1916 formed themselves into a
national organisation to do so - the American Association of Small Loan Brokers
(AASLB). Crucially though, such opposition was grounded on the basis of the
allowable maximum interest rates they could charge, not by questioning the
oversight principle of regulation itself. Only the smallest, highest charging lenders
rejected any move towards regulation (Calder, 1999: 133). Later that year, the shift
in the mode of government from the loan shark 'crusade' to small loan regulation
climaxed in the compromise of a maximum chargeable interest rate between Russell
Sage and the AASLB and their alliance to formulate a Uniform Small Loan Law
(USLL) and advocate for its state-by-state enactment.
This Progressive shift towards legislative change signalled a significant shift in how
the small loan problem was to be regulated. The relative failure of remedial lending
demonstrated that attempting to repel the loan shark by philanthropic measures had
failed just as certainly as repression of borrowing through usury limits had. Now
reformers acted through rather than against lenders, replacing a strategy of
supplanting from without with one of acting upon from within. In creating an
exception to usury ceilings for personal loans, the loan shark could potentially
become legitimised, the menace eradicated not by eliminating it but by turning it
into something else: a tolerable, even necessary enterprise. The progressive-era
liberal state thus acted on the basis of collective intent by recalibrating the legislative
margins, transforming the small loan from a social problem into a private transaction
within the economy which, newly freed, would be subject to that arena's
autonomous laws of competition, accumulation and rational self-interest. Such
intervention also acted upon the freedom of individuals and families themselves; in
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legalising higher rates to promote competition, capital influx and thus, ostensibly,
lower rates for the borrower, the state sought to advance the self-sufficiency of
individuals and promote family autonomy in borrowing decisions by freeing them
from the repressiveness of 'usurious' interest. Now, rather than seeking to act upon
the conduct of borrowers directly through the institution of remedial lending, they
would be acted upon more obliquely and more lightly but with far greater
effectiveness through the government of how small loan lenders governed them. To
some extent, then, the state recognised the self-governing capacities of workers, not
only that they needed to borrow but that they could exhibit the stability and capacity
to enter into their own contracts with lenders as legal subjects, plotting their own
decisions of how much to borrow and how to structure their repayments.
Yet the state did not trust to simply hand over the problem to the economy for once
enshrined as a social problem in need of state intervention, it could not simply be
disengaged. The state came to govern small lending 'from a distance' through the
expertise of Russell Sage, basing its intervention on their claim to objectively know
how this could best be done. The enactment of the Uniform Small Loan Laws as
well as legitimising lenders, simultaneously created a system for governing them: as
Rose and Miller state, 'imposing a regime of licensure ... empowers certain bodies
to regulate those who seek to act in a certain professional capacity, both legitimating.
and regulating at the same time' (1992: 190). It raised such credit forms from the
margins and the darkness where it had been crudely consigned by law but where it
had bred and multiplied in new urban conditions, both reflecting and embodying the
flux and turmoil of industrialisation, and coaxed it into the light of legality where its
growth and development could be dispassionately assessed and accounted for.
Individual states licensed lenders through oversight departments or officials, whether
dedicated or part of a wider financial regulatory apparatus, licensing fees even
disbursing the cost back onto lenders themselves. The specification of systematic
record keeping along with the requirement for regular auditing thus constituted the
supervisory office as a calculating centre which could penetrate, tabulate and analyse
such lending while simultaneously providing for legal enforcement. Maximum loan
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amounts and 'scientifically fair' interest limits defined the boundaries of what could
and could not be charged, financial bonds helped secure the lender's adherence to
the terms of the legislation, while the practice of wage assignments was carefully
specified with the requirement of notification to employer and wife. Ultimately,
punitive fines and penalties enforced the state's will.
This new regime, though, represented not merely the government of lenders but of
lending itself, and thus of borrowers as participants. The terms of the law carefully
inscribed how borrowing was to be undertaken by the individual- they would not be
free simply to contract at any rate of interest for any amount, nor could they dispose
of their wages as they saw fit outside of the domain of the family or the employment
contract. Their transaction, no longer anonymous, would be itemised with all others,
agglomerated and channelled to the requisite authorities for review where its
economic significance would be accounted for and future policy adjusted
accordingly. The gradual institution of the Uniform Small Loan Law by states thus
freed defined forms of personal borrowing and lending but simultaneously crafted a
channel that continuously shaped and moulded the course that such transactions
could take in the interests of a wider social harmony.
Consuming by Instalments
The Will to Consume: The Rise of Retail Instalment Lending
The selling of goods on time payments, or on the 'instalment plan', demonstrates a
different genealogy within the 19th century to that of cash lending. In fact, as Lynn
argues, the originator of instalment lending was actually the American state itself
through the Harrison Act of 1800 which sold offvast tracts of public land to farmers
in exchange for a twenty-five percent down payment with the rest falling due in
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three increments up to four years after the sale (1957: 415). More germanely, the
first cooperative Building and Loan association set up in Philadelphia in 1831 to aid
families of relatively modest means to afford their own homes pioneered the concept
of the self-amortizing 'sinking-loan fund', that is, a loan paid-off by a borrower in
multiple payments including fees over a fixed time span (Jackson, 1985: 130).
Within rural America, as Lynn demonstrates, the sale of new motorised farm
equipment such as threshers and reapers on instalments began to be advertised in
farming periodicals from around the 1850s, heralding a labour saving, productivity
enhancing industrial revolution on the farm.
It is generally held that instalment selling of consumer goods within the United
States began in 1807 with the large New York furniture firm of Cowperthwait and
Sons, spreading to rival firms and other cities to form what has been termed a 'high
grade' instalment business around mid-century, focussed mainly on prosperous wage
and salary earners and a small clientele of small businessmen (Mussey, 1903;
Seligman, 1927; Nugent, 1939). In addition to furniture, sales of piano also became
mediated through the mechanism of the instalment contract around the 1850s. The
purchase of a piano, at the time costing around $1000, represented a particularly
sizeable investment and was aimed at more affluent families. As Seligman notes,
terms were stricter with a one-third down payment required with the rest payable in
relatively large monthly instalments over two or three years.
Seligman contends that such credit opened up a consuming space in between those
who could afford such purchases outright and so had no necessity for credit and
those that were excluded and so had no recourse to it. The latter, whose latent danger
was manifested by such symptoms as their class, race and residential neighbourhood
were regarded as being unreliable, not simply because of their meagre resources but,
more fundamentally, because they were 'financially irresponsible' (1927: 15). The
working classes were thus regarded as being unable to fulfil the terms of their credit
contract because of a strongly moralistic understanding of their 'character'. If
liberalism depends Upon the self-governing capacities of individuals to manage their
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freedom, to exert a 'self-despotism' over their own actions, desires and wants as
Valverde (1996) terms it, such capacities were not equally present or instilled across
the population but were conceived to be naturalised along class, race and gender
divides, lacking among those that were marginal political subjects (1997: 262). Just
as differences in 19th century inebriety treatment programmes that Valverde (1997,
1998) discusses embodied and entrenched assumptions of differential liberal
subjectivity, so too did instalment merchants approach borrowers on the basis of
how such individuals were understood to govern themselves.
Figure 1.3 19
th
Century Handbill for a Baltimore Piano Dealer, Sanders & Stayman. Note the clearly
displayed option for instalment payments. Source: John W. Hartman Center for Sales, Advertising
and Marketing History.
As profit-oriented businessmen, high-grade furniture sellers recognised the facility
that credit could offer toward expanding their sales, allowing certain classes who
would otherwise be unable to purchase their wares, to do so. To these ends, the
concept of character provided a means to mediate the potential for loss due to non-
repayment by distinguishing those who were sufficiently 'self-despotic' to control
and rationally manage their freedom from those who were seen to be unable to keep
to coHtractual repayment terms agreed because of an innate ill-potentiality to govern
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their 'nature'. For Seligman, 'owing to the great care in the selection of the
purchasers, losses from dishonesty are comparatively uncommon, the default being
generally due to unforeseen contingencies' (1927: 15-6, see also Mussey, 1903: 13).
So even when non-repayment did occur, it was interpreted as being not as a result of
an inability to self-rule but rather, simply as a result of unfortunate circumstances
that could not be directly attributed to the moral qualities of the individual. The
treatment of such high-grade customers was 'exceedingly liberal' and even in the
event of default, as both Mussey and Seligman suggest, such retailers were loathe to
foreclose on the goods, refraining from doing so only after the possibility of
repayment seemed lost and often only repossessing furniture to the value of the
portion of credit outstanding. Even allowing for these authors' possibly sanguine
analyses, such a credit agreement appeared more as a gentleman's agreement relying
on and assuming a moral fortitude and resolve on the part of customers rather than a
contract providing recourse to a coercive legal remedy. Instalment credit was not
conceived as a form of borrowing and thus was not subject to statutory usury
restrictions; rather, it was adjudged through a succession of court judgements as a
form of deferred payment that was contractually agreed to by the parties concerned
(Berger, 1935).
In contrast to the state's inhibition of personal borrowing through the mechanism of
law, instalment buying existed legally as a private accommodation that lay outside
the scope of detailed regulation, an economic transaction marshalled solely by
means of will of the parties concerned. Although dismissed as a convenient legal
fiction by Berger (see also Crowther, 1971), such a genealogy reveals the differential
understanding that underlay instalment buying. In contrast to pawning or cash
borrowing, it was not a morally charged practice of desperation, dependence or
profligacy at work among lower elements of the population which a liberal state had
a duty to regulate for the collective good; rather, it was a self-governing contractual
agreement freely entered into by middle class participants which a liberal state had
no warrant to interfere within.
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However, the freedom of the purchaser-borrower was not something that was merely
taken for granted but, rather, represented an aspect that was actively constituted
within the context of the transaction. As Nugent (1939) suggests, this type of credit
differed from the kinds of 'open-book' credit that had gone before where customers
accumulated an account which they paid off in periodic intervals. In contrast,
instalment credit was a formal agreement for the purchase of a single item under
which the seller maintained legal title to the good until the final payment. Although
the item being sold represented a significant purchase, the length of the agreement
mandated relatively small payments over a period of up to eighteen months. In
addition, a minimum 10% cash deposit was required in advance (1939: 54-5).
Therefore, although a certain strata of the middle class were deemed sufficiently
self-governing to be 'trusted' with 'high-grade' credit, the actions of such a
borrower were enmeshed within a structured framework of external constraints
regulating the exercise of their free conduct. A deposit required that a certain sum be
accumulated in advance and be put towards the purchase cost. The individual's
payments were set out and agreed in advance conditioned by a strict timing regimen
that would mandate when the borrower was to pay and how much. The payments
themselves were sufficiently small to ensure that they did not prove onerous and
thus endanger the agreement but yet were balanced against a bounded contractual
period that was short enough to prevent distraction of the borrower's responsibilities.
and the excessive locking-up of the seller's working capital. Finally, through the
legal mechanism of the conditional sales contract, the seller maintained ownership
over the good until the end and could, whether or not reluctantly, exert this right at
any stage that the borrower failed to adhere to what was required of him. The free
self-governing liberal subject defined by the successful pursuit of 'self-despotism'
was a precondition for the emerging 'reputable' instalment sellers of the mid 19th
century but alone it was insufficient; it was to be accompanied by an intersecting
system of 'external despotism' that, once sanctioned by the signing of a contract,
would brace the will of the subject with a required upfront prepayment, the enforced
habitual routine of instalment payments and the grim threat of repossession.
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The 'high grade' forms of instalment credit that developed from the 1850s thus
facilitated certain lower sections of the middle class to attain those goods that were
among the inventory of the social strata that it aspired to belong to and which it was,
more broadly, coming to help constitute. Such forms of consumption, however, were
not experienced as a distinguishing of oneself but, rather, as an attempt to live up to
the expected standard of decency of the class with which one identified. If, as
Veblen ([1899] 1925) famously attested, the 'conspicuous consumption' of such
goods was an abstract communicable expression of economic resources that the
middle class commanded, then credit allowed such resources not so much to be
circumvented within the desire to attain social status as bridged over time; for this
emergent stratum, the pecuniary strength that goods reflected was secured not on the
basis of a stock of capital that was possessed in the present but on an ongoing flow
of salary and wages.
This interlinks with Bauman's (1988) argument that with the industrial centralisation
of capital, the possibility of individual freedom - which he sees as a relational
expression of power - is displaced from economic rivalry for capital to the
competitive pursuit of goods whose use-value becomes more overlaid by a
communicable symbolic value. Particularly in the case of these early furniture and
piano retailers, the extent to which credit was offered was strictly limited - at this
time, not every wage earner but only individuals who demonstrated themselves to be
of requisite character, capable of exerting the close self-discipline required of
freedom, could gain admittance to the status expressing goods available within the
market. Thus, the mid-century beginnings of formalised systems of credit for
relatively expensive household goods therefore reflect the shift of capital under
American industrialisation, with certain forms of consumption becoming bound up
in both affirming and constituting new emergent strains of middle class salaried
employee, dependent upon but also defining the expression of freedom.
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Sewing it Together: Women and Credit
At the tum of the 19th century, most clothing was either produced within the home or
custom tailored for the very rich; indeed the only areas in which clothing was mass
produced was for black slaves, sailors and later, mobile labour forces of prospectors
and lumberjacks. Only with the onset of the Civil War and the need to uniformly
clothe a mass army in a diversity of sizings did a systematised mass production
begin to become established (Boorstin, 1973; Ewen and Ewen, 1992). The invention
of the sewing machine, developed separately by three competing firms in the 1850s
who to avoid inter-company patent infringement suits formed themselves into the
grandly-titled Sewing Machine Combination, was initially aimed at tailors and
seamstresses. However, with innovations in design and cheaper production
techniques, machines became aimed at the domestic market from 1856 onwards; that
is, the home production of the family'S clothing by the wife. As Andrew Jack
remarks, the sewing machine perhaps represents one of the vanguard instruments of
a developing consumerism in its function as one of the first industrially produced
domestic appliances, one of the first to be sold on credit and, also, through a
franchised system of distribution (1957: 113).
Despite progressive declines in price, the cost of a standard machine at $125 was
still a large outlay of around a quarter of an average family income in the 1860s, and
presented a significant stumbling block to market expansion (Brandon 1977: 116).
The solution, as Singer's mercurial partner Edward Clark proposed, was a form
deferred payment:
Why not rent a sewing machine to the housewife and apply the rental fee to
the purchase price of the machine? ... Her husband cannot accuse her of
running him into debt since he is merely hiring or renting the machine and
under no obligation to buy. Yet at the end of the period of the lease, he will
own a sewing machine for the money (cited in Brandon, 1977: 117).
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Developing this strategy, the Singer Company pioneered instalment sales through
company showrooms and the employment of agents, tripling its sales in one year
through offering down payments of$5 and monthly instalments of between $3 and
$5.
As illustrated by Clark's quote, the development of instalment credit around the
mass marketing of domestic sewing machines proved culturally problematic given
that the target consuming group were women within the home. As Brandon suggests,
it appeared to present a disturbance to the stability of the domestic household given
the high proportion of time women spent stitching by hand as part of their conjugal
role as domestic producers and the labour-saving potential held by its mechanisation.
The sewing machine thus seemed to threaten a new-found female independence,
both in terms of greater free time exclusive to women and the possibility that the
purchase of such a means on credit might even be afforded by women in their own
right as part of their autonomous 'housekeeping money'. Such fears, as expressed in
newspaper letters of the time, manifested in one dimension as doubts about the
capability of women to operate such a complex piece of industrially-produced
machinery. Another dimension was the purchase of the sewing machine on credit.
Just as women were suspected of being incapable of mastering physical mechanics,
so too did doubts exist about their ability to comprehend the financial mechanics of
the instalment plan; particularly as sewing machines became much cheaper in later
decades, women were accused of preferring the instalment plan even when having
the means to afford a machine outright (Calder, 1999: 181).
In his survey ofthe industry, Mussey remarked that the mass instalment selling of
sewing machines was of a 'distinctly lower' order than that of the 'high-grade' trade
in furniture, pianos and books (1903: 40). Yet, such anxieties embodied not so much
a concern for credit itself as the effect that such credit might have in facilitating a
particular form of consumption inextricably linked to women and what
consequences this would have for marital relations and the structure of the family.
Rose 0999a: 128) argues that the modem form of the family came to exercise a key
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role within liberal government, constituting a private domain which, like the
economy, was deemed to have its own particular dynamic functioning outside and
independently of the state but which was essential for the existence of liberal
government by fashioning, at a subjective level, the capacities and conducts required
of self-governing individuals. The family also served as a mechanism through which
society could be governed by means of its very privacy and sovereignty, opening up
new aspects and avenues to intervention. As Jackson Lears (1994) demonstrates, the
American bourgeois family of the 19th century was constituted as a private
sentimentalised space of real human contact, free from the whirl and instability of a
developing market economy where women were to be assigned a special role as
nurturers and purveyors of a stabilising domesticity.
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As the Singer Company innovated the sale of its machines through relatively
autonomous agents, instalment credit also intersected with broader concerns about
the peddler. As Lears demonstrates, 19th century peddlers, itinerant salesmen
epitomised by the patent medicine man, exerted a destabilising effect on relatively
isolated rural American localities, inducing a sense and imparting a desire for the
exotic, the subversive and the camival-esque from both faraway commercial centres
and foreign climes - not only in terms of the exotic and luxurious goods being sold
but also the conjuring of a sense of theatricality and magic through which they were
sold (1994: 65-6; see also Featherstone, 1991). As he notes, women were seen as
being particularly prone to the seductive, manipulative wiles of the peddler, a
sexualised metaphor for a broader fear of loss of self-control in the face of
consumption. So too were itinerant sewing machine agents feared for their
aggressive pursuit of women customers whom, it was feared, could be seduced with
promises oflow down-payments and easy terms. In Seligman's historical analysis,
he is explicit in seeing a causal link between the use of mobile sales agents with their
high pressure selling tactics and the growth of abusive credit practices centred not
only on a field of purchasers 'a little less-to-do' than that of furniture stores but
predominantly female ones at that. Such fears seemed intensified to the extent that:
It is accordingly not surprising to find that the losses both of money and of
property became somewhat more frequent, and that the cases of hardship and
injustice became somewhat more common. Under the former law in New
York, the legal remedies consisted not only of replevin [legal repossession
prior to court case] of the article, but of bodily execution on the defaulting
purchaser. In not a few cases resort was taken to such execution (1927: 16-
7).
Thus, the combination of a disparate force of disreputable sellers and a lower class,
predominantly female and presumably susceptible clientele created conditions which
produeed a lower-grade form of instalment selling engaged in by individuals un-
61
governed by the self - on the one hand, immoral charlatans tempting, if not
manipulating the wives of husbands to instant gratification and on the other,
weakened whimsical women prone to consuming desire and deficient in the ability
to act as legal subjects. Parallel to the conception of peddlers as artful masculine
predators, Seligman explicitly remarks on how some sewing machine agents would
have sought the imprisonment of women in lieu of defaulted payments, a scarcely
concealed allusion to the forcible claiming of the female debtor's body from the
husband.
However, as Veblen ([ 1899] 1925) demonstrated, for a rising middle class, the social
very much impinged upon the domestic domain through the medium of
consumption. Whereas the 'leisure class' of old had demonstrated its social status
through the conspicuous demonstration of leisure activities, social development
increasingly located the manifestation of one's social class through the consumption
of goods. In this, Veblen accords a particularly significant role for the wife within
lower middle class families whom, he argues, assumes the responsibility of
conspicuous consumption on behalf of the household as the male householder
engages in productive salaried employment. In this, Veblen draws out an important
aspect of conspicuous consumption: although he defines it on the basis of
wastefulness, that the symbolic communicative value dominates use-value, he
argues that it may not be experienced by individuals as such but may in fact corne to
be regarded by the individual as essential to their wellbeing. However, such
consumption among the new middle classes was, he suggests, bound up in
'ostensible purpose', presented and experienced as though having some useful end, '
... as for example in "social duties", and in quasi-artistic or quasi-scholarly
accomplishments, in the care and decoration of the house, in sewing-circle activity
or dress reform, in proficiency at dress, cards, yachting, golf and various sports'
(Veblen, [1899] 1925: 94). In relation to the sewing machine then, the marketing
efforts employed in its early distribution tended to emphasise its productive nature,
how it would free women from the drudgery of hand stitching and allow them to
devote-time to such things as child rearing and recreational activities with their
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husbands, or actually function as an income generating device for the household
(Brandon, 1977: 126-8). Even the company's justification for instalment credit as a
form of 'hire' that would pay dividends in terms of eventual ownership emphasised
ideals of thrift and productiveness.
The 19th century mass marketing of the sewing machine thus seemed to threaten a
radical transformation in the nature of women's labour, a destabilising intrusion into
the familial relations of the private sphere upon which the solidity of wider society
was held to be dependent. Of course, hardly coincidentally, the position of women in
society was becoming contested at a political level through the development of
suffrage movement of the time. The manufacturers of the sewing machine, though,
projected a persuasive alternative vision where their mechanical aid did not disrupt
but reinforced the family, saving women from time-consuming labour which they
could then devote to their role as family nurturers or to the pursuit of enlightening
cultural activities in the company of their husbands. This resonated with the
Victorian 'cult of pure womanhood' which positioned women as nurturers and
carers whether in the family home or as 'friendly visitors' in moralising initiatives
such as the Charity Organisation Movement which sought to instil middle class
WASP values in the working class and immigrant households (Boyer, 1978: 143-
61). To these ends credit was shown to be an 'investment', a calculated use of
resources that would pay for itself and not only did not contravene bourgeois notions
of thrift and self-reliance but was presented as actively working through and
strengthening them.
But the sewing machine also promoted the idea of fashion, promulgating the
possibility that women, as well as the rest of the family, could dress up to the
standards required of their social station. In many ways, then, the domestic use of
the sewing machine represents a key moniker of 19th century social change, briefly
preceding the development of a mass produced, ready to wear clothing industry and
centred around the autonomous productive setting of the home, yet deploying new
techniques in marketing such as trade-ins and loss-leading, the novel utilisation of
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consumer credit as well as facilitating a new concern for clothing quality and style.
As Judith Coffin argues, the marketing of the sewing machine in 19th century France
shows a clear change from the middle decades towards the end of the century,
intersecting clearly with the shifting conception of the family from one of a site for
economic production and the inculcation of virtuous values to one where its primary
role was being reframed as an 'umbilical cord' for an emerging consumer society
(1994: 782-3).
A New Consumerism
As we have discussed earlier, the post-Civil War reconstruction period saw the
United States experiencing a sharp increase in industrialisation and capitalist
development as it entered the so-called 'Gilded Age'. The binding of the continent
by new transport and communications infrastructures with the Northern Pacific
railroad and the national telegraph network was mirrored in the mobilisation of a
new elite through a higher education centred on the prestigious east coast
universities which were increasingly oriented towards formalised business education
(Chambers, 1980; Hall, 1982). An increasingly national market was coming to
displace dispersed, self-sufficient 'island communities' with the nation's major
cities, themselves swelling in size with influxes of rural migrants and foreign
immigrants, increasingly serving as commercial hubs radiating outwards in their
regional control of finance, farm production and the products of industry (Hays,
1957; Wiebe, 1967). Within cities themselves, a new 'downtown' emerged which
Nye represents as the 'physical expression of concentrated energy use' (1998: 173).
Electricity animated the new trolleybuses and subways that propelled individuals in
and around newly constructed skyscrapers made possible by powered lifts,
ventilation systems and telephone networks. Within this context, a new structure of
centralised consumer retailing began to take shape. In Lears' s (1994) words, the
peddler-figure became 'reformed', stabilised within the form of the department
store ......
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Beginning in 1846 with the opening of A.T. Stewart's Marble Palace, department
stores such as Macy's and Marshall Field's began to emerge in the 1860s and 70s as
large retailers selling multiple lines of goods (Hendrickson, 1979: 60-149; Leach,
1993). Three key organising principles underlay how these new types of firms
operated (Strasser, 1989: 204-6). Rather than the traditional price bargaining system
between buyer and seller which had been predominant, such stores sold goods on the
basis of fixed single prices that were set according to a continuous calculated profit-
oriented analysis of stock turnover as opposed to being the outcome of incremental,
transaction-specific bargaining between buyer and seller. As their name suggests,
such stores were departmentalised into units selling specific lines of goods which
were then analysed by a centralised administration that assessed the sales
effectiveness of individual employees as well as the profitability engendered by the
department as a whole (see also Benson, 1986; Walsh and Jeacle, 2003). These firms
combined new merchandising and distribution approaches with economic weight
and the integration of its own manufacturing to change how consumption was
organised and related to the individual, disrupting and altering the experience of
consumption itself.
However, it was not simply the rationalisation of retailing that fostered this but the
way that goods became related to the individual. The fixed price system nurtured
individuals into a new role as consumers, engaging them not as active participants
within acts of purchase but as passive democratic participants of an experience
'where consumers are an audience to be entertained by commodities, where selling
is mingled with amusement, where arousal of free-floating desire is as important as
immediate purchase of particular items' (Williams, 1982: 67). From around the
1880s to the end of the century, department stores began to condition a new aesthetic
to the sale of their goods, using new electric light to illuminate the increasing
diversity of wares and services, creating seductively arranged, often fantastical
window and exotically thematic shop displays and arranging space to create a new
intimacy between customers and goods including separating and rendering invisible
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the manufacturing and clerical labour that underlay the 'dream worlds' being created
upon the shop floor (Leach, 1993).
Department store shopping, though, remained an urban phenomenon, attracting only
those within a relatively easy urban commute. The second main thrust in the
concentration of consumption was the development of the mail order firms,
particularly the two Chicago giants Sears, Roebuck & Co. and Montgomery Ward,
who fostered a new nationalised consumption in isolated rural areas beyond the
confines of the peddler and the General Store (Emmet and Jeuck, 1950; Boorstin,
1973; Hendrickson, 1979: 205-53). Itwas not by chance that both were located in
this city for Chicago served as the major hub in the development of the national
railway infrastructure, the location allowing these firms to effectively distribute their
wares over most parts of the country. It was Montgomery Ward who, building upon
his experience as a travelling salesman, pioneered the mail order concept, setting up
his company in 1872 with the support of the Grange farmers' organisation and the
promise to reduce prices by eliminating the 'middle man' and 'selling only for cash'.
The catalogue was the crucial element in mail order, the site which allowed the
seller to present the goods available for purchase. Initially small in size with the
emphasis on written description and simple woodcut illustrations, the end of the
century saw ever multiplying circulation and new innovations such as linotype and
colour printing which expanded the scope for a realistic visual projection of the
product being sold. Crucial to the development of mail order was a scheme known
as Rural Free Delivery (RFD) which initially emerged in the 1890s to guarantee a
reliable postal delivery system to farm addresses. More broadly, like the toll out of
the railway and the telegraph, RFD integrated territory by separating out time and
space in the formation of a national marketplace. 'For the rural American, the
change was crucial. Now he was lifted out of the narrow community of those he saw
and knew, and put in continual touch with a larger world of persons and events and
things read about but unheard and unseen' (Boorstin, 1973: 133).
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Neither department stores nor mail order firms remained unchallenged as they
expanded their arc to define new patterns of consumption. As Leach (1993)
demonstrates, the 1890s were characterised by an anti-department store crusade
composed of unions, small merchants, women's groups and some politicians who
rallied against the exploitative and competition-threatening power wielded by such
enterprises. Similarly, local traders being threatened with extinction by nationally-
oriented mail order companies petitioned for restrictive state legislation and
attempted to form systematic boycotts to limit the scope of these outside rivals
whom they accused of draining money from the country to the capitalist elite of the
city, even going so far as to organise community book burnings of catalogues (Cohn,
1940: 510-17; Smalley and Sturdivant, 1973: 51; Hendrickson, 1979: 212-17).
Neither type of campaign, though, could ultimately restrain the new national
commercial tide that consumption was attaining.
'Gullible, Ignorant and Illiterate': Credit and Deficient Wills
Within this post-Civil War period, credit itself began to undergo a rapid expansion in
terms of its geographic spread, the merchandising lines within which it was offered
and the types of people who used it (Seligman, 1927; Nugent, 1939; Calder, 1999).
Whereas before, it was exclusively for the financing of significant durable items of
consumption like furniture and pianos, by the 1870s, its use extended to such
relatively ephemeral household items as bedding, dishes and kitchenware as well as
for the purchase of suits, coats and dresses on such terms as one-fifth down payment
and eight weekly instalments. With the cheapening of sewing machine production
and competition between agents, instalment terms became pervasively liberalised so
that by the 1870s a machine could be had for as little as a dollar down and fifty cents
a week (Nugent, 1939: 67). The types of individuals using such credit also shifted to
encompass the 'proletariat' of Mid West cities, Blacks and immigrants so that the
class distinction which maintained the technique of instalment credit as a tool of a
rising-or aspiring middle class dissolved. In Seligman's blunt language, instalment
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credit became extended to a 'lower grade' of both commodity and purchaser (1927:
19). Such a shift was associated with rising numbers of urban workers and
immigrants with materially limited incomes who were disjointed from home and
land as sites of production and cut adrift within a new, fluid urban milieu (Nugent
1938: 43-4). Attempting to accumulate both household furnishings and express new
forms of consumption, instalment credit provided the possibility of their attainment
by exploiting the relatively certain regularity of wages - an extended sequence of
interminably fractional payments mirroring the (hopefully) interminable regularity
of the fixed weekly pay-packet (Calder, 1999).
In their analysis of the Spiegel Company of Chicago, an instalment merchandiser
that began to supply furniture on instalments to working class families in the 1890s,
Smalley and Sturdivant suggest that:
Although expensive, such a selling technique enabled families to acquire
necessary goods out of income by making frequent small instalments.
Certainly many such families would not have been able to exert the
necessary self-discipline to accumulate the money for full payment of many
goods in the absence of a semi-forced savings scheme (1973: 26).
This shows, albeit retrospectively, the transformation of understanding that the
spread of instalment credit encapsulated. As we saw previously, the early
availability of instalment credit had been associated with the demonstration of
character, the facility of a class fraction which was properly able to exert a strict
self-government over itself and could thus be largely trusted with expensive
household goods on a sequence of deferred payments. However, with its spread
down the social scale, the marketing of such credit became seen as an instrument of
material necessity, whose fulfilment by the individual stemmed not just from the
contractual nature of the agreement but the repetitive sequencing of payments
constituting a despotic mechanism substituting for, rather than supporting, the self-
government of the individual. As social investigator Henry Mussey described it,
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'[t]heir methods are copied after those the large dealers, but necessarily involve
more severity, because they deal with a less responsible class of customers, and are
themselves of a lower grade of business training and ethics' (1903: 15)
The arrival and growth of department stores also had an important, albeit indirect,
effect on instalment selling. These stores themselves did not offer instalment credit-
in fact, they prized themselves on their cash only policies - but their competitive
commercial strength forced many single-line retailers into offering instalment terms.
Such credit also allowed individuals to attain a higher standard of consumption,
particularly for clothing. With the increasing preponderance of mass produced
clothes and in new urban milieus beset by flux and shifting, uncertain social
relations and class identities, credit allowed increasing numbers to adopt the exterior
aspects of a higher social class within a context which increasingly grounded
judgement in appearance (Calder, 1999: 169-71; see also Boorstin, 1973; Horowitz,
1985).
However, the expansion of instalment credit beyond a specific middle class stratum
to more and more members of the working class increasingly rendered it as
culturally illegitimate for the former, probably by virtue of its association with
working class consumption. If, as Bourdieu (1984) contends, both goods and the
taste for goods correspond with the expression of fundamental social class
differences and that their distinctive power of both goods and taste declines in line
with the ability of lower classes to appropriate them, then in late 19th century
America, the mode of purchase mediating the possibility of appropriating the
distinctive potentialities of goods, too, came to represent a particular type of
'stylistic possibility' as much as the goods to which it gave purchase. As instalment
credit widened the consuming possibilities of lower classes, appropriating in some
measure the symbolic value of items formerly reserved for middle class
consumption, cash-buying was reserved as a distinguishing practice of middle class
consumption being catered for at new department store emporia that combined the
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presentation of spectacle with a refusal to entertain the possibility of instalment
credit.
Of course, as Lendol Calder (1999) notes, the middle classes did not extinguish their
use of it but rather limited it to a specific range of goods such as pianos and sewing
machines and, increasingly, sought to hide it behind the scenes. With the
constitution of social classes and their boundaries in a state of flux in the latter half
of the 19th century, the disdain that the middle classes expressed towards the practice
of instalment credit symbolises the uncertainty that they felt towards their own
position as well as their fear of the working classes beneath them who seemed to
beckon urban disorder, labour militancy and social fragmentation. In evoking and
laying claim to a Puritan past of independence and self-reliance, the middle-class
sought to uphold values and standards that might serve to resist the destabilising
social and economic changes that threatened to undermine their traditional morality
and societal institutions (Susman, 2003: 42).
Itwas not simply, though, that such credit lost an intrinsic power of distinction for
the middle class; rather that, in doing so, it became associated with a degradation
and inhibition of freedom. According to Foucault (1991), freedom lies at the heart of
liberal government, the discovery and elucidation of individuals, families, the
population, economic processes and society as autonomous, dynamic domains which
government may shape or direct but never interfere without risking their destruction
and its own. Yet, as Valverde (1996, 1997, 1998) shows, the liberal freedom of
individuals is always relational, always articulated against that or those which are
not free. At the end of the 19th century, certain marginal forms of consumption (and
by implication consumer) were understood to be unproductive and irrational in
direct contravention ofthe liberal injunction to self-control (Hilton, 2004). By the
1890s, as Nugent (1939) attests, instalment selling 'attracted a largely disreputable
fringe' which pushed prices up, reduced down payments and extended contract
times, such a dismantling of regulatory buttresses being matched by the increased
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use of punitive sanctions such as the deployment of liens over other household
goods as well as the aggressive pursuit of wage garnishment.
Figure 1.5 1900 Street Scene in Denver, Colorado. Note the retail store's credit advertisement in
background. Source: Myvesta Foundation.
Among such groups as Blacks and non-English speaking immigrants, this was
exacerbated by outright fraud, the impecunious threat of imprisonment and even
bodily violence. At the tum of the century, for instance, social investigator Henry
Mussey (1903) analysed a flourishing 'fake instalment business' in New York city
where unscrupulous vendors, targeting immigrants in particular, sold worthless or
highly over-priced merchandise on instalments and surreptitiously altered contracts
to defraud unfortunate borrowers. If, as Wightman (1996) sugg.ests, the classical
liberal contract is defined as the formal meeting of two wills, then Nugent's
description of immigrants and minorities as being characterised by 'gullibility,
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ignorance and illiteracy' indicates how deficient their will was understood to be. To
a greater or lesser extent then, certain marginalised sections of an industrialised,
urban population were understood to be non-rational, lacking the capacity for self-
control that characterised the free liberal subject and so unable to act in their own
self-interest when entering into credit transactions. As weak parties to an unequal
exchange, they were thus seen as vulnerable to manipulation through the self-interest
of others, a form of exploitation which they were incapable of resisting because of
their inability to defend their own interest.
Thus, at the turn of the century, most working class users of instalment credit were
understood to lack the capacity for freedom, materially, through inferior resources
but also in their competence to regulate themselves, to exert their will to bear the
responsibilities of freedom. They were therefore fated to manifest their degraded
will in such credit use - the more deficient the capacity for freedom, the greater the
coercion experienced and the more disreputable instalment credit became. In
generally, by avoiding or hiding instalment credit use, the middle class sought to
distinguish itself, not merely because such credit was excessively 'common'
symbolically but because it had become inextricably associated with a morally
constituted incapacity for self-government. It was the obverse of this through which
the middle class understood and defined its own freedom (Valverde, 1996).
Despite the social contempt with which instalment credit was held from the 1880s,
other forms of credit began to circulate within the consumption practices of more
affluent classes towards the end of that century. Within burgeoning department
stores, characterised significantly by their 'prolific middle c1assness' (Leach, 1993:
20), charge accounts were offered to wealthy customers in order to encourage a
specifically 'high class clientele' (Jeacle and Walsh, 2002: 740). As the latter
authors note, such individuals often 'exploited' such facilities by accumulating
charges and delaying payment for several months upon which, in general, no interest
was charged. The distinction between such charge accounts and the stigmatised
working class forms of instalment credit reveals the different forms of government
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which underlay each and the different understandings of the subjects involved.
Charge accounts were an extension of the older forms of 'open book credit' which
had been common between retail merchants and their customers; they were trust-
based 'promises to pay' rather than legally-enforceable contractual obligations.
However, unlike open book credit, they were not bound within complex community
relations but presumed a high-degree of self-regulation on the part of the customer.
In contrast to instalment payments, charge accounts were paid off as and when the
individual client saw fit. No mechanical regimen regulated the repayments and
neither could the retailer seek to legally reclaim the goods in the event of default-
on the contrary, everything rested on the individual's desire to clear their account.
Of course, the motivation for credit was understood by department store
management not as a 'necessity', a means of bridging the purchase of goods in the
present through the calculable, regulated allotment of the future, but as a
'convenience', a mechanism of streamlining the purchase of goods in the present by
extending its boundaries by means of the perceived strength of will of the individual.
Whereas middle class instalment credit acted upon and regulated the freedom of
those individuals who used it and working class variants, to a greater or lesser
extent, were constituted through a lack of freedom, the use of charge accounts by
wealthy store patrons explicitly functioned by and depended upon just such a
freedom.
However, these forms of credit did not remain the preserve of an elite. As Leach
notes, by the end of the 1890s, department stores began to actively market their
charge services to less affluent strata than before - soliciting existing charge
customers to recommend friends and acquaintances to join. As Calder suggests,
department stores implemented such a shift as they increasingly felt the pressure of
competition from supposedly lower class instalment retailers while the increasing
administrative rationalisation of its operations made such a strategy bureaucratically
possible (1999: 71-2). Soon, some stores began issuing numbered metal coins to be
proffered by customers to identify themselves when charging purchases (Leach,
1993 :-125).
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Figure 1.6Metal Identification Coin Issued to Credit Customers of the Hecht Department Stores,
Washington D.C. Source: Myvesta Foundation.
With this proliferation of credit, charge accounts even gave way to instalment-like
credit plans; for instance in 1900, Wanamaker's department store began to sell
pianos on an instalment-like 'contract basis' that obliged monthly payments,
although no down payment was required (p. 127). The most notable exception was
Macy's in New York which persistently prided itself on a cash only policy
ostensibly presented as a strategy to keep prices low. In 1902, as an alternative
strategy to the charge plan, it opened a dedicated service that allowed regular
customers to deposit cash against which purchases could be conveniently charged
and to which interest and annual bonuses were paid by the store. However, although
such 'debit' sales exhibited moderate growth as a proportion of total sales over the
succeeding years, its proportion was less than a fifth of comparable charge sales in
other stores (Hower, 1943: 341-44).
The loosening of department store credit policy, though, called into question the
presupposition of freedom of the customer. Particularly given the association of
department stores with feminised consumption, Leach draws attention to the
proliferation of turn of the century court cases involving upper and middle class
women accumulating debts on charge accounts that their husbands were unable to
pay. ~t this time, as Zukin notes, 'women were continually accused of being too
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weak to withstand the temptations of choice; they were charged with spending
money beyond their means, abusing their husband's charge accounts and shoplifting.
Kleptomania was considered to be the middle class woman's disease' (2004: 16).
Zukin's association of desire, credit and kleptomania brings into relief how women
were perceived. Like immigrants or the working class, the middle class woman was
seen to be intrinsically lacking in will, deficient in her ability to control the irrational
sensuous passions of her own nature and thus exceedingly vulnerable to the almost
sexual stimulation conjured by new arenas of consumption (Abelson, 1989;
Spiekermann, 1999). Shopping, thieving and credit abuse were thus closely related
constructions of the same underlying hystericised condition attributed to middle
class, homebound women - the janus-faced inability to resist both their own
irrational selves and the quality of the potent consuming temptations to which they
were exposed resulting in a supposed compulsion to steal or rack up charges that
their husbands struggled to contend with.
The development of 'low grade' instalment credit, however, did not remain confined
to urban centres. In 1904, the Spiegel home furnishings retailer of Chicago which
was founded in 1893 and which concentrated on selling household goods on
instalments to lower middle and working class families began to develop a mail
order business, initially concentrating on a geographical area within a hundred miles
of Chicago (Smalley and Sturdivant, 1973). Following the mass retailing lead of
mail order houses Montgomery Ward and Sears, it produced a catalogue detailing a
limited array of furniture goods and disseminated it to addresses acquired through
mailing lists, freely available town directories and the bribing of Postmasters.
Crucially, unlike its larger rivals which mirrored department stores in stridently
refusing to engage in instalment selling, Spiegels offered all such goods on
instalments with the cost of such credit built into an inflated purchase price. Whereas
Sears declared even as late as 1910 that 'Our only terms are for cash; we do not sell
on instalments or extend credit' (Cohn, 1940: 524), the early slogan adopted by its
smaller rival- 'We Trust the People - Everywhere' - demonstrates the supposed
democratising intentions of making both consumption and credit freely available on
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a uniform basis to wider sections of a dispersed population who could be relied upon
to effectively govern themselves. Indeed, as Smalley and Sturdivant note, given how
credit was so bound up within Spiegel's mail retailing strategy, the management
placed particular emphasis on credit as a 'respectable' practice for the new' great
army of salary-earners' whose comforts should not be limited by an insistence on
cash (1973: 48). In a letter to reluctant customers, credit was even identified by the
finn with the buying habits of the wealthy classes which was now available to
people of more modest means but who declared to be of equal honesty and
responsibility.
Although repayment on credit for furniture was felt to be reasonably secure on the
basis that the accumulation of furniture was an indicator of permanence, stability
and personal responsibility - 'good character' - the conditional sales contract
provided the possibility of a more coercive regulation through repossession.
However, the entry of the company into the instalment selling of clothing, and the
consequential eclipsing of the possibility of repossession of items sold in such a
way, generated greater fears about security which were seen by certain sections of
management to be endemic to 'the dirty rag business' (Smalley and Sturdivant,
1973: 63). In other words, without the possibility of resorting to 'despotic' forms of
regulation through acting to repossess the good and reserve any payments that had
been made, individuals might be less relied upon to exert the 'self-despotism'
necessary to maintain their repayments.
With the widening physical distance between consumers and the central retailer
implied by mail order and its branching out into new areas of merchandising,
Spiegel increasingly developed itself as a 'centre of calculation' across a national
market, governing consumers through the notion of character that was not attained at
first hand, through a proximate assessment, but through the marshalling of an array
of circuits that would connect the retailing apparatus with each individual and
potential customer, funnelling information back to the finn's administrative credit
office. As Rose and Miller (1992) argue processes of governance, acting upon
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distant events, deploy mechanisms of accumulating information that both enable and
legitimise it. At first, local lawyers and bankers residing within the individual's
community were harnessed as sources of information on credit applicants; later,
specialised local agents came to be used as well as references submitted by the
applicant. However, from 1917 onwards, individuals themselves became
increasingly employed in the firm's government of them through the widening scope
of the application form. The answers to an array of such questions as occupation,
earnings, address, age, marital status and race were increasingly correlated with a
perceived degree of self-regulation in repaying credit and were depended upon by
the finn for determining the 'character' of the customer. However, although
'character' was becoming discerned and articulated in novel ways through new
processes of inscription, its content still maintained a moral quality. For instance, as
Smalley and Sturdivant note, orders from Blacks were persistently ignored and their
details eliminated from subsequent distribution lists, for 'management was ...
unquestionably wedded to the stereotype regarding the black's character and
attitudes towards the responsible settlement of commitments' (1973: 87).
Mass Credit: Assembling the Automobile, Reassembling Thrift
Mass Financing and Mobile Desires
It seems almost a cliche to mention the importance of the mass-produced, mass-
owned automobile to the development of American society in the zo" century. The
very shape and form of American streets, cities and highways have been bound to its
proliferating ownership (St. Clair, 1986; McShane, 1994). Ling (1990) links its
development early in the new century to that of the Progressivism with its organising
impulse to incorporate rural 'island communities' and ease the menace of urban
overcrowding; yet, so too did the car provide a means of privacy, escape and
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freedom in an increasingly organised world. In this latter, Belasco (1997)
demonstrates how the car became a central feature of a new leisure pursuit of
itinerant 'autocamping' as middle class families sought a return to older times
characterised by independence, closeness to nature and family solidarity - ultimately
spawning the birth ofthe Motel industry in the 20th century. Particularly in rural
areas, as Berger (1979) shows, growing car ownership among farming households,
reaching 30.7% as early as 1920, altered the field of possibilities of family life and
the structure of previously isolated communities, particularly with respect to
religion, education and healthcare.
Similarly, the proliferation and mainstream mass commercialisation of consumer
credit within the United States during the 20th century is inextricably related to the
development of mass ownership of assembly-line manufactured automobiles. Just as
the automobile seems to encapsulate something of the essence of the 'coming of
age' of American consumerism and culture more broadly, such mass ownership was
only made possible through new mechanisms of financing such ownership. Ford's
perfecting of mass production had to be met by what Clark (1930) calls new
agencies and institutions of 'mass finance' to put the fruits of such production within
the realm of consumption. What is often regarded as the spark is the peculiar
seasonality of capital intensive automobile production and the effect that this had on
the need for credit facilities. As Martha Olney relays:
Assembly line production of autos was essentially nonexistent in 1910 but
characterised the industry by World War 1. This capital-intensive and
expensive production method created a problem for auto manufacturers; to
keep average costs down, the assembly line system called for a relatively
smooth seasonal production pattern, but demand for cars exhibited
tremendous seasonal fluctuations with a strong peak in spring following an
extraordinarily slow winter ... To produce in lockstep with sales would have
driven up fixed costs by requiring in April four times the plant capacity
-rrequired in January. Idle equipment in winter months would have depreciated
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more rapidly than equipment in regular use, further increasing costs. Swings
in labour demand might have created difficulties acquiring and quickly
training skilled labourers needed only during the peak months. For these
reasons, production needed to be smoother than sales, thus requiring a large
buildup of inventory in winter (1991: 119-120).
Put simply, production had to be level to minimise costs while people tended to buy
cars seasonally, thus forcing an excessive production of cars at certain times of the
year. However, it wasn't manufacturers that bore the costly burden of storing this
inventory, but rather, the car dealerships who were tied to specific manufacturers. As
Olney suggests, demand for dealerships far exceeded supply thereby putting the
manufacturer in a relative position of power vis a viz the dealer and able to dictate
terms favourable to it including passing the burden of storage on to the dealer on a
cash-on-demand basis. For the dealer, an external source of financing was clearly
required ifit was to avoid its stock of working capital being tied up in warehousing
cars for months at a time. This, though, was not forthcoming from the traditional
commercial banking sector that saw cars as, by and large, unnecessary expenses and
dealers as bad risks given the power of manufacturers to cancel dealership
agreements without notice.
What emerged as a solution was the finance company, either contracted or owned by
manufacturers, to fund such an inventory build-up on behalf of the dealerships.
Dealers essentially sold their stock, at a discount, to such companies which then
authorised dealers to accept future customer payment for the cars on their behalf.
These companies essentially acted as intermediaries between banks and dealers by
contracting capital from the former and supplying it to the latter in order for them to
finance the inventory purchasing of cars from manufacturers. Within Olney's
economistic analysis, the emergence of specialised finance companies was not a
response to an increasing 'demand' by consumers but was, rather, fundamentally
related to their role as 'production smoothing devices', from which they only later
branched out to promote credit to consumers.
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However, it would seem one-dimensional to declare, as Olney does, that finance
companies emerged simply as a response to production bottlenecks and the desire of
manufacturers to maintain control over dealers. As Seligman traces, the historical
practice of commercial firms borrowing using amounts owed to them, and not just
stock, as collateral for the loan has had a long historical lineage within the United
States, with, as he notes, such financing becoming applied to consumer forms of
debt around 1905 (1927: 33-5). In fact, it was through the 'Industrial' or 'Morris'
banks, one of the first commercialised agencies of consumer lending, that credit for
automobile purchases first became available in 1910, even before the mass
production of automobiles had really taken off with Ford's implementation of
assembly line methods in 1914. In 1913, the Weaver Company became the first
finance company to purchase the debts of car dealers followed by Guaranty
Securities Company in 1915, which began a similar practice for Willys-Overland
dealers in Ohio before quickly expanding both nationally and to other makes of car
(GM's future president Alfred Sloan was one of its directors at this time).
By 1917, there were six finance companies specialising in automobile finance or
adding it to their business activities. As Seligman's more balanced account relates:
'the desire of the automobile user to be provided with a somewhat easier method of
payment, and the interests of the automobile manufacturer to secure a larger as well
as an even, uninterrupted flow of output, conspired to bring about the introduction of
the instalment method' (1927: 30). By 1922, there were 1000 companies trading in
automobile financing, rising to 1600 by 1925, although the vast majority of trade
was concentrated in a handful of major companies (Clark, 1930: 21; Plummer and
Young, 1940: 33-5). The source of this financing came mainly from short-term
borrowing at commercial banks although the large national companies would
eventually come to offer their debt as an investment on the open-market. Yet, the
question remains as to how or why people were being increasingly implicated within
the consumption of the automobile, and why they were submitting themselves to a
regime of indebtedness to do so. As we have seen, the instrument of the instalment
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plan was not itself new, its deployment as a technology to mediate consumption
stretched back far into the 19th century. Nevertheless, the automobile saved
instalment-buying from the cultural disrepute into which it had fallen, in particular,
its strong association with working class consumption. As such, the automobile
represented a good whose function and symbolic qualities re-legitimised the use of
instalment credit by the middle class.
Consuming Desire
The nature of commercial organisation within the United States shifted dramatically
up to the 1920s and beyond as the promotion, facilitation and quality of consumption
increasingly became central to the calculations of capitalist enterprise. What Wiebe
(1967) calls the 'distended' society of the late 19th century, where industrialisation
had progressed without a correspondingly coherent sense of integrated organisation,
began to give way to new forms of productivity and economic consolidation through
commercial mergers, the proliferation of new forms of mass merchandising through
chain stores, the growth in size, scale and scope of department stores, and the
professionalisation of consumer industries through the formalisation of knowledge
in such areas as retailing, merchandising, sales and specific areas of service
provision. Banks, too, were drawn into a new role within this maelstrom of change,
shifting from their role as commodity brokers to permanent financiers of a system of
consuming desire (Leach, 1993). Building upon and developing the industrial mass
production which took shape during the 19th century, new means of nationally-
oriented mass distribution, most notably the chain-store method, were predicated on
the emergence of a mass consumer market. Advertising became the language, or as
Marchand (1985) calls it, the 'lubricant' of this anonymous sphere, appealing to an
emerging mass audience at the level of the subjective and playing on the idea of a
perpetual state of yearning and desire; with retail purchasing still perceived to be the
role of the 'female', the mass audience itself was feminised, perceived and
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constituted through advertising and marketing as being inherently subject to caprice
and emotionality.
According to Baudrillard (1998), the system of individual 'needs' represented the
final frontier for an advanced capitalism to incorporate and rationalise within
production. Rejecting liberal and critical theorists, he sees specific needs and desires
as not being imposed from without but as an alienation from use-value, analogous to
the alienation oflabour, forming a moralised, symbolic communicative system that
becomes bound to the expression of social difference. For him, the systematic
development of consumer credit occurs under the guise of instant gratification and
hedonism, a seeming inversion of established puritan values. Yet this is merely a
reflection of the capitalist colonisation of need and desire and the greater importance
attached to individual's obligation to consume - credit, in fact, provides a means of
'training' consumers, conditioning them towards 'disciplined' consumer behaviour
and providing the possibility for their incorporation where otherwise they might
escape.
Campbell (1987, 1995a, 1995b), too, rejects what he terms the 'manipulationist'
thesis in explaining modem consumption but his concern equally centres on
debunking the conceptualisation of consumption as a form of externally directed
communicative expression. What he seeks to discern, rather, are the particular
aspects of modernity that propel individuals to continuously engage in the
consumption of new commodities. In this regard, he focuses on the wellspring
within individuals themselves, the particularity of the modem consciousness that
produces a perpetual motivation for the consumption of the novel; seemingly
dwelling on some of the themes of Norbert Elias's (1991, 1994) theory of 'civilizing
process', he argues that the emotional make-up of modem individuals has been
fundamentally shaped by the progress of social change. Through such processes as
the decline of external physical danger via the monopolisation of violence in
processes of state formation, the rise of individualism and the disenchantment of the
world-through scientific rationalisation, a gulfhas emerged between the objective
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world and subjective experience with individuals being drawn into a greater
autonomous control over their emotional expression - what Elias would term the
increasing external constraint towards self-constraint.
For Campbell (1987, 1995a), pleasure becomes drawn less from a subjective
immersion in the physicality of sensory experience consumed and more from the
autonomous and controlled play of images about consumption conjured and dwelt
upon in the mind of the individual. The key, though, is that the sensory can never
match the perfection of the imaginary and so the actual consummation of
consumption gives rise to disillusionment and the idealisation of new forms of
consumption in a permanent cycle of longing, disappointment and new desire so that
'individuals do not so much seek satisfaction from products, as pleasure from the
self-illusory experiences which they construct from their personal, associated
meanings' (Campbell, 1987: 89)
Into the 20th century, the nature of production itself was shifting to encompass
consumer 'need' - as Cross details, from 1900 to 1930, discretionary spending
increased while the number of hours in the working week declined (2000: 17-8).
Yet, the vanguard ofa new capitalism, the Ford Motor Company, was coming to
epitomise a relationship between labour and capital that was increasingly 'organised' .
and instrumentally-rational with little care for the novelty of ephemeral desire. With
the establishment of the Highland Park plant in 1910, new lines of bureaucratic
administration and centralised planning were drawn out across the factory; capital-
intensive assembly belt methods combined with unskilled, usually immigrant
workers enmeshed in an extensive, precise division of labour; and men, machines
and materials were progressively allotted in calculated, rational workflows within
the production process (Meyer, 1981, 1989; Gartman, 1986; Ling, 1990; Bachelor,
1994; Brinkley, 2004).
Away from the factory floor, Ford's 'Sociological Department' carried out carefully
inscribed and documented investigations into the environmental conditions of the
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worker and their family conduct in the private sphere of the home to ensure
adherence to moral habits based on thrift and industry perceived to be conducive to
labour productivity. The company even established a savings and loan scheme
where, upon joining, workers were obliged to ceremoniously deposit one dollar each
payday, in person, to encourage a 'savings habit' while loan amounts were restricted
to twenty dollars each pay cycle (Meyer, 1981: 95-147; Ling, 1990: 127-67).
Inevitably, excessive borrowing by a worker became an object of investigative
scrutiny by the company.
Even the celebrated 'profit sharing' five dollar day policy instituted in January 1914
was part of a conscious strategy to integrate labour within the new heavy industrial
production methods that the Ford name has become inextricably associated with. It
'riveted' workers in their place within the new organised, 'solid' capital-intensive
industrial system, literally by reducing the incidence of staff turnover, strategically
by countering unionisation but more fundamentally by ensuring the adherence of
labour to a hierarchical, top-down order that increasingly deprived it of initiative and
creativity (Bauman, 2000: 57-8). Such a raising of wages, though, was not an
immediate ploy to transform workers into consumers, or at least not consumers of
automobiles, for as Cohen notes in her study of Chicago workers, even by the 1920s
automobile ownership among this labour segment stood at only 3% (1990: 103).
These workers, in contrast, persisted in buying traditional items like furniture and
smaller consumer items like phonographs on credit or, more commonly, saved their
surplus income and paid cash for their purchases. Despite the 'easy payments'
facility offered by auto instalment credit, the market for instalment credit was more
or less limited to the relatively affluent and the middle classes (p. 104).
'Fordism', therefore, represents an incomplete model for articulating and
understanding the new forms that capitalism was taking with the elevation of mass
consumption (Meyer, 1989: 81-3). Although pioneering the capital intensive
assembly line with its super-scientific management oflabour, Ford was wedded to
the idea of the single 'perfected' product of the Model T that was standardised,
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uniform and which would eliminate competition through low marginal prices (Ling,
1990; Tedlow, 1990). Consumer demand was not a factor to be analysed, to be
accounted for, to be problematised and systematically assembled as an independent
element within the broader production endeavour but was held simply as a corollary
of the factory process and the utilitarian features of the product. By making
production leaner and more efficient, prices could be reduced and more Model Ts
would be bought.
Alfred Sloan, vice-President at General Motors from 1918 and committed like Ford
to mass production, mapped out an alternative vision which held the consumer at the
heart of production. He conceived and realised a line of progressively priced
products of different grades that would segment the market and through which each
model would be changed annually to embody the latest style and fashion. Whereas
Henry Ford held the critical feature of his Model T to be unchanging 'simplicity',
Sloan drew a deliberate parallel between automobile marketing and the regenerative
novelty of consumerist fashion declaring' ... it is not too much to say that the "laws"
of the Paris dressmakers have come to be a factor in the automobile industry - and
woe to the company which ignores them'. Furthermore, he strategised on 'the degree
to which styling changes should be made in anyone model run .... The changes in
the new model should be so novel and attractive as to creative demand for the new
value and, so to speak, create a certain amount of dissatisfaction with past models as
compared with the new one .... ' ([ 1963] 1980: 265).
Fordism of the 1910s thus encapsulates an older, capitalism that, in many ways acted
as a key locus for 20th century consumption but which by the 1920s was becoming
obsolete. Henry Ford himself, perhaps, represents the last of the 19th century
entrepreneur-industrialists not only in his sole concern for the 'need' rather than the
'desire' of car ownership which included the elimination of advertising but also the
virtual sabotaging of his own organisational management structure and his drive in
1916 to sole ownership and all-encompassing control of the company (Tedlow,
1990:-161). Within itself, the austerity of the Model T, its simplicity and steadfast
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resistance to style, its trumping of value and durability as opposed to stylistic
innovation represented nearly the consumerist incarnation of traditional Puritan
values (McShane, 1994: 135). The Fordist devotion to the fixed, the unalterable and
the permanent stands in contrast to the elevation of consumer desire as a 'social
good' impelled by the continuous cycle of dissatisfaction within the minds of
consumers (Ewen and Ewen, 1992: 48). As automobile ownership became
increasingly pervasive among American households, the profits of capital came
increasingly to depend on a new rationalisation of the totality of consumer needs as
alluded to by Baudrillard. Firstly, through the creation of a graduated product line,
General Motors created a system of distinct symbolic differences that corresponded
to the different dispositions of different classes. As Bourdieu (1984) explains, such
dispositions are formed not only by the material conditions of the class but by their
dynamic ranking in relation to one other, a ranking formed through the cultural
dialectic of identification and distinction. In creating different cars to suit different
pockets, containing different performances, features, styling and accessories, each
such product was ranked by the degree of banality and distinction it projected, in
tum, 'naturally' corresponding and appealing to the objectively inscribed 'taste' of a
specific class. Secondly, the company tapped into the imaginative hedonism of
modem consumption, promoting the annual model change that both exploited and
deepened the dissatisfaction that individuals felt towards the car that they already
possessed, infusing the latest model with the gleam of novelty through new styling
and features that would stimulate their imaginative longing for the promise of new
experience that the latest, most up-to-date model seemed to exude.
Installing Consumer Discipline
The conflict of an outmoded 'productivism' of Ford and the progressive
'consumerism' of General Motors extended also to the field of instalment credit and
the contrasting formations of the General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC)
and the Ford 'Weekly Purchase' plan. GMAC, a wholly-owned but independent
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subsidiary of General Motors, was created in 1919 to ensure stability in productive
output by financing dealers to stock inventory as well as well as to directly mediate
consumer instalment purchasing (Sloan, [1963] 1980: 305).
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Figure 1.7 'Credit Might Fly' - 1925 Advertisement for GMAC, Time Magazine. GMAC boasts the
number of new car sales facilitated by its credit terms since the company's foundation in 1919. Here,
credit contracts are sent forth from the heavens to nestle in a treasure chest before taking flight across
around the country. Source: Reproduced inMurphy, 1999.
Sloan saw instalment purchasing as an integral element in selling something more
than the 'basic transportation' represented by the Model T. As car ownership
expanded, the used car market grew to service the need of getting 'from A to B', the
technical attributes of the car improved (most notably, the closed body) and the
annuaTmodel policy took hold, instalment credit would be instrumental in selling
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not cars as fixed objects but in servicing a demand for 'progress in new cars, for
comfort, convenience, power, and style' ([1963] 1980: 163). From the outset then,
instalment credit allowed GM to draw desire into the sphere of production, the
profits of capital connecting less with a rational 'need' for transportation and more
with such amorphous, aesthetic qualities as 'style' and 'comfort' that the company
believed the consumer, or certain types of consumer, wished to experience. By 1925,
GMAC was by far the largest of the national finance companies, developing through
an overall expansion of sales of GM cars but also contributing to an ever greater
proportion of such sales (Seligman, 1927; Clark, 1930).
Facing declining sales due to intense competition from rival manufactures pursuing
the increased sales inherent through instalment plans, the Ford Company instituted
the Ford Weekly Purchasing Plan in 1923. This called on consumers to commit to a
new Ford purchase by saving the cost, in five-dollar weekly increments, within a
specially designated and administered interest-bearing account (Nevins and Hill,
1957: 268-9; Calder, 1999: 195-99). Like Macy's 'Deposit Account' strategy
mentioned earlier, the repayment plan was designed to both encourage consumers to
be thrifty and self-disciplined as well as obviating the perceived administrative and
default losses inherent to the provision of instalment credit facilities. The plan,
though, was a spectacular and embarrassing failure. Eighteen months after its
launch, of the 400,000 that had signed up, only 131,000 continued their investment
to purchase - the equivalent of around one month's sales. The purchase plan clearly
embodied older Puritan values of thrift and self-discipline that had long been
instilled within workers to render them docile and devoted to the labour process.
Saving was the means by which independence and sovereignty could be assured, the
mechanism through which the individual worker and their family could be made
self-reliant and self-governing under liberalism (c.f. Donzelot, 1980). However,
within a context that increasingly targeted consumption and the continuous
regeneration of desire, saving became a distinctly inadequate medium for its
satisfaction.
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The period between the spurring of imaginative longing for the possibilities of new
forms of consumption and its resolution in acquisition represents a 'happy hiatus'
within which the possibility of perfected experience injects such goods with their
greatest pleasurable potential before the inevitable dissolution of such perfection
encountered by the goods in their 'real' state (Campbell, 1987). Fundamentally, as
Campbell explains, puritanism and modem consumerism are two sides of the same
coin, embodying the separation of individual feeling from action, the autonomous
manipulation of emotion within the individual in anticipation of a future to come.
The commercial development of instalment credit, though, released the possibility of
immediate purchase and instant gratification of consuming desire while the fate of
Ford's purchase savings plan indicates that the gap between accumulation and actual
purchase was an hiatus too far to bridge for too many consumers. Within this
qualitatively new period of consumption, with higher wages in a
bureaucratic/machine-organised world and a host of new and continuously surfacing
objects playing on the imaginations of consumers through new forms and media of
advertising, the scope of desire became so widened and its pace so multiplied that
even with the possibility of prompt gratification of specific wants, the experience of
wanting came to exist as a general state to which the consumer was permanently
exposed (1987: 92-3).
In many ways, instalment credit represents a systematic effort by capitalism both to
fulfil the goals of desire, but also to discipline and mould that desire - what Calder
(1999) calls the 'regulation of abundance'. This follows Baudrillard's position that,
while credit operates under a semblance of hedonism, it produces a rationalising
effect over the actions of individuals, allowing them to be incorporated as
calculating consumers where otherwise they would remain outside the limits of
profitable consumption. It is worth recalling here Simmel's (1978) argument that the
space separating a subject and an object of desire must be sufficiently distant to
permit those objects to be desired, to be imaginatively and abstractly dwelt upon and
understood within the consciousness of the individual beyond the purely sensory
pleasure of immediacy. Nevertheless, such objects can not be too distant from
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individuals otherwise desire collapses or is dissolved to nothing more than a 'vague
wish' as the possibility of possession appears too far fetched. Objects that reside
within these so-called upper and lower limits, although experienced as resistant to
the subject, are within sufficient scope of the actions of the subject for such
resistance to be overcome.
The systematisation and extension of instalment credit thus delicately recalibrated
the distance between the desiring consumer and the mass produced automobile.
Although the assembly line helped lower production costs and thus price, it was the
technology of the instalment plan, borrowed from the merchandising success of
older consumer goods such as the sewing machine but newly infused with
specialised finance capital, which transformed the automobile from a 'vague wish'
(which in 1907 Woodrow Wilson believed might bring socialism to America) into a
realisable object of desire for increasing swathes ofthe middle and lower middle
classes. Simultaneously, consumer involvement in such instalment credit agreements
involved a submission to a regimen of discipline which tightly governed the actions
of those consumers. Desire, stimulated by a new array of consumer choice, became
specifically regulated by the binding oftime and money flows within the instalment
plan:
•
Despite being a form of borrowing, an initial payment amounting to
around one-third of the purchase price had to be saved and offered in
advance as a down-payment
The sequential, step-by-step liquidation of debt characterising this form
of credit amalgamated principal and interest elements into a fixed number
of simple, all-inclusive predictable payments set out in advance for the
life of the agreement.
Missed payments became potentially manageable. Given the breakdown
of repayments, the missing of one payment rather than whole principal
meant that the credit agreement did not necessarily break-down. The
lender could potentially renegotiate the credit agreement, especially near
•
•
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the latter stages. The missing of payments in early stages, on the other
hand, provided early warning indication of difficulties on the part ofthe
debtor and the goods could be repossessed quickly before the continued
onset of costly depreciation.
• The legal characterisation of the contract as a conditional sale ensured
that the good could be repossessed and the down payment and monthly
payments already made remained the property ofthe creditor.
It is perhaps no coincidence that the formalised instalment plan governing credit
consumption seems to resonate with the characteristic mode of production of the
assembly-line. Both sought to govern complex new domains of consumption and
production respectively through a detailed arrangement of time and space that
impelled individual action into a repetitive array of simplified tasks dictated to the
individual from above.
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Figure 1.8 Outstanding US Consumer Instalment Debt, 1919-39. Source: Olney, 1991: 93-4.
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To briefly summarise the events of the 1920s, the scope and scale of credit
increasingly came to bridge the hiatus between consuming desire and fulfilment.
Between 1919 and 1929, the amount of total consumer instalment debt outstanding
at finance companies increased from $0.72 billion to $2.95 billion before
plummeting with the onset of the Great Depression (see chart 1). Itwas not until the
onset of a war economy at the end of the 1930s that rates recovered to something
like their previous highs.
In the financing of automobile purchase, increased competition led to an extension
of repayment times and a lowering of required down payments, helping to propel
new car sales from 1.3 million to 3.2 million over the same period (Olney, 1991:
96). As advanced industrial production brought new goods such as mechanical
refrigerators, radios, phonographs, washing machines as well as cars to the market in
what Olney has termed a 'durable goods revolution' , new and existing finance
companies deployed instalment credit to locate these consumerist items within the
boundaries of desire for broader swathes of the population (Seligman, 1927; Clark,
1930; Ayres, 1938). These new goods were met by the process of home
electrification that spread from 10% of households in 1905 to around 75% by the
end of the 1920s (Nye, 1998: 171). Instalment selling also increasingly penetrated
into other retail spaces including the department store as well as being more widely
adopted by the national mail order companies Sears and Montgomery Ward (Cohn,
1940: 524-36; Emmet and Jeuck, 1950; Leach, 1993; Calder, 1999).
Until the 1930s, as Olney (1999, 2002) demonstrates, the 'conditional sale' contract
form underpinning the structure of the instalment contract was heavily punitive
towards consumer 'indiscipline' . Any monthly payment defaulted could result in the
finance company repossessing the car to which they held title until the end of the
credit period as well as retaining their retaining of the initial down payment made
and whatever number of payments had been completed. As Seligman shows in the
early development of such firms, the use of the conditional sale form, the
specification of a one-third down payment and a six to twelve month contract period
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were carefully calculated contrivances to maximise revenues while playing upon
what were understood to be the incentives of consumers towards repayment or
default. In many ways instalment credit presupposed but also sought to nurture an
economising, entrepreneurial mentality - by setting out a legal framework to govern
credit consumption, individuals freely entering into such contracts could be relied
upon to defend and respond to their own material interests as consumers for the
benefit of the creditor. Later during the Great Depression of the 1930s, as loss rates
on merchandise and mortgage loans jumped markedly, Olney cites such constraints
as being the reason why losses on instalment credit were maintained at around 1-2%
(1999: 325). Freedom to engage credit to bring about a resolution of consuming
desire was thus predicated on particular institutional forms that both permitted and
regulated the path through which that freedom was to be realised.
Itwould be one-dimensional, however, to contrast a traditional Puritanism
dependent upon resolute self-restraint and self-government to a 'nee-Puritanism'
where individuals seem unable to exert self-government in the face of consuming
desire and will is submitted to the external government of bureau-legal processes. As
Olney (1999) details, the early development of instalment selling was regulated
legally under case law as opposed to legislation. In other words, neither the federal
nor individual states sought to intervene to cohesively govern this form of credit;
rather, its form developed on the basis of contracts freely entered into by individuals
and the challenges and contestations they provoked in the courts under contract law.
The conditional sales contract form that such credit took implied that it was not
perceived, at least legally, as borrowing and so did not come under the ambit of state
usury laws. Interest charges were merely the extra cost imposed for the
'convenience' of purchasing a good over time. In contrast to small loan lending, the
subjective will of individuals was to be the primary basis through which such forms
of credit wasto be governed - not coincidentally then was instalment selling of cars
concentrated upon middle class consumers (Seligman, 1927; Cohen, 1990), those
whom it was believed could be relied upon to discipline their own freedom.
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Calder cites the term 'regulated abundance' to describe how individuals' flows of
income are regularised by their removal from individual control and their subjection
to legal-bureaucratic processes so that individuals willingly come to subject
themselves and their actions to external forces. From his perspective, puritan self-
denial, self-restraint and self-control in accumulating resources are subsumed by a
neo-puritan budget plan restraint characterised by the external fetter and control of
the contractual obligations of sale that require payment. Rather prosaically, it is
argued that people need the external regulation of instalment-type credit as they
would otherwise not be able to save in the conventional way for relatively expensive
durable goods and would end up frittering away household resources upon less
important but more easily acquired non-durable goods.
Attempting to refute Daniel Bell's argument that consumer credit embodies a
disjuncture between an increasingly hedonistic cultural realm and a productive
system crucially dependent upon values of discipline, self-restraint and deferred
gratification, Calder observes that consumer credit embodies, in many ways, a
continuation of older Puritan values so that individuals must be strict in their own
personal finances and disciplined money managers within a context where this
necessity is imposed upon them from without:
The fact was - and is - that in a market crowded with sellers, if people were
to purchase durable goods with lasting value they would need the authority
of written contracts, the discipline of regular payments, the supervision of
credit bureaucracies, and ultimately the threat of embarrassment, harassment,
and repossession by bill collectors. Compared with the internal discipline of
Victorian thrift, the external regimen of savings imposed by instalment credit
expects less from people. But in terms of investment in durable goods, it
accomplishes more. (1999: 207-8)
There is a certain sense with Calder whereby people are seen as being in awe of the
paradise of an infinite array of consumption possibilities and have no option but to
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spend, to take advantage of emergent credit facilities for durable goods that they
cannot otherwise afford and thus more or less voluntarily bow to the environmental-
institutional constraints inherent to instalment credit which reign in and channel their
compulsive and impulsive desires (for a rational-choice treatment of this
phenomenon, see Schelling, 1980; Dresser, 1982; Elster, 1984). Yet, even with the
liberalisation credit conditions automobiles during the 1920s with lower down-
payments, longer repayment terms and lower rates of interest - an ostensible
weakening of the external regulation governing instalment buying - credit use
expanded among the middle classes and defaults, according to Olney's evidence,
remained low.
The development of mass finance instalment credit among such strata recognised
and acted upon a certain level of self-constraint within individuals (c.f. Elias, 1994);
that they lived in relatively stable and regularised social environments where they
were financially equipped to make repayments, were sufficiently foresighted to
assess their current income, future income and other necessary expenditures in order
to dispassionately imagine in advance the necessity of making weekly or monthly
repayments until the term of their agreement expired. In expressing their will
through a formal contract, individuals, were expected to rationally weigh up, in
advance and over time, the benefits and costs of such an agreement, exhibit self-
control in terms of their behaviour and engage in not so much deferred gratification
as 'managed gratification' by subordinating short-term impulses to expend resources
on other attainable goods for the immediately accessible longer-term gains of the
good for which the credit agreement was contracted. Of course the actions of
individuals, in their increasingly prominent role as consumers, were being shaped by
external constraints but these constraints could not impose self-discipline; this could
only emanate from individuals consciously imagining in advance how they would
act in order to adhere to the terms of the agreement to which they had freely
contracted. In essence then, individuals had to be instilled with and assume the
capacity, the will to be subjected to an institutionally created repayment system
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within an increasingly more complex, 'organised' and interdependent society, in
order to recognise the consuming benefits they felt that it would bring.
Reinventing Thrift
Benjamin Franklin, through the publication of 'Poor Richard's Almanack', had
sought to encourage what Weber ([ 1930] 1976) has called a particular 'spirit of
capitalism' which, shorn of an explicit puritan ideology, offered a moralised ethic
for the living of one's life that frowned upon personal indebtedness as a threat to
independence and self-sufficiency (Lasch, 1991; Tucker, 1991). Under industrialism,
as Horrowitz (1985) indicates, the bourgeois habit of thrift was used as a basis for
promoting industrious and disciplined habits among a growing urban labour force. In
classical political economy the promotion of such a virtuous personal conduct was
linked up to a wider economic wellbeing. Adam Smith ([1776] 1910), in the Wealth
of Nations, emphasised how lending for production allowed capital to be employed
in its own reproduction with profit from which the lender could be reimbursed. On
the contrary, lending for immediate consumption engendered the 'unproductive'
dissolution of wealth while repayment and interest presented a drain upon future
alternate revenues. 'The man who borrows in order to spend will soon be ruined, and .
he who lends to him will generally have occasion to repent of his folly' (p. 313).
Similarly for John Stuart Mill (1888), while credit did not represent the creation of
wealth, through the activity of banking it allowed idle savings to be efficiently
placed in the care of the 'industrial talent of the country' who could tum it to
productive use and increase public wealth. However, in the hands of 'unproductive
consumers', even though it may be repaid, credit served as a dissipation of public
wealth measurable in the lost opportunity to reproduce itself and thus create value.
Such precepts through which economic expertise both discerned and helped
constitute the idea of the 'economy' as a vibrant, independent sphere changed into
the 2<i.
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century. As the formation of capitalism altered through innovative modes of
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organisation, the production of new forms and types of goods through new means of
distribution and the bedding-in of a national market, economic discourse
conceptualising economic activity began to shift. In the same decade that consumer
instalment credit was becoming legitimated on a wider commercial scale, the
economist H.G. Moulton (1918) argued against the prevailing orthodoxy of
economic expertise by presenting evidence that under a complex industrial society
capital formation depends not on a simple 'thrifty impulse' but on making saving
available for both productive investment and sufficient consumer demand. In doing
so he excoriated his expert profession for it persistent adherence to outdated
assumptions and moralised posturing, 'the economist thus aspires to be more than a
pure scientist; he is also a preacher of the gospel of individual economic salvation.
The chief difficulty here is that in preaching so ardently we have usually forgotten to
be scientific' (p. 864).
In the 1920s, the economist Edwin Seligman (1927) of Columbia University
working on behalf of General Motors, published his landmark 'The Economics of
Instalment Selling'. Through an analysis of credit, he attempted to deconstruct the
entire economic dualism of the 'production' and 'consumption' of wealth into the
all-encompassing neutral term of 'utilisation' which itself could be 'creative',
'neutral', 'wasteful' or 'destructive'. In contrast to classical economics, he reasoned
from such a position that credit for consumption was not inherently degrading to
wealth and neither was credit for production self-evidently beneficial; their social
usefulness depended, rather, on the specific purposes to which they were put. Evans
Clark, of the policy research Twentieth-Century Fund, even suggested that modem
business was increasingly conceiving of the consumer 'as business men or women in
their own right', who had to be constantly replenished with liquid capital in order to
enable them to continue making purchases and thus sustain the markets that were
being built around them (1930: 3).
German economist Ferdynand Zweig (1934) emphasised, too, the productivity-
raising. impetus that instalment credit had provided to the post first world war
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American economy, raising the quality of working class consumption by assisting
the purchase of durable goods and stimulating mass-consumption into a virtuous
tandem with mass-production. Such credit even served, he believed, as a form of
income redistribution through which the savings of the 'well-to-do classes' could be
channelled to increase the share of income and consumption possibilities of the
working class. In a simple but telling metaphor of this new elision of the
'productive' and the 'consumptive' in lending, Rolf Nugent, in analysing the
position of the borrower at the end of the 1930s, imagined a consumer thinking of
not 'going into debt' so much as 'expanding both sides of his balance sheet' through
having the simultaneous use of the objects for which he was paying for by credit
(Nugent, 1938: 44).
Within the banking industry of the 1920s, such a discursive shift in the
conceptualisation of thrift connected with the programmatic language of scientific
management and, more broadly, the shift of capitalist enterprise towards large scale
organisation (Roe, 1965). Rather than being abandoned, thrift was revised and
rearticulated from what was understood as a blind, unthinking saving to the efficient,
planned management of resources: '[t]he thrift man in the age of scientific
management did not skimp or hoard; rather, he planned and controlled the use of his
financial resources. The family budget allotted amounts computed with exact
precision to subsistence, pleasures, investment and, above all, saving' (p. 625).
Despite severe conservatism within the industry, the Economic Policy Commission
of the American Bankers Association accepted the possibility of instalment selling
as a normal 'ingredient' within the economy once such credit was neither subject to
individual 'abuse' nor posed a wider economic danger. To these ends, as Roe
discerns, particular emphasis was given to the collation of statistics and the creation
of a 'scientific formula' that would calculably regulate applicant acceptance, down
payment amount and loan period. Instalment credit could thus be subject to effective
direction and management to maximise its productive potential and minimise any
detrimental effects.
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As well as plotting the increase in the volume, proportion and prominence of
advertising for credit terms by goods retailers during the 1920s, Murphy (1995) also
analyses the particular way that such advertising came to project the use of credit.
Rather than simply selling the goods concerned, she argues that the advertising of
the time also attempted to 'sell' the idea of credit itself, employing modalities of
language that represented it to individuals as a restrained, frugal and thrifty practice.
The five discursive strategies she notes are the:
• favourable comparison of weekly instalments with the rhythmical habit of
savings
• declaration of the dignity of particular credit plans, even how it might result
in savings
• presentation of the easy affordability of instalment payments that would
present 'no strain on your income'
• elevation of the productive usefulness of having immediate access to a good
and the convenience of paying while using
• indication of tailored credit repayments to suit the income and savings of the
individual
William H. Whyte would note a few decades later in mass society's advertising of
credit that '[flew talents are more commercially sought today than the knack of
describing departures from the Protestant Ethic as reaffirmations of it' (1956: 17).
So it was that in the opening decades of the 20th century thrift proved too durable a
virtue of self-government to be abandoned; it provided rather a plastic, chameleonic
one that could be remoulded and re-tinted to fit a new capitalism whose profitability
depended on the stimulation of consumer desire. An older bourgeois thrift of
frugality and asceticism, part of a calculating and instrumental 'capitalist spirit'
became subsumed into a 20th century thrift of middle class consumers that was
equally, if not more, calculating and instrumental in its exhorting of 'income
mana~ement' but which now emphasised the productivism, utility - and the need to
discipline - the fulfilment of consumption.
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The purpose of this chapter has been to analyse ~ selective socio-history of the
different forms that credit for consumption has taken within the United States since
the 19th century with the onset of industrialisation, and in doing so, attempt to
interrogate the specific forms that such borrowing has taken at different historical
junctures, in what ways those borrowers have been conceived and understood, how
it has been thought that they have required particular forms of government and how
such credit has related to the broader phenomenon of consumption. However, to
speak of consumer credit is problematic. The term itself is an invention of the early
20th century, embodying not only its growth as a material reality as mainstream
finance capital began to penetrate the facilitation of consuming desire but as a new
discursive conception of individuals and of the money that they were increasingly
able to borrow. Within this, consumption and its adjunct of credit became not only
more significant in the lives of individuals but in the calculations of capitalism, the
analyses of economists and the political conceits of the state.
Pawnbroking represents one of the earliest forms of personal borrowing and images
of the 'Three Balls', furtive or feckless pledgers, and shelves of goods stacked in
gloomy surrounds soak much of the imagination of early industrial life. Around the
mid-l S'" century, however, as industrialisation began to take hold within America's
east coast urban centres, new forms of borrowing developed around the pledge of
future salary and the legal title of possessions. Secured by abstract title rather than
material possession, these small lenders attempted to govern the uncertainty of
repayment, the possibility of financial loss and the opportunity for profit through an
assessment of the borrower's fixedness within their neighbourhood, the contrivance
of legal claim, the strict temporal regulation of repayments and the coercive threat of
revelation to neighbours and employers. Despite, and in some ways because of, the
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illegality of such lending where interest was charged typically well in excess of
legislative state ceilings, some successful lenders developed into chains of small
offices throughout America's major cities.
However, in the flux and turmoil of industrialisation and the discovery of 'poverty'
as a 'social problem' ineradicable by the market, the phenomenon of small loan
borrowing became understood as a financial and moral burden upon the workers and
their families. In response, elites promulgated the philanthropic solution of remedial
lending to competitively eliminate the threat that small loan lending seemed to
represent by providing a cheaper source of funds that would both aid the needy and
provide for the possibility of their re-moralisation through the inculcation of thrifty
habits. Within the context of Progressivism, a disparate response at the tum of the
century to the fragmentation and disorder of urban industrial life, a new social
scientific expertise developed in relation to the problem of small loan lending.
Although Vilifying lenders as exploitative 'loan sharks', leading crusades to have
them eliminated and championing alternative benevolent forms of borrowing such as
credit unions and the remedials, these experts also recognised the intrinsic
limitations of these alternatives. What they strategised instead, at the start of the new
century, was a new proposed role for states in legalising and licensing commercial
small lending, simultaneously providing for the needs of workers and
organisationally governing the terms under which such lending took place.
From the mid-Is" century, the instalment selling of consumer goods demonstrated a
different set of governing practices to cash borrowing - most particularly, charges
for its use were not interpreted by the courts to be a form of 'interest' and so were
not subject to typical state usury restrictions. In the antebellum years, the practice of
instalment selling developed among certain furniture and piano retailers who
governed the uncertainty of repayment through the use of down payments, the
reservation oflegal title and the temporal discipline of small incremental payments.
But they also relied upon the strength of will of the individual consumers who were
accepted - the potentiality for such self-government being assessed and determined
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along class, race and gender lines. Credit thus became part of the consuming
practices of elements of the middle class who were attempting to assuage desire but
yet were unwilling or unable to do so without recourse to such credit.
From the 1850s, the development of the sewing machine, primarily by the Singer
Company, and its retailing through a nationwide network of agents saw the first
application of instalment credit by industry in the pursuit of consumer profit. The
destabilising impact of this technology on the role of women and the liberal
constitution of the family became articulated, in one dimension, on the fearfulness of
allowing women to buy these forms of household equipment on credit due to their
intrinsically impaired will which, rather than marshalling their credit use, was seen
to render them vulnerable to pressures of consuming desire and the exploitative
practices of peddling agents. In the final turbulent decades of the century, as
instalment credit became increasingly used by workers, immigrants and Black
minorities, it also became pervasively stigmatised, associated through narratives of
skulduggery and exploitation, the exhibition of deficient will and an absence of
freedom. From this the middle classes carefully distanced themselves.
Into the 20th century, with new forms of industrial and capitalist organisation and an
increasing focus on the national market, the constant unbound regeneration of
consumer desire increasingly took primacy in the calculations of profit. Particularly
in the development ofthe mass, assembly-line produced automobile, instalment
credit became re-legitimised for the realisation of desire, with mainstream finance
capital of the 1920s increasingly being directed towards the personalised financing
of, firstly, automobiles and soon a whole host of new consumer goods for a growing
mass market. Instalment credit therefore came to provide a medium for the
satisfaction of desire, locating increasing numbers of goods within the boundaries of
possibility for more individuals while, at the same time, provoking a disciplining and
regulation of that desire through bureaucratic-legal constraints and an emphasis upon
the capacity for those individuals to regulate their own actions. In conjunction with
the developrnent of mass financing, the idea of thrift became articulated by bankers,
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economists and advertisers in new ways that incorporated consumer credit as a
productive endeavour, an essential economic activity and as a normal component of
a disciplined consumer's budget.
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Chapter 2. 'It's Everywhere You Want to Be':
Willy: Once in my life I would like to own something outright before it's
broken! I'm always in a race with the junkyard! I just finished paying for
the car and it's on its last legs. The refrigerator consumes belts like a
goddamn maniac. They time those things. They time them so when you
finally paid for them, they're used up.
Arthur Miller, Death of a Salesman
In their new North American re-branding and marketing campaign launched in
September 2005, Visa adopted the tag line 'Life Takes Visa' and deployed resonant
emotional imagery, from the everyday to the spectacular, to demonstrate the
possibilities of consumer empowerment through the ubiquity of their credit card. But
how did Visa and its ilk come to encapsulate the idea of consumer credit, providing
for the possibility of 'consumer empowerment' in the 21 sI century and, more
importantly, what has been the significance of this process for American society and
beyond?
From the 1920s onwards, as mass consumption began to attain increasing
significance, new attendant forms of mass personal credit began to take root as a
fundamental mechanism for its realisation. This involved not only new
organisational arrangements developed through the market but also new ways of
thinking about credit and its usefulness, as well as the imagining of a new role for
the federal state, itself fundamentally altered by the legacy of the New Deal, for the
management of this vast economic production I consumption matrix. However in the
post-war era, this idea of an homogeneous standard of living growing by increments
under the careful hand of the state-as-gardener began to crumble under the weight of....
its own ambition. In what followed, consumers were encouraged to follow their own
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individual path to fulfilment through an economy that became pre-eminently
grounded on consumption and markets that increasingly tied profit to the virtues of
self-identity, non-conformity and personal fulfilment. Simultaneously, the state's
economic duty increasingly began to turn on its repudiation of the New Deal legacy,
concentrating its governing energies instead on the ever greater streamlining of
market efficiency in the name of consumer choice where once it had actively
intervened in the interests of collective welfare.
As we shall see, Visa, Mastercard and their brethren were born to the logic of mass
society, of mass mail drops, mass markets, anonymity and homogeneous terms but
their later development under deregulation and new entrants, segmented markets and
expansionary ownership, accelerated their role as instruments of personalised,
individualised consumer fulfilment. Today, credit cards have come to be the sine
qua non of contemporary consumerism, embodying an instantaneously deployable
global payment instrument, an unconstrained, personalised credit resource, an object
of aesthetic delight or ethical purpose, an access point for elevated consuming
experiences and more. Yet the freer, the more personalised, the more liberated credit
has become, in general, in its imbrication within the field of consumption, the more
widely, and more finely information is sought and accumulated on the personalised
consumption choices of individual consumers. Just as the scope of choice within the
market becomes broadened and diversified for the profitable facilitation of wants
and desires permanently being recalled and recast, the more centralised and
technologically intensive becomes the system of surveillance designed to ensure that
the endless succession of choices actually made are permanently inscribed and
personally attributed.
It is this unimpeded, hyper-dynamic circulation of information between lenders and
reporting agencies which is seen to be the true 'productive' heart of the economy.
Through its sinuous, frictionless informational tracing of consumer credit choices,
continuously produced knowledge about consumers is accumulated and
disseminated in a fashion which is both cooperative and commercialised, compiled
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and made available to lenders and others who judge the future creditworthiness of
such consumers based on their demonstrated, 'objective' capacity to do so in the
past. As credit choices have become 'freer' and wider, the surveillance of those
choices has become equally seamless and fluid. Freedom of choice thus depends on
the accumulated, constituted ability of consumers to control that freedom over the
long-term.
Mass Credit, Mass Society and their Discontents
Shifting Discourses and Economies of Consumer Credit
The early decades of the 20th century saw the United States become an increasingly
economically centralised nation oriented around the systematic production of
fulfilment for consuming desire, a desire experienced by individuals who were being
increasingly constituted as a mass of 'consumers'. Such changes encompassed: the
dissemination of the corporate organisational form; systematic mergers and the
formation of giant industrial enterprises; new modes of distribution such as the
spectacular department store, national chain stores and the expansion of mail order;
the rise of professional and business training and accreditation in the modern
university enmeshed with new forms modalities and of advertising; rising incomes
and leisure time, with individuals themselves seeking meaning and fulfilment
through endless cycles of pleasure and dissatisfaction that was increasingly being
met and propelled by the endless calculated production of new, more and better
consumer goods. Crucially, the development of new forms of mass credit, financed
by specialised external finance capital, helped foster and nurture this circling trail of
production and consumption by providing a medium which made possible the
simultaneous realisation and disciplining of consuming desire.
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Within this context, new discourses began to circulate which legitimised the new
forms that consumption and credit were taking. In the 1890s, Simon Patten (1907)
had espoused the morally uplifting qualities of a rising threshold of desire while in
the new century, taking up this theme, Edwin Seligman (1927) challenged the age-
old distinctions of production and consumption, the 'woeful poverty of economic
analysis' that supported the cultural virtue of thrift as well as the understanding of
luxury as inherently corruptive. Teasing out the specific mandate of his work on
instalment selling, he presented the pragmatic but tantalising possibility that
consumer credit was only as productive or as wasteful as the specific use to which it
was put. Such a discursive shift, though, did not proceed smoothly or without
challenge. During the 1920s and 30s, board members of the nation's Federal Reserve
maintained a strict opposition to instalment credit which, in diverse ways, they
condemned as self-indulgent and immoral, de-stabilising to commercial banks,
commercially deceptive to business and an aggravating cause of the Great
Depression itself (Kubik, 1996). However in the post-Second World War consumer
boom, with re-conversion from war to consumer commodity production, the political
rationality of Keynesianism held out the responsibilities of the state to be the
facilitating of economic growth through the encouragement of mass consumption
(Cohen, 2003). In a virtuous spiral, the continuous pursuit of mass commodity
ownership provided for high employment, wages and productive output in the
enhancement of collective social wellbeing, a process which the state sought to
foster through a policy of economic interventionism through such diverse
programmes as the 1946 Employment Act, aggressive defence spending, ramped up
highway building projects, and the administrative organisation of the Federal
Housing Administration and the Veteran's Administration insurance of homeowner
mortgages (Cross, 2000). Americans were thus presented as enjoying the highest
standard ofliving in the world, and national pride was equated with the ability of
broader reaches of the population to enjoy the benefits of mass consumption.
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Figure 2.1 Scene from the 'Kitchen Debate', Moscow 1959. In a spontaneous interchange bet~een
Secretary Khrushchev and Vice-President Nixon held at an American exhibition in Moscow, NIxon
conceded the pre-eminence of Soviet rockets but attested to the superiority of American televisions
and domestic appliances that made the housewife's job easier - conflating as May (1988) notes, the
American way with the American standard of living. Source: CNN Cold War Series.
As Clyde Phelps (1954), an academic economist and proselytizer for credit argued,
the American standard of living was the greatest and fastest growing in the world
and instalment credit was essential to its maintenance. To these ends, he presented
credit use as a phenomenon not of poverty or wealth but of that 'great mass' of
middle income groups who 'needed' the enjoyment and convenience of those goods
whose purchase was made possible by credit. Although credit involved' going into
debt', he argued that this was offset by the equity that consumers built up in the
goods that they purchased, a wealth dignified with such productivist terms as
'consumer plant', 'equipment' and 'household capital formation'. As with Seligman,
production and consumption were not conceived as a dualism but as indisassociable
factors in which the perpetuation of individual wellbeing was symbiotically bound to
the continuation of a collective economic and social security. Within this
conceptualisation of production and consumption, the individual and collective,
consumer credit was seen to form a key locus point, particularly from 1950 when
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consumer capital expenditure was calculated as outstripping its equivalent
'producer' form for the first time (Shay, 1965: 370-1). Ultimately, as Phelps wrote,
'instalment buying has played an important part in raising living standards by
helping to facilitate the rise and expansion of great new industries, creating millions
of jobs, and by assisting in making possible through the economies of mass
production lower prices and improved quality of consumers' durable goods' (1954:
28-9).
In the new century, materialising this changing discourse, commercial banks forsook
their historical disdain for consumer lending and increasingly engaged it as a
profitable avenue of activity, obliquely, as we have seen, through the capitalisation
of sales-finance companies for instalment lending but also more directly through the
facilitation ofloans directly to consumers. The Depression was ultimately to prove a
watershed moment in the conception of consumer credit provision for, as the
banking system veered on a state of collapse with innumerable bank closures, only
39 consumer sales finance companies were forced to close between 1925 and 1933,
with less than half involving financial losses to creditors (Plummer and Young,
1940: 66-7).
In 1928, National City Bank opened the first personal loan department in New York
servicing city employees, clerks, stenographers and other office workers with cash
credit at interest rates of around 12%, seen at the time as a massive blow against the
travails of the salary lenders. By the end of 1930, it was facilitating double the
number of personal loans of all other banks in the country combined (Clark, 1930:
74-5; Grant, 1992: 306-11). Throughout the 1930s, despite the pressures of the
Depression and the scepticism of the Federal Reserve, the numbers of banks offering
loans expanded from around 85 before 1925 to over 1,222 in 1938, with banks by
that time offering over $196 million in such credit. When sales-finance companies
are added, the total number of banks servicing consumers directly and indirectly was
1,500 with total credit outstanding amounting to $500 million (Chapman, 1940: 21-
46). Commenting on the post-war era, Robert Shay (1965) could claim that the
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combined economic weight of consumer instalment credit had become 'strategic' to
the growth of employment and national productivity by virtue of its sheer economic
weight in financing consumer durable 'investment' (Shay, 1965: 379).
Consumer Credit and State Regulation, Part 1: Defending Collective Welfare
The Great Depression in the United States encouraged two significant regulatory
initiatives in relation to a banking industry which, it was believed, by over-extending
itself through ruinous competition and inflexibility had helped precipitate the
speculative bubble which had had such disastrous consequences on the American
economy (Nocera, 1994; Dymski and Veitch, 1996; Brand, 2002). The McFadden-
Pepper Act of 1927 pressed responsibility onto states to regulate the banks within
their borders while also prohibiting banks from operating branches outside of their
home state, thus preventing behemothian regional banks from destroying their
smaller counterparts. This was later reinforced in 1956 by the Bank Holding
Company Act which prevented the operation of multiple banks in multiple states by
a single parent holding company. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, on the other hand,
placed severe limitations on banks from engaging in multiple business activities and
also created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to federally insure the
savings of bank depositors. Thus in effect the state, through law, acted to directly
limit banking competition, deliberately inhibiting and forcefully segmenting the
market in order to preserve a stable, sustainable economy.
This regulatory bulwark not only governed the wider scope of bank activities but
also served to regulate the narrower form of consumer credit practices. Although
seemingly paradoxical in today's context, these statutory initiatives were part of the
welfarist New Deal political rationality which shaped the post-Depression space of
rule that conceived of the economy and society as dynamic totalities which could,
theoretically, be governed through rational, calculated planning, thus ensuring
economic and social progress without the comprising of individual autonomy and
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excessive state intervention (Rose, 1999b: 127-8). These initiatives did not merely
mean a new role for the American federal state but tilted the balance of legislative
authority away from the political heterogeneity of individual states to the
homogeneity of the nation as a whole - such federal social interventionism acting, to
paraphrase Dean (1999a), on a unitary body in what was understood to be the
defence of a unitary domain. Without this active intervention of the state, it was
calculated that the free play of the economy would escalate into a speculative boom
whose grandeur would only be matched by the degradation of the inevitable slump
to follow with, as had happened so dramatically in the 1930s, the infliction of
permanent scarring on the face of the social body.
However, the New Deal federal state served not only to limit the scope and reach of
the banks but, in one element at least, actively fostered the business of consumer
lending. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which had been set up to
administer the insurance of residential home mortgage loans and thus encourage
lenders back into the business of making them, included a provision under Title Iof
its enabling legislation, the National Housing Act 1934, for the insurance of home
improvement loans for 'repair and modernisation' (Coppock, 1940). The
socialisation of risk that the FHA provided, in addition to the stated aims of reducing
unemployment and costs and reinvigorating market flows, helped acclimatise
lenders to the profitable opportunities inherent in consumer lending in an
environment where they were secured against the unknown hazards of financial loss
(Coppock, 1940: 3; Chapman, 1940: 23; Calder, 1999: 282-3). Another New Deal
measure, the Electric Home and Farm Authority, sought to encourage the
development of rural electrification by providing subsidised, long-term consumer
instalment finance through dealerships for household electrical appliances, mainly
refrigerators but also ranges, water heaters, washing machines and radios (Coppock,
1940: 115-18). Thus, in the interests of collective welfare based on promulgating
employment and social stability, the diffuse New Deal state itself intervened to
provide fiscal and administrative direction and support to marketised consumer
credit+
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During the mid decades of the century, a highly direct macro regulation of consumer
credit was taken during times of perceived crisis. In the formation of the 'war
economy' in the 1940s, the Federal Reserve was empowered under 'Regulation W'
to set minimum down payments and maximum loan periods for all types of
consumer credit, including instalment and store charge accounts, in order to dampen
the threat of inflation and facilitate conversion to war production (Cole, 1988;
Schreft, 1990). This was repeated in 1948 in an effort to combat post-war inflation
and again in 1950 during the onset of the Korean War. Although consumer credit
was conceived as a marketised mechanism for the facilitation of consumer desire,
the use of terms controls established the Federal Reserve as a calculating centre from
which it could temporally calibrate the opportunities of such desire - periodically
adjusting the contractual terms that creditors could offer to individual consumers
across a diverse space oflending - in order to defend and promote the wider
collective economic security of the nation. Just as the controlled promulgation of
mass consumption and credit were inextricably bound to economic growth and
social harmony, during times of crisis its deliberate curbing by the state was deemed
equally essential in order to curtail the corrosive menace of price inflation and,
during war, to redirect the economy as a whole towards the defence of its
sovereignty.
At the state level, as we have seen, instalment selling had remained outside the scope
of both small loan legislation and statutory usury control due to the preponderance
of court judgements that rejected the concept of instalment 'charges' as a form of
interest. By the 1930s however, the introduction of several bills and acts sought to
enforce some measure of control over instalment selling in order to remedy the
perceived 'inequality' of bargaining power understood to be inherent to that form of
contract (Greene, 1935; Reuss, 1935). By the 1950s, twelve states had passed some
form of instalment selling regulation (Mors, 1950). The perceived abuses that
legislation was designed to counter were: firstly, deceptive computation which
presented interest in an artificially low manner and the use of 'widely varying and
112
frequently incomprehensible formulas' to calculate interest, both of which were
thought to impede the consumer from rationally deciding between credit offers;
secondly, the non-disclosure of contractual terms and the incentivising of retailers by
finance companies which unduly encouraged individuals to take on credit they could
not afford; thirdly, wage assignments and coercive provisions for non-repayment
which provided for unfair leverage over the buyer's actions by the finance company
(Cavers, 1935; Reuss, 1935; Foster, 1938; Mors, 1943, 1950). In response, the
various bills that were introduced formulated a concept of consumer disclosure
whereby any instalment contract would be required to clearly state the cash price of
the item, the down-payment amount, the unpaid balance, additional charges, the
contract duration and the specific instalment amounts that were to be paid. Some
also required a formal licensing of dealers and finance companies and the
submission of regular reports to a central supervisory authority.
Unlike the Uniform Small Loan Law (USLL), constituted on the basis of personal
borrowing as a 'social problem' stemming from the widespread exploitation of
borrower indebtedness, the creation of legislation to regulate instalment borrowing
was predicated on its conception as a form of 'consumer protection'. Itwas invoked
not as a response to the spectre of urban industrial poverty afflicting labour but to
the effective problem of how consumers could 'shop intelligently': 'patently the
need is for a uniform, accurate, outspoken method of statement, universally applied
whenever instalment credit is granted' (Foster and Foster, 1935: 190). Interestingly,
Russell Sage did develop two uniform laws on instalment credit in the 1940s but
achieved no success in having it passed in any state; the organisation later
withdrawing from credit as a field for its activities after the war (Mors, 1950: 206).
Rather than a subject who was understood as being both materially and morally
vulnerable, the instalment buyer was a hampered consumer whose will was not
dissolute in itself but merely weaker relative to the dealer and finance company
which could command considerable administrative, legal and financial resources. By
their form, rather than their quality, such individuals were understood to be impeded
in the 'free exercise of rational choice and the free recognition of the consequences of
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their actions. Thus, the instalment legislation passed was based on obviating this
'inequality' , not by regulating the form of operation as the USLL did but by
dictating the formula of the contract within which terms were freely agreed. The
state did not fix maximum amounts or legal monthly rates of interest; rather it sought
to induce transparency into the transaction in such a way that the individual could
readily compare market alternatives, between different instalment offers or using
instalment credit at all, and pursue their own rational self-interest as a consumer.
In a certain sense, the creation of a legislative cloak of consumer protection for the
instalment credit consumer demonstrates a particular cynicism held by the state in
relation to the domain of the market. Its complexity, as well as the accrual of
resources to finance companies due to new modes of organisation, was seen to be
inherently burdensome on the individual's will and distorting to the efficacy of
economic exchange. In response, states drew new lines of government towards the
protection, even the privileging, of the will of the citizen-consumer constituency in
the face of a loss of freedom that was no longer redeemed by but was seen to be
residing within the very machinations of the market.
Mid-century, at multiple layers of the American polity, these new banking laws,
provision interventions, temporal terms controls and instalment selling regulatory
initiatives problematised, in a general sense, the market as being potentially
destructive and dangerous to the wellbeing of society. Although the pursuit of
individualised self-interest was a crucial function of the market, its exigencies and
externalities were rationalised by the state (and states) in diffuse ways as being in
need of a calculating and deliberative intervention in order to both dampen its self-
destructive tendencies and boost its activities where these were seen to be needful of
intervention in the wider interest. This form of government, as Dean (1999a)
suggests, acted to enframe society in mechanisms of security that locked together the
health of society with that of the economy. The autonomy of the market - of banks,
finance companies, retail lenders and consumers - was penetrated while leaving
them as formally autonomous actors, the present and future pursuit of individual
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self-interest anchored within a framework of ongoing collective welfare. With the
implementation of banking laws, market subsidisation and the temporary injunction
of terms controls, this collective welfare was 'society' in its broadest sense, the
organic tissues of the nation which had been so wrenched through the economic
turmoil of a Depression believed to have been compounded by the suicidally
competitive activities of the banking sector (Brand, 2002) but which was later
threatened by corrosion in the purchasing value of money. With respect to
instalment selling regulations on the other hand, this welfare was a generalised
constituency of credit consumers, a distinctive, concrete collective in danger of
being subjugated by the growing economic power of finance companies whose sheer
size was held to warp the fabric of competition.
Conformity, Identity and Consuming Self-fulfilment
In the middle part of the 20th century, mass consumption and production had become
the binary pillars supporting the weight of the collective wellbeing of the nation. The
superiority of this' American way' was concretised by the fulfilment of such
consumerist desires for: the latest automobile model hot off the assembly-lines of
Detroit; a new Levittstown home, the mass-produced prefabricated housing
constructed for the young post-war generation in the new growing suburbs of the
major cities; a television, the new entertainment which bound the individual into a
mass audience for the national broadcasters, and the assorted household goods from
washing machines to fridge-freezers that Richard Nixon was so sure 'lightened the
burden' of the housewife (Gans, 1967; May, 1988; Baldassare, 1992; Cross, 2000;
Cohen,2003).
Mass consumption, though, was predicated on mass production, the bureaucratic
effectiveness of the organisation, the careful calibration of labour through group
relations psychology and the regulated physics of work flow systems that insured
optimal output and maximal return on capital and high wages for a workforce that
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formed a continuing layer of demand (Rose, 1999a). The state itself fostered a
welfarist system that bound society in a web of solidarity through such diffuse
programmes as state-enacted workman's compensation laws of the 19l0s (see
Chapter 1), the development of social security in the 1930s (Miron and Weil, 1997)
and the formation of the Federal Housing Administration to administer homeowner
mortgage insurance for the middle class and provide financial guarantees for the
construction of multi-family housing for those on low incomes. With a national
system of mortgage insurance, the state sought to directly penetrate the housing
market through the administration and funding of a scheme that conjoined the
subjective desires of the individual for suburban space to the protection of mortgage
providers and, more indirectly, the stimulation of the home construction industry
(Jackson, 1985; Caves, 1989; Carliner, 1998).
In the immediate post-war period, the development of the Employment Act of 1946
was premised on the Keynesian belief that the labour market was too crucial to be
left to vagaries of capital; the state thus charged itself with the responsibility of
guaranteeing full employment through the provision of appropriate fiscal
expenditure (Santoni, 1986; De Long, 1996, 1998). As Klausen (2002) shows, the
goals of the act enjoyed cross-party political support; with a widely held belief that
demobilisation would lead to deflation and economic recession, it was widely
conceived that only the pursuit of full-employment through what Weir and Skocpol
(1985) have called 'commercial Keynesiansim' could prevent the inevitable onset of
social dislocation.
By mid-century, mass consumption was seen to be the natural corollary of economic
growth - mass production with stable full-employment and high wages fed mass
consumption in a benevolent cycle that constantly pushed forward the limits of the
American standard of living. Over this virtuous circle stood the state, exerting its
fiscal and administrative powers to act as a 'guarantor of progress' for all, dispelling
hostilities and binding the individual, the economy and society through mechanisms
of soltdarity (c.f. Donzelot, 1991a). As Christopher Lasch (1991) suggests, the post-
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war decade, characterised by the extended reach of the welfare state and the
concentrated strength of American capitalism, had seemingly dissolved the dangers
of poverty and gross inequality while bequeathing an unprecedented affluence across
broader reaches of the population. Yet, within this ordering of society, a wide range
of social critics saw considerable danger in 'the decline of individualism and the
menace of conformity'; Jeremiads, who from a diversity of political positions,
persistently sought to inveigh from the wings on the dangers of the so-called 'mass
society'. Erich Fromm (1942) suggested that the 'mass' conditions of zo" century
industrial life, of centralised capital, vast cities, complex markets and media
bombardment, had alienated the individual and destroyed the possibility of
individual freedom. In order to escape their sense of isolation and powerlessness, the
modern individual had renounced their true individuality and had essentially ceased
'to be himself. Directly comparing its effects to those of hypnosis, he argued that
the modern individual has become nothing more than an 'automaton', the expression
of any supposed individuality merely the reflexive regurgitation of wider culture, the
effluent of an unthinking subjection of the self to society.
For the Critical Theorists such as Adorno and Horkheimer (1972) and Marcuse
(1964), culture had been systematically and wholly penetrated by a scientifically-
organised capitalism rendering it staid, homogeneous and unchanging, exploiting
and dulling the workers outside the working day as much as in it. The pleasure of
consuming desire, in particular, represented a set of 'false' needs imposed upon the
indoctrinated and manipulated masses so penetrated by the distorted form of society
that they are unable to recognise and reconcile their 'true' objective needs. Among
the more popular variants of this thesis was Vance Packard's (1957) muckraking
'The Hidden Persuaders' which sought to penetrate what he saw as the carefully
calculated manipulation of a witless mass audience by a cynical advertising industry
armed with the latest subliminal techniques. In a more academic vein, Galbraith
(1985) criticised what he saw as the excessive devotion of energies of the new
'affluent society' towards satisfying the over-productiveness of industry, the 'needs'
for wliich had to be contrived by a burgeoning advertising industry. Such a fixation
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upon the private, he argued, detracted attention and resources away from the
nurturing of a viable public infrastructure within which inequality could be
alleviated and a more broadly conceived, more meaningful quality of life improved.
In one of these celebrated and widely read social analyses of the period, sociologist
William H. Whyte (1957) elaborated on the fall of the traditional individual,
governed by the tenets of the Protestant ethic and the rise of what he termed
'Organisation Man' living in the 'packaged villages' of suburbia whose 'social
ethic' compels his affinity and aspiration of belonging to the group as well as his
belief in science to mediate the governance of group relations. For Lasch (1991), this
'Organisation Man' was symptomatic of the arrival of a new national character set
that was 'outer' rather than 'inner' directed, which obsessed about fitting in with the
collective and moulding every aspect oflife to conform to the requirements of the
organisational formula, which crafted and packaged itself as a personality as though
it were 'a commodity with an assignable market value'.
Yet within the United States from the 1960s, just as these diverse critiques gathered
force, the constitution of the mass consumer market that had been assembled from
the end of the 19th century, reaching fruition in post-war Great Society, began to
fragment:
A broad, relatively undifferentiated approach to marketing had spurred
economic growth during the 1920s and then, impressively, in the 1950s. By
the end of the 1960s, however, that growth had begun to stagnate. Even more
alarming was the conspicuous emergence of local and subcultural forms of
expression. Many of these explored the possibility of a mode of life, and of a
material culture, that looked beyond the gargantuan system of production,
distribution, and merchandising that had defined the American Way of Life
since the 1920s (Ewen and Ewen, 1992).
In response to languishing profits and a perceived market saturation, marketers and
advertisers increasingly began to tailor the mediation of consuming desire within the
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framework of cultural identity. Intersecting with the rise of Black and feminist
identity politics and the youth subculture movements (so feted by Marcuse), goods
were increasingly imbued with symbolic qualities that appeared to resonate with
such concerns, offering in tum a marketed set of values and meanings to be desired
and appropriated to help give material form to the expression of a 'meaningful'
sense of self (Ewen and Ewen, 1992; Cohen, 2003). Most famously, Pepsi embraced
and projected the notion of the youthful 'Pepsi Generation' as a device with which to
lure a new generation of consumers growing up in the midst of new countercultural
times, offering a soda drink as a consumable expression of a dynamic, vital
countercultural sensibility.
In analysing some of the major advertising campaigns of the 1960s, Frank (1997)
demonstrates that they increasingly came to dwell upon themes of 'rock 'n roll
rebellion', 'hipness' and 'authenticity' defined explicitly in opposition to a staid,
conformist, manufactured mass-market. However, as Frank notes, it was not the
advertisements alone which attested to a new emphasis on authenticity and
creativity. Advertising agencies themselves were increasingly deconstructing their
hierarchical structures to embrace new 'creative' organisational forms. The Doyle
Dane Bernbach (DDB) agency, responsible for the innovative advertising campaigns
for the Volkswagen Beetle that contrasted the organic simplicity and free
spiritedness of the 'lovebug' to the cynical manipulation and mass-society blandness
of Detroit's products, simultaneously rationalised their management structure to
shorten the hierarchical chain, reduced administrative oversight to nurture an
environment of creative freedom and ensured that different employees within the
creative process could interact more fluidly together on project work.
As Rose (l999a) shows, this new emphasis on freeing the worker reflected wider
changes in the government of the organisation which were taking shape at the time.
In Minerva's Owl fashion, the pre-eminent 'Theory X' form of organisation, the
arch-type of the mass society, was presented as one which enmeshed workers within
a hierarchical, bureaucratic structure with defined goals and rationalised procedures.
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Uve below your meens,
Figure 2.2 'The Lovebug'. Volkswagen ironically enjoins the American consuming public against
keeping up with the Joneses. Source: Doyle Dane Bembach Archives.
Employees were tightly controlled as though merely factors of the productive
process, in need of rigorous managerial inspection and financial incentivisation in
order to elicit greater performance.
Radical organisational and management theorists, most notably Douglas McGregor
(1985) in the Human Side of Enterprise, vilified this mode as outdated, accusing it of
fostering conservatism, apathy and a deadening conformity - and ultimately lower
profits and market share - in the face of a dynamic, shifting market. In contrast, they
emphasised the need for a less structured, more fluid organisation form, less
overbearing, less proceduralised, that would tie the creative, self-realising capacities
of workers to the enhancement of the productivity, adaptability and dynamism of the
organisation. Underlying this was a new perspective that 'the citizen, at work as~
much as outside it, is engaged in a project to shape his or her life as an autonomous
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individual driven by motives of self- fulfilment' (Rose, 1999a: 116). Work was no
longer to be a constraint upon the freedom of the individual; it was, rather, to
become a conduit for self-realisation as much as the goods that were being newly
marketed for consumption (Donzelot, 1991b; Bauman, 1998a: 30-36).
It is Giddens's (1991; see also Beck, 2002: 127-38; Beck et al., 2003: 21-6)
contention that under conditions of what he terms 'high' or 'late' modernity,
characterised by the dynamism and fluidness of social relations, the dysjuncture of
time and space through new technologies and the dis-embedding of social
institutions from traditional practices, the idea of the 'self as a reflexive project
comes to the fore as the overriding mission of individuals. They are to attempt to
weave a personalised narrative for themselves, to interlink their actions, choices and
experiences in a deliberate and more or less coherent fashion so that 'what the
individual becomes is dependent on the reconstructive endeavours in which she or
he engages' (p. 75). Self-actualisation becomes the goal to strive for, if never to
reach; the casting off of a perfidious 'self which may have been imposed by the
past. Bauman (1988, 1997, 1998a, 2000) too emphasises the dis-embedding qualities
of contemporary social life which he ascribes to a shift towards a state of post or
'liquid' modernity, creating a crisis of identity, of meaning for individuals whose
sense of place in the world has been swept away along with the authority of cultural
and political elites, the work ethic, the traditional bonds of class and a societal belief
in politics and political institutions. The majority of the population are now 'free'
from such bonds but, in exchange, are tasked with the responsibility of self-
construction, of delving into the market of symbolically redolent goods or quasi-
therapeutic resources, and continually fashioning a personalised identity for the self.
Within this context, it is not what is chosen which is significant for there are no
overarching guidelines determining relative values; it is rather the availability and
scope of choice itself which becomes the meta-narrative of existence. Older bonds
such as work remain, of course, but not so much as a source of identity within itself
through the process oflabour, but as a key facilitating element in one's ability to
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choose; work becomes, too, an aspect of identity to be judged aesthetically as any
other commodity or service in its capacity to generate pleasurable experience and
meaning and to be woven into broader tapestry of self-fulfilment.
In analysing the relationship between consumption, post-modernism and identity,
Featherstone (1991) explores how contemporary experience has become relentlessly
aestheticised, with advanced communications media 'saturating the fabric of
everyday life', from market commodities to cityscapes, with an unending flow of
shifting and changing signs and images deconstructing the boundaries between high
and popular culture. For him, the bohemian artistic lifestyle has become
universalised - no longer do individuals unthinkingly adopt ways of living, living,
rather, becomes an aestheticised experience ' ... the new heroes of consumer culture
make lifestyle a life project and display their individuality and sense of style in the
particularity of their assemblage of goods, clothes, practices, experiences,
appearance and bodily dispositions they design together into a lifestyle' (1991: 86).
In Ewen and Ewen's (1992) words, life becomes lifestyles, a fluctuating range of
choices to be made within the market, each with their own demarcated ideals of
behaviour, morality and conduct. They compose amorphous templates with which to
both structure and imaginatively improvise a permanent project of identity creation.
The effacement of boundaries between high and low culture, though, do not imply
that class has faded in significance in terms of shaping and structuring consumption.
Rather, as Bourdieu (1984) argues, new modes of hedonistic and expressive
consumption are bound up in the historical formation of a new class of petite
bourgeoisie. Whereas this class fraction had been traditionally concerned with a
puritan 'morality of duty' which promoted ascetic self-denial as the means towards
social advancement, the 'new petite bourgeoisie' takes the morality of pleasure as a
duty. In popularising a framework ofliving previously the preserve of the
intelligentsia, they adopt a permanent learning mode to life, searching for self-
expression and meaning in such fields as the cultivation of personal health and the
care of the body, through a preoccupation with fostering communication and
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intimate relations with others, and the legitimation of new styles and modes of
authentic living. This new class, though, promotes not merely the latest styles and
fashions but also a general interest in style itself - as Bourdieu describes it, by acting
as a 'transmission belt' for consumption by presenting itself as the archetype of style
and inducing other classes to be concerned not only with the products and forms of
consumption it legitimises but with modes of living that inspire the search for such
consuming fulfilment.
Within contemporary American society, class and levels of cultural capital continue,
albeit in subtle and nuanced ways, to be important in structuring and symbolically
distinguishing the consuming practices of consumers (Holt, 1997). Those classes
embodying high levels of cultural capital greatly value the taste for self-actualisation
and personalised narrative which may manifest in greater consumption of idealist
products that emphasise' experience' over ostentatious material satisfaction, for
example, experiential ethnic dining over a posh French restaurant, and the
consumption of 'de-commodified' commodities that purposefully disdain the mass
market, for example local micro-brews over international beer brands. At the same
time, though, lower classes with lower cultural capital tastes may not quite exhibit
the same gravitation towards the pursuit of individualised, authentic lifestyles to
which the higher strata are drawn (Holt, 1998).
However for elite and aspirational consumers, choice, although promulgated under
the notion of 'freedom to choose', is also a constraint (Rose, 1999a). One is obliged
to construct a life for oneself from the wide spectrum of choices available, to
connect the choices available in every aspect of one's life to a coherent sense of
one's own distinctive individuality. With the promulgation of the market and the
decline of collective welfare provision as being anathema to choice, one can choose
only what the market provides. One can 'choose' to live in a chic urban apartment,
to drive a high performance car and eat organic vegetables but one cannot choose to
build good public housing provision, efficient public transport unhindered by traffic
gridlock or a natural environment unspoilt by waste and pollution. For those unable
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to exercise a capacity to choose, through a perceived addiction to commodities or
experiences or for those unable to escape a traumatic past which haunts them and
impedes their ability to cohere an identity, or those who experience choice as
meaningless and the project of identity formation impossible to sustain, a
proliferation of therapeutic interventions present a range of options to be chosen to
restore the subject's capacity to choose (Rose, 1996b, 1999a; Reith, 2004b).
At the same time, one must understand one's life as the cumulative outcome of such
choices made so that any disparity between what is and what one aspires to in the
quest to find meaning and significance is as a consequence of the choices that have
been made by the individual themselves. The only failure is the failure to make the
right choice (Ewen and Ewen, 1992: 197). Accidents happen but their effects on the
individual's life are the result of the relative efficacy of choices made: ill-health and
disease, for example, are the consequences of unwise choices, of not signing up to a
gym programme, of not eating five portions of fruit and vegetables or enough fibre
or essential fatty acids, of not signing up to private medical insurance, of not
choosing a more balanced lifestyle or a more stress-free job (O'Malley, 1996, 2000,
2004). The individual is thus made responsible for their capacity to choose and the
choices that they make, both incrementally but also in terms of their accumulation in
the formation of a personalised narrative of the sel f.
Psychographies and the Constitution of Lifestyle
The valorisation of identity over mass however was not something that was merely
appropriated by consumer capitalism; new technologies of marketing like
psychographics also helped constitute new ways for people to be (c.f. Hacking,
1986, 1990). As Marchand (1985) shows, market research, the use of statistics and
behavioural psychology had been essential tools for capitalist firms from the early
ili .
20 century to both derive and render into thought a mass-market as a conceptual
form where consuming desire could be made amenable to intervention and
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regulation. By the 1960s, though, consumer subjectivity of was becoming mined in
innovative new ways. In Britain, as Miller and Rose (1997) show in their analysis of
the Tavistock Institute, the 'psy-sciences' were becoming deployed within
advertising and marketing of goods to mobilise consumers towards new possibilities
of consumption. Within selling more generally, the end of the one-size-fits-all 'mass
market' was being heralded by marketers who articulated the need for a segmented
approach that went beyond mere demographic characteristics such as age, sex or
class and entered the more complex territory of human behaviour (e.g. Mainer and
Slater, 1964; Yankelovich, 1964; Brandt, 1966). Most notably, new psychographic
technologies discerned and articulated a conception of the mass-market that was not
differentiated so much by class, income or other traditional demographic criteria
(although these overlapped in crucial ways) as by 'lifestyle' groups with common
activities, attitudes, interests, aspirations, beliefs and personality attributes (Wells,
1975). In rendering the psychological topography of consumers visible in such a
way, the general psychographic approach offered a mechanism for summoning and
connecting the symbolic meanings of commodities to the specifically discerned
desires of a defined group of consumers in order to better market to them. As
Tedlow (1990: 371) remarks, marketing goods by psycho graphics carne to tell
consumers not about a product, but rather, about themselves.
Of course, firms had always produced different goods for different parts of the
market. As we have seen earlier in Chapter 1, General Motors of the 1920s produced
different cars for different income groups. Here, though, products were not so much
segmented as stratified, marketed as different quantities along a single continuum of
'car', the same product of mass production, to be moulded to an appropriate and
readily identifiable class stratum of mass consumption (c.f. Cohen, 2003: 294-5).
However, through psychographic target marketing, consumer good manufacturers
have become concerned with segment, not as a noun, but as a verb. It is they
themselves who have segmented the market, imaginatively creating categories out of
perceived agglomerations of attitudes where none existed before - as Tedlow
adroitly observes, '[t]here was no such thing as the Pepsi Generation until Pepsi
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created it' (1990: 372). Crucially, segments are qualitatively different from each
other, the goods produced for them are not part of a broader continuum of mass
consumption but exist as distinctively different artefacts for the cultivation of a
defined mode of expression. Their meanings stem, not from their symbolic qualities
as constituents of a collectively defined standard of living, but from how those
meanings speak to the individual's own purposeful sense of themselves.
Nevertheless, technologies such as psychographies do not imply that the materiality
of class has been completely subsumed by the free-floating ephemerality of lifestyle.
In the VALs system, for instance, segmented values and the possibilities of
consumption still remain stubbornly grounded in the resources that people can
muster - the relative affluence of 'Emulator-Achievers' conditions their compulsive
shopping for exclusive brand-names to compensate for their feelings of impaired
social mobility while the 'Need-Directed' are 'so busy trying to make ends meet that
they really don't have time to worry about the type of beer they drink or the image
projected by the cigarettes they smoke' (Meyers, 1984: 20). Moreover, as Douglas
Holt (1997) has argued, the relative weakeness ofVALs in marketing practice stems
from its dismissal of the varied, overlapping collective contexts within which
consuming practices are dynamically encountered, adopted and expressed by
individual consumers.
Bourdieu (1984) suggests that such a fragmentation of consumers to specifically
target-marketed groups isolates them, forcing their 'freedom' from established
temporal boundaries of domestic space and family and also from 'collective
defences' such as community, occupation and class which historically buffered the
impact of the consuming desire stimulated within the individual by the market. The
framing of consumer desire through such techniques, though, is not merely imposed
bureaucratically but offered as part of a particular template for living which, over
time, people can harness an affinity to in the quest for identity. Indeed, more
contemporary marketing segments like 'Grey Panthers', 'Dinky' and 'Empty
Nesters' have entered into popular discourse as recognisable lifestyles suggestive of
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particular attitudes, values and forms of consumption with which to describe others,
if not oneself. Although 'invented' categories, they have inscribed consumers into
the calculations of consumer enterprises in a stable and coherent way, making them
susceptible to particular forms of government, and constituting them through media
as cognisable forms of lifestyle to appropriate, or even identify with, in order to give
expression to oneself.
However, systems of segmentation are not stable but become subject to a constant
re-revision and reinvention. At the end of 1980s, for example, the VALs system was
replaced by VALs 2 which divided the American population into eight segments
based on new specific perceived relationships between individual attitudes and
consumer purchasing practices (Piirto, 1991). One marketer, in discussing the
context of segmentation, breathlessly attests to the inherent flux of contemporary
production and consumption:
Companies are using new flexible technology like computer-aided design
and manufacturing and software customization to create astonishing diversity
in the marketplace and society. And individuals temporarily coalescing into
'micromajorities' are making use of platforms - media, education, and the
law - to express their desires (McKenna, 1991: 88)
Thus, such technologies would seem to grant only a fleeting sort of stability to the
inscription of the consumer. In fact, in attempting to develop new consumer goods
and services, producers may have an inherent tendency to pull apart lifestyle
categories that they themselves have constructed and re-forge new ones in their
place (Pahl, 1989: 714). Bauman (2000) remarks that, although contemporary
identities appear to give an external solidity to one's life as a 'work of art', they are
always shearing and unstable, held together by nothing more than the diaphanous
ties of the consumer's chimeric desires. Ironically then, the permanent fluidity and
ethereality of contemporary consumer lifestyles corralled by the pursuit of choice,
the invocation of new consuming desires and new innovative means of constructing
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a narrative of identity become reflected in the falling out of fashion of particular
segmentation methods, their updating and altering to reflect the latest values and
attitudes or the arrival of competing technologies of lifestyle identification mining
new data sets with novel, enhanced methodological techniques. Psychographic
market segmentation is thus permanently fated to chase the tail of those fluid
lifestyles it attempts to give structure to.
Plastic Credit, Plastic Lifestyles
NewWay to Pay: A Brief History of the Credit Card
The mid-century United States saw the emergence of a new form of credit that has
become emblematic of contemporary consumer credit and of the hegemony of
consumption more generally. From the end of the 19th century, as we have discussed
earlier, charge accounts had been developed in department stores as instruments of
convenience for an elite clientele, gradually becoming more widespread for
customers of more modest resources into the new century. By the 1930s, the
Wanamaker's department store of Philadelphia modified their charge account
system to incorporate an element of balance carryover for up to four months, being
extended later into a fully rotating charge account by Filene's of Boston and
Bloomingdale's of New York whereby customers could carry over unpaid balances
from month to month. In the immediate post war period, cooperative credit ventures
took place when groups of large retailers pooled their individual charge accounts
into a common system in which the individual credit consumer was identified by
means of a 'charga-plate' (Mandell, 1990: 34-5).
Department stores however were not the first retailers to embark on such a venture.
As early as the 1920s, oil companies had issued 'courtesy' cards to frequent
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customers that allowed them to charge gasoline purchases at any service station of
that company to a common account to be paid-off monthly. Just prior to World War
2, Standard Oil bypassed the usual policy of issuing such cards to loyal, well-known
customers of particular stations and engaged in a mass, unsolicited distribution of a
quarter of a million cards (p. 19).
Figure 2.3 Early Californian Retail 'Charga-plate'. Source: Myvesta Foundation.
Just as the purchase ofthe automobile played a crucial role in advancing the mass
financing technique of the instalment plan, its fuelling helped bequeath the
development of a new mass financing of more ephemeral, more open-ended forms
of consumption based around a mobile system of identity. By 1949 the creation of
Diner's Club heralded the development of a new breed of Travel and Entertainment
Card that would be joined within a decade by American Express (Amex) and Carte
Blanche (Mandell, 1990; Nocera, 1994). Although maintaining a policy that
accounts be paid-off within a single monthly billing cycle, these companies
represented the incursion of a new outside source of capital into consumer financing.
In doing so, consumer credit became divorced both from particular sites and forms
of consumption; it was no longer channelled and governed through individual
retailers but through specialised large-scale centralised administrative organisations
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determining consumer accessibility through increasingly abstract bureaucratic
procedures.
At the end of the 1950s, the emergent charge cards were challenged by the setting up
of revolving bank card systems (Mandell, 1990; Nocera, 1994; Manning, 2000;
Chutkow, 2001). The first of these was California-based Bank of America, the then
largest bank within the United States, and Chase Manhattan of New York. Bank-
issued credit cards were distinguished from other types of card payment form as they
offered customers a means not only of purchasing diffuse forms of consumption that
was not restricted to particular retailers but of rolling-over balances from month-to-
month. The arrival of the bank card extended the sophistication of the plastic credit
pioneered by the Diners Club and American Express by introducing an interest
element on unpaid balances that could be pushed forward indefinitely and whose
level was dependent not simply upon the amounts charged by credit consumers but
by the proportion of the balance paid (or unpaid) at the end of the monthly billing
cycle.
However, banks faced a particular predicament that has been termed the 'chicken
and egg' dilemma (Nocera, 1994). This double-bind implied that customers would
only take a card which was accepted as a means of payment at a relatively large
number of retailers while retailers would only sign-up as a merchant for a particular
type of card if there were sufficient numbers of customers in a possession of it. They
attempted to solve this by engaging in a policy of potential merchant-courting while
pursuing a strategy of indiscriminate mass-mail solicitation to attract customers. The
undifferentiated mass-mail drop thus characterised the early efforts of these banks
that were attempting to both reach and create a mass market for a new credit form
that depended upon a mass deployment for its profitability. Unlike with retailer-
specific charge accounts, developed to promote sales and, to a lesser extent, ongoing
loyalty, the credit card form's profits stemmed from the interest and annual fees paid
by customers as well as the discount rates which retailers offered to banks in order to
operate as card merchants. The banks' concerns for profitability thus became
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directly adhered to the maximisation of possession and usership in the facilitation of
consumption, and resonated more broadly with the Keynesian state's concerns for
the nurturing of economic growth through the calculable fostering of mass
consumption.
By the end of 1960, there were around forty independent credit card systems across
the country (Evans and Schmalensee, 1999: 63), each system servicing a particular
concentrated regional area. However, the extensiveness of Bank of America's
branch network within California encouraged its early pre-eminence as a credit card
provider, giving access as it did to a largely concentrated, relatively affluent
population base (Mandell, 1990; Chutkow, 2001). The forging of a mass market
through mass mailing proved, though, an attritional process with, as Nocera records
with regard to the BankAmericard effort, heavy delinquency, default and fraud
proving an onerous burden on operating costs that ran at some $20 million in real
terms just fifteen months after its launch (1994: 29). In 1966, Bank of America spun
off its credit card into a separate company, National BankAmericard Incorporated,
which offered to franchise the card brand to willing banks beyond the state
boundaries of California. Although customers and merchants were recruited by local
banks, with settlements organised centrally, the credit card itselfbegan to establish
itself as a nationally recognised credit facility, a brand that could facilitate
consumption anywhere across the United States. The credit card thus evolved as a
mass-issued but personalised credit form that increasingly mediated the possibilities
of consumption beyond the boundaries of form, time and space. I Just as the
BankAmericard spread to other states, a rival network was established by a group of
East coast banks, forming the Interbank Card Association who then purchased the
rights to the 'Master Charge' card brand.
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Credit Cards and Self-governing Lifestyles
In significant ways, the expansion of the credit card across the United States proved
a significant impulse in undermining the regulatory capacities of the state. The post-
Depression governance of the market through federal statute was constructed to
dampen what were perceived as the excessively competitive actions of financial
institutions by restricting them to individual state boundaries. However, the
expansionist ambitions of Citibank to overtake Bank of America as the largest bank
in America were dependent on it being able to operate not merely within the state of
New York but across a broader national stage (Nocera, 1994; Manning, 2000;
Millman, 2001). As Nocera rhetorically asks, '[b]ut how could a bank "go national"
and still remain within the letter of the law? That answer was credit cards. Just as the
Chicago banks had once dropped credit cards in the Illinois suburbs to attract
suburban customers, so could Citibank now use credit cards to try to attract
customers all across the nation' (1994: 145).
The U.S. Takes Off
III Credit Cards,
Figure 2 4 'T lei Eli ht' Lif 'id . a ng 19 t. ne magazine, the popular chronicler for and off the American suburban
m! die class, acutely discerns the new emerging duopolistic national payment card system. Source:
Life Magazine Cover Archive.
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In 1977, taking advantage of BankAmericard's re-branding as the more
aspirationally titled 'Visa', Citibank purchased extensive mailing lists and engaged
in a programme of mass mail solicitation, issuing 3 million credit cards not only
within its own state but nationwide, in doing so becoming the largest issuer of credit
cards in the country.
In the 1980s, new card brands entered the market to challenge the pre-eminent Visa
and Mastercard. The 'Discover Card', offering lower interest rates, a percentage
'cashback' to consumers and competitive discount rates to retailers, was established
and distributed directly by long-standing mail order king Sears before being sold to
money market firm Dean Witter. The venerable American Express, which had
traditionally offered its product as a charge card aimed at the business user and the
'affluent', marketed its 'Optima' card which could be 'revolved' month-to-month
like a bank-issued card (Ritzer, 1995; Evans and Schmalensee, 1999; Klein, 1999).
In the same decade, a new breed of bank like Capital One, Providian, MBNA and
First USA emerged and began to take root within the credit card market; known as
'monolines', they specialised primarily or exclusively in the offering of credit cards.
These new creditors innovated new credit scoring systems and sophisticated
marketing techniques, including the teaser 0% balance-transfer facility, to attract
new customers, tailoring credit card features such as annual fees, credit limits and
additional services to profitably solicit and administer particular types of consumer,
incorporating customer responses to further refine their marketing and account
management techniques (Williams, 2004: 50). As Capital One's founder remarked,
'we built an information-based company that can create an infinite number of
products and put them through massive scientific testing to get down to a market of
one, or mass customization' (Millman, 2001: 6). Credit cards, like the invocation of
consumer desire more generally, were increasingly oriented towards, not a mass
canvass of American consumers, but the inscription and cultivation of particular
groups or types of individuals whose credit consumption choices were being
conceived, and acted upon, as personalised, knowable expressions.
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Of course, consumers will only carry cards if there are retailers willing to accept
them. In the 1960s, the spread of credit card acceptance tended to be limited to
smaller retail merchants, particularly in tourist areas, which did not operate their
own independent credit system (Evans and Schmalensee, 1999: 130-6). By the mid-
1980s, both Mastercard and Visa actively solicited acceptance from thirty high
profile department stores such as Bloomingdales's and Macy's which, apart from the
prestigious American Express, had not accepted any credit cards up to that time. In
the 1990s, the national card brands also began to penetrate into the supermarket
chains, increasing their coverage from 5% in 1991 to 90% by the end of the decade
(p.132).
During the 1980s, the credit card organisations themselves began to become
concerned with their consumer image and their market positions in relation to one
another. As Klein (1999) shows, the 1983 Visa marketing campaign targeted
professional working women, the DINK (double-income-no-kids) 'super class' that
was perceived to be emerging, and the affluent 'baby boom' generation who were
seen to be entering their peak earning years during this decade. The aspiration that
enveloped the campaign was one which the company hoped would foster an
'emotional bond' between the individual and their Visa card. Within television
advertisements, transactions for various more or less mundane goods that become
woven into an individual's or family's search for self-fulfilment are shown to be
facilitated by use of their credit card. In magazine pictures, images of individuals
enjoying fulfilment in unspoilt natural setting are overlaid with inspirational quotes
that emphasise the infinite possibilities of discovery in the unfurling path of life. For
Klein, the campaign was an attempt to locate Visa within the bounds of a
personalised search for identity, to culturally associate their product, through the
themes of individuality and choice, with the fulfilment of individuals' personalised
desires. In a sense, Visa was projected as a product capable of realising the exercise
of choice through consumption, the 'visa' for giving voice to the quest for identity.
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From the 1970s, the credit card has emerged as one of the key facilitating
instruments of contemporary consumption. As can be seen in figure 2.5, possession
among all American households increased from around one-sixth in 1970 to over
two-thirds in 1998. Although continually stratified by income, card possession
increased most markedly for the lowest income groups, from a low base rising
fourteen-fold to 28% while, in the same timeframe, becoming virtually ubiquitous
among the economic elite (for consumer credit more generally, see Bostic, 2002). As
can be seen in figure 2.6, there has also been a shift in the balance of debt held by
American consumers away from instalment-type consumer loans to revolving credit
facilities that characterise the credit card form. As Durkin (2000) suggests, such a
shift reflects the preference of consumers for the convenience offered by 'pre-
arranged' lines of credit. In addition to increasing rates of credit card possession
across the population, the proportion of cardholders carrying or 'revolving' a
balance forward has also increased, from 37% to 55%.
Since the 1960s the developing form of the credit card, embodying an open-ended,
self-renewing credit agreement, a generic form of credit dissassociable from
particular goods or retailers but encompassing the broader arena of consumption, has
come to represent a malleable, personalised resource in the formation of identity
through consumption. Through the credit card, individuals have come to exercise
heightened levels of self-determination in terms of the credit that they engage. It
becomes merged across goods purchased and across periods of time, assuming a
quantified monetary form expressed and carried over time, divorced from the
specific goods it finances but representing the continuous, ongoing process of
consumption facilitated through the widening scope of such credit. In Daniel Klein's
(1999) analysis of consumer credit and experiential consumption, he argues that the
credit card has located whole new spheres of ephemeral consumption within the
reach of credit financing including theme park tourism, telephone sex lines, psychic
hot lines, themed hotel fantasy suites, each in their own way making marketed
pleasure, meaning or affective, quasi-therapeutic advice more readily available for
choostng in the consumerist inscription of the self.
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Prevalence of Credit Cards within United States
by Income Quintiles, 1970-98
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Source: Durkin, 2000
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136
The form of revolving credit demonstrated by the credit card represents a new
conception oftime that is characterised by its diffuseness and open-endedness in
contrast to, as we have seen earlier, instalment credit's tight apportionment oftime.
Although a strict structure is still maintained in terms of a monthly balance
statement and the apportionment of annual interest, a more fluid structure is evident
in terms of there being no fixed payment required beyond an agreed minimum and
an upper chargeable credit limit, which itself is negotiable and subject to periodic
review. The sub-units of time framing instalment credit, as we saw in relation to
automobile financing of the 1920s, were conceived as being discrete and self-
contained, interlinked only in terms of being part of a broader series of steps towards
final payment. The flow of funds in anyone period were not inherently linked or
affected by that in any other. Within this system of predictability and regularity,
instalment credit represented the discrete and defined nature of desire, which was
fixed upon particular objects and governed through the incremental, regulatory
nature of the contract as well as the will of the individual.
However under revolving credit, although time continues to be distinctly
apportioned, these units are interlinked as balances carried over time with the
individual's particular actions in any period affecting future periods. As such,
individuals must orient their own actions across a more complex formation of time
where specific periods have consequences on others which must be taken into
account within a context where the strict, apportioned teleology of instalment credit
dissolves to a shifting, indefinitely time-bordered, personalised form embodying the
continual lifestyle shaping actions of the individual consumer. There is no overall
amount with which the agreement is concerned nor a fixed balance that remains to
be paid; in their place, rather, are variable limits determined by the creditor's
assessment of the ongoing creditworthiness of the consumer and constantly
renewing, changing balances that build up or deplete down in tandem with the self-
determined credit consumption of the individual.
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Thus, the tightly structured link between amounts of time and money inherent to
instalment forms of credit gives way. Although an apportioned interest rate and
balances are organised monthly, credit card agreements are characterised by the
loose constraints of an upper maximum ceiling (which is, in fact, variable over time)
and a minimum payment amount (which is only calculated as a proportion of the
overall balance). Within these terms, a free interplay takes place between time and
money, shaped only by the credit user's desire and level of self-constraint in terms
of the apportioning of income, expenditure, desire and ability to repay. Over an
indefinite time period, the individual sets the specific terms of credit use and
repayment which are as infinitely variable in formation as the individual wishes
them to be.
In certain ways, credit cards embody an increasing dependence upon the self-
governing capacities of consumers:
• After initial sanctioning, credit cards can be used by the credit user for unlimited
numbers and types of goods across an indefinite time period as long as the
maximum and minimum terms are maintained.
• No time boundaries - balances can be carried onward infinitely up to the
maximum limit, which itself can be increased either automatically or subject to
application by the credit user.
• No payment boundaries - individual credit users decide how much to charge to
their accounts each period and how much to pay each month - whether the full
balance or particular portions thereof.
• The individual can hold multiple cards from multiple banks or providers thereby
creating multiple layers across which credit use has to be self-managed.
• The possibility exists for advance solicitation whereby access to credit cards are
granted automatically and retrospectively without an application being made by
the individual.
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In discussing Keynesian economic interventionism as a strategy of government,
Donzelot (l99la) remarks how it is (or was) concerned with temporal control- the
regulation of economic and social time through an active fiscal and monetary policy
over the course of the interminable economic cycle. Within contemporary modes of
government emphasising the autonomisation of the individual, it seems almost as if
such temporal responsibility passes, in part, to the individual credit card user in their
process of self-government. Such individuals are made responsible for regulating
their own matrical flow of purchases, borrowings and repayments over time in the
stabilisation of a narrativised lifestyle continuously being crafted through
consumption.
These lack of external constraints on individual action, relative to the characteristics
of instalment credit, actually requires an increasing need for self-constraint as to a
consumer's momentary impulses, enhanced foresight as to the consequences of their
actions and an ability to increasingly manage their own behaviour, in an objective
and instrumental way, over longer and more complexly interwoven periods oftime.
However, this dependence on individual self-government has taken place against the
development of broader technologies of government operated at the level of the
population. As we will explore in subsequent chapters, creditors have increasingly
come to deploy large-scale data surveillance mechanisms and sophisticated risk
technologies based on the statistical analysis of attributes and repayment actions to
assess creditworthiness, the capability of individual consumers to freely govern their
credit consumption in acceptable ways. For those unwilling or unable, access to and
the autonomy of future potential credit use is restricted to varying degrees, thus
inhibiting the individual's consuming choices and degrading their ability to maintain
and develop an identity through the ongoing exercise of such choice (Klein, 1999: 6-
9; Bernthal et al., 2005).
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Commodified Credit and the Consuming Self
The 2005 Visa advertising campaign perhaps throws into relief something important
about the contemporary development of the credit card. This campaign continued the
aspirationalist theme of the 1983 one referred to earlier but in a manner which
emphasised more the emotional bond between consumer and credit card; in the
words of their advertising agency creative director Rob Schwartz, the company
sought to increase its so-called 'share of heart' to match its 'share of wallet' in order
to persuade consumers of Visa's potential to empower them to get 'the most out of
life':
The credit card category is rife with conventions. Brands spend a lot of
money to show that because they're big, you can trust them. But big isn't
enough. We're leveraging Visa's size to empower life experiences. It's not
about your credit card company being big, it's about how big life can be
(TBW A, 2005).
Rather than the narrativised interweaving of ostensible products and experiences or
allusion to grand metaphors of freedom and self-fulfilment enabled by credit, the
new campaign dwelt on both curious and spectacular experiences not necessarily
consumerist within themselves but designed to resonate with the wider existential
possibilities of the self. Reflecting this, the advertising messages produced sought to
emphasise the 'brand' rather than the 'card'. As such, the need was felt to persuade
consumers, not to get and use credit, but to feel an ongoing affinity towards the one
logo among the many present on the plastic that they do or may potentially carry in a
cacophonically symbol-imbued credit card market. If, as Holt argues, the 'semiotic
potency' of marketed brands to give meaning to consumption is diluted the greater
and more intensively they are marketed within the hyper conditions of
postmodernity (1998: 21), then, as an alternative strategy of appeal, Visa sought to
mask the actual market within which their credit card is offered for use.
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Figure 2.7 'A Tongue Sticking Life'. In their new advertising campaign, Visa forsake the attributes
of payment flexibility and grand consumer aspirational metaphor to evoke the simple joys of life
among those of an age unable to even apply for a credit card. Source: TBW A Advertising Agency
Ironically, the credit card does not simply represent an instrument for lifestyle
generation through the expansion and facilitation of consumer desire but has, within
itself, come to embody the aspects of a consumable commodity. 'Product'
characteristics such as interest rates, credit lines, fees and special features like cash
rebates, points and payment protection insurance allow creditors to compete with
one another for market share as 'each issuer tries to get consumers to take its card,
either in addition to or in place of cards from other issuers. Each issuer then tries to
get consumers who have its card to charge more purchases on it and .... to carry
greater balances' (Evans and Schmalensee, 1999: 210). Credit cards have thus
become commodities within themselves, brands to be produced and marketed as
though they were toothpaste or breakfast cereal. For instance, a 1999 survey of
credit cards administered by market research firm J.D. Power carried out interviews
with a sample of consumers to assess 35 'products' from 17 of the largest credit card
issuers, breaking responses down by market segment - 'general/gold', 'rewards' and
'platinum' - and ranking them with a quantified score (Souccar, 1999). Consumers
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were assessed on their 'satisfaction' with a particular card, their use of the card and
their plans for future usage. Rather than interest rate pricing, the research firm
suggested that call-centre contact, contentment with billing and payment processing,
and issuer reputation were the most important elements of satisfaction; in fact
'aggressive pricing' could be self-defeating as it tended to attract customers
perpetually looking ahead to the next credit card offering.
The development of reward programmes on credit cards, whereby credits are
accumulated over time by the user in proportion to the volume of their card
purchases, provides a prudential means for credit consumers to customise and
broaden the choices that they make. The most widespread form of this are varied
'points' schemes such as MBNA's 'Goldpoints', 'Worldpoints', and 'Elite Rewards'
which provide the consumer with a range of free goods and services, discounts and
benefits tiered according to the number of credits that have been accumulated by the
individual through their card use. MBNA also offer affiliated reward schemes with
specific retailers, airlines and cruise lines to provide consumers with discounts and
other benefits redeemable at those particular affiliates.
Earn FREECruises and Stateroom Upgrades on Norwegian Cruise Line,
Orient Lines, and Star Cruises!
• Earn 25 Compass Rewards
Points with your first
qualifying use of the card-
that's 25% of the first
rewards level!
• Earn 3 points for every
$100 in purchases made
with the card.
• Earn 4 points for every
$100 in purchases made
with the card for Norwegian
Cruise Line products and
services.
. ~igure 2.~ 'Cruising for Credit'. Norwegian Cruise Line and MBNA bank target a particularly
l~cl~ned credit. card customer. From 100 points, they can enjoy a single category cabin upgrade - with
p 0 3000 points, they can benefi~ from a credit of $3000 to be redeemed against any cruise journey.
The greater the number of points accumulated, the wider the scope of choice offered as their
~ specifically tailored reward. Source: MBNA2
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Credit card issuers also offer schemes involving cash rebates rather than redeemable
points. For instance, MBNA's 'Cash Back' card offers an immediate 1% credit on
application for net purchases of$2,500 while its 'Motley Fool' option offers a yearly
cheque for 1% of the total volume, charged to the card during the preceding twelve
months.' Other credit card products also allow the credit user to divert such cash
returns into the investment products of partner financial organisations, from
federally-insured savings accounts to investment products which provide a means of
savings for a child's future college tuition fees." Weber ([1930] 1976) presented the
spirit of modern capitalism as being born of an ascetic Protestantism which ethically
condoned acquisitive activity but coupled this with a self-imposed restraint upon
ostentatious consumption. From this, he argued, the impulse towards an ongoing,
productive investment of capital was made possible. Within contemporary
consumption, it seems as though such a puritan ethic has obtained a curious new
form. Whereas it had been based on the deferment of gratification towards the ends
of accumulating wealth, this contemporary version embodied in the accumulation of
credit card points and rebates is based on the continuous engagement of consumer
gratification. It is through one's more intensive consumption of credit, the ongoing
fulfilment rather than the suppression of desire, that greater advantage is accrued.
With effortless ease, then, it seems as though the credit card provides an effortless
means for dissolving the temporal tensions between the desires of present and the
ambitions of the future.
However, the dissolution of such tension does not make such 'saving' any less
rational than before for if rationality is the ability to dispassionately calculate a
means/end calculus over relatively extended periods oftime, then it is the content of
such rationality which has altered. In contrast with the past, it represents not an
overarching orientation based on the sustained self-constraint of one's desire in
order to maximise one's capital but a self-governed choice to be made among a
variety of marketed options in the interests of optimising one's capacity to choose.
To these ends, it is not the option of saving which is or is not chosen - for with
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credit card reward schemes, accumulation is automatic and contemporaneous to
consumption - but the type of 'savings'. Ultimately what is chosen will depend on
the individual credit consumer's long-term project for the self, their weaving of a
particularlised narrative to create a meaningful life. Perhaps they enjoy the vicarious
pleasures of catalogue browsing ('Goldpoints' can be accumulated for catalogue
purchases), embracing their Irish-American identity and travelling to the 'old
country' to trace their family lineage ('Aer Lingus Shamrock Rewards' can be
accumulated for free flights) or possess an ethical concern about the preservation of
North America's wetland habitats (an ongoing donation to which will be made on
their behalf by their use of a 'Ducks Unlimited' affinity card). As a by-product of
their consumer hedonism, the credit card consumer might also choose to be a
prudential subject, calculating and preparing for the future not only by choosing the
card with generous payment protection insurance and the latest identity theft and
fraud protection features but, in the longer term, through choosing to save their cash
rebate into an interest-accruing account or investing in the future lifestyle of their
children by accumulating a fund for college tuition.
Meanwhile, the development of 'affinity card' programmes have made credit cards
available as a more immediately distinctive element in the construction of a
particular lifestyle. The leading purveyor of affinity cards, the American bank
MBNA, offers cards with affiliate ties to professional organisations, students and
alumni of particular universities, environmental causes, cultural organisations,
charities and sports. Not only is the card personalised with the insignia of the
affiliate but the bank offers particular incentives such as donations on the
consumer's behalf, discounts and brand-name merchandise. On the application form
for the 'Elvis Presley' card, for example, in addition to the more 'conventional'
incentives such as 'worldpoints' and 0% interest on balance transfers and cash
advances, potential consumers are offeredr'
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• FREE new authentic Elvis collectible after qualifying use(s) of your
account! This is an officially licensed, signature classic 8" x 10" framed
photograph of Elvis Presley -- a $60 retail value!
• Every purchase you make with the Elvis Presley Visa® credit card
generates a contribution to the Elvis Presley Charitable Foundation to do
good works for less fortunate and homeless people--at no additional cost to
you.
• 10% off all catalog purchases, and souvenir and gift shop merchandise.
• 10% off Heartbreak Hotel® room rates and merchandise.
• 10% off Graceland Platinum Tour Admission
• Free parking when touring Graceland (subject to availability)
The exercise of one's entire scope of consumption through a credit card thus
becomes inflected with the tint of a particularised life that the consumer desires to
give form to. In doing so the consumer may be rewarded with customised,
preferential choices accruing only to them and others like them who have chosen to
give expression to themselves in that distinctive fashion. 'Don't you step on my blue
suede shoes' .
A credit card may also become inducted as an element in a personalised, ethical
mode of expression. Launched in 2006 by Bono, Irish rock star and celebrity Third
World campaigner, the Product(RED) campaign represents a collective initiative by
producers of 'iconic' products such as American Express, Motorola mobile phones,
Armani couture and others to launch special lines of consumer products
distinguished by the colour red with a (variable) portion of profits being distributed
for the alleviation of HIVIA ids in Africa." To these ends American Express RED,
which pledges to donate the value of 1% of customer balances to the Global Fund,
seductively invites consumers to 'make every purchase inc(red)ible', offering the
simultaneous possibility of both consumerist fulfilment and selfless yet effortless
charity. According to the British head of American Express's card business, Laurel
Powers-Freeling, the intended consumer is one who thinks 'I have to spend money
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anyway, so ifthere's a way of using the power of my purse for good, great, but I
don't want to give up anything to do so' (Martinson, 2006).
Figure 2.9 'The RED Revolution'. Three of the brand staples available through the RED initiative.
Source: Product(RED)
Barnett et al. (2005) argue that ethical consumption, articulating an overt
'commitment or obligation towards distant or absent others' (p. 29), provides a new
sphere within which consumers are governed by marketers, campaigners and policy-
makers, and come to think about and act upon themselves, in their consuming
choices and practices. As these authors identify, the neo-liberal implications are that
responsibility and action become addressed through individuated market choice with
responsibility being assumed by consumers for 'distant others' without any sense of
why they might be accountable - what Beck (1992: 137) has called a 'long-distance
morality'. Despite its universalistic intentions, though, Barnett et al. acknowledge
the likely ways that such consumption may become bound up in the expression of
economic, social and cultural divisions. Rather obviously with Amex RED, such
divisions are manifest in the fact that, as a credit card, a minimum income and credit
rep0Rgovem the basis of its consumption. Accordingly, such ethical expression in
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the formation of self-identity becomes dependent on the economic and consumer
capital wielded by the applicant.
With the proliferation of credit cards, the supposed 'democratisation of credit' across
broader reaches of the population, creditors have come to produce new visible
symbolic distinctions such as gold and platinum cards with more restrictive
eligibility criteria based on income and offering higher credit limits with
complementary additional services. Credit cards thus act not only as a conduit in the
formation of identity but serve to illuminate that identity directly through the
creditor's careful calculation of its symbolic scarcity. However, it is not simply
through their rarity that they attain value. Veblen argued that conspicuous
consumption was intrinsically wasteful in that it did not add to the satisfaction of
ostensible needs but served to demonstrate to others the pecuniary strength of the
consumer. Hierarchical cards, though, do not simply represent the strata of the
individual whose name is embossed, but in a more nuanced fashion, materially
represent, to others and the self, the scale and scope of choice which that individual
enjoys through credit:
Freedom to choose sets the stratification ladder of consumer society and so
also the frame in which its members, the consumers, inscribe their life
aspirations - a frame that defines the direction of efforts towards self-
improvement and encloses the image of a 'good life'. The more freedom of
choice one has, and above all the more choice one freely exercises, the
higher up one is placed in the social hierarchy (Bauman, 1998a: 31).
With the possession of an exclusive credit card, though, consuming choice is not
merely enhanced by the extensive credit limit that one is able to engage but by the
shaping of exclusive conditions under which one's credit use is exercised. MBNA's
elite 'Quantum' card, in addition to offering lines of credit of up to $1 million
dollars, produces a 'frosty-looking, translucent' piece of plastic which 'looks more
like an accessory than a credit card' (Lee,2000: 11). A limited-edition version of
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American Express's competing 'Centurion' card features a motif of an x-rayed,
sequined, boot-clad leg produced by haute-couture fashion designer Alexander
McQueen (see figure 2.10) which was unveiled at a celebrity London catwalk show
as though it were the latest fashion season's offering.' The distinction of the
symbolic properties of the physical card are not merely conferred by a quantitative
rarity but by the appropriation of a culturally recognised high-fashion aesthetic that
commodifies the plastic card possessed by the individual as an appropriable style
element within itself.
Figure 2.10 'Pull the Other One'. Alexander McQueen's exclusive design for American Express
Centurion. Source: Design Week
A rewards programme offered by UBS Warburg for 'high-net-worth' customers who
have charged a sufficient volume to their cards, provides for such distinguished
consuming experiences as a round of golf with a professional golfer and the
opportunity to design one's own wine at a commercial vineyard (Creamer, 2006).
More broadly, American Express offers its platinum card holders such privileges as
free upgraded airline tickets on certain airlines, complimentary access to business
class airport lounges, facilities such as free breakfasts and late checkouts at selected
hotels and complimentary premium-club membership at car rental agencies to
'bypass lines and paperwork, [and] go right to your waiting car'." Visa's premium
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'Signature' card allows card users to get dinner reservations at the most exclusive
restaurants, even if they are fully-booked." The eminence of choice experienced
through card purchases is elevated, not only by the quantity of credit that the
individual consumer can command to their will but the qualitative form such credit
takes. For those whose scope of choice qualifies them, rarefied and distinguished
consuming experiences become the reward for continued credit use while the
potential pleasure generated by such credit use can be automatically multiplied or
prolonged, or a delay in gratification eliminated, simply as of the qualified
cardholder's right.
Yet, what is to be chosen? Many high-end credit cards also offer what is known as a
'concierge' service, a customer service representative who can be contacted by
telephone or email to procure advice, research and assistance not only on one's card
use but on anything that the card might be used to purchase. In the 19th century,
Marx argued that under conditions of capitalist alienation, money, because it offers
the universal property of being able to appropriate all objects, makes the qualities of
those objects the possession of the individual who possesses money. As he
rhetorically asked:
I am mindless, but if money is the true mind of all things, how can its owner
be mindless? What is more, he can buy clever people for himself, and is not
he who has power over clever people cleverer than them. Through money I
can have anything the human heart desires. Do I not therefore possess all
human abilities? Does not money therefore transform all my incapacities into
their opposite? (Marx, [1844b] 1975: 377)
In the 21st century, it is no longer simply the tangible amount of money that one
possesses which gives form and weight to the subject under capitalist relations of
production; now the same ends can be accomplished through the intangible quality
of one's credit entitlements. The credit card concierge acts as a permanent
counsellor to the consumer, offering the cardholder equipped with the financial
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means to choose but bewildered by the possibilities of what to choose or constrained
by the boundaries of time and space, the wherewithal to give effect to his will to
make the right choice (or neutralise the consequences of a choice that has been ill-
made).
Making Arrangements for Special Occasions
A Platinum Card Concierge helped a Card member make his
son's honeymoon especially memorable by arranging for
champagne and flowers to be delivered to the honeymooners'
room, as well as a private beachside dinner for the couple.
Helping When You're Away from Home
A Platinum Card Concierge arranged for a replacement
passport-in 24 hours-for a Card member who had lost his
identification while he was travelling.
Shopping for Gifts and Hard-to-Find Items
A Platinum Card Concierge located a bracelet a Card member
had seen while on vacation in Rhodes, Greece - a town with
more than 100 jewellery stores.
Taking Care of Your Home
A Platinum Card Concierge found a housepainter to paint a
Card member's Paris home, helping select the colour as well as
ensuring the job was complete by the date the Card member
specified.
Fig.ure 2.1~ 'Consumer First Aid'. Even not being there, being careless, being forgetful and not
havmg the time or the inclination are no longer problems for America's elite consumers. Source:
American Express'"
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Consumer Credit and State Regulation, Part 2: Autonomising the Consumer
It is not simply, however, that the preoccupation with choice, the construction of the
self through the formation of identity and the fulfilment of a lifestyle are the mere
outcomes of a totalising shift from modernism to some variant of post-modernity.
They connect in very specific ways, and provide new modalities for, new
rationalities through which individuals are governed. As Miller and Rose suggest,
the idea of consumer choice has been accorded a vital economic role within
contemporary forms of government so that 'economies are successful to the extent
they can promote this, at one and the same time, proliferating and differentiating
needs, producing products aligned to them and ensuring the purchasing capacity to
enable acts of consumption to occur' (1990: 25).
As argued by ,governmentality' theorists, the latter decades of the 20th century in
Western societies has seen 'advanced' or 'neo'-liberalism come to replace welfare-
interventionism as the dominant political rationality of government. Just as
welfarism sought to transcend the externalities of liberalism characterised by self-
destructive economic competition, commercial monopoly and fragmenting social
bonds, neo-liberalism stemmed from a cross-political matrix of discourses that
attacked the welfare state as a bureaucratic morass and the inflationary pressures
produced by an active fiscal interventionism into the economy (Rose and Miller,
1992; Rose, 1993, 1996b, 1999b; Dean, 1999a). Neo-liberalism, as an assembly of
ideas about how to govern, was not simply a reactivation of a classical liberalism,
that is, that the state should abstain from interfering within the domain of the market.
Liberalism conceived of the economy as a quasi-naturalistic sphere endowed with its
own immanent logic and dynamics derived from and fulfilling the essentialised and
self-referential needs of the workers, producers and consumers that participate
within it and from which government must stand free. Against this, neo-liberalism
envisages the market as a spontaneous social order that emerges through the
development of civilisation, that is, the development of rules of learnt conduct.
Markets are not somehow fundamental and ahistorical but emerge through a process
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of institutional, economic and cultural development (Burchell, 1993; Dean 1999a).
Similarly, choice is not a product of autonomised irreducible individual interest but
is a human faculty that can be manipulated and made calculable through the context
within which it is made. The neo-liberal rationality of government is thus not about
freeing people but about making people free. The programmes it implements
concern not simply 'freeing' the market (although this is important in some respects)
but about 'enabling' the market to exist in a diversity of contexts for the politically
specific claim of improving' efficiency' .
Although government becomes stripped of its social functions, it does not mean that
government does not seek to intervene; on the contrary, government is compelled to
promote and sustain an environment conducive to a sense of 'entrepreneurialship' on
the part of its citizens. Enterprise, as a polymorphous form of activity rather than a
tangible entity, figures as a permanent ethical blueprint for the promotion of the
autonomous choosing individual. Such individuals are to govern their own lives, to
skilfully and judiciously deploy their resources over time in order to optimise their
autonomous capacity to choose and thus calculably fashion a fulfilling and
meaningful life for themselves (Miller and Rose, 1990; Rose, 1996b; O'Malley,
2004). To these ends, individuals are to be 'enterprised', to have their environments
acted upon in such a fashion so that they are empowered as choice-makers. In a
sense, all individual action is reconceived as economic action - individuals are seen
as calculating entrepreneurs of themselves who shape their own lives on a cost I
benefit basis through the choices that they make. 'The political subject is now less a
social citizen with power and obligations deriving from membership of a collective
body, than an individual whose citizenship is to be manifested through the free
exercise of personal choice among a variety of marketed options' (Rose, 1999a:
230). Government is not achieved by acting through the contracted bond of rights
and obligations between the individual and society. On the contrary, the field of
operation of government are the choices of the free self-determining individual, one
whose freedom is not self-evident but one who must be made free through the
devisement of a context within which they are free to choose (Dean, 1999a).
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Legislation and statutory action by the state is crucial in the process of government
for securing the alignment of other entities to the objectives of the polity (Miller and
Rose, 1992: 189-90). In relation to consumer credit within the United States, new
forms of state action from the 1970s have shaped the institutional context of
consumer credit in a distinctly neo-liberal way, promoting the autonomy of
individuals through setting the framework of possibilities for their marketised
choices.
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) 1974, as we will explore in more detail
in Chapter 3, was enacted to prohibit discrimination in credit decisions based on
race, national origin, age, gender and marital status, so attempting to programme a
unified field of consumers upon which credit sanctioning decisions would be
decided on 'objective' grounds of creditworthiness. It explicitly sanctioned
empirically validated statistical credit scoring systems as being 'fair' as long as the
above characteristics were not included as analytical variables. Thus, a field of
consumers was forged as a fundamental space of rule whose potential to self-
realising autonomy through the medium of consumption and consumer credit was to
be assured through law. Only those consumers who had shown themselves to be
incapable of autonomy in the face of credit, those who were specifically
uncreditworthy or excessively risky in a technical sense, were to be excluded from
this right. Even in such cases it was intended by the drafters of the act that it would
be of benefit by requiring that creditors disclose the reasons for refusal, with such
information 'educating' malfeasant consumers on how to remedy their deficient
creditworthiness (Elliehausen and Durkin, 1989: 7-8).
Of course, the act was not predicated on the fact that those of different races or
ethnic origins, of different ages or genders were or are equally creditworthy or enjoy
equal access to credit but by removing the explicit usage of such attributes and in
sanctioning statistical risk systems which lay claim to objectivity through binding
expertise and empirical derivation, this becomes explicable in terms of 'really
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existing' differences in creditworthiness of different groups and the autonomous
self-realising potential that this implies. Encapsulating this, scoring system
developers Fair Isaac declare that 'at a given score, non-minority and minority
applicants are equally likely to pay as agreed' .11 So, because risk is formulated
'objectively' from the technical arrangement of factors, the political context
underlying why different groups enjoy differential access to credit is leeched leaving
only the conceptualisation of creditworthiness as a measure of individual self-
government.
The Community Reinvestment Act (eRA) 1977, which built upon the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act 1975, attempted to broaden access to credit by acting upon
the operations of lenders. Like the EeOA, the concerns which motivated the passing
of the act related to the phenomenon of 'redlining' where banks refused to make
mortgage loans to those living in poor ethnic minority neighbourhoods (Schill and
Wachter, 1994: 224-5; Dymski, 1999: 37-8). Through the eRA, lenders are
periodically examined and rated by the particular federal agency responsible for
their supervision in terms of their provision of credit to the geographic communities
within which they operate including explicitly defined 'low and moderate income
neighbourhoods' and adjusted to the characteristics of the lender itself, the
community and the lender's competitors. The eRA rating attributed to the lender is
then taken into account by those agencies when deliberating on applications for
deposit facilities, mergers and acquisitions by that lender. Along the lines identified
by Rose (1996b, 1999b), the ostensibly free market for consumer financial services
is penetrated by calculative systems of financial control and target setting, the
resultant benchmarks and indices serving to shape its operation according to the
programmatic aims of the state.
Therefore, rather than engaging each and every individual within the solidarity of
society and the entitlement of universal provision, the state acts to promote the
exercise of individual autonomy through the nurturing of market choice in consumer
credit-;attempting in particular, to transform the dependency of the marginalised into
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a sustained freedom to choose. To these ends, the state respects the formal
independence of the market and economic activity; indeed the government of free
choice depends on a free market within which that choice can be realised.
Nevertheless, the state operationalises its goals by 'acting at a distance' upon the
lender through the principles of audit and standardised assessment, ultimately
denying market freedom itself to those lenders unwilling to align themselves to its
ends. However, as Peterson reports, the gap between idealised conception and
programmatic reality has been wide with little or no regulatory sanctions being
recorded against creditors who shirk their 'reinvestment' responsibilities (2004: 103-
4).
In the latter half of the 20th century, the main plank through which the state has
governed consumer credit has been the Consumer Credit Protection Act, in
particular, the first title which became known as the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).
The act, which endured a tortuous eight year passage through the legislature before
being passed into law in 1968, had three stated aims (Rubin, 1991). The first,
betraying the discursive persistence of Keynesian economic management, was to
help provide economic stability by encouraging the informed use of credit; the
second was to empower consumers to shop around for the most advantageous credit
terms, while the third was to protect consumers from unfair and inaccurate billing.
The activating mechanism deployed was that of disclosure, taking up and building
upon its form within the uniform instalment sales laws that we analysed earlier but
in a form which was not simply concerned with protecting the consumer but actively
privileging their position within the market. Essentially, creditors were required to
calculate the annual percentage rate (APR) of every credit product they marketed,
that is, the cost of the credit including interest and all incidental costs, in a
standardised fashion and prominently display this charge so that consumers could
compare and contrast the costs of different credit products available in the market. It
is perhaps no coincidence that the concept of disclosure plays significantly to the
predominant neo-classical economic perspective where individual atomised
preferences are pursued in markets which operate at optimal efficiency when there is
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'perfect information' among buyers and sellers about prices and other market
conditions (see Peterson, 2004: 118-23).
The terms of the act were intended not merely as a means of promoting a general
transparency about prices within the market; rather, in a more amorphous fashion, its
main purpose was perceived to lie in its effective fostering and improving of the
cognitive, attitudinal and behavioural processes of consumers in relation to the
efficient shopping for, and use of, credit (Durkin and Elliehausen, 2002). From a
cross-political perspective it was thought that consumer 'behaviour' could be
programmed in a desirable fashion, 'persuaded' rather than 'compelled' to govern
itself for the maximisation of its own interest, in turn, compelling creditors to
compete on terms thus increasing overall industry efficiency (Brandt and Day,
1974).
In contrast to older forms of regulation which directly regulated and channelled such
economic transactions through the specification of interest limits, licensing
requirements and oversight mechanisms, TILA embodied an attempt by the state to
govern the transactions of consumer borrowing 'at a distance' by acting upon the
self-governing propensities of consumers. Consumers were free to borrow,
whenever and from whichever source these chose, but such self-interest could not be
taken for granted. On the contrary, the state sought to render the exercise of choice a
more efficient practice by attempting to enforce a homogenisation of a particular set
of conditions within the national market for consumer credit, thus prioritising the
role of the consumer. Through simplifying choice, the act of choosing could be
made more efficient and so the consuming activities of individuals, involved in their
personalised projects oflifestyle construction, could be enhanced and made more
effective. As Rubin notes, disclosure has proven a popular technology within
contemporary neo-liberal governmental programmes for acting upon the self-
governing propensities of individuals, forming the backbone of such related
consumer protection statutes as the 1988 Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure
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Act and the 1991 Truth in Savings Acts as well as the regulation of other diverse
areas such as securities, consumer good quality and the environment (1991: 234).
Miller and Rose (1992) suggest that programmes of government are congenitally
failing operations, their messy, pragmatic and unintended reality perpetually failing
to intervene in the space of rule in a fashion that faithfully represents the
programmers' intentions, even to the point of producing iatrogenic effects. As a
programmatic attempt to articulate a role for the state in the government of credit,
TILA was subject to criticism for its ineffectiveness and its counter-productive
outcomes which left creditors vulnerable to legal challenges on the basis of what
were understood to be spurious technicalities of non-adherence to the letter of the
law (Rubin, 1991: 236-8). In a certain sense, consumers were seen to be excessively
privileged by the terms of the act to the detriment of creditors. Yet, at the same time,
consumers, too, were felt to be ill-served by an act whose provisions 'were not
telling them what they needed to know' (p. 238). Numerous empirical studies
suggested that, rather than streaming information towards the consumer in order for
them to make the best possible choice, TILA soaked the consumer in a torrent of
impenetrable disclosure terms that overwhelmed their ability to discern the 'true'
cost of credit and effectively compare the merits of different credit products (Jordan
and Warren, 1966; Kripke, 1968; Brandt and Day, 1974; Davis, 1977). In particular,
lower class consumers ill-equipped with the 'cultural capital' to interrogate lengthy
legal forms and whose use of credit was governed more significantly by availability
rather than price, were seen to be more than relatively disadvantaged under the terms
of the act (Kripke, 1969; Worden and Sullivan, 1987).
So, just as a dearth of information might starve the basis of entrepreneurial action, a
state-enforced deluge could be cloying to it, not simplifying but, on the contrary,
actively hindering the free exercise of choice. In response, as Peterson reports, TILA
was amended five times, in 1970, 1974, 1976 (twice) and 1978 before being
completely overhauled in 1980 by the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform
Act (2004: 126). This latter act served to eliminate many of the legal problems that
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beset creditors while streamlining certain consumer disclosure requirements.
However, almost inevitably it seems, '[t]here is little evidence ... that this present
version has been any more effective in communicating information to consumers or
in encouraging them to shop effectively for credit (Rubin, 1991: 239). Like the
fatalism of bringing a horse to water, no governing process can successfully enforce
an economically rational consumer consciousness.
What was perhaps the last gasp of an active state intervention within the market for
consumer credit occurred in January 1980. Faced with the perceived wide-scale
political, economic and social threats of rising double-digit inflation, the Carter
administration triggered executive powers under the 1969 Credit Control Act which
equipped the Federal Reserve to reduce outstanding credit and thus ease upward
pressure on prices in the interests of general economic stability (Schreft, 1990;
Grant, 1992; Williams, 2004). As well as limiting the lending activities of financial
institutions more generally, the new measures attracted particular attention in terms
of specific mechanisms that sought to control the growth of consumer credit. Indeed,
in his speech announcing this new measure, President Carter made specific reference
to older notions of thrift in the American citizenry, arguing that instead of saving,
consumers had become conditioned to take advantage of inflation in their use of
credit, their pursuit of self-interest spiralling a problem which undermined the
integrity of the American economy.
However, credit controls did not simply embody a reversion to a welfare-
interventionist form of government. Firstly, the controls differed from their older
wartime incarnations in that instead of directly dictating minimum down payments
and loan amounts, much greater emphasis was placed on voluntary restraints and the
specification of depositary requirements, thus allowing financial institutions to
pursue their own specific strategies to determine how credit growth would be
restrained. Its mechanism of operation thus brought into play contemporary
governmental 'technologies of performance' that do not seek to dictate the form of
economic activity but, rather, to set goals and delegate the process of their
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achievement to the free play of the 'market' itself (see Dean, 1999a: 168-70).
Secondly, despite the intention of raising the cost of credit extension to protect the
unitary economic domain, the controls incorporated specific exemptions for smaller
creditors as well as loans which were used to finance automobiles, mobile homes
and mortgage loans. In fact, under the voluntary restraint element of the controls,
loans to finance mortgages, car purchases and inventory financing by automobile
dealers were specifically encouraged rather than limited (Schreft, 1990: 36).
If a rationality of welfare-Keynesianism envisaged a context, realisable through the
fiscal and administrative capabilities of the state, within which the attainment of
individual interest and the perpetuation of collective security were mutually
reinforcing, then the activated terms of the Credit Control Act fell between two
liberal stools in activating a state interventionism for a common wellbeing yet
specifying, in a neo-liberal fashion, that consumer autonomy necessitated that
certain sections of the market be beyond the scope of such an intervention. Mirroring
the political discourse on the failures of the welfare state, much of the criticism
which followed the initiative was the degree to which its restrictions 'harmed'
consumers, particularly the most hard-pressed and vulnerable, who did not have
access to alternative sources of financing. As consumers, they were being deprived
of the self-realising possibilities of choosing.
Although it was anticipated by the Federal Reserve that limiting the extension of
consumer credit would actually have negligible effects on combating inflation,
providing supposedly a 'symbolic' component, applications for credit plummeted
while retail sales as a whole slumped as the wider economy entered recession. As
Schreft (1990) suggests, whether or not the regulatory controls 'caused' the
recession it was believed that they did, just as their abandonment a mere six months
later was held to have contributed to an immediate economic recovery. In part, by
compromising the autonomy of consumers, restricting the scope of their credit and
consuming choices and thus dampening their individualised projects of the self, the
state had endangered, not secured, the basis of economic vitality. Itwas, though, not
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merely the particular formulation of controls that was held to have been deleterious
but the very attempt at making any kind of wholesale, calculable intervention. As the
Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Frederick H. Schultz suggested at the time:
We learned in 1980 that it is exceedingly difficult to assess in advance the
impact of control on economic activity. When the Board enacted its program,
we did not anticipate, and we had no reason to anticipate, the market impact
it would have. Given the limited coverage of the program, it would have
been expected to have had a moderate effect on aggregate demand; however,
we did not reckon correctly the dimensions of the psychological impact of
the program on borrowers and lenders (cited in Schreft, 1990: 46).
It was not just that the actions of the state failed in this particular instance; they
were, rather, fated to fail for any attempt to regulate the economy en masse in any
dimension is seen to set off a chaotic series of unintended, unforeseeable
consequences within and through the minds of individuals, spreading out and
infecting other economic sectors until the whole arena of the economy itself
becomes distorted. Like the cautionary tale of the sorcerer's apprentice, bedlam and
disorder are the inevitable fruits of a well-meaning but over-determining
intervention to guide the unitary economy beyond the autonomy and freedom of its
participants. By 1982, the credit control powers granted to the President under the
act were abolished and have not been reintroduced by Congress since.
Credit Reporting and Surveillance
During the course of the 20th century, consumer credit expanded and intensifed
across the United States, incorporating specialised financial capital to create and
invent new possibilities for the ongoing fulfilment of a continuously regenerated,
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increasingly heightened process of consumer desire. Credit, as a commercialised
contractual agreement to pay for goods or repay money borrowed in the present
against some temporal conception of the future, has always presented lenders with
uncertainty, the possibility of profit from interest or other charges balanced against
the threat or hazard of loss from non-repayment, default or delinquency.
Historically, within the context of the 19th century, we have seen how small loan
lenders deployed invasive, bureaucratic mechanisms to locate and target borrowers,
a strict, temporal arrangement of repayments and a coercive apparatus to extract
payments from the unwilling and the desperate, often outside the scope of legality.
Instalment sellers of various kinds have governed the repayment actions of
borrowers through the bureaucratic arrangement of increments of time and flows of
payments, an assessment of, and reliance upon, the subjective 'character' of the
individual and the formulation of a contract binding the obligations of the borrower
within a wider legalistic framework. Since the 1960s, as we have seen, most
particularly with the entry of banks into direct consumer lending and the
development of new forms of credit like the credit card, not only has the process of
lending and borrowing money become abstracted from the context of interaction, but
it has increasingly come to rely upon the self-governing capacities of individuals,
their potential to regulate and control both their use of, and their repayment to, a
personalised, instantly deployable, temporally unbounded form of credit.
Yet, lenders do not merely rely upon the existence of such a capacity. On the
contrary, with the development and innovation of bureaucratic recording procedures,
practices and commercial transactions of information sharing, circuits of
computerisation, processes of information storage, retrieval and distribution between
multiple lenders, service providers, collection agencies and state institutions, a
shifting 'surveillant assemblage' (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000) has come into being
within the domain of consumer credit. This figuration of practices not only provides
a means for tracking and accounting for the actions of individual credit consumers, it
has come to constitute them in particular ways, to give them meaning and salience in
a form that can by readily identified and acted upon by lenders and others for their
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particular ends. In doing so, this assemblage has come to constitute credit consumers
as a collective and as individual subjects, its logic and procedures, its storage and
circulation of data, its inventions and innovations giving them a particular density
and substance that is significant not only for lenders but in how credit consumers
think about and act upon themselves.
A Brief History of the Credit Reporting Industry
The sharing of information on the abstract 'creditworthiness' of individuals has its
antecedents in 19th century commercial trading. Madison (1974) notes how early 19th
century American merchants relied upon their established personal ties with the
other businessmen they dealt with in order to assess creditworthiness for deferred
payment. However, higher volumes of commercial activity across greater distances
due to the expanding markets of the post Civil War era, road, rail and
communication infrastructural developments, and the technologically enhanced
speed and volume of industrial output presented businesses with a problem of
'distance' in terms of advancing credit facilities to unknown buyers. Around this
problem grew credit reporting firms such as the Mercantile Agency and R.G. Dun
which were established to provide written compiled reports of commercial
creditworthiness in a context where the personal relationships of old governing
access to credit had been tom asunder under the march of progress.
Madison (1974) and Olegario (2002) demonstrate how despite the increased distance
of commercial trade and the intervention of specialised third party reporting
agencies, the formulation of written reports adhered to a localised, often
significantly moral conceptualisation of 'character' in their assessments. Although
traits often held multiple meanings, aspects of character related to clients by credit
reporting agencies can be seen to divide into three types. These were: personal
details which included such markers as age, marital status and ethnicity;
entrepreneurial / productivist qualities such as approximate wealth, professional
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trade experience, entrepreneurial drive and perseverance; and overtly moral
attributes like honesty, punctuality, level of personal and family extravagance or
thrift, drinking or gambling vices.
Consumer bureaus, like their commercial equivalents began to emerge at the
beginning of the new century within the United States as well as other countries,
reflecting the greater prominence of retail consumer credit (Westin and Baker, 1972;
Cole, 1988). Initially comprised oflists of 'bad debts' organised and shared between
retailers on a non-profit basis or organised by trade associations in large cities, they
allowed each contributor to avoid advancing credit facilities to those who had
defaulted elsewhere, such people being interpreted as of intrinsically flawed
character and liable to repeat their actions. In 1906, a national trade association, the
National Federation of Retail Credit Agencies, was formed to both promote the
industry and provide a centralised, standardised clearinghouse for exchanging credit
information on consumers between cities and regions. Within the US from the 1920s
and 30s, ever greater numbers of consumer reporting agencies, increasingly
organised on a commercial basis and now recording the general performance of all
an individual consumer's accounts as well as particular incidences of default, began
to establish themselves in smaller and smaller towns, reflecting the rapid diffusion of
automobile instalment finance and the progressive development of retail store
instalment and charge accounts at the time. From around one hundred bureaus in
1916, membership of the national association grew to around eight-hundred in 1927
and double that by the mid-1950s, achieving collective coverage of all consumers by
1960 (Hunt, 2002: 9). However, reflecting the centralisation of credit provision in
national retailers and the increasing prominence of banks in consumer lending, a
centripetal process began to characterise the formation and practices of the industry
in the latter half of the century.
In 1965, Credit Data Corporation (CDC) was established and, in breaking with the
traditional paper filing system that had gone before, began to exploit new computer
and telecommunications technologies to provide the first form of electronic access to
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consumer records within the wider California region as well as the major cities of
the eastern seaboard (Rule et al. 1969; Westin and Baker, 1972). This shift towards
computerised, high-speed access of credit records intersected with the particular
demands of the large-scale banks, now concentrating on high-volume consuming
lending, who were increasingly concerned with assessing creditworthiness based on
the statistical distribution of pre-defined characteristics across a population of
borrowers rather than creditworthiness as an individuated, subjective phenomenon.
This electronic mediation of data led to new ways of inscribing the information held
in credit files. Closed-ended, numeric categories detailing the 'objective' payment
performance of the individual to previous creditors, incorporating such information
as account types held, account status and number and severity of delinquencies,
replaced such bureau formulated evaluative judgements as 'good payer', 'slow
payer' which had been traditionally inscribed.
CDC was bought out in 1968 by TRW, an automobile parts and military defence
contractor and from the 1970s, considerable industry consolidation occurred as
lenders began to focus nationally on the marketing of consumer credit. Ultimately,
three credit bureaus, deploying fully automated electronic systems of information
retrieval, agglomeration and distribution have emerged as national repositories for
consumer credit information, namely TRW, which later became Experian when it
was bought out by British conglomerate Great Universal Stores, Equifax (a long
established bureau previously known as Retail Credit) and TransUnion, (the parent
company of Union Tank Car Company, a railcar leasing firm which, in a corporate
strategy of diversification, acquired the Credit Bureau of Cook County in 1969)
(Westin and Baker, 1972). By the 1980s, each bureau had individually attained
coverage of the national population of consumers. However, smaller bureaus, often
in commercial affiliation with the three nationals, have remained servicing low-
volume clients or particular niche markets such as medical service providers and
insurers, landlords and utility providers (Hunt, 2002: 12).
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Currently, around two million credit reports are issued each day to lenders (and other
parties such as landlords and insurance companies defined as having a 'permissible
purpose' under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act) who incorporate its
information into sanctioning decisions as to whether to grant credit to an individual,
what interest rates and other terms should be applied or to adjust the terms of a pre-
existing credit account. Individually, each of the three national bureaus maintain
files on around 200 million individual consumers encompassing approximately 1.5
billion credit agreements. Each bureau receives and updates their files with
approximately 2 billion items of information each month from thousands of lenders
and other organisations, processing the information in between one and seven days
(Avery et aI., 2003: 49-51).
Credit bureau records are divided into files for individual consumers and each file
into five relevant categories encompassing:
• Identifying Information. This lists the name ofthe individual, known
aliases, date of birth, current residential address, telephone number,
previous addresses, social security number, occupation, and employer
Credit Account Details. This category indicates each credit account opened
and closed for the individual within the previous seven years and conveyed
•
•
to the bureau, sometimes including reports submitted by medical and utility
firms. Each entry is detailed with the name of the creditor, relevant dates of
account activity, credit balances including limits and historical
information; current status and historical status of account; description of
the account including ownership (individual, associate user, co-signer),
account type; purpose of the account; and the type of creditor (bank,
finance company, retailer etc.)
Public Records. This category details publicly recorded financial
information on the individual acquired directly or from third-party
processors including foreclosures, civil judgments, tax liens and
bankruptcies over the previous ten years. On each entry are recorded the
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•date of record, type, current status, amounts, court reference number and
the name of the plaintiff
Collection Records. This indicates credit accounts and unpaid bills
concerning the individual which have been outsourced or sold to a
collection agency and reported to the bureau by them. Under each entry are
recorded the collection agency, date collection was acquired, date reported,
current status, amount if currently owing, and the name of the original
creditor
• Inquiry Records. This category lists every request for the individual's
credit report over the previous two years made in response to the
individual's application for credit. Each entry includes the date of inquiry,
type of credit for which inquiry was sought, and the name of creditor
(Avery et aI., 2003)
Liquid Information, Productive Knowledge
But data generated about consumers within the consumer credit industry is not
merely a by-product of capitalist activity in the pursuit of profit; it is rather
perceived to be at the core of entrepreneurialism in its enablement of economic
activity. Academics Fred Cate and Michael Staten, staunch advocates of
information sharing, posit that 'information is the lifeblood of our 21st century
economy', the free-flow of information being 'essential to providing the services,
products, convenience, safety, accessibility, recognition, and low costs that
consumers expect and demand' (2000: 1). The language here is significant for it is
not merely that such information serves as a fixed knowledge, to be agglomerated
and invested in the production of profit; on the contrary, its key beneficial attribute
is its dynamism, its vitality and fluidity reflected in the use of such descriptions as
'lifeblood', 'rapid availability', and 'free-flow of data'. In a sense, the key perceived
benefits of credit reporting reflect Bauman's (2000) analysis that contemporary
modernity has become 'liquid', its 'solid' predecessor of sprawling factory
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complexes, heavy capital investment and job-for-life workforces girded by fixed
political ideologies giving way to outsourced production, global capital movements,
the ethereality of consumer branding and the anxieties of life-politics, therapeutics
and identity formation.
According to Cate, the equation is a simple one: the rapidity and easy availability of
accurate information provides the very foundation of modem consumer credit, itself
fundamentally underpinning the American economy and its very 'way of life' (2002:
230). Critically, such information dynamism enables efficiency. For institutions, the
circulation of data enables the diversity of the market, permitting lenders to
specialise in particular credit products while having access to the full picture of data
germane to the individual consumer. Information flows too, empower the
possibilities of target marketing, the engineering of products, services and marketing
in order to surgically locate those seams of customers whose free-floating desires
can be harnessed to the purchase and consumption of these customised particulars,
in the process, bypassing the prohibitive costs and resistances of the cumbersome
mass market. Cate (2000) identifies, as a specific example, the emergence of new
credit providers in the 1980s such as Discover and AT&T whose strategic use of
credit reporting data led to their innovation of such marketised credit card features as
customer rebates, no annual fees and loyalty points which shook up the static
duopoly of Visa and Mastercard, fundamentally altering the 'competitive landscape'
to the benefit of consumers.
The consumer interest, too, is directly served by the efficiencies produced through
an unhindered credit reporting system. Itmeans that even large loans can be gotten
quickly, in 'minutes or hours' as opposed to the 'weeks or months' of a previous
encumbered era. The free-flow of information, too, permits loan pooling and the sale
of stocks of debt to external investors, thus constantly liquefying and replenishing
the stocks of capital available to lenders for lending. The 'mobility' of credit
information and the 'portability' of credit histories ensures that consumers can shop
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far and wide for the lowest cost credit, even at a distance from home, while
increasing the number of access points to credit that all households enjoy:
As a result, the typical u.S. household has more than twelve retail banking
products scattered across more than six different financial institutions.
Upper-middle-class families with two incomes hold, on average, 24 credit
cards from a dozen different issuers, including retailers (Cate, 2002: 235).
The flexible distribution of accurate data is also presented as being a key impetus in
the ongoing 'democratisation of credit' with lenders being increasingly more
confident in their identification and acceptance of the most marginal applicants who
had previously been excluded from the market. At the same time, it helps prevent
unsuitable consumers from incurring loans which they will be unable to repay thus
preventing damage to their general welfare (Dunkelberg et al. 1979: 11).
The credit reporting assemblage is thus a key element in enhancing the dynamism of
American enterprise, not only in the sense of commercial organisation but as a mode
of activity virtuously linking together the autonomous desires of individuals and
households, the adaptiveness and profitability of institutional creditors and the
vigour and international competitiveness of the American economy (c.f. Miller and
Rose, 1990: 24-5). The efficiencies of information sharing enhance the possibilities
of consuming choice - rendering it quicker, cheaper, widened, more accessible,
more responsive, and more diversely suited to individual tastes. Credit reporting thus
augments the autonomy and self-realising capabilities of consumers, allows the ever-
shifting figuration of the market to respond to their needs, reduces the costs of
borrowing and elevates the primacy of the greater exercise of choice in the pursuit of
credit-enabled consumption. 'Consumer credit finances homes and cars, funds
college educations, and provides the credit cards that consumers use everyday to
purchase goods and services' (Cate and Staten, 2000: 9). For lenders, it allows new
markets to be competed in, new innovations to be attempted, market diversity to be
embraced, and risks to be encountered, managed and profited from. Ultimately, from
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the agglomeration of enhanced, individual choice is drawn both the 'surprising
resilience' of the American economy and the concomitant 'raised standard of living
for U.S. citizens'.
Technologies of Inscription
The rise of the liberal state acting upon and through the autonomy of those
fundamental processes deemed exterior to itself - population, economy, society-
depended on particular technological devices and discursive means for conceiving
and inscribing those very processes so that they could be acted upon (Foucault,
1990, 1991; Hacking, 1990; Miller and Rose, 1990; 1992; Rose, 1993, 1999b; Dean,
1999a). Statistics, files, tabulating and recording systems and their concomitant
bureaucratic systems of organisation were essential for rendering those domains into
the discursive realm of government in a stable, systematic manner, to be made
comprehensible and intelligible so that they could be governed in a balanced,
justifiable way. In a certain sense, the state did not impose a regulatory bureaucratic
regime in its transformation to liberalism; it became a liberal state more precisely
through its ability to transform actions and occurrences - with the aid of 'inscription
devices' and the establishment of 'centres of calculation' - at a greater and greater
distance from the political heart of government into information amenable to ever
greater exploitation in the act of government. As Giddens (1991) would argue, such
technologies contracted the boundaries of time and space within the territory of the
nation state. However, some naturalised, pre-existing reality was not simply being
recorded for as Hacking (1986) has argued, that which is categorised and the process
of categorisation emerge in an intertwined process. In the words of Miller and Rose
with respect to the economy:
establishing a network of conduits for the detailed and systematic flow of
information from individual locales of production and trade to a centre
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helped constitute a single economic domain whose constituent elements
could be known and regulated 'at a distance' (1992: 186).
Discrete actions and events in relation to material production are lifted from the
opacity of everyday life and made visible, and with the application of a burgeoning
expert knowledge, become situated, understood and evaluated in relation to one
another as coherent, dynamic economic processes permitting a reflexive, measured
government intervention within the economy with such intervention, in turn, further
cohering the economy as a conceptual and material reality.
The governing of individual conduct depends on what has been termed' governing at
a distance' (Miller and Rose, 1990). From the genesis of liberalism, the state has
limited its unrestricted intervention within those processes deemed autonomous,
coherent and outside its purview - the 'population', 'economy', 'society' as well as
the minutiae of private life and everyday existence - contending instead to govern
more remotely in delicate, complex and shifting alliance with other groups, sectional
interests, firms and a diverse range of experts. Technologies of government therefore
do not reside exclusively within the state; rather, as Foucault indicated, government
should be conceived amorphously, as any attempt by authorities to act upon the
conduct of others in order to shape their beliefs or actions in a particular direction
(Foucault, 1983, 1991). The historical form that government takes is conditioned by
a prevailing political rationality, a relatively unified discourse which problematises
the space of rule in a particular way and sets forth the broad goals of what is to be
achieved by government and how. A multiplicity and diverse range of programmes
of government seek to act upon the conduct of individuals in numerous different
sites and different ways but always in relative congruence with those contemporary
prevailing political rationalities. Technologies of government, as we saw above,
comprise those very material apparatuses, conventions and techniques that allow
individual conduct to be made known and simultaneously acted upon towards the
ends of government.
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Within the sphere of accountancy for example, Miller and O'Leary (1994) explore
the formation and deployment of standard costing as just such a technology within
the early part of the twentieth-century. Intrinsically bound to a broader governmental
imperative of enhancing 'national efficiency', and located within firms seen
politically as crucial spaces for the government of the wider national economy,
standard costing was utilised as a means for rendering visible and calculable the
relatively proficient or wasteful actions of individuals within enterprises. Eruneshing
them in financially quantifiable norms and standards that not so much uncovered but
fabricated an understanding of what it meant to be efficient, standard costing
provided the potential for measuring and determining efficiency not only for
management but for the self-calculating workers themselves.
Inscribing the Field of Consumers
With the increased national development of an ever more extensive, national market
for consumer credit during the course of the 20th century, increasingly displaced
from local, particularistic sites of consumption, credit reporting itself has expanded-
through a classical, centripetal process of competition and elimination - to
incorporate more and more consumers at an increasingly national level, essentially
forming a unified system distributed across three commercial firms. In doing so, it
has come to function as a technology for inscribing the domain or space of that
which is to be governed. Bureaucratically shorn of moral judgement and qualitative
assessments which marked an older conception of creditworthiness intimately
associated with wider notions of character, the contemporary credit reporting
structure reflects, and represents an amalgamation of, those micro bureaucratic
technologies of inscription existing at the level of the individual credit grantor.
Through these, the creditor governs the sanctioning and repayment oflines of credit
through the deployment of a bureaucratic edifice of filing, tabulation, indexing and
quantitative credit control which replaces relatively personalised, character-based
assessments and judgements.
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From the mico-locales of the lender, the establishment of credit reporting conduits
and the formation of' calculating centres' in the databases of the national credit
bureaus opens up the world of credit consumers as a reality, a reality instantiated and
regenerated through the ongoing practices and commercial relationships between
consumers, lenders and bureaus; a space formed through the countless recorded
actions of a multitude of credit consumers, the institutional prerogatives oflenders
and other organisations, the capitalist strategising of credit bureaus, and the
possibilities and costs of data technologies; a domain with its own dynamism and
intensity within which it becomes possible to assess and to intervene, to appraise and
to govern.
Credit bureaus in their contemporary form caution that they record only 'objective'
information and seek to impart no evaluative judgement on those individuals whom
they maintain records on: nobody is 'good' nor 'bad' .12 The development of such an
objectivity within a developing credit market makes possible, and in tum is further
strengthened by, the utilisation of electronic technologies in recording,
agglomerating and distributing data. These technologies, necessary to the
contemporary market of mass, high volume credit, depend for their efficiencies on
the simple coding of information into yes / no binaries (e.g. credit agreement
fulfilled or unfulfilled), clearly defined limited categories (e.g. types of credit
agreement entered into), and quantitative scales (e.g. number of times delinquent).
However, such information is not merely a neutral recording mechanism - on the
contrary, its framing embodies particular expectations and understandings of that
which is to be measured, and through which that which is measured is understood
(Miller and Rose, 1990; Rose, 1999b). It presents each individual as an individual
consumer abstracted from the social context of a household a community a social, ,
class or ethnicity; individuals become linked only as the voluntary co-signatories to
the same recorded loan while each credit account opening and payment recorded,
each collection and bankruptcy inscribes an ostensible choice that the individual has
exercised, whether wisely or otherwise. For example, delinquent payments on an
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instalment agreement presuppose not an economic condition but an economic choice
not to repay, a choice taken by an autonomous rational actor in the service of their
wider atomised personal interests, perhaps as an outcome of failing to take due
prudential action in light of future personal uncertainties. More generally, in the
formation of an objectified history, an institutional bias disfavours those with limited
or no credit histories who, unable to demonstrate a capacity to use credit, will either
tend not to be given such an opportunity or will be burdened with more onerous
conditions.
The production of credit information, objectivised in its formulation and
construction, is essential to the systematised integration of credit reporting across the
breadth of the national population. Simmel (1978) explained in relation to the
emergence of the money economy that the standardised expression of value implied
by modem money was essential to the facilitation oftrade in foreign markets and as
a means of integrating activities under an extended division of labour where trust,
based on shared meaning and understanding derived from the tightly structured
interaction of smaller social groups, was being increasingly displaced. Similarly, the
process of instantaneously tracing creditworthiness across more extensive areas of
space supplants nuance-rich, qualitative assessments based on the slowly
accumulated 'tacit knowledge' of lender management (Leyshon and Thrift, 1999)
with an homogenised understanding of both the meaning of creditworthiness and
individuals as being creditworthy, within the context of an increasingly specialised,
narrowly functional relationship between borrowers and lenders.
As Rose (1999b) has argued in relation to the significance of numbers within
government, the founding of a domain of objectivity is inherently related to social
developments such as enhanced population mobility and the establishment of new
large-scale markets which create a meaning system residing not in the personalities
of tightly bounded small social groupings but emanating from the wider intricacies
of a dense web of interdependencies. In such a fashion, credit reporting has come to
represent a reified conception of creditworthiness beyond the subjective, producing
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and reproducing the credit history of an individual not on their own terms, but only
as a component of a wider constituted population. Contemporary lenders do not
assess potential consumers as independent entities but as precisely identifiable
elements of a wider body of some 200 million consumers. Counting the number of
successful repayments made by an anonymous consumer on a precisely defined kind
of credit agreement, over a definite period of time, with a tightly categorised kind of
lender only produces an understanding of creditworthiness against the current and
past actions of other consumers, the numbers and length of their repayments and
delinquencies, and what array ofloan types they use with what precisely categorised
kinds of lender.
Surveillance and the Subject
In recent years, the development of computer and telecommunications mediated
surveillance, of which contemporary credit reporting can be seen as part, has been
understood by some social theorists to have strikingly novel consequences for the
individual as a subject. In their influential article on evolving patterns of
surveillance, Haggerty and Ericson (2000) argue that contemporary practices of
surveillance mediated by technological networks represent amorphous
'assemblages' that capture individual bodies in particular relations of power,
formatting and capturing their information flows from dispersed centres thus
rendering them as flows of data that can be instantaneously reassembled and
scrutinised as required. Ultimately, a 'new' body emerges, an electronic
doppelganger representing the corporeal body above and beyond itself but which
circulates in its place through an assortment of calculating centres for the
determination of action about the individual.
Mark Poster (1990, 1996) too takes up this theme of the reconfigured subject. For
him, the 'superpanopic' power of computerised databases to both instantaneously
transfer and indefinitely preserve inscribed, personalised information not only leads
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to a disinterring of the divide between the public and the private - every private act,
to pay a bill or forego child support payments instantly becoming a matter of public
record - but de-centres the formation of the subject from its 'ideologically
determined unity' thus rendering such modernist conceptions as public/private,
consumption/production obsolete. Building on Foucault's elaboration of discourses
and the constitution of subjects within relations of power, Poster suggests that the
unprecedented potentiality of computer-mediated institutional databases to absorb,
disseminate and reconfigure the effects of notation leads to an interpellation, within
its files and data fields, of the contemporary subject in a form that is objectified,
dispersed and exteriorised:
[t]o the database, Jim Jones is the sum of the information in the fields of the
record that applies to that name. So the person Jim Jones now has a new form
of presence, a new subject position that defines him for all those agencies
and individuals who have access to the database. The representation in the
discourse of the database constitutes the subject, Jim Jones, in highly
caricatured yet immediately available form' (Poster, 1996: 289).
Mass society and the sovereign individual subject thus become transformed, the
former into banks of nebulous samples and markets, the latter as a 'dividual', a
perpetually reconfigurable assortment of elements derived from its circulation within
these wider media (Deleuze, 1992: 5). Although coining the term 'superpanopticon'
to describe this process, Poster deliberately contrasts it to Foucault's conception of
the panopticon as the perfected embodiment of an older disciplinary power - one
that attempted to craft the individual as a 'subject', autonomous and capable of
possessing a sense of self and of governing their own destiny. Taking this analysis to
its postmodernist limit, Bogard (1996) suggests that these institutionally and
technologically fabricated 'designer identities' are more real than the real self. In
enmeshing the actions of bodies within flows of information channelled and
arranged by the system's parameters, imperious to the boundaries posed by time and
space;contemporary surveillance has given, or is giving, way to simulation, reality
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to hyper-reality. Whereas surveillance, according to Bogard, sought to uncover truth,
to unmask what was real within a framework of imposing control upon subjects,
simulated surveillance, paradoxically, both ensures perfect visibility and control
while at the same time, disposing of that space of 'reality' as something to be
known.
To take one example, a lender may discern an array of individuals from a marketing
database, combine this with information acquired from their requested credit reports
derived from one or more credit bureaus, channel this disparate array of data into a
statistical programme which simulates what individuals may be the best, most
profitable marketing prospects for its specifically tailored credit product and, equally
importantly, are likely to respond to a solicitation. To these elect, a pre-approved
credit offer might be targeted. As such, based on the potentialities of their dispersed,
de-centred subjectivities produced through an assembly of databases and combined
in a stylised fashion through the strategisation of the lender, the conduct of these
individuals has been pre-emptively conducted, the field of possibilities of their
choices altered before they have encountered, or even be made aware of the altered
possibilities.P Like the criminal justice system's deployment of statistical profiling
for preventative detention of the criminal, marketing may become actuarial and pre-
emptive outwith the actions, choices and preferences of the individual consumer
(Simon, 1987, 1988; Feely and Simon, 1992).
Rhizomatic Surveillance
Unlike that 'avalanche of numbers' which made possible the modem nation-state
(see Hacking, 1990; 1991), the credit reporting system does not empower a single
calculating entity at its centre. On the contrary, the calculating potential it engenders
is dispersed back to those micro-locales from which it was drawn. Within this
system, flows of data function not merely as instruments for surveilling credit
consumers but as a commodified service which generates not only a governing
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potential for lenders but a profit stream for credit bureaus. Consumers are opened up
and rendered visible for the purposes of individual creditors, operationalised through
their autonomous choices to seek credit. Significantly, then, it is consumers
themselves who implicate themselves within practices of credit reporting, whose
continual conscious choices to seek and use credit voluntarily enmeshes their bodies
within this surveillant assemblage. They are, as Poster notes, both the source and
recorder of the data generated about them (1990: 93). Even if resistance to such
practices is generated in the name of privacy, such privacy functions for the
individual not as an absolute value but as Haggerty and Ericson term it, a 'shifting
space of negotiation' (2000: 616). The vast majority of Americans seek credit, desire
its realising potential and in doing so, contractually submit themselves to its
information-distributing infrastructure despite concerns of privacy invasion and
suspicion as to the motives of such a system. Perhaps, though, as Poster notes this is
less a rational choice trade-off than an unconscious one, a product not of a consumer
pragmatism so much as a 'complicated configuration of unconsciousness,
indirection, automation, and absent-mindedness' on the part of consumers (1996:
288).
How any creditor will seek to act in order to govern consumers will be determined
by its general objective of maximising profitability - but how this is realised will
depend on their individual commercial strategy, particularly within a specialised,
diversified market. In the past, creditors avoided those whose lack of
creditworthiness was implied by their character but as creditworthiness has become
functionally specific and relativised, it is no longer a fixed attribute of the individual
but a shifting, variable attribution created within the specific context a credit
transaction. Although the credit reporting infrastructure opens up a field of credit
consumers, it offers only a potentiality rather than an impetus to intervention. As we
shall examine in later chapters, the emergence of a technologically mediated,
relatively centralised credit reporting system has been concomitant to the
proliferating deployment of statistical risk scoring technologies by individual
lenders. It is this risk technology, typically unique to the firm and crafted from their
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own localised, inscribed empirical history, feeding upon the written application for
credit and the customer's credit file, which evaluates the credit seeker and represents
them as a risk. Not only that, but how the customer is to be governed in light of this
constituted risk is dependent upon how the firm conceives its profitability-
minimising risk exposure or maximising revenues, cross-subsidising products to
maximise customer acquisition or marketing to risky yet potentially profitable
'subprime' risk categories who will pay extraneous fees and higher interest rates. As
Manning (2000) attests, the new 'deadbeats' for credit card companies are no longer
those who skimp on their repayment obligations; it is rather those who pay-off their
balance each month, incurring no interest or other charges.
Putting forward his thesis of contemporary surveillance as a 'panoptic sort', Oscar
Gandy (1993), in part, posits contemporary surveillance practices as something of a
continuation of older disciplinary practices now no longer constrained by the
confines of space nor sight in their enforcement of the norm. In this he draws a
specific parallel between the coloured epaulettes worn by the different classes of
pupil of the Ecole Militaire as described by Foucault (1979: 181-2) which entitled
them to differential categories of privilege and the multicoloured American Express
cards brandished by contemporary consumers enabling them with varying levels of
consuming licence. Gandy's analogy is, however, flawed. The categorisation of the
French pupils served as a mechanism of normalisation, the worst could aspire to
higher appanages while the best were motivated to avoid the ignominies of their
lower brethren. Such a system thus served to homogenise the space of government,
ultimately serving to disappear under its own logic. On the contrary, the colour-
coded cards that American Express offers are segmented categories that dissolve the
'mass-ness' of the mass market into identifiable segments which permit its more
profitable exploitation. This logic here is one of heterogeneity not homogeneity; it
aspires not to uniformity but to customisation, the rolling out of bespoke credit
products precisely tailored to the characteristics of every single consumer.
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There is no single gaze exercising an individualising surveillance within
contemporary credit consumption. As Deleuze (1992) describes it, such practices as
exemplified by credit reporting are a form of modulation, with control effected not
centrally or coercively but through a matrix of shifting 'flows and transactions'
between the individual subject and those activities through which he or she engages.
Haggerty and Ericson (2000) deploy the descriptive adjective 'rhizomatic' to explain
this form that surveillance takes, one that is expansive and regenerative but spatially
unfocussed and hierarchically flattened, whose strength emanates not from its
intensification of a uni-direction gaze upon the individual but by its incorporation
and forging of new connections between the multitude of different circuits of
technology and data within which individuals are ensconced through their everyday
practices.l"
Within credit reporting, changing and manipulable virtual identities or 'data
doubles' are created through information flows, abstracting key elements from
individuals and rendering them as meaningful within specific practices. Far from
being 'innocent or innocuous virtual fictions', their existence and distribution do
determine access to certain benefits in certain contexts (Lyon, 2003: 27). Yet, at
least in this context, they do not abstract or dissolve the notion of a centred,
autonomous subjectivity. On the contrary, within contemporary consumption, the
centred, autonomous subject has never been stronger. Individuals are obliged to be
free, to constitute a meaningful life for themselves through the deployment of their
sovereign, autonomous choice within all those areas of life configured as 'markets' _
shopping, work, education. Far from being disparate and fragmentary, the individual
subject is tasked with exercising this choice to actively forge an ongoing cohesive
narrative within and through their life. Through consumption, where credit has
become established as a key mechanism for the fulfilment of desire, temporally
reframing the possibilities of choice, those who sustain an engagement with credit in
the consumerist pursuit of a meaningful sense of self will be those who exhibit the
longest, most richly detailed, most extensive virtual selves.
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Thus, an abstract data double - what I tenn a credit identity - with the widest
panorama and greatest resolution of detail does not deconstruct the unity and
centred-ness of the contemporary subject, at least not in the consumption of credit.
On the contrary, it exists in articulation with the centred subject. On the one hand, it
reflects the subject's ongoing labour to sustain itself, recording in its stylised
'objective' way each credit choice and all exhibited capacity to uphold these choices
in repayment; and on the other, it provides a central resource for future credit
consumption, presenting itself as a report card of the individual's capacity to self-
govern, a cumulative history taken as evidence by whatever current lenders might
take a commercial interest.
Rhizomatic surveillance technologies such as credit reporting can perhaps best be
conceived as a means of securitising the identity of consumers at access points to
consumption (Rose, 1999b: 243). The presence of a credit bureau record and its
content enable creditors, on their own terms, to determine who to sanction lines of
credit to, for how much and for how long. As Bauman remarks:
... it is the credit and marketing companies which are the main movers and
users behind the database, and what they seek is to make sure that the records
confirm the 'credibility' ofthe people on record - their reliability as clients
and choosers, and that those incapable of choice are sifted out before damage
is done or resources wasted; indeed, being included in the database is the
prime condition of 'creditworthiness' and so is the means of access to 'the
best game in town' (Bauman, 1998b: 50-1 [emphasis in original]).
Although Bauman is correct in noting that the existence of a credit record tends to be
a precondition for entry to 'circuits' of consumption, the detailing of delinquencies
and defaults, referrals to collection agencies for unpaid debts and court judgments
within a record can serve as an agglomerated, overarching securitized identification
of the individual's incapacity to govern themselves under the desires proffered by
consumption and thus may potentially serve as an exclusionary marker for lenders. It
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is not only paucity of detail, then, which may proclaim the sclerosis of self-
government.
Crucially, neither the presence nor the content of a coherent, securitised identity
produced within the credit reporting assemblage are sufficient for access given that
the way in which credit is accessed is diffused throughout the market and how
competition and diversity within that market ensure that individual firms target
different consumers in different ways. The division that Rose (1999b) charts within
contemporary society between an 'included' majority empowered with the
resources, capacity and self-control to exercise their freedom through consumption
and an 'excluded' minority composed of 'non-consumers' , 'would-be' consumers
and 'flawed' consumers (see Lyon, 1994: 154) is rendered possible through the
infrastructure of credit reporting. Yet the circuits of inclusion are generated not only
through the shifting assembly ofthe consumer's credit identity but, crucially,
through how lenders, in their dispersed, localised sites, strategically choose to act
upon it.
Homo Economicus and Surveilling the Self
Within the US, from 1960 to 1970, three congressional committees and five state
legislatures held hearings into the practices of the credit reporting industry (Westin
and Baker, 1972). Reflecting growing public concern, particularly the heightened
speed and scope of data distribution in the wake of computerisation, the committees
focussed on such issues as the content of reports, their accuracy and completeness,
procedures for disputing information held and precautions taken by the industry
against unlawful access. Although the debate is often approached within the
conceptual domain of privacy, it is perhaps more interesting to consider it as one of
'credit due-process' as Westin and Baker remark. As argued earlier, with the rise in
the pre-eminence of the consumer and the increased government of individual
conduct through consumption, the supposed deregulation of the credit industry has
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implied, on the contrary, a reorientation of regulation in favour of fostering the
autonomy of the consumer. Rule et al. (1969), analysing the industry at the time,
castigated the credit reporting process as one of intense secrecy, favouring the
interests of business over those of the consumer. They called for greater
transparency and oversight in the 'public interest', but a public interest not built on
solidarity but on collective individualised autonomy. They note, for example, that:
The credit file may be an indispensable condition to enjoyment of the basic
material trappings oflife, including one's house, automobile, home
furnishings and entertainment; yet if things function smoothly, as they most
often do, the existence of the file remains completely hidden (1969: 162).
There is no sense here of a unified social framework, but rather, of individual self-
interest ('one's house, one's automobile') enabled by a systematic credit reporting
infrastructure. What they criticise is not the existence or principle of credit reporting;
on the contrary, such a system is a necessity for individual consumer self-realisation.
What is at stake is its opacity and the potential negative consequences it may hold in
store for some consumers - in effect, its inadequacy at sufficiently realising
consumer autonomy. In such a vein, Rule et al. (1969: 162-65) chart its flaws: its
dissemination of erroneous information, its mishandling of information, its failure to
reflect consumer dispute with the credit provider and its inability to adequately
reflect up-to-date public information. In sum, what is derided is not the existence of
such a system but its inadequacies, the degree to which the virtual identities it
fabricates do not adequately reflect their material counterparts. It therefore not only
enables and empowers individualised consumption but can, potentially, be
unreflective of consumption potential and inhibit the process of identity self-
construction. For Rule et al., balance can only be restored by setting legislative
margins for the industry to operate within and, most crucially, by enshrining a right
of access by consumers to their own records.
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Arguing from an economic libertarian perspective, Klein and Richner (1992) and
Klein (2001) defend the credit reporting industry from 'misguided' government
regulation (particularly ofthe European privacy variety) arguing, in effect, that the
market has evolved an efficient means of objective and narrowly functional
'institutionalised gossip' for securing the reputation of consumers in large, complex
societies. It is this system which has allowed the modem consumer credit market to
flourish and from which consumers benefit through greater and cheaper availability
of credit. However, their analysis reveals a distinctly neo-liberal framing. As Dean
(l999a: 157-8) argues, liberalism conceives the market as an organic domain where
individuals pursue their naturalised interests and whose autonomy the state must
heed. However, the distinctiveness of neo-liberalism is that it problematises
entrepreneurialism and competition as forms of conduct which must be nurtured
through active intervention in order to allow the market to function. In such a
fashion, Klein and Richner's approach takes credit seeking actions as a narrow form
of economic behaviour - rather than collective wellbeing being served by the pursuit
of individuals' self-governed self-interest, they see the use of credit as a form of
costlbenefit practice that requires the formation of an external institution imposing
costs of reputation harm:
When credit reporting is in place, consumers have an extra incentive to pay
their bills. They are eager to keep their credit report clean, for otherwise they
may lose the benefits of credit. ... By enhancing accountability, credit
bureaus help tum consumers into responsible individuals (Klein and Richner,
1992: 395).
The liberal subject of interest is thus dethroned in favour of the neo-liberal homo
economicus as manipulable man (Gordon, 1991: 43) whose fundamental,
reductionist capacity to choose must be permanently worked upon through his or her
environment in order to elicit forms of acceptable conduct beneficial to the
collective interest. Interestingly, it seems the subject is not pre~umed to be moral but
must be made so through credit reporting as a 'precise and unintrusive means of
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social control' (Klein and Richner, 1992: 398). Perhaps their bluntest statement in
this regard is in citing Robert Cole's claim that historically, when practices of credit
reporting are absent, so too is the existence of consumer credit. It is thus not from
the benevolence of Capital One, MBNA or Citibank that we can expect our credit
card, nor is their regard for their own self-interest sufficient; rather, what is essential
is the conduct shaping effects continuously imparted by an effective credit reporting
mechanism that rewards the' good' consumer with future credit and punishes the
malfaisant with refusal (Klein, 2001: 326). Yet despite their disdain for state
interventionism in credit reporting and abhorrence of the economic sclerotic effects
imparted by the European Union privacy Directive, they implicitly support the right
of American consumers to access their own credit record. Critically, responding to
consumer complaints is seen not only to be a legal but a managerial necessity for it
is only by the input generated by consumer queries that the reliability of credit
reporting procedures can be tested and the quality of its service improved.
In 1970, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) was passed which provided for the
rights of consumers in the following ways:
• The limitation of commercial dissemination of reports to individuals or
companies with a legitimate 'permissible purpose'
To know if refusal of credit was based wholly or in part on the contents of a
credit report and the details of the bureau which supplied the information
To access one's own credit report for a 'reasonable fee' and for free in the
event that the consumer was turned down for credit in light of the report
To dispute information perceived to be inaccurate or incomplete - the bureau
must investigate the complaint with the lender who provided the information
and report back to the consumer, amending the record where relevant
To have inaccurate, incomplete or unverified information removed within a
'reasonable' timeframe
•
•
•
•
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• In general, information must be deleted from the report after seven years,
with the exception of bankruptcy information which can be maintained for
ten years
(Camden, 1988; Jentzsch, 2001: 21-3; Cate, 2002; Averyet al., 2003: 48-9).
Two subsequent amendments to the Act were introduced with the Consumer Credit
Reporting Reform Act, 1996 (CCRRA) and the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act, 2003 (FACTA). The first of these, the CCRRA: imposed new
specific time limits of 30 days for responding to consumer requests, allowed
consumers, for the first time, to query incorrect records directly with lenders in
addition to credit bureaus, and specified new responsibilities on credit bureaus and
lenders to distribute data amended in light of queries(Cate, 2002; Jentzsch, 2001: 24-
7).
More recently FACT A, in emphasising consumer rights to question accurate but
fraudulent data included on their credit files by way of 'identity theft', has amongst
other provisions: granted borrowers the right to a free annual credit report from the
three majors bureaus, enhanced the disclosure of consumer rights, mandated the
revelation of credit scores for a fee, imposed a new duty on lenders to inform
consumers of 'negative' items being reported, and required lenders to inform
consumers when their credit terms were substantially less favourable than the most
favourable terms available (FACTA, 2003; CFA, 2004). FACTA also mandated the
Federal Trade Commission, the main government agency responsible for ensuring
FCRA compliance, to produce investigative studies on identity theft security, the
voluntary reporting of 'non-traditional' credit data and its effect on consumer
creditworthiness, and the impact of disclosure rights on consumer queries of
inaccurate or fraudulent data.
Such programmatic attempts to intervene within credit reporting can be seen as an
attempt to disrupt the particularised interest of creditors and bureaus which have
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created a system which is simultaneously both essential and potentially detrimental
to the individualised interests of consumers and their ability to be 'entrepreneurial'
in their use of credit. However, rather than impeding it, the implementation of the
FCRA enhanced a credit reporting assemblage essential to the increased
extensiveness and intensiveness of consumer credit use more and more implicated in
the facilitation of consumption practices, The expansion and agglomeration of the
industry and its deployment of an advanced information retrieval, storage and
distribution apparatus was both enabled and propelled by higher volumes of credit,
accessed at greater speed and across a more diverse range of products, encompassing
more and more individuals within a more nationally homogenous market.
In creating objectivised, functionally specific credit identities of consumers emptied
of localised meaning and prejudicial, normative content within the context of an
expanding market of credit and consumption, practices of credit reporting helped
'make up' such a field of consumers reality. The state, in problematising the role of
economic government as one in which national prosperity and wellbeing were to be
enhanced by autonomising and enterprising individuals within their consumption
practices, acted through the FCRA to secure the basis of consumer self-government.
The main thrust of the FCRA was the legislative assurance of consumer access to
their Own records generated through the credit reporting assemblage - it preserved
the surveillance infrastructure underpinning the possibility of consumer choice
through consumption while simultaneously elevating the rights of the consumer and
impOSing a duty of care on bureaus and lenders above the conditions of the
contractual transaction entered into by the individual.
However, in establishing such a new right or freedom, its effect was to burden
individuals with th ibili f ' ininz th f h ' die rcsponsi 1ity 0 maintaining t e accuracy 0 t err ere It
identities Tb b ' , ,, ey were to ecome self-surveilling consumer subjects, Lenders and
their affir t d '
ia e agencies were not to be accountable for the errors that they had
cOmmitted i c. ' , I id " , "n rormmg virtua 1 entitles; on the contrary, individuals were to become
responsibl ti h '
e or t emselves, with errors and the constituted effect of 'identity theft'
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being circumscribed as random, uncertain events -like illness or unemployment -
which the consumer was to be conditioned to prudentially manage on their own
behalf. With the establishment of technologies of inscription and the constitution of
new domains, new ways are created for individuals to think about themselves
(Miller and Rose, 1992; Miller and O'Leary, 1994; Rose, 1999b). Through the
spread of a national credit reporting system, then, individuals carne to conceive of
themselves as credit users in the same way that they were conceived of as credit
users by lenders and bureaus, both reflected by and strengthened through demands
for record disclosure, and thus establishing as Miller and Rose (1992: 87) argue,
calculating selves enmeshed within circuits of calculation.
Therefore, through the terms of legislation, individuals as consumers and credit
users were to be governed to consider the 'objective' content and possible
consequences of their objectivised credit identity for their sustained access to credit
and the consumption potential offered. They were to view their access to credit as a
generalised function of their abilities to 'responsibly' adhere to their repayment
obligations on a multitude of dutifully recorded credit agreements, to accept negative
but accurate information as the justified outcome and reflection of their own faulty
choices or overzealousness in credit use, and to see inaccuracies as a systemic
imposition which they were obligated to challenge and remedy in the pursuit of
maximising their Own consumption potential. Above all else, they were to avoid the
consumer suicide of bankruptcy - the ultimate dissolution of one's self-governing
entrepreneurial potential in the eyes oflenders. The legislative shaping of credit
reporting can be seen, therefore, as an extension of the self-governing remit of
individuals into the management of their credit use, implanting within consumers a
new legally-sanctioned possibility and mechanism for calculating and judging their
OWnactions. In doing so, it helped instil within them an increasingly calculative
understanding of the significance and consequence of their credit identity,
strengthening more generally with respect to the future their capacity for foresight
and prudence and creating a crucial scale for the measurement of Consumer
autonomy.
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Within the 20th century, consuming desire became increasingly located as a
necessary element of a mass production I mass consumption society, a virtuously
interdependent binary that the state sought to regulate in the interests of unified
economic and social welfare. As part of this interventionism, new forms of state-
level instalment selling laws were instituted from the 1930s to 'protect' the
instalment consumer while, at a federal level, new banking laws were drawn up in
the wake of the Great Depression to dampen the destructive tendencies of economic
competition. Similarly, in the aftermath of the Second World War, consumer credit
was temporarily targeted as a calculable conduit to ease wider price inflation and
defend national sovereignty. Yet, by mid-century, the idea of mass-society began to
fragment as poly-vocal discourses gathered force, criticising the rigid conformism
and de-humanisation of mass society while supposed crises of market saturation and
profitability hit consumer industries. Increasingly within consumption, in marketing
and in how individuals understood and acted upon themselves, individual identity,
the quest for personal meaning and the fulfilment of a personalised lifestyle became
all-encompassing ideals.
In many ways, the development of the credit card traces the transformation of a mass
market into this customised space of individualised self-narrative. Emerging in the
expansionary ambitions of banks, the early diffusion of the credit card was
dependent on the unsolicited, undifferentiated mass mail drop across relatively broad
reaches of the population. Yet, as its use has proliferated in recent decades, it has
become targeted at certain lifestyle segments while certain branding efforts have
emphasised the always shifting, ever novel possibilities of an unexplored life whose
breadth of choices are facilitated by 'plastic' credit. As a form of credit, secured by
sophiSticated credit bureau records and credit scoring systems, it depends upon the
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self-governing abilities of consumers, weaving within and through a never-ending
array of consuming choices made by individuals.
Yet, in their contemporary form, credit cards contribute to this not just through the
malleable credit they enable the individual but through the means by which they
have become commodities within themselves and how they have become intersected
with certain distinctive, consuming experiences. In certain ways this technology of
credit, framing a boundless future for the continuous fulfilment of individual desire
in an escalating present, begins to fold back upon that which is desired. Increasingly,
selective benefits, personalised rewards schemes and affinity programmes come to
be offered as choices that give the exercise of credit a distinctive, personalised
quality; credit, it seems, emerges as a meta-choice. Such choices, though, become
hierarchised in new ways, reflecting the variable scope of choice the individual
enjoys through their material resources and, in tum, expressing that capacity not just
through credit but through the rarefied, qualitative experiences and opportunities that
their card entitles them.
As has been shown, the preoccupation with autonomous choice remains not merely
at the level of the 'market' but feeds into new neo-liberal modalities of government
that have come to condition the responsibilities of the state. In relation to the wider
field of consumer credit, as with much else, the state has, since the late 1960s,
attempted to act through the autonomy of the credit consumer, not in the defence of
a unitary economic or social domain or to protect consumers from the market; rather,
it has sought to mould the market in a particular way in order to 'enterprise'
individuals, to promote their inclusiveness and access to the self-realising
possibilities of credit and both energise and privilege their choosing capabilities as
consumers in how they use credit.
However, this free choosing capacity of consumers was not merely an exogenous
social phenomenon animating a new credit-dependent consumer capitalism; in
signifiCant ways, it became actively fabricated through the development of a national
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credit reporting system systematically inscribing the credit choices made by
consumers. Credit reporting, as we have seen, is as old as the market for consumer
credit itself and the forms it has taken have altered in articulation with the wider
development of credit provision. Embodying the increased specialisation,
centralisation and fluidity of contemporary consumer credit, the credit reporting
industry manifests a commercial, centrally organised form which enables
informational organisation and instantaneous data distribution between lenders and
its agencies. Within this disparate, shifting assemblage, the bureaucratic surveillance
of individual consumers' credit choices has become heavily technologically
mediated, extensively reflecting data from a wide array oflenders and other sources
and intensively mining a more finely-grained detail on the credit obligations and
repayment performances of individuals. For each and every consumer then, a
dynamic informational projection, a cohesive securitised credit identity, reflects in
continuous detail the scope of their actions in using credit. At the same time, it
simultaneously conditions their possibilities of ongoing choice within the market for
credit and, beyond, in the wider field of consumption.
Yet it is not only lenders and other providers who engage with this abstract credit
identity - consumers themselves, codified by federal statute, have harnessed their
consuming ambitions to a recognition of this means by which they are inscribed and
assessed. Individual projects of consumption, dependent upon the means of credit,
have become increasingly bound to a reflexive consciousness of the means by which
their free choices are inscribed and regulated. Credit consumers are thus both the
objects of surveillance and self-surveillance in their exercise of choice. The more
intense their consumption, the more extensive their engagement in market credit,
and the more profoundly they express their freedom as consuming subjects - the
more they must be located within and made subject to a regime of informational
regulation by lenders and themselves. It is this admixture of precise, calculated
control that makes possible the production of increasingly fluid, dynamic,
personalised credit forms which sustain a permanent interface for consumer wants.
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Chapter 3. Risk and the Risky
We have seen up to now that the development of consumerism and neo-liberalism of
late modernity have situated individuals as entrepreneurs of the self, driven by a
requirement to condition a life for themselves through the upholding of a capacity to
choose, to extend and animate their lives as a subjectively-directed narrative of
consuming desires and wants. Consumer credit plays a (if not the) crucial
mechanism of consuming fulfilment. Within this, an individual's unique credit
identity, the abstract dynamic reflection of the individual's accumulated 'choices'
continuously produced within the credit reporting assemblage, represents and
secures the faculty of the consumer to uphold that obligation to consume. However,
as we have seen, credit identities are 'objectively' constituted, supposedly shorn of
any overt normative or prejudicial marker. Credit bureau TransUnion presents it
that:
Creditors make credit decisions. Each creditor has their own formula for
evaluating a credit application, and only the creditor can tell you why they
made a decision. TransUnion does not grant or deny credit. Our role is to
supply the creditor with the contents of the report, which they can review in
order to assist them in making a sound decision.'
How then do creditors make their lending decisions within a market context
increasingly dependent upon the sustained self-governing abilities of the consumer?
How is the permanently lurking threat of default to be systematically governed? Or,
to put it more brusquely, how do contemporary creditors choose who is creditworthy
and who is not? Following on from this, what happens to those who are deemed
insufficiently self-governing? Are they to be denied the benefits of credit in
contemporary society?
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In the first section of this chapter, I want to examine how a probabilistic conception
of risk increasingly came to define what was meant by the creditworthiness of an
individual consumer, that is, the understanding of a lender that a borrower would
repay some outstanding loan contracted for the purposes of consumption. This is not
something that was progressively achieved or represented a necessary logical
follow-on from older conceptualisations of creditworthiness. Arising within the
context of an ongoing expansion in the market for consumer credit, the conceiving
of creditworthiness as risk evidences a discursive break, a new departure in
managing consumers and their credit agreements that distinguishes it from older
focal points such as 'character'. Risk represents an abstract technology, or sets of
technologies, operationalised within particular techniques and practices of statistical
credit scoring that came to be applied by lenders, unevenly and in a relatively
unplanned manner, to the problem of reducing losses due to the non-repayment of
credit loans. To these ends, the attribution of risk signifies a generalised means of
understanding, of grasping the nature of credit consumers with respect to the future.
As Les Levidow (1994) notes, contemporary discussions about risk have a
pronounced tendency to reify the concept. Within credit therefore, the
conceptualisation and technical production of someone as a 'risk' naturalises the
potential harm of default as an inherent property of the individual. However, as
Ewald (1990, 1991) suggests, there is no risk in reality but anything can be
considered as a risk, depending on how one understands the circumstance. The
production of consumer credit as a profit-making enterprise within an advanced
capitalist economy represents the binding of time, the location of such transactions
in relation to a sense of the future which, because of the complexity of social life, the
relative disembeddedness of transactions from social relations and a heightened
dependence upon the self-governing potential of individuals, is permeated with
uncertainty. As capitalism is built upon instrumental rationality and the capacity for
foresight, risk, as a probabilistic analysis of the recursiveness of events within
complexity, brings the future contingency of default and financial loss within the
boundaries of consideration in the present. Itmakes the uncertainty of the future
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knowable in specific ways and thus incorporable within the calculated objective of
maximising profit. Risk, thus, represents the relations between people and a way of
thinking about the future contingency of those relations, finding form in particular
settings for the attainment of particular ends.
In this chapter Iwant to examine the emergence of the question of the population
within American consumer credit and how its role as a new locus of analysis was
bound up in new forms of consumption and new media of mass credit in tandem
with the development of a collectively-oriented, Keynesian rationality of economic
governance. From the 1970s, a technocratic, statistical expertise gradually became
applied by lenders to the problem of regulating default within populations of
borrowers, exposing consumers to new kinds of visibility and making them
amenable, as risks, to new kinds of government. Later this novel form of
intervention was given official sanction by the state through legislation as a means
of guaranteeing equality of opportunity to the market according to the individual's
capacity for self-government. This capacity, naturalised and cohered as 'objective'
risk, removed it from the terrain of politics and thus from the possibility of political
challenge.
Yet, as Iwill attempt to show, the use of technologies to constitute default risk are
themselves seen to be subject to 'risks' - methodological, procedural and temporal-
which degrade their theoretical and practical facility for distinguishing between
populations of 'good' and 'bad' credit consumers. Such technologies are thus subject
to a constant process of reflexive re-evaluation and re-generation by experts seeking
to sustain and enhance the discriminating efficacy of the models they produce as
well as the seductive offerings of competing epistemologies promising alternative,
more effective ways of constituting individuals as risks.
At the same time, the successful proliferation of credit scoring technologies among
consumer lenders in determining default risk has led to its colonisation of other areas
of contingent decision-making within the operations of lenders, stretching and
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rearticulating the meaning of risk in temporally, spatially and functionally novel
ways. The construction of individuals as risks has also become interlinked in a new
fashion, as a partial antecedent and predicate, with other circuits of risk woven to
enframe the uncertainties experienced by lenders and other institutions trading entire
portfolios of loans encompassing a multitude of consumers and credit agreements.
Yet, not only is the technical constitution of risk unstable, but how risk is deployed
represents an historically variable condition. Within the shifting figuration of the
American consumer credit industry in the 1980s and 90s, it is argued that the
modality of such risk has become disjointed away from strategies of hie rarchi sed
avoidance by lenders to ones of polysemous engagement, from the treatment of risk
as a cost to its deployment as a profitable opportunity. To these ends two recent
practices are explored: the development of 'profit scoring' technologies which
subsume default risk as a constituent variable within a broader consideration of the
profitability of the consumer; and the use of 'risk-based pricing', the individualised
setting of interest rates and other terms according to the specific risk represented by
a consumer.
In the second section, we examine what happens to those inscribed as being 'too
risky' for the mainstream market. Such consumers may be actively excluded,
through exhibiting technical attributes like a low income or insecure occupation
'objectively' indicative oflikely future default. Or, perhaps, they lack a credit record
and so are excessively risky because no reliable estimate or assessment of future
action can be drawn. Or, maybe such consumers possess a credit identity but one
besmirched by a record of consumer iniquity - accumulated defaults, a history of
collections or, perhaps worst of all, bankruptcy - which the relentless empiricism of
credit scoring shows to be intolerably fated to future repetition. In a wider sense,
they may also be excluded passively, through a lack of cultural capital about the
workings ofthe mainstream financial sector, their habitus drawing them to the
consumption of alternative credit forms for which they have a 'taste' and which are
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objectively circumscribed for their particular social position (Aldridge, 1998;
Taylor, 2002).
As such, the wider consumer market does not consign the risky to oblivion but offers
them alternative forms of credit through which their needs and desires can be met,
forms which do not depend upon the securitisation of credit identity or upon a
measurable scale of risk assessment; in other words, alternatives which do not rely
upon the ability or capacity of such consumers to govern themselves as part of a
continuous, self-directed life project. On the contrary such 'fringe' credit provision,
in the form of contemporary pawnbrokers, payday lenders and rent to owns retailers,
harks back to the older forms examined in Chapter 1, lenders who encase the
borrower within mechanisms which unceremoniously govern the context of specific
transactions. Such credit, as we shall see, locks the marginal credit consumer within
a logic of discontinuity, of discrete, incremental borrowing acts which reflects and
reinforces the poverty of their circumstances and thus their ability to sustain an
inner-directed ability to choose. Choosing between fringe credit, or nothing at all,
represents no choice within a consumer society.
Risk and Technologies of Credit Scoring
Consumer Credit and the Emergence of the Population
Retail instalment credit, as we saw in Chapter 2, was already relatively widespread
within the United States in single-line retailers by the end of the 19th century, some
of whom were compelled to offer credit terms due to the competitive pressures
evinced by large, new multi-line department stores who themselves did not offer
credit (Calder, 1999). However, the 20th century increasingly saw the facilitation of
instalment and charge account credit lines at large department stores and mail-order
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firms who had previously offered cash-only terms as the profitable opportunities
presented, competition and the legitimisation of instalment credit through
automobile sales conspired to render them more widespread.
Within department stores themselves, specialised credit offices came to be
established, tasked with the specific responsibility of managing credit applications in
a systematic and ordered fashion. Potential applicants were interviewed and
assessments of creditworthiness made on the basis of the perceived physical
demeanour of the applicant - how 'shifty', 'evasive', 'seedy' or 'flashy' they looked
(Jeac1e and Walsh, 2002: 743). Specialised staff also examined the applicant's local
neighbourhood and made judgements as to its reputability, cross-referencing with
local retailers to incorporate their appraisal of the individual's standing within the
locality. In addition, existing credit accounts were maintained with a regularly
updated written narrative as to the customer's perceived wealth, income and
personal circumstances. These assessment procedures, concentrating on a localised,
qualitative perception of the borrower's 'character' grounded within the intimacy of
personal relations and community, acted upon an understanding of the individual as
a concrete subject with an autonomous capacity for action (see Castel, 1991). In
doing so, the possibility of default seemed to reside as an immanent, intrinsically
uncertain aspect of the individual. Examining their physical attributes, inquiring as
to their local status, recording the narrativised observations of staff members
represented a discrete, individualised search for symptoms of an eventuality of
default and an attempt to intervene to prevent its occurrence through the denial of
credit (see also Rock, 1973: 40-50).
This system, though, gradually gave way to a more rationalised, bureaucratic set of
procedures during the 1920s and 1930s (Jeac1e and Walsh, 2002). New innovations
in record administration: the unit file, a systematic, permanent customer
identification scheme, a tabulated coding procedure for categori~ing customers and
innovations in accounting techniques opened up the debtor to the individualising
gaze of the lender, rendering their credit use more visible and malleable through a
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systematisation of facts and numbers within a customer's written dossier. Similarly,
as we have already noted within the operations of national mail order firms such as
Sears and Spiegels, assessments to grant credit increasingly came to be made on the
basis of a calculated appraisal of questionnaires returned by potential customers
governed through a standardised set of credit terms coming under the regulation of a
specialist credit manager rather than, as had been the case, the use of local attorneys
and investigators to assess the qualitative, locally-articulated character of the
individual (Emmet and Jeuck, 1950; Smalley and Sturdivant, 1973).
Simultaneously then, through a totalising gaze, the collective body of borrowers was
made visible as a dynamic entity within itself, with certain norms of repayment
present across its breadth that could be discerned and made known and against
which the individual could be made subject for the purposes of controlling costs,
increasingly cohering the body of borrowers as a whole, its attributes, extended
balances and repayment streams as autonomous, self-referential phenomena within
the finn's accounts. Therefore new ways of recording data and understanding
transactions within the finn, in addition to the greater reach of credit, increasingly
rendered for lenders the agglomerated body of consumers as a coherent entity
demonstrating attributes as though they were intrinsic to it, independent from the
actions of the individual consumers that composed it.
In the post World War Two consumption boom, the population of consumers was,
more broadly, entering into the calculations of government for the first time. The
altering of the political landscape by the New Deal had changed the nature of liberal
rule within the United States, as had the expert economist's understanding of how
the economy, that charge upon liberal government to manage neither too much nor
too little, could be directed through the fiscal resources and sovereign power of the
state. Classical economics grounded on Say's Law of supply and demand had
emphasised private production and savings for investment, independent of the state,
as being the key dete~inants of national economic growth and full employment. In
contrast programmatic Keynesianism, as we saw in the previous chapter, ascendant
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in economic policy at the end of the 1930s and in the post war era, presented
economic output as being the product of consumption spending and reduced national
savings, requiring increased government spending to stimulate consumption and thus
promote economic growth (Ahiakpor, 2001; Klausen, 2002).1 Thus consumers as an
aggregate entered into the calculations of the state as a key resource of economic
management while the task of widening consuming possibilities sustained the
legitimacy of a reinvigorated capitalism against a revolutionary Bolshevik
alternative. In the wake of the Great Depression, '[f1uelling "mass consumption"-
enhancing the ability of the mass of Americans to purchase goods - promised not
only a route to economic recovery, but also a more democratic and egalitarian
America for all its citizens' (Cohen, 2003: 55-6).
The 1950s saw the further elaboration of the population as the locus of analysis
within consumer credit with the emergence of mass revolving consumer credit
market within the United States. The turn of the century had seen, for the first time,
the establishment of specialist finance companies supplying mass instalment credit
for the purchase of expensive durable goods for household consumption, most
particularly, the automobile. The 1950s, however, saw the materialisation of
dedicated new companies and the entry of existing financial institutions into the
profitable provision of credit for more mundane, ephemeral forms of personal
consumption. Whereas before, such facilities had been offered directly by individual
stores and mail order companies, managed through their specialised credit offices,
for the purposes of stimulating sales and cementing customer loyalty to the firm,
these new players sought to realise such consumer credit as a profitable commercial
activity in and of itself (Mandell, 1990; Nocera, 1994; Evans and Schmalensee,
1999; Manning, 2000). The 1930s had seen some important developments in this
mass market approach to credit, including the first roll out of gasoline cards, charge
accounts issued by oil companies which could be used by motorists to pay for gas at
any of their petroleum-branded stations. However, as we saw in the previous
chapter, it was the post war period which saw the greater national focus and more
encompassing sweep of credit with the establishment of the Diner's Club travel and
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entertainment card (T&E) in 1949 and the entry, a decade later, of American
Express, the Hilton-backed Carte Blanche, Bank of America and Chase Manhattan
into the market for flexible credit.
The 1950s and 60s thus represent the ascendancy of a new form of mass consumer
credit with provision dislocated away from specific retailers and even types of goods
to the diverse, borderless domain of everyday, generalised consumption itself, in
tum, widening the scope and possibilities of consumer choice. Whereas high value
durable goods had been governed through the legal instrument of the instalment
contract which punished the defaulter through repossession of the good and the loss
of payments made (Olney, 1999,2002), mass plastic credit increasingly depended on
the self-governing possibilities of consumers themselves who now had to regulate
their own personalised, broader, ever more instantaneous credit consumption and
self-manage the scheduling of their own repayments within the terms offered to
them. Defaulters no longer faced the loss of the item within which they had invested
their payments but, rather, the curtailment of their credit potential and the loss of an
ever wider scope of future consuming opportunities enabled by it (Phelps, 1955).
In a very pragmatic way, these emerging credit card providers epitomised a new
industry paradigm of managing consumers as a population rather than as individual
subjects. First and foremost, rather than extra sales or loyalty, their profitability
depended on a percentage of a high turnover of low value credit purchases, both in
terms of interest payments paid by consumers and the discount fees paid by
affiliated retailers. It was not isolated acts of consumption enabled by credit which
engaged the calculations of these new lenders but the sustained use of credit in and
of itself. In this regard, the task which most preoccupied them was establishing a
wide customer base for without this merchants would not be attracted to join the
scheme while, in tum, consumers would not be drawn into a system where few
retailers were willing to accept their cards. To tackle this, as we have seen, banks
engaged in the widespread strategic mass mailing distribution of cards to attract a
critical mass of customer numbers, initially at least, impervious to the resulting high
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levels of fraud (Mandell, 1990; Nocera, 1994; Evans and Schmalensee, 1999). In
dealing with such a large body, the administration of accounts was abstracted from
the heuristic processes and 'tacit knowledge' (Leyshon and Thrift, 1999: 441) that
had previously characterised retailer-specific credit accounts and dealt with
bureaucratically by way of simple application forms with a limited number of tightly
categorised variables on each individual customer (Mandell, 1990: 56). Within this
agglomeration of a large customer base, individuals were no longer acted upon as
subjects but as an accretion of a limited array of attributes, bureaucratically
accumulated over time and assessed with reference to the distribution of these
attributes across the population of customers.
With the mid-century adoption of Keynesianism, mass consumption by the
population came to dominate the governmental calculations of the American state in
relation to the economy, a consumption increasingly mediated through plastic credit
to ever finer levels of expenditure. At the same time, the growth of a profit-oriented,
specialised consumer credit disembedded from the intricacies of personal relations
and specific sites of consumption was becoming implicated in the facilitation of a
generalised, ascendant mass consumption. The profit goals of these lenders, where
revenues were generated as a particular percentage of the individual low value / high
volume credit transactions they facilitated became more directly mapped onto the
total volume of consumers they could enlist and consumer credit they could
generate. The economic exigencies of this new generic credit nurtured a bureaucratic
administration of limited, categorical, quantified data such as occupation,
neighbourhood, balances and repayment history so that the breadth and colour of
detail on each customer, characterising older credit forms, faded relative to a new
depth and detail of data on the whole population of such consumers.
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Constructing Risk, Objectifying Equality and the Ghost of Cause
In 1941, the first known formal application of a specific statistical 'imaginary' to the
problem of controlling the incidence of consumer credit default was carried out by
David Durand on behalf of the National Bureau of Economic Research (Durand,
1941). The particular methodology he used, discriminant analysis, had been
developed by the statistician Gary Fisher (1936) in order to determine population
differences where the explicit differentiating quality was not visible - he succeeded
in deducing different varieties of iris and origins of skulls by their physical
measurements. In Durand's case, applying this abstract statistical technology, he
analysed a selected sample of historical loan accounts at a range of institutional
creditors including commercial banks and a variety of specialised finance companies
and demonstrated that groups of 'creditworthy' and 'uncreditworthy' borrowers,
defined in probabilistic terms as to whether they would or would not default on a
specific credit agreement, could be adduced in advance from an analysis of certain
attributes demonstrated by those individuals. Analysing his case-study samples, he
formulated numerical decision rules which could theoretically be applied to new
applicants for credit (Durand, 1941: 83-91).
A series of scholarly exercises by other researchers followed at a variety of different
types and scope of creditor, each attempting to formulate a particular 'credit scoring'
model using actual, historical credit data and retrospectively demonstrating how the
model in question would have reduced, anywhere between 7% and 24%, the number
of bad loans that were actually accepted at that creditor had it been in operation (for
a brief account of these early studies, see Meyers and Forgy, 1963). Within these
academic exercises, the possibility of governing credit sanctioning decisions by risk
was demonstrated through the construction of a model embodying certain
understandings on the part of the statistician such as the ascription of thresholds, the
categorisation of the application data, the definition as to what constituted 'default'
and how the length of the credit agreement was to be defined. Against an
accumulation of actual historical data including application details and the
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performance of credit agreements during their lifespan, these derived models
ascribed certain statistical relations between attributes and repayment outcomes
which, when applied to individuals, produced a predictive, probabilistic statement as
to the calculated likelihood, or 'risk' , of default.
As Rose (1993) and Rose and Miller (1992) suggest, expertise operates a key role
within 'government' in its widest sense, the knowledge from which it derives its
authority, grounded in neutrality, disinterestedness and claims to efficacy as distinct
from the argument and rhetoric of politics, becoming harnessed in various ways
within its exercise. Thus statisticians and consultants, exerting title to a scientific and
technical knowledge, became employed as experts in the construction of technical
models for the identification of risk. Their claims as to the objectivity and efficiency
they could provide promised lenders new possibilities for the governing of
consumers, creating norms in terms of risk around which could be ordered the
population of consumers. This, then, opened up default across the population of
consumers as something to be rendered calculable in the interests of profit. For
lender management, scoring technologies came to provide a nexus threading
together commercial considerations of the default costs threatened by individual
consumers, the operational costs of the finn encompassing the whole field of
customers and the standardisation of credit sanctioning procedures engaged by the
lender's credit sanctioning staff. Scoring and the process of constituting risk thus
came to provide the lender with a new means of understanding and conjoining the
government of individual consumers, its population of customers and its rank of
employees (Lewis, 1992b).
Yet, regardless of the pre-eminence claimed for statistical techniques by experts in
relation to credit sanctioning, its adoption remained sporadic within the mass
consumer credit industry, not being applied by credit card issuing banks until the end
of the 1960s despite the seeming affinity between mass credit lenders concerns with
the bio-political governance of consumers and the statistical techniques that
promised an effective mechanism for doing so. In fact, credit scoring was initially
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more prominent within longer established types of consumer lender such as finance
companies, large retailers and mail order firms like Montgomery Ward (Johnson,
1992; Lewis, 1992a). But why? The 1960s, as such, represent the era of the credit
card's infancy and troubled adolescence. As mentioned, new credit card issuers,
dependent on accumulating a population of customers to make their operations
realisable as well as profitable, engaged in multiple mass-mail drops that were
indiscriminate with regard to individual creditworthiness or the possibilities of fraud
loss. The market itself was also highly unsteady with many new entrants and exiters,
failures, reorganisations and consolidations between rivals before the emergence of
two main national systems in BankAmericard and Mastercharge which began to
franchise their card brands to other banks across the country and establish system
protocols between franchisees and merchants (Mandell, 1990, Nocera, 1994; Evans
and Schmalensee, 1999). If statistical risk depends on an analysis of a documented
empirical past to produce calculated predictive assessments of the future, then
institutional stability and permanence within the credit card industry were essential
prerequisites.
From the 1950s, with economic governance by the state effected through the
management, en masse, of the capacity of its citizens to consume, the ability to
engage in consumption constituted a crucial manifestation of one's membership of
society as a free individual. However in the 1960s and 1970s, marginalised groups
such as blacks and women, increasingly agitating for equality through the civil rights
movement and second wave feminism, articulated specific demands for the end of
discriminatory practices within consumer credit which often curtailed the ability of
these social groups to access credit (Hiltz, 1971; Garrison, 1976; Cohen, 2003).
After hearings held by the National Commission on Consumer Finance to
investigate the discrimination experienced by mostly married women in applying for
credit, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 1974 (with subsequent amendments) was
enacted to outlaw discrimination in credit sanctioning based on the characteristics of
gender, marital status, race, national origin, religion or income source (ECOA, 1974;
Anonymous, 1979; Hsia, 1979; Elliehausen and Durkin, 1989; Chandler, 2001). To
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this end, credit scoring was encoded in 'Regulation B' of the act, explicitly
delineating what could constitute a statistical model by defining it as one based on
the analysis of key applicant attributes and default grounded upon statistically
representative sample groups. Anything else was residually termed a 'judgmental
system'. Age was permitted, although only as long as the eldest group category was
guaranteed the most preferential treatment. Ultimately, the act gave legislative
recognition to scoring systems as being objective, scientific devices permitting a
dispassionate, empirically derived account of creditworthiness and explicitly
identified the role they could play in eliminating 'subjective' discrimination. What
the state attempted to construct was an enhanced mass consumer credit market
where obsolete social divisions were to be eliminated in favour of two dynamic,
contextually-defined groups: the 'tolerably' risky, those who were capable of their
own self-government in managing credit and the 'intolerably' risky, those who were
not.'
Through the objectivity produced in scoring, bound to a necessary consideration of
consumers as risks within the context of a population, the act gave impetus to
creditors to deploy statistical models as a means for defending against suits for
unlawful discrimination in credit granting, the scientific-statistical-empirical
framework of scoring thus allowing lenders to claim that all credit decisions were
made in line with the 'real' creditworthiness of the credit applicant and not some
inherent discrimination or prejudice. In addition, with scoring objectified within a
document-based bureaucratic system, the creditor could demonstrate irrefutably,
through the presentation of the bureaucratic procedural audit trail through which the
sanctioning decision was accomplished, that it was arrived at in a 'legitimate'
fashion (see Bunn and Wright, 1991: 509). As Rose argues with respect to the
proliferation of risk systems within contemporary psychiatric assessment:
In a situation where the outcome of a mental health assessment may be an
administrative decision to release a patient into the community, the risk
~assessment may be used not so much to make accurate predictions as to
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ensure that the decision made was defensible if something should go wrong
(2002: 222).
Thus, in a certain sense, it is not just the scientific statistical nature of the scoring
endeavour based on its consistency of application and correct weighting of
predictive variables which forges the seeming objectivity needed for impartial
sanctioning decisions but also its rigorously documented nature and its amenability
to audit (Dawes et al. 1989; Bunn and Wright 1991). As Rothstein et at. (2006: 93)
remark, risk provides a 'defensible procedural rationality' not only in terms of
managing the objects which an organization is tasked with regulating but also the
wider institutional threats that the organisation experiences. Risk thus becomes not
merely an expedient means of determining whether to grant credit, but of
minimizing the legal threat posed by its decisions not to do so.
The conceptualisation and technical production of someone as a 'risk' tends to
naturalise the potential harm of default as an inherent property of the individual. In
attempting to de-reify such a conception, three central avenues can be identified.
Firstly, the conception of credit risk is produced only within the context of a
population. Risk, as a probabilistic statement, is thus inherently relativistic for risk
only makes sense against the fact that others are either more or less risky (see Ewald,
1990). Secondly, risk is not produced for its own purposes but for the particular
purposes that the lender understands to be conducive to the expansion of their
capital. What these are, in tum, determines how risk will be known. For example,
the production of risk always incurs developmental and operational costs and so,
such production takes place only according to the extent of the willingness of the
lender to bear them (Hand and Henley, 1997). Finally, risk is produced within
models that are constructed by experts who, in attempting to map risk, select certain
characteristics, classify characteristics in particular schemes, determine thresholds
and distinctions between characteristics and adjudge how the model is to be tested
for efficiency.
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As Rose (1999,2002) argues with regard to this third point, the multifarious
judgements and subjective decisions which go into the creation of quantified risk
systems and underlie every single determination of risk are 'blackboxed' , rendered
hidden and incontestable by the apparent simplicity of the single figure which is
generated. As both Porter (1992, 1995) and Rose (1996, 1999) observe, reliance on
the apparent objectivity of numbers occurs not when the institutions are strong but
when they are weak, beset by challenges to their ability to govern. Therefore, by
camouflaging its subjective design, considering individuals not as individuals but as
arrays of categorised attributes, demonstrating a verifiable relationship between
these variables and certain outcomes and creating a quantified probabilistic
statement that can be demonstrably audited, the deployment of credit scoring creates
individual creditworthiness as something which exists, as it were in reality,
independent of its measurement. Consider the following quote from the score
modelling company Fair Isaac:
Fallacy: Credit scoring is unfair to minorities.
Fact: scoring considers only credit-related information. Factors like gender,
race, nationality and marital status are not included. In fact, the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA) prohibits lenders from considering this type of
information when issuing credit. Independent research has been done to
make sure that credit scoring is not unfair to minorities or people with little
credit history. Scoring has proven to be an accurate and consistent measure
of repayment for all people who have some credit history. In other words, at
a given score, non-minority and minority applicants are equally likely to pay
as agreed."
The question Fair Isaac conveniently sidesteps, of course, is whether minority
applicants tend to have as high scores as non-minorities. But, because scoring is
understood to be objective and specific, the self-government imp.lied by one's risk is
naturalised to the individual, independent of his or her social position.
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The facility that credit scoring offers to the question of discrimination is the
treatment of individuals, not as subjects, the bearers of particular aptitudes or moral
qualities but as objects, agglomerations of particular quantifiable attributes. In doing
so, scoring undercuts the coherent identity of being 'female' or 'black' within which
oppression or marginalisation is experienced, displacing credit decisions onto an
array of characteristics seemingly innocent within themselves and seemingly
individually predictive of repayment performance, independent of subjective will.
Yet power divisions, inequalities and exploitation are inherently bound within
society; their worst excesses may be alleviated through legislation and the nurturing
of credit scoring, however, within a system which individualises responsibility for
the opportunity to consume, their effects cannot be eliminated if a profitable,
extensive system of consumer credit in its current form is to exist. Like much else,
one's position in the social structures does indeed predicate whether one has the
ability to repay credit. But the construction of objectivity camouflages inequality
within the statistical mechanism of the scoring model where its newfound
invisibility helps preclude its contestation. Blacks, thus, become discriminated
against not on the basis of race but on such interlocking factors as income,
occupation and neighbourhood residence where their structural disadvantage within
society manifests lower incomes, more predominantly working class occupations
and communities statistically associated with a higher risk of default. Similarly,
women experience unequal credit opportunities not because of their gender, it
seems, but due to the generally lower incomes and occupations implied by their
gender. In both cases, through a self-fulfilling prophesy, a truncated credit history,
indicative of fewer credit opportunities, acts as an independent variable predicting a
higher risk of default, in tum, further restricting ongoing access to credit for these
groups.
Pete McCorkell, a representative of score modelling firm Fair Isaac, defends credit
scoring against charges of discrimination against minorities by arguing that
detractors are asking the wrong question (2002: 214). Although scoring results in
higher-reject rates for certain groups, he argues that this is because 'income,
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property, education and employment' - structural factors he sees as bearing upon an
individual's capacity and propensity to default - are not evenly distributed across
society. In fact it would be irrational, he suggests, for an objective measurement of
risk not to demonstrate systematic risk discrepancies under such conditions -
however, it is 'social' and 'political' questions that such discrimination raises rather
than 'technical' ones. One is reminded of Karl Marx's ([I 844b] 1975) famous
rhetorical questioning of the political economist as to whether one would be obeying
economic laws in prostituting one's body or selling one's friend into slavery. The
imagined response is yes, but that one must consult with 'Cousin Morality' and
'Cousin Religion' to seek their counsel. Similarly, it seems, the narrowly technical
sphere of scoring is estranged from the contested domain of politics, a system that
measures merely the 'objective' correlations between variables across the population
rather than elaborating on their wider significance. Whether some kind of
'affirmative action' should be put in place to favour minority groups is a question
that McCorkell reserves for 'Cousin Politics', albeit one he admits to being
unthinkable in the current neo-liberal political climate.
However, in de-reifying credit risk, one should be careful not to simply adhere to the
alternative side of a dichotomy between realism and relativism, or objectivity and
subjectivity (Levidow, 1994). As Hacking argues in relation to the 19th century
'obsession' with the statistics of deviance, ' ... new slots were created in which to fit
and enumerate people .... [S]ocial change creates new categories of people, but the
counting is no mere reporting of developments. It elaborately, often
philanthropically, creates new ways for people to be' (1986: 223). The attributions
of risk produced by credit scoring come into being within particular social contexts
for the organisation of individuals in respect of the future; nevertheless, through
such production, individuals are materially acted upon as risks, an identification
which restricts or enhances their future consuming possibilities which, in turn,
influences their future identification as risks. Risk, as a means of intervening within
the world, changes the nature of the world within which it is created (Reith, 2004a:
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385) - in being acted upon as risks, people become risks. Risk thus both reflects and
imprints in novel ways the social conditions under which it is deployed.
Nevertheless, the production of objectivity through the elimination of the question of
the subject and its re-situation across disparate, independent variables creates a
counter problem, and source of dissent, in terms of a loss of a coherent sense of
cause (Johnson, 1992: 21- 4). Despite its disavowal of cause in practice and its
concern simply with counting the calculable effects of default (Lewis, 1992a: 6-7;
Thomas, 2000: 152), risk rests uneasily with how individuals experience the world
as subjects. Dawes (1999), a researcher in the field of economic psychology, argues
that individuals are more or less incapable of acting solely on the basis of objective
probabilities, that there is always a need for a causal explanatory narrative to justify
or explain relations between variables. Without such a narrative, a statistical relation
will tend to be rejected or ignored, especially if there are alternative intuitive
explanations or it clashes with prevailing cultural beliefs. Concern with the effects of
'brute-force empiricism' informed Capon's (1982) trenchant denunciation of scoring
systems where he argued that credit decisions should be confined to variables which
have an 'explanatory' bearing on repayment outcomes rather then a 'statistical' one.
The treatment of individuals simply on the basis of statistical correlation, he
believed, offended against cultural traditions of individual responsibility and due
process. More recently sociologist George Ritzer (1995), in an extension of his
famous neo-Weberian 'McDonaldisation' thesis, has criticised credit scoring
systems for their degrading potential and their celebration of the virtues of
calculability over human meaning and understanding.
Within the United States, where rejected applicants are statutorily entitled to know
the 'reasons' for the refusal of their application, the implementation of a risk system
is constrained by the degree to which it can be contextualised within an explicatory
framework. Therefore, it cannot be enough to say that there is an abstract statistical
correlation between an attribute and likelihood of default - it must be couched in
terms that make it comprehensible to the applicant as a causal 'reason' (Chandler,
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2001: 47) . Similarly, at the level ofthe firm, Lawrence (1992) shows that the
implementation of a scoring model to replace a judgmental system requires the
approval and oversight of management who may call into question the use of certain
attributes where there is no intuitive reason for their effect. Without 'cause', a
variable will often be left out of the design of a credit scoring system, regardless of
its statistical predictiveness. Even the fact that the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
prohibits the use of the characteristics of gender or race indicates that despite
possible statistically significant correlations between such characteristics and default
outcomes, political and cultural values of equality specify what 'should' determine
whether an individual can get access to credit.
Risky Risk
From the 1970s, particularly with the wider dissemination of the credit card among
consumers, the development of computing power for statistical modelling and the
electronic mediation of data, credit scoring technologies were progressively
deployed by lenders so that the sanctioning of new credit to new consumers
increasingly became framed within a discourse of risk. In 1990, 82% of banks had
adopted credit scoring mechanisms (Rosenberg and Gleit, 1994: 606) while today
the technology is seen to be virtually ubiquitous within the consumer credit industry
(Makuch, 2001a: 3-4). Yet, analysts of credit scoring present this not as a
straightforward, unhindered rational adoption by lenders - on the contrary, it is
written as a narrative of the persuasive triumph of the unquestionable efficiency of
risk scoring over the relative inefficiency of human 'judgmental' decision-making.
On one level, this is presented as a straightforward quantitative superiority _ for
example, its discriminatory potential is estimated to be 20-30% better, thus
increasing the number of profitable customers accepted and decreasing the number
of costly defaulters (McCorkell2002: 213). Yet it is not only in elevated revenues
and dampened costs that the use of risk is adjudged to prove its worth but in the
wider-efficiencies that it imparts to the lender's organizational operations. To these
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ends, credit scoring is deemed transparent, consistent, uniform, unbiased, less labour
intensive and automatable. In addition it is time-saving, thus lowering the attrition
levels oflost customers experienced while also providing a close calculable
management control over lending policy (see for example Lawrence, 1992: 76-7;
Jennings, 2001; Makuch, 200la: 3; Glassman and Wilkins, 1997: 54-5; Rosenberg
and Gleit, 1994: 590; Leyshon and Thrift, 1999: 445; Averyet al., 2000: 523).
But scoring had not only to face the problem of effectively constituting individuals
as risks, it also had to 'gain the acceptance of the credit community' (Lewis, 1992a:
19). In this account of the 'mercurial outsider', statistical and operations research
experts battled the regressive conservatism of lender managements historically
wedded to judgmental decision-making as the traditional means of sanctioning credit
to convince them of the progressive potential that credit scoring offered (p. 10-11).
For instance, on the website of score modeller Fair Isaac noting 'milestones' in the
company's history, one of the early events recorded in 1958 was when the company
'sends letter to the 50 biggest American credit grantors, asking for the opportunity to
explain a new concept: credit scoring. Only one replies,.5 Yet, that one reply from
American Investment Corporation provided the humble launch-pad for Fair Isaac to
prove the irresistible benefits of credit scoring (Lawrence, 1992: 74).
But, while a discourse of risk may have eventually triumphed over this managerial
rear-guardism to become the pre-eminent means of conceptualising consumers in
relation to default, the technologies through which risk itself is constituted are seen
by experts to be subject to a permanent process of failure, contestation and
regeneration and the rivalrous claims of competing methodologies, or even
epistemologies, of risk.
The conceptual and operational basis upon which scoring models are built and
deployed is subject to a permanent reflexive analysis that seeks !lot to dissolve the
framework of statistical scoring methods but, on the contrary, to improve their
potential discriminatory power in practice by rendering more accurately the
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predictive risk determinations of particular cases of default that they attempt to
formulate. However, failure is endemic to the government of default through risk for
the underlying ontological assumption is one of indeterminism and irreducible
stochasticity. Although certain regularities can be seen within the population, the
future actions of anyone individual are not only not known but inherently
unknowable (see Knight, 1971). In many ways, the permanent re-evaluation and
renewal of credit scoring to more accurately locate the risk of individual consumers
is a Sisyphean endeavour as the aspiration towards formulating the 'actual' risk
'truly' represented by a potential credit consumer represents a search for an index of
relative unknowingness. If perfect predictiveness were possible, the concept of risk
itself would disappear - as Mitchell Dean suggests '[r]isk, in this sense, never
completely evaporates or disappears. It can be minimized, localized and avoided, but
never dissipated' (1999: 146). The effectiveness of a credit scoring model can thus
only be judged macroscopically on how well it distinguishes, at the level of the
population of consumers and across numerous cases, distinctive sub-groupings of
'good' and 'bad' consumers and the degree to which it minimises misclassification.
Yet a credit scoring model's efficacy at distinguishing these sub-populations is seen
itself to be subject to numerous 'risks' which interfere in its effective constitution of
default risk.
Firstly, methodological risks attach to specific techniques used in the construction of
models: discriminant analysis may be seen to suffer from the assumption of equal
co-variance and normal distribution within the population sample while logistic
regression may be particularly prone to analytical difficulties if the sample size is
insufficient (e.g. Rosenberg and Gleit, 1994: 594; Lee and Jung, 2001).
Secondly, procedural risks attach to the specific construction of a model. Most
critical here also is seen to be the problem of 'sample bias' (e.g. Lewis, 1992a: 41-2;
Glennon, 2001: 245-52; Hand, 2001). Credit scoring is based upon the bureaucratic
archived repayment history of the creditor which inscribes the collective against
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which any individual is deconstructed and assessed in terms of risk. However, by
definition, that recorded history will only be composed of those who were accepted
in the past and thus is not representative of the whole range of applicants that the
creditor will encounter in the future. Another issue is seen to be that of an
excessively homogeneous population (Avery et al., 2000). A large creditor
deploying a scoring model across a large territory with an homogeneous conception
of population cannot take into account regional economic characteristics and thus
evident regional sub-population differences. Therefore, while the model may be
predictive overall, it records relatively inaccurate risk scores, that is, an
inappropriate ranking for individuals between regions.
Thirdly, temporal risks pose a threat to the integrity of a scoring model's risk
determination (e.g. Glassman and Wilkins, 1997: 55; Hand and Henley, 1997: 525;
Lee, 2001). Conceived as the problem of 'population drift', the correlations
calculated between variables used to make risk predictions are fixed within the
model but change and alter over time 'in the real world' of the population.
All these 'risks' - methodological in terms of the statistical technique to be used to
animate the empirical data, procedural in terms of the technical process of crafting
the model and temporal, by virtue of the dynamism and naturalism of populations _
are perceived to affect the ability of a formulated credit scoring model to distinguish
groups of 'good' and 'bad' borrowers, deplete the accuracy of the risk assessment
made at an individual level and degrade the efficiency of the lender at producing
profit. At any given threshold, more costly defaulters will be accepted and more
profitable consumers will be refused credit. In response, the experts who elucidate
these risks simultaneously offer means for obviating them: by formulating new
techniques to improve predictive accuracy, establishing benchmarks for deriving
representative samples, detailing how multiple scorecards can be deployed to
account for regional and population variations, suggesting 'reject inference'
techniques to estimate the probabilistic fates of historically rejected consumers and
advocating the implementation, in association with lenders, of practices of periodic
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model validation and revision. Therefore, within credit scoring, the construction of
the constitution of risk is thus never taken for granted but must be constantly
evaluated, maintained and recreated in order to preserve the integrity and reliability
of such constitution.
However, in terms of the constitution of risk, not only have statistical models been
problematised, they have also been challenged by alternative epistemologies that
have found some application with the domain of consumer credit (Thomas, 2000).
Two which have attracted most attention have been:
• Decision / Classification trees. This method creates a decision-making model
through the sequential splitting of an historical borrower sample by single,
predictive attributes to form a map of homogeneous groups with similar
levels of default. With the setting of an acceptable risk threshold, the
attributes of future applicants can be analysed by this map to determine if the
applicant falls into an 'acceptable' default group (e.g. Boyle et aI., 1992).
• Neural networks. This system involves the training of an artificial
intelligence programme with a historical sample of borrowers from which it
'learns' how to optimally distinguish 'good' from 'bad' borrowers through a
repeated trial and error process (e.g. Malhorta and Malhorta, 2003).
Nevertheless, these competing alternatives do not engender a fundamental challenge
to the discourse of risk around which the sanctioning systems of creditors are built.
In fact, as Gruenstein suggests, any credit risk evaluation system is implicitly a
statistical one (2001: 182). Each technology, in practice, seeks to know better the
risk adhering to an individual applicant within the context of a population, to more
accurately represent it in order to reduce the overall incidence of default endured by
the creditor. In essence, the use of anyone of these diverse techniques is assembled
around the same ontological conception of what risk means. Although they differ by
offering alternative avenues for knowing that risk, they share a common objective
which is to more accurately render it as an objectivised quality of the individual.
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Each, too, is concerned with the calculable effects of default, not 'causes'. In every
case, default is conceived as an inherent aspect of the group and individuals are
persistently conceived as agglomerations of attributes that are historically,
probabilistically associated with a repayment outcome. Like more conventional
statistical techniques, all of these alternative methods are predicated on failure. As
the occurrence of default is conceived as being integral to the group and all attributes
presented by all individuals are integrally related to a greater or lesser effect with
default, then default remains irreducibly chancy at an individual level. These models
do not seek to know whether the individual will or will not fail; rather they are
concerned only with mapping the likely extent of such failure.
At the same time, none of these alternatives provide a clearly dominant paradigm for
the construction of risk in terms of exhibiting an agreed discriminatory superiority in
the practice of making credit decisions (Hand and Henley, 1997: 535-7; Makuch,
2001b: 138-9; Thomas, 2000: 160-1). Not only are they bound to a common
conception of risk, none represent an advanced coherent rationalisation of the
problem of knowing risk for each rival appears to confront its own autonomous
technical dilemmas in the process of constituting it. Whereas risk technologies are
presented as an advance upon traditional 'judgmental' sanctioning processes,
assessable through a discourse of efficiency that measures its superiority in terms of
greater calculability and accuracy, lower costs and higher revenues, competing risk
technologies are locked into a discourse of relativism. For instance, a logistic
regression model might be more predictive than a discriminant analysis but it is
vastly more difficult to compute and implement in practice (Lee and Jung, 2001:
217). Similarly, a neural network might be good for modelling from a small number
of cases but its key strength of mapping hidden relations in data renders it
impenetrable to an intuitive explanation as to why a customer was determined to be
an excessive risk - a statutory requirement under federal law in the United States
(Malhotra and Malhotra, 2003: 93). More generally, the application of a risk
technology to the question of how to govern credit consumers is not seen to confront
an homogenous problem of how to ascertain risk. In a large and diverse market with
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lenders of varied size and specialism armed with different priorities and resources,
and engaging with a particular array of consumer target markets, different technical
means have particular characteristics that make them suitable for different kinds of
creditor in different contexts depending on the structure of the data, the
characteristics used and the speed of change in the population.
Fragmented Risk
Through the strategic deployment of an array of technologies to mine their recorded
history of lending to a population of credit consumers, consumer lenders have come
to conceive of future default contingencies by new credit customers within a
discourse and apparatus of risk in order to rationalise their tactical decision-making
on whether to grant them credit. But, with the entrenchment of credit scoring within
commercial practices of consumer credit, the idea of risk has also come to colonise
more aspects and domains of the lending process within and beyond the original
problematic of determining the 'creditworthiness' of new customers, in doing so,
extending the scope of risk as well as rearticulating other contingent areas and
events of the lending process through its rubric. The development of credit scoring,
as a system of risk, has also innovated and facilitated the treatment of conditional
losses experienced by a lender across its portfolio of consumers, producing
imaginative new connections between the 'micro' risk of the individual credit
consumer and the 'macro' risk of a portfolio of such consumers.
Risk Colonisation
With the advent of new technologies of so-called 'behavioural scoring', the concept
of default risk becomes temporally unbounded. Rather than just assessing a defined,
fixed notion of risk before the credit agreement commences ('credit scoring'
becomes more aptly termed 'application scoring'), the deployment of risk comes to
be extended within the post-sanctioning phase in order to encompass the on-going
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management of the account by the creditor (Coffman and Chandler, 1983; Hopper
and Lewis, 1992; Thomas et al., 2001). With application scoring, the ascertainment
of an applicant's objectivised risk is implicated in the decision as to whether to
accept them or what interest rate and restrictive conditions they should be assigned.
However, with behavioural scoring, the applicant's risk is monitored on an ongoing
basis through the systematic incorporation of new information as to how the
applicant performs in order to frame a lender's contingent decisions on whether to
renew a credit card account, adjust credit limits, target marketing efforts for other
products or submit a delinquent account for collection. Different approaches exist
for creating a framework to determine this conception of risk. One simply
incorporates new information as it comes on-stream within an existing scoring
model. Another approach is to directly model customer behaviour - either by a
conventional means of relating individual attributes to the experience of the group or
through the use of Bayesian methods which attempt to statistically extrapolate into
the future based on the relatively small amount of information inherent in the
individual consumer's demonstrable actions.
A second crucial dimension of credit risk colonisation has been the spatial extension
of the concept of risk through the construction of bureau-based 'generic' scoring
models. In 1989, the scoring consultancy firm Fair Isaac developed a risk scoring
model based on the consumer credit history data held by the credit bureau Equifax;
by the 1990s, it had extended the formulation of the risk model to the two other
national credit bureaus, (Chandler, 2001). Whereas such data had been used by
lenders within their own 'customised' risk models the creation of the so-called,
'FICO' model transformed risk scores into a commodity that could be bundled with
individual credit reports sold to lenders who were unwilling or unable to formulate
risk scoring models of their own, or who could incorporate the score ranking within
their own customised systems. In either case, the marketing of FICO transformed
risk from a discontinuous, variable attribution generated within the bounded
population of a creditor's customer base into a standardised, co~tinuous measure of
risk constructed within the context of the wider national population; an enduringly
218
standardised measure of risk permanently absorbing the repayment attributes of
millions of credit consumers and dynamically updated across the entire field of
consumer lenders.
Ironically, though, it is this very standardisation and commodification, creating a
permanent circuit of risk visibility, which undermines the effect of its hegemony as a
measure of default risk. Because it is a generalised measure of risk based on a mass
population of consumers and constructed on the limited characteristics of repayment
history, it is perceived to be a relatively inaccurate measure of risk when contrasted
to models developed on the more particular empirical framework and market profile
of individual lenders and which assess and incorporate a wider array of data
including income, occupation and address (Chandler, 2001: 50). Similarly, as the
institutional performance of lenders, their profitability and competitive advantage
are seen to be linked to the discriminatory efficacy of the risk models they deploy,
then a generic commodified model, which any lender can access, provides no
competitive advantage. Nevertheless, as we will see in Chapter 4, one of the
interesting developments in recent years with respect to bureau scores has been the
development of consumer self-monitoring products on the internet for individuals to
reflexively and prudentially manage their own FICO risk score in order to maximise
their future opportunities for using credit.
Finally, a third avenue in the colonisation of risk has been its transplantation into
other areas of decision-making within commercial consumer finance. Just as credit
scoring transforms the uncertainty of repayment into a calculable risk, the
application of statistical modelling attempts to transform relative operational
uncertainties in such areas as marketing, debt collection and fraud into similarly
numerical probabilities incorporable into a more efficient organisation of those
domains. Other operational decision processes beyond new credit sanctioning thus
become reconfigured through the framework of risk, with expert designed
empirically-derived models discerning statistical associations between an array of
individual variables and observable events modelled in order to reconstruct decisions
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as risk eventualities. For example, in collecting on delinquent accounts, a collections
model analyses historical account characteristics to assess quantifiably what
accounts should have retrieval resources devoted to them in order to maximise
revenue returns and minimise the application of collection time and resources (e.g.
McAllister and Eng, 2001). In soliciting existing credit customers for new and
different kinds of products and services, statistical risk systems are used as part of a
target marketing strategy to assess the likely responsiveness of a customer to a
marketing solicitation in order to maximise the response rate and minimise the costs
of administering the marketing endeavour (e.g. Jost, 2001: 198). Multiple
configurations of risk can also be deployed in order to target those customers who
are 'good' risks in terms of both responsiveness to the marketing offer and
likelihood of default (Stanghellini et al., 1999). Finally, identifying fraudulent
applications for credit may also come to be articulated and framed within a
technology of risk (e.g. Gosh and Reilly, 1994).
From Micro to Macro Risk ... and Back Again
It has been argued that risk is not a reified attribute of the world but a product of
human understanding about the world, in tum, affecting our actions in relation to the
risk experienced. This is clear when we consider recent attempts to articulate default
risk at a macro level, attempts signifying the relocation of an abstract intellectual
technology of risk onto a new plain for the conceptualisation and governing of
consumer credit.
It is argued that even across a stock of credit agreements, risk is never dissipated
(Jacobson and Roszbach, 2003: 627). The use of statistical modelling by a lender
attempts to calculate the future quantified probability of default of an individual
consumer, thus rendering the total anticipated costs of default across an array of
customers as calculable and predictable. However, inappropriate modelling, the
dependence of risk scoring on extrapolation from the past (which as we have seen,
can be-buffeted by such factors as unaccounted population drift or market specific
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conditions) and the simple perils of chance, which can impact upon overall default
rates in any given year, all conspire to render levels of default imperfectly calculable
at a macro level and so make uncertainty a seemingly irreducible aspect of consumer
credit.
During the mid-1980s, a process known as 'securitization' grew to encompass stocks
of consumer loans (Watkins, 2000: 922; Barth, 2002; Johnson, 2002). This involved
consumer credit providers packaging their inventories of credit agreements as
tradable bonds which could be sold at a price discounted on the basis of future
revenue flows accruing to the credit agreement and reflective of the level of risk
underlying these new assets. Although arising initially for stocks of auto instalment
loans, loans with fixed predictable repayment schedules, the most recent growth has
been in tranches of credit card debt. In this, the five major credit card providers
Bank One, MBNA, Citibank, American Express and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
('Discover Card') comprise 70% of the market for so-called credit card 'asset-
backed securities' (Johnson, 2002: 288). Although maintaining responsibility for
servicing the repayments from consumers, large credit providers such as banks have
been able to remove stocks of debt from their balance sheets, raise fresh liquid
capital on the basis of such illiquid assets and lower their stock of non-interest
bearing reserves required under trans-national banking regulations. Employing a
battery of instruments known as 'credit enhancements', securitizing firms have also
been able, independently of their own corporate risk profile, to explicitly isolate and
channel the level of risk presented by the portfolio that they are offering in order to
minimise the premium needed to attract investors. Particularly in the case of auto-
loans, lenders have also been able to off-load the majority of the macro-level risk
presented by this stock of loans to the investing institutions.
It is argued that the creation of such securities, carefully calibrated for risk in terms
of the likelihood of revenue and default losses across the portfolio exceeding a
certain anticipated amount, is inherently connected to the proliferation of credit
scoring mechanisms within consumer lending {Glassman and Wilkins, 1997: 55;
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Guseva and Rona-Tas, 2001: 632; Makuch, 2001a: 17-8; Barth, 2002: 311-2). As
such, the deployment of risk systems which construct risk determinations at the
'micro' level of an individual consumer set within the context of a population
become intimately connected to, and a necessary precondition for, the construction
of a higher order of 'macro' risk expressed at the level of the portfolio itself,
enabling stocks of debt to be sold and traded as assets at a price premium tailored to
its level of risk exposure."
However, this 'micro to macro' linkage is not a uni-directional process for the
purchasing and selling of stocks of residential mortgage debt to free-up the inter-
state movement of capital has manifested a long history stretching back to the early
years of the Great Depression and the formation of the Federal Housing
Administration (Jackson, 1985: 216; Carliner, 1998: 308). At the end of the 1970s,
'Fannie Mae' and 'Freddie Mac' were chartered by the United States Congress as
private but 'government-sponsored enterprises' to nurture a secondary market for the
trading of mortgage debt - essentially these agencies were tasked by the state with
purchasing mortgage debts from banks and other lenders, packaging them into
revenue-generating portfolios of debt and selling them to national, and later
international, investors. Prior to 1995, though, credit scoring had made very little
headway into the assessment of mortgage borrowers. According to McCorkell
(2002), the continued appreciation of real estate collateral obviated a concern for
controlling the costs of default while a lack of a representative number of 'bad'
mortgages was understood to make the modelling of default risk difficult to
accomplish.
However, in the 1990s research by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac concluded that the
generic FICO model, popularised within consumer credit and not an actual explicit
measure of mortgage default, nevertheless served as a relatively efficient predictor
of mortgage default risk (Straka, 2000). Soon afterwards, both agencies began to
'encourage' mortgage lenders to use FICO scores as a constituent element in the
assessment of any mortgages that they intended to sell to them, conjoining the
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individual calculability of risk of mortgages purchased to the risk-determined price
of the tranches of mortgage debt sold. Therefore, the individual risk calibrating
possibilities of credit scoring encouraged a 'macro to micro' risk linkage, with
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, concerned with the wholesale risk represented by
packages of mortgage debt, helping to foster the deployment of risk models among
retail lenders and thus the constitution of individual mortgage credit applicants as
'risks' .
Deploying Risk
Some authors (Simon, 1987, 1988; Feely and Simon, 1992, 1994) view the use of
risk and the deployment of statistical techniques as being indicative of a broader
shift in the characteristic form of power being exercised at large in society, from
discipline to actuarialism, wherein the latter is characterised by the increasing
pervasiveness of abstract risk systems concerned with the management of
populations. However, as O'Malley (1992, 1996,2004) argues, risk systems are
deployed in particular contexts for the resolution of practical quandaries within
which they become enfolded and enmeshed. Within consumer credit, risk is a
technology which is deployed in a multitude of ways, in a diversity of settings for a
miscellany of ends. Scoring systems are not modelled and executed within
generalised social conditions encompassing the increasing diffusion of actuarialism,
imposing itself as a linear rationalisation in the exercise of power. Rather, they are
brought into being within the relatively localised environs of specific creditors for
the achievement of more or less cognisable goals. This is not to say that the creation
of credit risk does not have its own discursive intensity and dynamism but its
adoption and the purposes for which it is put are not uniform. The overall strategic
objective behind utilising a risk technology is not to capture more exactly the risk of
individual default presented by credit applicants but to make them visible and
knowable as risks in particular, variable ways within the context ofthe population in
order that they can be governed towards the achievement of certain objectives.
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We have seen already how credit scoring technologies are presented within a
discourse of relativity, the particular usefulness of any method being seen by experts
as dependent on the particular characteristics of the finn, its operational features, the
types of credit product it offers and the scope and scale of the consumer population
it encounters. Yet it is not only the mechanisms by which default risk is constituted
that are relativised but how that risk is deployed within actual practices of governing
credit consumers. As one consumer credit industry analyst suggests:
Over time, if the score development data continues to become more detailed
and if the development techniques approach a terminal level for extracting
information from the data, the scores produced by the various independent
development efforts can be expected to converge when accuracy is
considered. The data and development effort will always be distinguishing
factors but for the larger players in industries with relatively stable product
offerings, data and development expertise are becoming less of a competitive
advantage. At that point, the competitive race will be won based on the
creative design of both the score and its applications, as well as the level to
which the score is relied upon (Makuch, 2001a: 4).
Seemingly, then, growth of market share through the progressively more effective
identification of default risk by scientifically-endowed 'technicians' (Lewis, 1992b)
is becoming less important relative to creative innovations in how the identification
of risk is to be put to work through the innovatory, entrepreneurial ambitions of the
firm.
Profit Scoring
The original development of credit scoring systems held likely defaulters as 'high
risks' whose probable failure to repay constituted a potentially burdensome cost to
lenders. Through the hierarchised attribution of risk to credit applicants, the
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technocratic dreams of efficiency that scoring promised were that the excessively
risky could be isolated and managed through the denial of credit. However, as we
saw in the last chapter, the 1980s and 90s saw significant changes in the market for
consumer credit, particularly in the field of credit card lending involving a greater
emphasis on marketing and branding by Visa, Mastercard and American Express,
the emergence of new products like the American Express 'Optima' card and
Montgomery Ward's 'Discover' card, the playing out of the effects of deregulation
on interest rates and industry structures leading to the arrival of non-financial
institutions like AT&T and General Electric to credit card provision, and the
emergence of new 'mono line' banks specialising in the targeted marketing of credit
cards to different profiles of consumer (Evans and Schmalensee, 1999; Klein, 1999;
Manning, 2000; Millman, 2001). Against this backdrop, credit card ownership
proliferated over broader swathes of the consuming population with possession
among all American households increasing from around one-sixth in 1970 to over
two-thirds in 1998 (Durkin, 2000).
This 'democratisation' of revolving credit in the form of the bank credit card helped
reorient the way that risk was to be deployed and acted upon. Traditionally, mail
order firms, finance companies and others involved in the sanctioning of credit had
experienced risk as loss. However, the evolving form of plastic credit manifested a
concern with consumer credit as a profitable enterprise in its own right, divorced
from the sale of particular goods bound within fixed locations of time and space.
Implicated within the perpetual, fluid, more self-governed consumption of goods
sought by the individual in the everyday living of their lives, it heralded a shift away
from credit as a discrete instrument of purchase to the regularisation of debt as a
continuous, lived experience of consumption. This, combined with the
standardisation of an interest-free grace period, displaced how risk could be
understood. Whereas consumers who carried balances month to month paid interest
on their debt, those who paid off their balances in full each month essentially paid
nothing - earning the moniker of 'deadbeat' within industry parlance due to their
lack of profitability, even costliness (Manning, 2000: 294; Williams, 2004: 30-2).
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Crucially now, deadbeats were no longer those who were excessively risky but those
who were excessively safe. This transformation altered the way risk could be
conceived; it might no longer be represented hierarchically, as something to be
isolated and minimised. On the contrary, risk could now be embraced in a lateral
government of credit users as something positive and productive, conducive to
market share and profitability (Graney and Wynn, 1992).
In consequence, the seemingly straightforward prioritisation given to the
identification and minimisation of default risk by credit scoring experts has been
distracted by a range of problematizations (see Rosenberg and Gleit, 1994: 592-3;
Hand and Henley, 1997: 525; Jacobson and Roszbach, 2003: 626-7):
• Although a customer might be deemed an unacceptable risk at a given time
period, refusal to grant credit might interfere with potentially profitable credit
agreements with that customer in the future.
• Forms of credit such as credit cards may be more profitable for customers
who are a higher risk when interest charges, fees and penalties are taken into
account.
The costs ofmisclassifying 'good' and 'bad' applicants are not constant; for
example, a defaulted loan may be reclaimed through the use of a collection
agency or may need to be written-off, with obvious implications for
profitability.
If a lender offers a portfolio of credit products, it may be more profitable
overall, through cross-product subsidisation, to accept a relatively high risk
applicant for one product if it opens marketing opportunities to offer them
another although, complicating this, there is no guarantee that the customer
will necessarily accept the offering of a future credit product.
The interest profits on a larger loan to a higher-risk applicant may outweigh
the lower costs presented by a lower-risk applicant for a smaller loan.
Even more so than loan agreements, the construction of a sample of current
-credit users in order to produce a model for profitability would necessarily
•
•
•
•
226
have to be over a specific time-frame whereas customer profitability is an
ongoing, longer-term variable.
If the simple isolation of high risk consumers has become subordinate to a range of
more diffuse goals in terms oflender profitability, this does not represent the
eclipsing of the role of statistical expertise and scoring technologies within
consumer credit. On the contrary, the issues outlined above along with advances in
computer modelling and electronic data retrieval have incited something of a
transformation in the nature of credit scoring itself. As Thomas (2000) charts, there
has been a recent shift away from models based on the determination of default
towards the introduction of profit scoring models that explicitly aim to calculably
optimise profitability independently of the minimisation of default risk. Crucially,
this increases the complexity of data management, necessitating the regard for a
whole array of new factors such as marketing, service-levels, organisational
operations and pricing across the breadth of the creditor's operations. In effect, with
the deliberate attempt to target profitability, the risk of default risk becomes simply
one variable to be included within a more diffuse actuarial form of decision-making
within the lender organisation, breeding the development of more complex
modelling techniques (e.g. Carr and Luong, 2005; Crowder et al., 2005). The
systematic determination of default risk continues but under conditions whereby that
risk is subsumed and integrated into another, wider and more complex determination
of risk - the risk that the credit consumer will be unprofitable to the lender.
But what is the broader significance of this new deployment of risk? For O'Malley
(2000,2004), the rise of the contemporary 'advanced' or 'neo'-liberal rationality of
government signifies a change in the modality of risk more generally within society.
Whereas before, uncertainty was to be alleviated through its calculated distribution
across a population as risk, risk now represents the uncertainty borne by an
entrepreneur within the exercise of a dynamic, adaptive entrepreneurial conduct. It is
no longer something to be corralled within the permutations of technocrats but
something to be set free and embraced as a source of gain through the foresight and
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verve of the entrepreneur. With the application of profit scoring to consumer credit,
the constitution of default risk is disjointed from practices of avoidance where
lenders select only a hierarchy of the safest borrowers and subsumed within a wider
entrepreneurial engagement by creditors with the multi-faceted productive
possibilities of consumer indebtedness. Yet the problem of profitability, of
exploiting the contingent possibilities of marketing credit to consumers, does not
necessitate a new dynamic, entrepreneurial engagement with uncertainty but rather,
is again recast technologically and discursively as a question of risk. In fact, the very
complexity of attempting to determine an optimal profit risk strategy in relation to
individual consumers necessitates a greater dependence upon, not repudiation of, the
systematised expertise of statisticians, operations researchers and other 'technicians'
of probability.
Risk Pricing
Although default risk becomes subsumed within new techniques of profit scoring,
the development of new risk pricing techniques denotes an alternative avenue for the
deployment of risk. We have seen up to now how creditors have come to utilise
credit scoring in order to produce a risk assessment of individual applicants from
which a fixed threshold serves as the decision rule of acceptance or rejection,"
However, the development of 'risk pricing' within the consumer credit industry
during the 1980s displaced this binary conception of accept / reject with a continuum
where interest rates and agreement terms are set according to the particular level of
risk attributable to the applicant. The higher the risk presented, in general, the higher
the interest rate imposed on the credit product by the creditor, ostensibly, to
compensate themselves for the differential costs of default presented by differential
categories of risk (Makuch, 2001a; Edelberg, 2003; Chatterjee et al., 2005) . For
instance, on credit card issuer Capital One's website, advertised credit card products
are divided into three catego . . h hr .
nes WIt t ee different Annual Percentage Rates of
interest depending on the 'quaII·t' f d' hibi db h ' d' id 1 h ' hY 0 ere It ex ibtte y t e In IVI ua - t at IS, t e
level of risk they are deemed to represent. For those consumers:
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• with above average credit - 'low risks' - a rate of 13.15% applies
• whose credit needs some improvement - 'medium risks' - the rate is 15.15%.
• demonstrating a limited credit history - 'high risks' - the rate is 20.05%.8
Dean argues that the use of risk in such a form renders it a continuum rather then a
break, or in his memorable phrase, it 'does not divide populations by a single
division so much as follow the warp and weft of risk within the population' (1999:
146). There are no longer single population demarcations but rather categories of
risk - the rejected are no longer the inverse of the accepted but are subdued as a
residual category deemed too risky, even with the attribution of high interest rates.
Although the population as a whole remains the primary locus of risk, risk now
becomes deployed to allow the targeting of sub-populations - the population as such
becoming managed not as a mass but as a spectrum. A similar process of what is
termed 'risk unpooling' or 'segmentation' has recently become evident in the
domain of private insurance. Rather than the 'socialising' of responsibility (Baker,
2002), private insurance firms are now motivated towards producing ever-finer
discriminations of risk among their populations of policy holders in order to
individualise responsibility while maintaining the exclusion of the excessively costly
(Ericson et al., 2000).
Edelberg contends that credit risk pricing only became more common in the mid-
1990s in the United States as more sophisticated risk modelling techniques and
lower computerisation storage costs made such a process practicable:
Prior to the expanded use of risk-based pricing in the mid-1990s, low-risk
borrowers were essentially paying relatively higher rates than were
appropriate, and high-risk borrowers were paying lower rates. As premiums
adjusted to better reflect risk, the spread between premiums for higher risk
people and lower risk people increased (2003: 20).
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She demonstrates that since 1995, risk-defined premia have increased for numerous
types of consumer credit, most prominently for first-home mortgages, automobile
loans and credit cards." As Edelberg notes, the extension of risk based pricing is
related to the profit motivated expansion of consumer credit, allowing as it does for
expansion in two directions: individuals who were formally excluded for being
unacceptably risky are now included at a higher price, even among conservative
creditors, while individuals who were formerly included are now offered credit at a
lower price and so are given the potential to consume more of it. Risk pricing is thus
seen to enhance the general welfare - rewarding the low risk with low rates and
allowing the high risk the opportunities of credit formerly denied to them (Johnson,
1992: 28; White, 2004: 503-4).
Marshall McLuan once remarked that money was the poor man's credit card. Yet,
one of the most high profile outcomes of risk based pricing for consumer credit
within the United States has been the emergence of the so-called 'sub-prime'
market. With the development of more sophisticated scoring models, some creditors,
due to the perceived saturation of the mainstream credit market for' good' risks,
began to specialise in differentiating between types of 'bad' risks, offering credit to
the more acceptably risky in combination with intrusive monitoring and restrictive
terms including high interest rates, low credit limits, collateral deposits and
swingeing penalties and fines (Gilreath, 1999: 150-53). Among the most infamous
of the sub-prime lenders was credit card lender Providian, one of a new breed of the
monoline banks which, as we saw in Chapter 2, emerged within the United States
during the 1990s:
Providian may not have invented sub-prime lending, but it certainly
perfected it. The company's genius was in segmenting people based on
financial behavior. Founded in the mid-1980s and originally called First
Deposit, Providian created a [scoring] system that made it possible to find
the 'perfect' credit card customer: someone who cared more about low
minimum monthly payments than high interest rates and who would pile up
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debt but would rarely default. 'We found the best of the bad', says a former
executive (Koudsi, 2002: 2).
Providian's rapid expansion in the late 1990s, assisted by favourable economic
conditions and low employment, led it to becoming the fifth largest credit card
provider in the United States and one of the most revered companies of Wall Street
for its uninterrupted earnings growth, spurring established competitors like Capital
One to copy its sub-prime practices. Here, entrepreneurialism, represented as the
development and deployment of a superior scoring technology combined with the
foresight, verve and skill to embrace a particular market segment that more
established competitors were too 'risk averse' to countenance brought what seemed
like just rewards for the company:
Net earnings jumped by 45 percent annually between 1997 and 2000; card
loans outstanding soared from $18.8 billion to $32.2 billion today. In 2000
Providian posted a 39.21 percent return on common equity, 17 points better
than Citigroup ... (Millman, 2001: 105).
Its business success was clouded however by accusations of predatory lending,
illegal collection practices and exploitation, leading to class-action suits and
company settlements of $300 million (Millman, 2001: 108). By the end of the 1990s,
economic recession and consequential risk over-exposure drastically curtailed the
sub-prime market, almost destroying the acutely risk-exposed Providian. As such,
Providian perhaps represents the emblematic cautionary tale of neo-liberalism, that
taking risks for reward implies the very real possibility of failure and loss without
restitution if greed for success overtakes one's capacity to entrepreneurially manage
those risks.
A similar 'down-market' process is discerned by Ericson et al. (2000) in their
analysis of the contemporary insurance industry.'? They argue that risk segmentation
is siml!_1taneouslya process of risk assessment and marketing. The more
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sophisticated deployment of risk does not mean excluding bad risks - on the
contrary, the diffusion of a more complex risk assessment is characterised by a
greater level of incorporation of individual consumers within its market fold either
through firms pricing different levels of risk or concentrating on a particular risk
niche market. 'Substandard' risks may be profitable once they are adequately priced,
no alternative exists and the insurance coverage is compelled. They cite the example
of a motor insurance firm which deliberately marketed itself to high risk consumers,
profiting handsomely from the high premia it charged, a lack of competition, its
restriction of coverage payments and the high interest rates it charged on instalment
payments.
Risk pricing and the emergence of the sub-prime markets in credit and as well as
other markets demonstrate the new ends to which risk is being deployed. Before, the
attribution of risk was used to exclude those deemed more likely to add to costs than
to revenues, manifesting as a bifurcate division between the acceptably and the
unacceptably risky. However, in a competitive consumer market propelled by profit,
this simple division gives way under such techniques as risk pricing to an
inclusionary impulse. As with profit scoring, rather than the 'risky' being suppressed
they are actively engaged with - the attribution of risk serving not to locate and
divide but to define and price. In a sense, there are no longer 'bad' risks, only un-
entrepreneurial lenders with inferior or badly leveraged risk technologies resigned to
the saturated, low-profit 'prime' markets. The expansion of capital thus leads to an
increased downward targeting of consumers with more and more being integrated,
on differential terms, leaving only a residuum of excluded, un-free non-consumers.
As with the problematisations and potentials presented by the targeting of
profitability, risk pricing cannot simply be reduced to some unilinear, rationalising
process of 'actuarialism' or even the manifestation of a practical response to a
capitalistic profit motive on the part oflenders. Rather, risk pricing coalesces from
the articulation of new forms of expertise and profit with new ways within which
individuals as consumers can be understood and acted upon as risks.
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In combination with this new potential, the identification of risk now comes to be
used to adjust the price of credit to the particular, discrete self-governing potential of
all consumers so that the availability of choice wrought by credit is restricted to their
calculated ability to uphold the freedom to choose. This new responsibilisation also
implies a reallocation of the costs of default. With 'community pricing', or a single
risk cut-off point, the inevitable costs of default that accompany the deployment of
risk are distributed by the lender across the whole body of accepted credit consumers
through the setting of a single interest rate. In certain ways, a single risk cut-off
point represents a particular solidarism in terms of credit that mirrors 'social' forms
of insurance. In effect, all credit applicants accepted by the lender were conceived as
being sufficiently self-governing to justify the advance of credit. With the inevitable
default of some, default being seen as endemic to the population, the costs were
borne in the common interest rate paid by all- as one analyst of credit scoring terms
it, the 'cross-subsidisation' oflosses and expenses (Makuch, 2001a: 16). On the
contrary, risk pricing ensures that the individual is made culpable for the costs of
their own risk and those who share it through a segmented pooling of the similarly
risky. The individual is thus made responsible for their own capacity as a consumer,
for the consuming costs and horizons of opportunity implicit in their individualised
projects of consumption. 'Deserving' consumers pay less (Makuch, 2001: 16) while,
by implication, 'undeserving' consumers pay more. Like O'Malley's (1992, 1996,
2000,2004) conception of the 'new prudential' individual who, under newly
contrived governmental arrangements, must exercise their own careful,
individualised choices in defence against 'risks' like illness and unemployment that
were formerly distributed across the social body, the contemporary credit consumer
is made responsible for the risk that they themselves represent, for the condition of
their own life and the choices that they have made in the past determining their
credit consuming potential in the present.
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Borrowing on the Fringe: The Fate of the Risky
With the deployment of sophisticated risk technologies, the question arises as to the
fate of the 'excluded', that 'risk residuum' deemed to lack the responsibility to pay
for their own risk; 'what to do about those not in a position to aspire (legitimately) to
the seductions of commodities - the unemployed, the incompetent, the criminal and
the dispossessed?' (O'Malley, 1994: 213). It seems that no matter how risk is drawn,
deployed or acted upon, it creates a permanent bifurcate division between those that
are tolerably risky and those that are not. Even with the proliferation of risk-pricing
techniques within which the risk of default loss is compensated by higher interest
rates and the development of a viable subprime market wherein higher risk
consumers may be profitably targeted, the very continuance of risk as a conceptual
and technological tool within consumer credit presupposes a residuum, a permanent
underclass of consumer who is not, and perhaps never will be, in a position to be a
self-governing consuming subject. They are, it seems, fated to remain beyond the
reaches of a mainstream credit market so dependent for its profitability on the
capacity of free consumers to govern the permanent cycle of desire, fulfilment,
disillusionment and new desire so intimated and facilitated by credit. As acutely
observed by Valverde (1996: 361), liberalism's claim to universal freedom has
always been tempered by its absence in reality, demonstrating not so much its
hypocrisy as an essential aspect of its constitution. Similarly, Bauman (1988) argues
that freedom is a permanent relational state, defined against that which is unfree and
coerced.
Within consumer credit, the 'acceptably risky' are those identified who can be
trusted to achieve a stable equilibrium between the ongoing fulfilment of their
consumerist desires with the responsibility of timely repayments. As we have
already discussed, risk is a relational construct; it embodies no intrinsic meaning
except as part of a quantitative hierarchy. A consumer is only more or less risky than
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any other consumer. Therefore, risk always implies the possibility of excessive risk,
those whom are seen to be unable to exert the necessary self-government, those who
are conceived as being unable to achieve the necessary balance between the
hedonism of credit-enabled purchases and the puritanism of regular, interminable
monthly bill-payments.
But how is such exclusion achieved? Of course, unstable employment or insufficient
income may be obvious attributes which weigh heavily in formulating a low credit
score for an individual but within the contemporary consumer credit market, the
ability to self-govern is most clearly and coherently evidenced by a credit identity,
the inscribed history of the individual's credit use and notable failures in using
credit. As we have seen, credit reports create an objectivised history of the
consuming subject, a real-time 'data-double' dynamically reflecting and determining
the possibilities of self-governed credit consumption. Through the assemblage of
credit reporting, exclusion manifests two avenues. On the one hand those with no
history of credit use, in particular, the poor, the young and recent immigrants, are
unable to fabricate a credit identity and thus, from the general prospective of
creditors, are unable to demonstrate a viable potential to govern themselves. Its
absence thus embodies their exclusion and becomes a double-bind perpetuating their
marginalisation within credit markets. On the other, those demonstrating histories
inscribed with payment delinquencies, defaults, collection actions, court judgements
or bankruptcies are bound to an identity which actively demonstrates for creditors,
through the empirical predictive framework of risk, the incapacity of that consumer
to effectively regulate their future selves. These too are fated to remain outside the
marketing sphere of mainstream credit providers.
Bankers to the Poor
However, despite a general state of exclusion from mainstream consumer finance ,
such consumers are not excluded from the possibilities of credit consumption.
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Rather, the types that they do consume exhibit a structure and form which make no
effective claims to, nor depend for their profitability upon, the self-governing
abilities of these consumers. In practice, they do not deploy technologies of credit
scoring constituting individuals as risks nor feature as junctures within a national
credit reporting assemblage which derive and calibrate the consumer's capacity to
self-govern. These lenders are known as 'fringe', 'second-tier' or 'high-cost'
lenders, such labels explicitly distinguishing them from conventional banks, credit
card firms and finance companies, their perceived presence beyond the mainstream
reflecting the persistent exclusion of their clientele as much as the features of their
operation.
Within the contemporary American market, there are three main types of fringe-
lenders which can be identified: pawnbrokers, payday lenders and 'rent to own'
retailers.
Pawnbrokers
These are the historical successors to the 19th century forms examined in Chapter 1
with the general function of the pawn transaction remaining the same - a small
amount of money is advanced on the temporary pledge of personal items which are
later redeemed on repayment of the amount advanced with interest (Johnson and
Johnson, 1998; Manning, 2000: 203-5; Peterson, 2004: 18-21; Caskey, 1991, 1994:
37-54,2005: 26-30; Caskey and Zikmund, 1990; Oeltjen, 1989, 1990). The most
commonly pledged items of value are jewellery, electronic equipment, cameras,
musical instruments and firearms. Traditionally, pawnbrokers have been regulated at
a state and municipal level through the statutory specification of such terms such as
maximum monthly interest rate and additional fees, licensing and bonding
requirements, transaction and forfeiture procedures, oversight authority and
inspection contingencies (Oeltjen, 1990: 234). According to Caskey, effective
interest rates, including fees, on an average size loan can vary from between 36% to
355%l'er annum (1994: 40) while he estimates that, although pawnshop loans
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represent significantly less than 1% of outstanding consumer debt, around 10% of
the American population may have recourse to regular pawn transactions as a source
of credit (1990: 49).
Following a steep decline since the 1930s, the number of pawnshops has increased
dramatically since the 1970s to around twelve thousand nationwide, with such
growth concentrated mainly in Southern and Central states (Caskey, 1994: 47-9,
2005: 27). However, in the last few years, pawnshop numbers have declined relative
to the increasing popularity of payday lending (Caskey, 2005: 27-8). One significant
recent development, though, has been the emergence of so-called 'Car Title' loans as
a variant on pawning (Quester and Fox, 2005; Fox and Guy, 2005). These are high-
value loan transactions secured on the basis of title or possession of an individual's
car with principal and interest due at the end of a single monthly period or the lender
claiming ownership of the collateral in the event of non-payment. According to Fox
and Guy, the regulatory system for title lending varies nationally with certain states
authorising high or no interest ceiling title loans in some form, others enforcing
lower cost title loans, and the rest regulating the industry under general usury or
small loan rate ceilings. Interest rates for these types of loan are believed to average
300% per annum including fees (2005: 5-10).
Payday Lenders
Payday lenders tend to be examined as a subset of the check cashing industry which
itself is often framed against the wider problem of access by poor and minority
groups to mainstream banking facilities and the relatively expensive commissions
charged by check-cashing firms (Caskey, 1994: 54-78, 2005: 31-40; Mullen et aI.,
1997; Squires and O'Connor, 1998; Manning, 2000: 205). Check cashers, as their
name suggests, are essentially commercial offices which offer cash in exchange for
government, payroll or private cheques, charging a variable commission to the
individual for the service. The rate of commission is often dependent on the
perceived risk of the transaction, with higher commission charged for personal
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cheques more susceptible to bouncing. According to a Consumer Federation of
America survey, commissions for pay-cheques average 2.34% of the cheque's face
value, for Social Security cheques, 2.21% and for personal cheques, 9.36%.11
Payday or 'deferred deposit' loans, a relatively recent innovation from the latter half
of the 1990s, represent an increasingly available additional service offered by check
cashing firms and others. In a payday loan transaction, a customer writes a personal
cheque to the lender held as security or post-dated with the individual's date of wage
payment. In exchange, the borrower receives the amount agreed for which the
cheque is drawn less a fee representing the loan's interest payment (Squires and
O'Connor, 1998; Manning, 2000: 205-8; Wiles and Immergluck, 2000, Peterson,
2004: 10-8; Caskey, 2005: 17-26; Stegman and Farris, 2003; Elliehausen and
Lawrence, 2001). On a two-week $100 loan, a 2001 CFA and PIRG report found
average equivalent annual interest rates of 470% nationally, rising to an average of
780% APR in Massachusetts and New York (Fox and Mierwinski, 2001: 12-3).
Estimated numbers of payday lenders have risen from insignificant levels in the
early 1990s to around 14,000 major offices, lending anywhere between $8 and $14
billion to approximately 15% of American households (Stegman and Faris, 2003: 9).
Recent variants on such loans include so-called 'Refund Anticipation Loans' where
a discounted loan is advanced by a lender, in this case usually one of the main
commercial tax preparation service firms such as H & R Block or Jackson Hewitt,
for a period of between seven to fourteen days, secured on the basis of an
individual's anticipated federal tax refund (Wu et al., 2006).
Rent to Own Centres
This form of lending represents a reactivation of the old European notion of Hire
Purchase, designed to legally mask a consumer credit transaction under the guise of
a lease agreement. 'Rent to Owns' are essentially specialised retailers that lease
goods to consumers over a defined period of time, at the end of which the consumer
238
Figure 3.1 Neon Sign for Fastcash Pawn Outlet, Wyoming. Source: Winter Water Wonderland
Photography
Figure 3.2 Modem Payday Lender Storefront, Washington State. Source: Bellvue Community
College
239
assumes legal ownership (Manning, 2000: 208-9; Swagler and Wheeler, 1989;
Martin and Huckins, 1997; Hill et al., 1998; Peterson, 2004: 21-5; Lacko et al.,
2000, 2002). However, each payment increment is autonomous so the consumer
endures no legal obligation to continue with payments until the end of the agreed
period. In the event that payments cease, the rental agreement may be terminated
with possession of the good reverting to the retailer. Fulfilled ownership rates from
rent to own agreements are uncertain with estimates by the industry itself of 25-30%
contrasting with alternative findings of between 60-70% by independent studies
(Lacko et al., 2002: 128).
Goods provided are, in the main, home appliances and electrical equipment such as
televisions and computers but also includes such items as home furniture and
jewellery. At the end of the 1990s, it was estimated that there were around 7,500
such outlets nationwide dealing with some 3.5 million customers and generating
industry revenues of $4.5 billion (Martin and Huckins, 1997: 385). In not generally
being recognised as forms of credit, rent to own transactions are not specifically
governed by federal or state credit laws, such regulation being effected in the vast
majority of states through their framing as lease agreements. However, courts in
several state jurisdictions have ruled that rent to own transactions are credit sales and
thus subject to the requirements of state credit statutes (Lacko et al., 2000: 3). As a
rental form, there is no explicit specified interest rate, with the cost of payments
embedded within the weekly or monthly charge - in this, a 1997 PIRG survey found
that rent to own good prices were between 2 and 5 times that of conventional
retailers producing implicit annual interest rates of around 100%.12
Credit Consumption on the Fringe
What is particularly striking from the foregoing description of fringe credit forms is
the enormity of the interest rates being charged. Compared with mortgage interest
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rates of 6-7% and credit card rates of 15-25%, fringe lenders exact enormous annual
equivalent interest rates stretching well into triple figures. Industry apologists point
to the relative small size and short-term nature of most loans and the relatively high
administrative costs which require lenders to charge high interest rates in order to
produce a profit. Detractors accuse the industry of gouging the poorest members of
society who, often in desperately perilous financial circumstances, have nowhere
else to turn for stop-gap loans and whose lack of education makes them particularly
susceptible to questionable lending practices (Caskey, 2005: 18-9). They point also
to the continuous exploitation of consumers whose marginal existence means they
often cannot repay the amounts owed and must continuously roll-over the principal,
paying ever-more interest to service what they cannot payoff. It is obvious that such
lenders exert a considerable hold over the poor, profitably extracting large amounts
of interest from those least able to pay it with. Indeed, it is particularly ironic that
banks who themselves exclude 'risky' borrowers have been partnering with payday
lenders in order to share in the buoyant revenue streams of industry (Fox, 2004).
However, what is particularly interesting is the degree to which fringe borrowing
becomes a site for the reactivation of old dilemmas, arguments and quandaries. We
saw in Chapter 1how loan sharks and 'low grade' instalment lenders were similarly
accused of exploiting the most needy individuals, while advocates for the
legitimisation of consumer borrowing pointed out the necessity of higher usury
ceilings for consumer loans relative to general commercial loans given the former's
relatively small size, short duration and high risk. In the 1960s, David Caplovitz's
(1963) path-breaking sociological study The Poor Pay More revealed the high rates
of interest and duplicitous sales practices experienced by individuals and households
living in disadvantaged communities. As such, what questions of usury and
exploitation expose beyond themselves is the anxiety that society permanently feels
towards the poor and the destabilising effects perceived to be attached to their
consumption and credit practices. At the same time, the responses and interventions
called forth to alleviate their difficulties indicate much about how the state, and other
sites of power, comprehend the task of government.
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Pawning, payday lending and 'renting' represent distinctive forms of credit, yet they
are bound by common features which collectively both characterise and distinguish
them from conventional consumer financing. Numerous studies indicate that the
young, low and moderate income earners, renters rather than homeowners, the
relatively poorly educated and Black and Hispanic ethnic minority groups are the
predominant consumers of pawnbrokers (Caskey, 1994: 68-73; Caskey and
Zikmund, 1990: 6-7; Johnson and Johnson, 1998: 37-50), payday lenders (Squires
and O'Connor, 1998~Wiles and Immergluck, 2000: 5-7; Fox and Mierzwinski,
2001: 5-6; Elliehausen and Lawrence, 2001: 28-32; Stegman and Faris, 2003: 14-5)
and rent to own centres (Lacko et aI., 2000: 31-4, 2002: 132; Hill et aI., 1998).
Spatially, too, such types oflender are calculated as being generally overrepresented
geographically within poor and minority neighbourhoods (e.g. Graves, 2003; King et
al., 2005) as well as in districts with military bases containing ready supplies of low-
paid, 'vulnerable' military personnel (Graves and Peterson, 2005).
Yet, at the same time, these lenders do not represent a marginalised form of
enterprise commercially. Like the chattel and salary lenders of the late 19th century,
contemporary fringe lenders have expanded through chain and franchise networks
but, unlike these, they have been very heavily capitalised in doing so. The most
striking example has been the success of Cash America Investments which expanded
from a group of four Texas pawnshops to become a publicly-quoted company in
1987, later achieving a listing on the New York stock exchange in 1990. In 2005, it
operated 464 pawnshops across 21 states under the Cash America and Super Pawn
brands as well as 286 payday advance offices with total gross revenues of over $594
million.P Within the rent to own industry, the NASDAQ listed Rent-A-Center,
founded in 1986, has emerged as America's leading rent to town retailer with 2,775
stores and 297 franchises across the United States, Canada and Puerto Rico and
corporate earnings in 2004 of over $2.3 billion.l" Payday lenders have also forged
operational connections with mainstream, nationally chartered banks which allow
these lenders to evade state usury and other loan ceilings by operating legally under
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the umbrella of the bank and thus lending on the basis of the rate ceiling pertaining
to the state in which the bank has its headquarters (Fox and Mierzwinski, 2001; Fox,
2004).
Fringe lending represents not the antithesis of consumer credit, a fading legacy of
the past to be eliminated through the colonising impetus of banks and credit card
companies. On the contrary, its form and reach has expanded and developed in
concert with the growth of mainstream consumer credit since the 1970s. Pawnshop
numbers have expanded significantly, doubling their numbers alone over the course
of the 1990s (Johnson and Johnson, 1998: 7). Rent to Own stores more than tripled
their number between 1982 and 1996 (Manning, 2000: 209) while the payday
industry, only in existence in the latter half of the 1990s, has grown to perhaps as
many as 14,000 major outlets (Stegman and Faris, 2003: 9-10). These lenders thus
represent an inherent part of consumer lending, its logic of exclusion, its necessary
dark side specialising in the poor and disenfranchised.
Interestingly, many commentators have pointed to the effects of market
liberalisation on the upsurge of fringe banking (Manning, 2000: 198-200; Squires
and O'Connor, 1998: 7-10, Johnson and Johnson, 1998: 8-9). For instance, the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 removed
interest rate ceilings on bank deposit accounts. Having previously subsidised
artificially low interest rates with low or no account fees and charges, this
deregulatory measure raised deposit interest rates but increased annual fees,
minimum deposits, cheque cashing fees and others costs associated with the
operation of checking accounts, in many cases putting them beyond the feasible
reach of low-income households. The Financial Services Modernisation Act 1999
ended New Deal-era restrictions on financial institution ownership, thus leading to
industry consolidation, a pattern of branch closure concentrated in low income and
minority communities and a greater orientation toward financial products tailored
towards wealthier households, again lowering proportions of poorer and minority
families with ties to conventional banking institutions. According to the Federal
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Reserve, households without some form of bank account were predominantly of
'low incomes, to be headed by a person younger than 35, to be non-white or
Hispanic, to be headed by a person who was neither working nor retired, to be
renters, or to have relatively low levels of wealth' (Bucks et al., 2006: 12). Without
access to conventional banking facilities, such segments of the population may be
cut-off from their attendant credit facilities and to be drawn towards high-cost fringe
alternatives. Under neo-liberalism then, fringe lending has expanded as the
necessary 'other' of consumer credit, the alternative commercial domain for the
temporary resolution of material necessity and transient realisation of consumerist
needs for those existing on the margins.
In targeting the same population strata, the three main forms that fringe lending
takes manifest a lack of dependence upon the self-governing capabilities of the
individual to maintain repayments. Each, rather, provides an alternative set of
external mechanisms that transcend the perceived lack of will of the consumer,
coercing repayment or enframing action which alleviates or manages the risk of
financial loss to the lender stemming from non-repayment. Pawnbrokers,
historically, have been the paradigmatic case whose loans are framed around the
physical deposit of valuable collateral which requires repayment with interest by the
individual for redemption or which is liquidated to satisfy the debt. Typically pawn
loans are advanced to the value of half of what the item would achieve ifit were
sold, providing a calculable financial gain to the lender regardless of the contingent
outcome. Non-redemption rates are estimated at between 10-30% (Caskey, 1994:
41-2). Payday loans are similar to pawn loans except that the form of collateral
deposited, a personally drawn cheque, represents a more abstract, but more readily
disposable, form of value in the event of default. Given this lack of intrinsic value,
there is a greater marshalling of the actions of the individual upon which the value of
the cheque is dependent. Unlike the other two forms of fringe borrowing, the
individual must maintain a conventional checking account in good standing and
exhibit a history of pay-cheque deposits in order to be eligible for a payday loan
(Elliehausen and Lawrence, 2001: 54; Fox and Mierzwinski, 2001: 5-6). Such
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customers, then, would seem to experience less distance from banking facilities.
Finally, rent to own transactions are constituted on the basis of being a sequence of
autonomous transactions with an ultimate outcome of ownership or return; such
lenders thus always maintain legal ownership of the item until the end of the
contracted 'rental' period. In the event of default, the lender may at any stage claim
repossession of the good to be leased in a new transaction as well as possession over
whatever payments had been made (Zikmund-Fisher and Parker, 1999: 200).
Ironically, then, the most 'risky' strata of consumers pose little effective risk to
fringe lenders in terms of default. Axiomatically, in engaging in a coercive
government of credit consumers to regulate the risk of financial loss, fringe lenders
are characterised by both a general absence of risk assessment technologies and
referrals to credit reporting systems. As such, systems designed to assemble and
calculate the self-governing potential of the individual are irrelevant when the
actions being recorded are not free but, instead, are channelled through external
constraints which obviate the risk of financial loss. In fact, this 'freedom from
freedom' is often the primary marketing line for fringe lenders, for example
'everyone is preapproved ... no credit is needed' (cited in Manning, 2000: 208)
while the absence of assessment procedures is cited as a key motivating factor in the
consumer's decision to borrow from these sources with such consumers having
already been turned down for conventional credit or anticipating that they will be
(Swagler and Wheeler, 1989: 152-3; Hill et aI., 1998: 4; Elliehausen and Lawrence,
2001: 56; Johnson and Johnson, 1998: 67).
The credit use of fringe consumers is thus not assessed nor recorded and so does not
form part of a formalised credit report enveloping and framing future credit choices.
As we have analysed in an earlier chapter, objectivised credit identities trace the
individual's process of self-narrativisation through consumption, forming an
accumulated, dynamic, historically constituted picture of the individual's self-
governing abilities. In contrast, fringe borrowing is discontinuous and short-term,
exhibiting no institutional memory of the individual's actions. Whereas bank loans
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and home equity lines of credit are measured in months and years, mortgages in
decades and credit cards indefinitely, or at least until the consumer finds a better
offer, payday and pawn loans are transacted in fortnightly or monthly bursts. Even
rental credit, calculated across contractual periods of 18 to 24 months, remains
discontinuous, the actual obligation for payment extending no longer than the end of
that week or month, each period autonomous and independent of the previous and
subsequent one.
Such discontinuity also describes the engagement of the fringe loan. They exist not
with a predictable regularity like a monthly credit card bill or a loan statement but at
certain times of the years, in response to particular pressing events. As such, 'the
likelihood that recent [payday] customers will have an advance outstanding at any
point in time varies according to seasonal factors' (Elliehausen and Lawrence, 2001:
47) while, in relation to Rent to Own, around 30% of items leased are not carried
through to ownership despite the inherent loss of capital (Lacko et al., 2000: 56).
Fringe borrowing is not about responding to desire within a process of personalised
self-fulfillment, of tracing an inner self, a coherent story anchoring the subjectivity
of the individual. Rather, it represents a response to external pressures, of 'needing'
rather than 'wanting' to borrow (if such a Veblen-esque distinction can defensibly be
made). For pawning and payday loans, relatively small amounts of money are
contracted at irregular times in response to unforeseen events. In Elliehausen and
Lawrence's (2001: 47) study, two-thirds of payday loans were in response to
'unplanned expenses' and to tide over a 'temporary income reduction', with
consumers often becoming ensnared in a continuous 'rolling-over' ofloans through
the individual's inability to pay-off the amount owed in full (Wiles and Immergluck,
2000: 3-5; Stegman and Faris, 2003: 19-25). Caskey (1994: 70) similarly cites a
1990 survey by the New York Provident Loan Society where 81% of pawners
indicated pressing circumstances or outstanding bills as the reason for borrowing.
Even the seemingly 'discretionary' expenditure of rent to own is circumscribed, like
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payday lending and pawning, by the individual's general lack of access to alternative
credit forms.
In the consumerist market where the individual is tasked with the obligation to
uphold the continuous, informed exercise of choice between different goods and
services, fringe borrowers excluded from conventional credit exhibit no choice, have
no alternatives to choose between. Politically and economically marginalised within
society through poverty, under-employment and ethnicity, they borrow in order to
pay utility bills or furnish their homes, reacting to threatening contingency and
poverty of circumstance that disrupts and impinges the possibility of self-
determination rather than acting according to the neo-liberal virtues of autonomy
and choice. Such borrowing manifests the unfreedom of attempting to overcome
acute and chronic crises, of utilitarian necessity and curtailed resources, rather than
the freedom of pursuing a flowing aestheticisation of the self.
In Bourdieu's framework, as examined in Chapter 2, the economic capital possessed
by individuals shapes and moulds the level of their cultural capital, their
informational and symbolic resources, and the particular 'habitus' or set of
internalised dispositions that they demonstrate towards multiple fields of social life
(Bourdieu, 1984, 1986~ Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). However, as he suggests,
the means of transmission of cultural capital remain hidden, its exhibition giving the
appearance of a natural, unquestioned competence rather than one which is
contingent. The position of the fringe borrower, their 'choice' to consume forms of
fringe credit, is fundamentally rooted in the economic conditions which render them
excessively risky in the bureaucratic assessment procedures of mainstream lenders
and without much alternative to pawning and the payday loan for their often
pressing, utilitarian needs. At the same time, their lack of economic capital
conditions their lack of the specific cultural capital required to negotiate financial
transactions with banks and other mainstream lenders. Their dominated economic
position also conditions a habitus unconsciously predisposed to, at ease with and at
horne-in the expensive, 'irrational' forms of fringe borrowing objectively designed
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(small loans, short periods, fixed fee, no obligation etc.) for those of their socio-
economic position (see Aldridge, 1998: 5). In a sense, where one (desperate?)
individual sees a manageable $30 fee on an essential two-week $300 payday loan,
another sees a horrendous annual equivalent interest rate of260%. Thus not only is
the exclusion of the poor accomplished actively, though technologies of risk, but
passively, through their lack of informational resources and embodied 'taste' for
forms of credit that exacerbate and exploit their own poverty.
Transforming the Fringe Consumer: Rationality, Markets and Risk
With a presupposition of rational homo economicus attempting to maximise his or
her scope to choose, analysts of the fringe borrowing phenomenon have attempted to
grapple with the problem of why ostensibly rational individuals would choose to
consume such punitively expensive forms of credit. In relation to rent to own
leasing, Zikmund-Fisher and Parker (1999: 204-8) hypothesise that such consumers
operate with sets of preferences manifested through their restricted choices ('price
insensitivity'), a strong preference of present benefits against future costs, a desire
for the imposed budget discipline of rental payments, and a high risk aversion that
values the payment escapability of a lease contract (see also Swagler and Wheeler,
1989: 148-53; Elliehausen and Lawrence, 2001: 56; Bertrand, 2006). The rationality
of fringe borrowers is thus shaped by the confluence of circumstances within which
they are culturally and economically entrenched, in a fashion which distinguishes it
from 'middle-class' forms of rationality. In a similar but more overtly normative
vein, Peterson argues that fringe borrowers, in general, consistently underestimate
the problems of fringe debt, excessively value the present over the future, have
cultivated a manifestly compulsive 'addiction' to high-cost credit and resolutely fail
to update their preferences in light of new information. As such, fringe borrowers
are seen as individuals who are different from mainstream consumers whose,
rationality has been pathologically distorted to the extent that ex~loitatively
expensive forms of credit are chosen over cheaper alternatives (2004: 165-91).
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Yet, this micro-economic analysis ofa 'relativistic' as opposed to an 'impaired'
rationality is really a discursive sleight of hand. In airily positioning fringe
borrowers as making choices that are a function of particular economic, cultural or
social conditions, these conditions are solidified as an overwhelming determining
'cause' of action, which somehow interpellate the individual, are solidified within
them and forever after determine what and how they choose. Mark Granovetter
(1985) calls this the 'oversocialised' conception which, ironically, individualises and
atomises in its explanation of economic behaviour as much as the 'undersocialised'
view of the neo-classical economic paradigm. In such a fashion, the choices of
fringe borrowers are explained in relation to wider causal factors but in such a way
which re-individualises the explanation of those choices. Ultimately, then, their
conduct persists in being perceived as the product of an inherited, flawed rationality.
This, as we shall see shortly, plays out in the mode of intervention called for to
alleviate the financial difficulties of such borrowers - rather than a political solution
concerned with the structures of society and attendant inequalities, it takes as its
focus the need to 'educate' and 'enlighten' the choices made by them in conjunction
with the installation of a contrived market mechanism to envelop the realisation of
those choices. Rather inevitably, the 'oversocialised' account flatters the prejudices
of neo-liberalism, its preoccupation with the autonomous, enterprising subject, its
valorisation of the market and its repudiation of acting on poverty through the
structures and solidarity of 'society'.
In his analysis of fringe lenders, sociologist Robert Manning repeatedly emphasises
the vulnerability of fringe consumers whose poverty and lack of education make
them particularly susceptible to the advertising siren calls of the fringe lenders
offering opaquely-costed credit with easy access terms and no credit check protocols
or risk assessment procedures (2000: 209). Despite his sympathetic account of their
plight, Manning's narrative of susceptibility similarly treats fringe borrowing as a
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form of deficient rationality. For instance, in vividly describing the sales strategy of
rent to own retailers, he details how:
The feeding frenzy commences immediately as salespeople befriend
potential customers, assess their initial needs and desires, trump them with
'special offers' for higher-quality products or models with 'premium
features', and then swiftly seal the deal with instant credit approval and
same-day delivery and installation. Unsuspecting customers, especially those
who have been frequently rejected for retail credit, are overwhelmed by the
slick sales pitches, personal flattery, and instantfuljillment of their consumer
romance (2000: 214 - my emphasis)
Embedded in the perpetual drudgery of poverty, afflicted with inadequate education
and tasked with enduring an almost permanent exclusion from the consummation of
a sensuous 'consumer romance', the will of fringe consumers towards moderated
consumption and deferred gratification, to regulate the combination of excited
internal passions and compelling external temptation, is held to be severely
compromised. Consequentially, this leads to their engagement of credit use that is
not in their own ostensible best interest, either through the lost equity of
unsustainable leasing payments or ensnarement within a permanent cycle of rolled-
over debt that renders them trapped and helpless. Perhaps the most startling narrative
of this 'absent will' attaches to the rent to own industry which has been beset by
lurid media reports highlighting the extremes of consumer vulnerability associated
with this form of credit including harassment and threats, breaking and entering,
even the solicitation of sexual favours (so-called 'couch payments', presumably by
female debtors to male collectors) in lieu of payment in specie (Lacko et al., 2002:
128).
Thus, steeped in the difficulties of material deprivation compounded by personal
failing, resistant cultural values and the cynical ploys of lenders, the individual is
seen te be locked into a dependence upon fringe borrowing through which they
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manifest and reinforce an impaired ability to exercise rational choices (Caskey,
1994: 78-83). But what is to be done about fringe borrowing as a perceived social
problem of exploitation? How are programmatic, ameliorative strategies of
intervention framed by policy experts under the rubric of neo-liberalism?
One approach focuses on bolstering the rationality of the individual subject. In
relation to the specific case of rental credit, extension of the Truth in Lending Act is
sought. Just as the entrepreneurial autonomy of consumers became acted upon
within the conventional credit market through the Truth in Lending act which
mandated the disclosure by creditors, in a standardised fashion, of the dollar and
percentage cost of any proposed credit agreement, a common system of disclosure is
advocated for rental consumers (Hill et al., 1998: 8; Swagler and Wheeler, 1989:
158; Martin and Huckins, 1997: 424; Lacko et al., 2000: 89-97). In relation to fringe
borrowing more generally, credit counseling and the promotion of individual
financial literacy through targeted educational programmes which nurture and
develop the choosing capabilities of consumers are proposed (Martin and Huckins,
1997: 424; Stegman and Farris, 2003: 28; Barr, 2002: 460-61,2004: 236-7) while
payday borrowers are themselves encouraged to shop around and compare costs,
seek alternative cheaper forms of credit and enroll in a debt repayment plan with a
credit counseling agency (e.g. FTCls; Fox and Mierzwinski, 2001: 24).
Peterson, while advocating similar disclosure and protection measures, proposes the
radical solution of actively testing a consumer's ability to understand simple credit
agreement terms and calculations as a precondition for a borrower's receipt of a
fringe loan (2004: 300-4). Comparing the 'irrational' consumption of high-cost
credit to the 'irrational' decision to smoke tobacco, Peterson also suggests adding
stark 'financial health warnings' to credit advertisements and other documents in
order to help match the individual's 'purchasing preferences with their own best
welfare' (p. 309). He sees such emphasis on safety rather than morality as an
effective way to avoid the patronising of borrowers - rather than being told
borrowing is 'wrong', they must be cautioned to be 'cautious'. From Peterson's
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perspective then, irrational, un-restrained borrowers must be heavy-handedly
'persuaded' by a benevolent state to properly govern themselves in ways which are
known to be in their own interest.
Other proposals focus on the formation of the fringe market itself and call for
specific interventions to alter its functioning to ameliorate the conditions
experienced by vulnerable consumers. Consumer Federation of America studies, in
particular, have advocated the legal prohibition of payday lending based on the
personal cheque possession and the elimination of legal loopholes which allow
payday lenders to evade state usury, small loan and consumer protection laws by
partnering with nationally-chartered banks or by offering services across state lines
through the internet (Fox and Mierzwinski, 2001: 24; Fox, 2004: 27-8; Fox and
Petrini, 2004: 37). By highlighting a play upon the legal capacities of the state, the
market itself can be seen to be directed in a way which protects fringe borrowers
susceptible to its exploitative grip.
Beyond the individual and the fringe market itself, the conventional consumer credit
market, and mainstream financial services industry more generally, are targeted as a
domain through which marginalised, fringe borrowers might be inducted to become
mainstream borrowers. Encouraging the opening of bank checking accounts is seen
as a key site and locus point where contact can be established between the individual
and the financial system through more flexible opening hours, the creation or better
advertisement oflow-cost checking account services including overdrafts, and the
introduction or return of bank branches and ATM services to marginalised and
minority communities (Caskey, 1994: 128-38; Mullen et al., 1997: 7; Squires and
O'Connor, 1998: 10; Hermanson and Gaberlavage, 2001: 8-9). The state too is seen
to have a role to play through more stringent enforcement and a more effective
fonnulation of the Community Reinvestment Act which, as we saw in Chapter 1,
attempts to programme responsiveness by institutions to the financial needs of
excluded communities within which they are geographically located (Squires and
O'Connor, 1998: 11; Barr, 2004: 233-5). More recently, through a separate initiative
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in 2001, the Department of the Treasury established the 'First Accounts' scheme
which sought to provide government funds to financial institutions and organisations
to subsidise the cost of providing electronic banking accounts and other services to
low income individuals, as well as contributing to the provision of consumer
education and counseling services (Barr, 2004: 222-3).
In a similar manner to the Treasury initiative but outside the ambit of the state, the
National Community Investment Fund, a semi-philanthropic financial body created
to promote investment within community-based financial organisations, fashioned
the 'Retail Financial Services Initiative' in 2003, a pilot scheme designed to promote
access to financial services for low income 'unbanked' individuals through a group
of participating banks and credit unions (NCIF, 2005). Through the initiative and in
strategic partnership with community-based organisations, small emergency loans
and forms of credit mirroring the structure of payday and tax refund anticipation
loans were offered to consumers at rates and terms significantly less onerous than
fringe alternatives. Yet, the provision of access to low cost forms of credit provided
only one side of the solution for these persistently 'risky' consumers. Inherent to the
scheme was a focus upon permanently changing the behaviour, the rationality, of
marginalised borrowers by way oflender-based education and counseling plans
enveloping and developing the 'whole customer':
Though RFSI institutions work with customers many other institutions would
consider high-risk, most would argue that customers who get into trouble
with overdrafts or late loan payments rarely do so with fraudulent intent.
Rather, they don't understand how financial products work and what the
consequences of misusing them are. Or they simply have bad habits, and
changing them takes time. Monitoring and early intervention are thus
essential tools for both reducing risk and helping customers develop good
financial habits. It's not enough to give customers access to products;
institutions have to help the customers use them prudently (NCIF, 2005:
- section 8.2 - my emphasis).
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Thus, through the actions of specific community and civil society groups, vulnerable
fringe borrowers have been inducted into prototype or 'transitional' alternative
markets which, rather than being generated within the capitalist sphere for the
creation of profit, have been custom designed to protect and rehabilitate these
marginalised consumers with credit forms designed to meet their small loan and
credit needs at a significantly lower cost than those offered by the fringe market (see
Stegman and Farris, 2003: 27-8 on credit union provided alternatives to payday
loans and Hill et al., 1998: 8-9 on an alternative credit scheme offered in place of
Rent to Own). However, with low-cost access comes the quid pro quo of obligatory
credit counseling as a precondition of access, an interventionist scheme to
permanently change their financial habits.
In initiating consumers constituted as 'risky' into the mainstream market for credit
and financial services as an alternative to exploitative, fringe lenders and check
cashers, the latter's deployment of punitive interest rates and coercive forms of
government are replaced by transitional credit forms which mimic their functional
arrangement but which are also operationalised through new mechanisms to improve
or rehabilitate the self-governing capacities of the excluded. To make them self-
governing requires not only the fabrication of a market alternative to allow them the
continuous possibilities of autonomous choice but the exertion of a close
surveillance and pedagogic instruction which transforms them as subjects so that
they might be able to comprehend what it means to regulate the self, or at least be
persuaded of the need to exert a routine of 'good habits' in the conduct of their
financial affairs (c.f. Valverde, 1996). The possibilities of choice thus require that
the right sorts of choices be made.
In an interesting scheme reported by Bertrand et al. (2006), a North Carolina Credit
Union offered a Salary Advance Loan programme mimicking the period and size of
payday loan provision but secured instead on the deposit of the individual's future
salary-payment. Built into the scheme was an obligatory 'Cash Account', an interest-
254
bearing savings account into which was forwarded 5% of the value of each loan
advanced. By despotically enforcing good savings habits through the use of credit,
the rationality ofthe individual is braced in ways which are understood to be
ultimately beneficial for them. Like a child being inveighed to eat their greens who
grows up to find a meal without a vegetable portion to be wanting, it is hoped the
imbuing of good habits will lead to a permanent transformation in the way the
individual makes free choices in relation to borrowing and saving.
At the beginning of this section, it was argued that technologies such as credit
reporting and risk scoring systems calibrate and measure the self-governing abilities
of credit consumers. In doing so, they reflect and shape their pattern of access to
mainstream credit sources and systematically exclude pools of consumers unable to
exhibit such a narrative of disciplined consumption. For these, the discontinuity and
coercive regime of fringe borrowing remains the only credit alternative to sustain the
household through emergency and fulfill the miraged longings prompted by
consumption. However, just as they serve as the locus of exclusion, both the credit
reporting assemblage and technologies of credit scoring represent manipulable
possibilities for inclusion. Rather than 'transitioning' such manifestly 'risky'
borrowers to mainstream alternatives or acting to augment their will to promote
sustainable credit choices, technologies of surveillance and risk may be deployed in
a fashion which alters the constitution of individuals as risks in order to ostensibly
recognise their potentially secure, true self-governing natures. This has been codified
as the problem of 'underserved' or 'thin file/no file' market segment encompassing
the young, immigrants, the poor and minority groups:
Those with low income and who are left out of the credit system have a
difficult time building assets. To a considerable extent this is because they
cannot borrow. They have a hard time borrowing because there is far too
little information on their credit history to predict risk. Note that this is true
of those consumers with 'thin-files' who are credit risky as well as those who
- are creditworthy (IPI, 2005: 5)
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Therefore, because credit reports inscribe creditworthiness through the surveillance
of particular types of information, certain groups (particularly minorities and recent
immigrants) are systematically and persistently excluded not just from credit but all
those marketed services, including insurance providers, employers and tenants,
which make consumer access dependent on the content of a credit report. In the field
of credit reporting, the Information Policy Institute (IPI) advocates the inclusion and
reporting of 'alternative data sources', such as telecoms, utility and rental data which
have 'credit like' characteristics and the assessment of which might be statistically
predictive of future credit actions. In such a fashion, the credit referencing agency
Experian has begun collecting an array of just such 'alternative data' from checking
accounts, landlords, payday lenders and money transfer companies in an attempt to
understand the logistical feasibility of collecting such information and to empirically
test its statistical predictiveness of credit default (Tescher, 2006). Meanwhile, the
credit score modeling finn Fair Isaac has developed a scoring product known as the
'FICO Expansion score' which produces risk attributions for credit sanctioning
decisions based on 'alternative' and other data sources available to the lender, as
opposed to the traditional FICO system's dependence on credit reference agency
data (Horan, 2005)
This is not, though, about providing indiscriminate access to credit for those who are
poor or marginalised but, rather, about enhancing the technologies of the market in
order to identify the 'underserved's' effectively self-governing sections - those who
pay their phone and electricity bills as fastidiously as a conventionally creditworthy
consumer pays their credit card bill. By technically adjusting how objectivised credit
identities are inscribed and readjusting the empirical terrain of risk assessment
scoring systems, narratives and calculations of self-governed consumption can be
systematically conjured into existence for situating lending decisions. Potentially,
'underserved deserving' consumers can be absorbed through the boundaries of the
market, promoting not only profitable consumer credit use but the consumption of
other services, employment, mortgage credit and the possibilities of asset-building
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inherent in homeownership. Thus from the potentialities of market involvement stem
directly the promises of a wider inclusivity.
Social Inclusion and the 'Credit Underserved'
Within Western societies, the neo-liberal discourse of 'social exclusion' is seen to
have become central for framing state intervention in the alleviation of poverty and
social fragmentation (Levitas, 1996; Lister, 1998). With a transformation of
emphasis from equality to 'equality of opportunity' and social rights to 'social
responsibilities', paid work and education have become the primary malleable
programmatic vehicles through which a 'multi-dimensional' poverty - cultural,
political as well as economic - is to be acted upon and the lowest strata 'integrated'
into the rest of society. Within the foregoing analysis of the problem of fringe
borrowing or the wider problem of exclusion from mainstream financial services, the
usual suspects have persistently appeared: the poor, the young, ethnic minorities and
immigrants, a heterogeneous 'underc1ass' located within territorialised communities
spatially and socially cut adrift from the rest of society. They are, as Bauman
describes them, 'flawed consumers':
people unable to respond to the enticements of the consumer market because
they lack the required resources, people unable to be 'free individuals'
according to the sense of 'freedom' as defined in terms of consumer choice.
They are the new 'impure', who do not fit into the new scheme of purity.
Looked at from the now dominant perspective of the consumer market, they
are redundant - truly 'objects out of place' (1997: 14).
But society does not condone such 'objects out of place' . The question remains,
then, as to how are they to be 'tidied' in the framework offered by neo-liberalism?
Although identified and located as explanatory variables, their social conditions and
the structural features of their expropriation do not serve as the site of intervention or
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amelioration. Rather, expertise articulates the problem as a discrete dimension of
social exclusion - the 'unbanked', the 'credit underserved' - and frames intervention
through the relation of these groups to the market for credit and financial services
and through the ways that these individuals are understood to make choices.
Whether by way of the legislative power of the state, the beneficence and
enlightened self-interest of financial organisations or the pragmatic localism of
community-based groups, the targeted individual is to be subjectively conditioned,
in concert with debt counselors and personal finance advisors, with an augmented
capability to exert an autocratic self-regard over the sustainability of their
consumption practices and credit choices.
At the same time, the objective conditions and context within which choices are
made are deliberately and multifariously engineered through programmes of market
regulation, 'transitionary' credit forms and mechanisms more responsive to the
specific conditions of marginal consumers that steer the limits of what can be
chosen. Here, the market represents less a site for the mutual fulfillment of interest
than a malleable tool, or set of tools, for ensuring maximum personal choice. Yet,
what both have at their core is a concern with developing the autonomy of abject
consumers so that they can become self-realising, or more effectively self-realising,
consuming subjects, capable of managing the risk that they represent as consumers
and free to entrepreneurially pursue the conduct of their lives as a narrative of their
own choosing.
$ $ $ $
Within the United States during the 1920s and 30s, the population emerged as a
locus of analysis for lenders offering credit for consumption. The development of
credit accounts at department stores and mail order companies became intertwined
with new administrative technologies and accounting procedures at the level of the
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finn, displacing the borrower as an individual subject whose distinctive 'character'
augured an uncertain potentiality of default, with financial flows, attributes and rates
of default as constitutive elements of the wider customer body.
Against the backdrop of the post-war consumption boom of the 1950s, a new form
of mass consumer credit developed in the credit card; unconnected for the first time
with any specific form of consumption, its profitability was inherently bound to its
own perpetuation within generalised consumption, implying new forms of
population management by lenders as well as a greater reliance on the self-
governing capabilities of the consumer. Such 'plastic credit', in expanding the scope
and reach of credit within the everyday lives of consumers, regularised a more or
less permanent state of indebtedness. At the level of the state, a new economic
policy of Keynesianism elevated collective mass consumption over production as the
critical lever of economic growth - deficit spending echoing personal indebtedness
in the promotion of consumption. At this time statistical techniques began to give a
novel articulation to the problem of identifying non-payers and reducing the costs
associated with default across a lender's population of consumers. Credit scoring,
the analysis of statistical relationships between variables and default outcomes
within a population thus became applied to the governing of sanctioning decisions
by these mass lenders, rendering credit applicants visible and governable in new
ways as risks.
With the establishment of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 1974, programmes of
credit scoring received official state sanction as 'objective' instruments for the
determination of creditworthiness and were thus encouraged as a means of ending
discrimination within lending. Through the idea of risk, the act naturalised
creditworthiness as a capacity of the individual, reflecting risk's more general
reification of phenomena as 'real' properties of the world. Of course, the deployment
of risk itself could not lead to the easing of structural inequalities within society-
rather, they became depoliticised, divorced from an oppositional identity, hidden and
rendered incontestable within the equations of the expert's model. However, the
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neutralisation of the subjective created a disparity between the opportunity to
consume and one's lived experience, fostering opposition to the 'iron-cage'
treatment of individuals and protests as to the reduction of 'human qualities to
abstract quantities' (Ritzer 1995: 141).
However, systems of risk do not simply disperse through the consumer credit
industry according to their own interminable logic as more rational, more efficient
means of governing consumers. On the contrary, credit scoring technicians have
retrospectively portrayed lender managements of the past as Luddite regressives,
organisationally wedded to outdated inefficient methods of judgemental decision-
making before their inevitable submission to the tide of progress offered by credit
scoring. More crucially, though, the systematic statistical constitution of default risk
is itself perceived by its experts as being beset by a perpetual array of risks which
require the constant reappraisal of methods and procedures and the periodic renewal
of models within which risk assessments are created. The very success of a risk
discourse in conceiving and governing the problem of default has led to the
imaginative investment of its technologies in new ways and in new areas within the
operations oflenders, fragmenting its cohesiveness by re-articulating it through an
unbinding of time, a broader more continuous reach across the population and a
penetration into other areas of contingent consumer management such as debt
collection, marketing and fraud detection. In certain specific ways, the calculation of
individual default risk has also become interconnected with a higher order of risk
conceived and systematised around the governance of uncertainty and loss
experienced at the level of an entire portfolio of consumers and their debts.
However, not only are systems of risk open to 'risks' and continuous re-evaluation
and the concept of risk subject to fragmentation through its application to new
practices but the risk determinations constructed within models are themselves
invoked by experts and lenders in new and shifting ways. Before, risk embodied a
negative connotation with lenders identifying the 'tolerably risky' as the threshold
for determining whether the individual was to be sanctioned credit. Although
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varying from lender to lender, the idea of a single risk threshold denoted a simple
binary division between the included and the excluded, the (relatively) safe and the
intolerably risky. However, against the backdrop of a dynamic market and the
increased emphasis on consumption in the formation of identity, risk assumes a
positive status as an attribution to be entrepreneurially assumed and profitably
exploited.
Within consumer credit, this has taken one form through the incorporation of default
risk within a statistical determination of the profitable credit consumer. Here, the
subtext of risk changes, from that which is potentially dangerous and to be avoided
to that which is too safe and unconducive to financial return. Elsewhere, the
centrality of default risk to the government of credit consumers persists but in a form
which increasingly responsibilises the individual for the costs of their own self-
government through the adjustment of interest rates and other terms to the specific
identification of risk. Here, the idea of a single risk score representing a single
checkpoint to an homogenous collective becomes dissolved onto a spectrum of risks
enveloping a segmented market. What was avoided before as 'bad risk' becomes
sought after as a high return, growth-fuelled dynamic market segment, as distinct
from a 'safe', sclerotic, 'middle of the road' market. Costs, formerly socialised by a
single, common interest rate are now individualised, turned upon those segments
each according to their due.
But the question arises as to the fate of the 'excluded' that 'risk residuum' deemed,
to lack the ability or responsibility to pay for their own risk, those 'flawed
consumers' of consumer society (Bauman, 1997). They are denied access to the
seductions of the market, excluded from circuits of credit consumption through their
paltry or blackened credit record and the manifestation of personal attributes _
occupation, income, neighbourhood - 'objectively' indicative of their lack of
creditworthiness or, what amounts to the same thing, their inability to manage
themselves. For them, the 'fringe' financial service providers await - the
pawnbroke-, the payday lender and the rent to own centre which envelop the
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irrational, un-self-governable within more coercive mechanisms that guarantee
governability: the pledge of collateral, the holding of a customer's post-dated,
guaranteed cheque or the denial of the transaction as a dejure credit agreement.
While such consumers may exist on the fringe, the ever closer relationship between
fringe lenders and mainstream financial capital reveals that even the poor, the
excluded, the marginalised are not beyond the interest of capital and profit. In
essence it is such borrowers alone, not their 'bankers', who subsist on the 'fringe'.
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Chapter 4. 'See How Lenders SeeYou': Risk, Uncertainty
and Self-identity
Let us all be happy and live within our means, even if we have to borrer
the money to do it with.
Artemus Ward
The political rationality of liberal government, caught between the dilemma as
Foucault (1991) shows of governing too much or too little those domains-
'population', 'economy' 'society' - deemed external to the formal apparatus of
government, has always depended upon the self-governing capacities of individuals.
These capacities it has sought to mould, shape and direct, in a word, to 'govern' for
the purposes of maximising the collective security and wellbeing of its domains of
rule. However, within its contemporary forms, liberalism has grown increasingly
disillusioned with the possibility of governing through the dynamism and vitality of
these domains, reorientating itself instead to the contrivance of marketised choice for
the individual so that the intentions of government are accomplished through their
individual capabilities, their subjectivity, their freedom.
As Dean (1999a: 194) explains, neo-liberal discourse detotalises the economy so that
it is no longer understood as being co-extensive with the territory of the nation-state,
as something that can be regulated and managed in and of itself; rather, it becomes
reframed as a mere constituent of a globalised economy by which it is buoyed and
buffeted and against which it must be made 'competitive' through the 'enterprising'
of individual and organisational conduct. However, this does not represent the end of
economic government - only the end of its accomplishment across a totalised
national space through such mechanisms as Keynesianism or bureaucratic state
welfarism, Rather, the economy becomes nurtured through acting upon and through
264
the freedom and autonomy of the individual to choose, a root given soil in the
reconstitution of more and more areas of social experience as consumer-oriented
markets. In being autonomous, in living their lives as personalised enterprises and as
projects of fulfilment, individuals collectively contribute to economic growth and
prosperity. With consumer confidence and spending as key indices of economic
performance and two-thirds of American Gross Domestic Product seen to emanate
from personal consumption, the autonomy and freedom of the individual to choose
are seen as central economic resources to be cultivated.
Monica Greco (1993), in analysing contemporary conceptions of health, argues that
disease is no longer conceived today merely as the opposite of health, the irruption
of a normal state of being through the manifestation of a particular disease or
condition like 'flu or heart disease. On the contrary, everyday life has become
pathologised with the individual perceived to be always potentially 'at risk' from
illness through the complex interplay of individual disposition and environmental
context. Within this she argues that the individual has become encumbered with the
responsibility of ensuring the maintenance of their own health through the making of
'healthy choices' in every facet of their life, from exercise to alcohol consumption,
from salt intake to workplace stress. However, not only must a personal preventative
capacity be exercised through the making of these prudent, informed choices but the
unwillingness or inability to act 'healthily' must itse1fbe acknowledged as a form of
disease. Illness thus comes to denote a lack of self-mastery while health becomes an
expression of enterprise, a personalised project sustained through the ongoing
prudent exercise of choice.
The idea of health, as we will see throughout this chapter, provides a substantial
imaginary whenever individual creditworthiness is discussed:
Your credit score influences the credit that's available to you, and the terms
that lenders offer you. It's a vital part of your credit health. Understanding
- credit scoring can help you manage your credit health.'
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Lenders can partner with myFICO to help their customers improve their
credit understanding and health.2
The easy to use kit facilitates better financial health by interactively walking
consumers step-by-step through the process' .3
Credit scores are a lot like cholesterol counts - you cannot evaluate a
patient's overall health based solely on that one number. Physicians must
consider the patient's lifestyle, family history, eating habits, as well as the
cholesterol count."
What is revealing about this health metaphor is that it follows the contemporary
understanding of psychosomatic health presented by Greco. Health, whether medical
or credit, is no longer a state, something considered when disease strikes or a loan
application is refused by a lender; it becomes, rather, a personal project for which
the individual is required to manage, the continuously reproduced outcome of an
array of choices which the individual must be persuaded to take in order to be
healthy (see also Bauman, 2000; Vaz and Bruno, 2003). This is the position of the
individual under neo-liberalisrn whose operation of freedom, autonomy and
fulfilment become the conduit of government rather than its antithesis.
As we have seen previously, the rise of a mass market for consumer credit was an
interweaving process accompanied by the promulgation of written, tabulated records
of repayment and the sanctioning of access around relativistic conceptualisations of
creditworthiness. Within this emerged a heightened understanding by individuals of
themselves as credit users and the realisation of a responsibility to manage
themselves. With the greater deployment by lenders of statistical scoring systems
constituting individual consumers as risks, especially with the rise of the Fair Isaac
generic model based on data held by credit bureaus, a demand for score disclosure
became articulated by consumers themselves, ultimately leading to Fair Isaac and
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the credit bureaus offering scores to consumers as a marketed product. However, a
credit score exists in abstract. It represents the data in a credit bureau file in a
specific way, creating in numerical form a default risk assessment relative to the
mass population of credit users. This bureaucratised technology was created for
lenders to calculably determine acceptable default levels and so guide individual
sanctioning decisions on all applications for credit. To be incorporated within
individual self-governance, it had to be made meaningful and relevant, to be
articulated as a norm which the autonomous individual could deploy in order to
shape their actions towards ends beneficial to a care of the self.
This chapter attempts to examine how the contemporary American credit consumer
has become aligned to a credit identity articulated as risk, coming to subjectively
understand and govern themselves through such an identity born from technologies
of actuarial government forged by the consumer credit industry. The first section
outlines the development of the FICO credit scoring system by the company Fair
Isaac as a so-called 'generic' form of credit risk analysis based on the information
held by the three credit national credit and the events which led to its formalised,
marketed disclosure to consumers, against the initial wishes of the company itself.
The following section examines the specific mechanics of how an alignment is made
between the individual's actions in using credit and the technologies of FICO credit
scoring so that the individual becomes aware of the significance of their credit score
as a 'FICO identity'. The third section analyses the way that such technologies of
risk have become parlayed into identity 'security commodities' to be purchased and
incorporated as consumer goods by the individual in order to defend, enhance and
illuminate their personalised lifestyles. The fourth section scrutinises how such
security commodities, based around the disclosure of the individual's actual score,
are used by the individual to reflexively manage their risk-expressed identity and
thus their ongoing consuming potential. An attempt is also made to demonstrate the
significance of the concept of 'uncertainty' and how risk, as a technology for
producing a calculable relation to the future, has become an identity to acted upon
by the-consumer under incalculable conditions. The final section then focuses on a
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particular form of uncertainty faced by the contemporary consumer, the 'risk' of
identity theft, and how forms of prevention becomes incorporated within specific
practices of the self.
Risk Identity, 'FICO' and the Consumer
The Rise of the Generic Credit Score: The Branding of Risk
By the end of the 1980s within the United States, a significant shift occurred in the
technology of credit reporting. As detailed in Chapter 3, credit scoring technologies
had begun to significantly proliferate among lenders from the end of the 1970s as a
means of interpreting the creditworthiness of individual consumers based around
empirically established conceptualisations of risk. In 1989, Fair Isaac, the leading
developer of credit scoring risk systems for creditors, began to develop a
standardised generic statistical risk system formulated not on the localised recorded
data of individual lenders but on data held by the three national credit bureaus and
within which any individual with a credit report could be attributed a quantified risk
score. By 1991 the systems were in place, individually branded and marketed by the
three national bureaus to lenders as a new product for deriving credit risk,
imbricatable within established, customised lender-specific scoring models or
functionable as a stand-alone credit sanctioning system. These so-called 'FICO'
scores extended further the constructed objectivity of credit reports by overlaying a
technology of risk. As we have discussed at length in Chapter 3, interpreting and
expressing creditworthiness as a numeric risk helped dislocate a qualitatively rich
conception of creditworthiness intimately understood within the moral framework of
individual character. In doing so, credit default was established as an empirical
phenomenon endemic to the population, linked not to fixed causes explicable in
terms of specific individual character but rather to probability based combinations of
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variables, exhibited to a greater or lesser degree, by all individuals within a
population. Risk is thus the apogee of a relativistic articulation of creditworthiness,
its attribution to individuals dependent upon the specific technology of risk through
which they are interpreted and the formation of the population within which they are
located.
The emergence of a generic risk technology with respect to consumer credit records
provided a common standardised means of conceptualising and measuring the
relative default risk of a new population of consumers inscribed into reality through
the burgeoning assemblage of credit reporting. In tum, the idea of a standardised,
empirically-derived credit risk capable of being attributed to virtually any consumer
depended upon the rendering into existence of just such a population. Through what
Rose (1999b: 205) labels 'the potency of numerical technology', the formulation of
FICO scores enabled the specific ordering of consumers within a hierarchy of risk
through the computation of data lines on the credit report as relatable variables
associated with a commonly defined default outcome. Therefore, different items on a
credit report, from types of accounts opened to numbers of delinquencies, could be
balanced and merged to form a risk score specific to that individual. In tum, changes
to the credit report could result in changes to that attribution over time in terms of a
progression to a higher or lower risk. And crucially, individuals could be compared
to each other and ranked on a spectrum of risk.
The FICO score thus represents the formation of a new norm across the population
of consumers, as simultaneously a rule and a means of producing that rule (Ewald,
1990: 154). In this context, it represents a unified understanding of what kind of
default risk a given individual poses and a technology for producing a common risk
assessment across the whole population of consumers, to which a given level of risk
can be compared. However, unlike the norms inherent in disciplinary power,
individuals are not coercively normalised. FICO scores are only rendered into being
within individual transactions for credit, they exist discontinuously only at particular
points-in time when autonomous individuals actively seek to enter into a credit
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agreement. Rather than creating an homogeneous social space as the deployment of
discipline sought to do whereby norms act as standards to be obtained by those so
subjected, the deployment of a generic credit scoring system fosters a diverse market
space. In a general sense, less risk is preferred to greater risk by lenders within the
market, but how the attribution of a risk assessment will be acted upon will vary
from lender to lender, depending on the market segment that they seek to profitably
exploit. In other words, FICO scores act as a general interpretation of credit risk -
but no single cut-off point, no common threshold of exclusion exists for all lenders
and, indeed, lenders do not base their decisions exclusively on a FICO score. The
deployment of a generic risk scoring technology as a new means of assessing
creditworthiness only enhances diversity and further segments the market for credit.
By the end of the 1990s, FICO had become firmly established as the standard
generic credit scoring product across the US consumer credit market. This position
was further strengthened when Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, the two
Congressionally chartered companies responsible for developing secondary markets
for home mortgages, directed their use to primary lenders in the mortgage
sanctioning process. As the significance of one's bureau-based FICO score for
accessing credit began to develop, we see the emergence of a disclosure debate
mirroring that which had taken place before with regard to credit bureau records in
the 1970s. This time disclosure was concerned with the rights of consumers to
access their FICO credit scores.
The Politics of Score Disclosure
In September 1999, Representative Cannon introduced a bill to the House of
Representatives proposing to amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act by requiring
consumer disclosure on demand of all credit scores held by bureaus.i As Cannon
announced at a press conference:
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Consumers will better know what mortgages and loans they qualify for, and
what type of interest rates they can get based upon their credit history. They
will be able to shop for the best financial services they can get, and know
what to expect .... Giving a consumer this information empowers them to
make wise financial decisions,"
In early 2000, co-sponsored by E-Loan, the Californian Association of Realtors and
consumer interest group Consumers Union, Senator Figueroa presented a bill to the
Californian legislative assembly that would allow consumers, within the context of a
lending decision, to see any score used to help determine the success or failure of a
credit application." Later that year, the bill was passed by the assembly and signed
into law by the Governor. In September 2000, a federal bill modelled on the
Figueroa one, requiring lender disclosure, was brought before the Senate by Senators
Schumer and Allard.8 Testifying before a Congressional subcommittee, Schumer
projected as 'sinister' the fact that 'lenders have access to all the decision-
influencing information and consumers are left in the dark' and advocated the terms
of his bill as being necessary to ensure consumer access to their credit scores so that
they could make sure that they themselves were able to get the best competitive
terms to meet their own credit needs, particularly with respect to mortgage credit
access and the realisation of 'the American Dream of home ownership',"
Schumer's statements are further mirrored in how consumer rights advocates
Consumers Union interpreted the territory inhabited by credit consumers. In an
article published in their journal Consumer Reports, they bemoaned the lack of
balance present in the consumer credit industry where creditors know the credit
scores of consumers but such information is kept from consumers themselves. 10 Due
to this lack of self-knowledge and the proliferation of risk pricing whereby interest
rates paid for credit are dependent on one's credit score, they argued that consumers
were systematically being disadvantaged within credit agreements and inhibited
from 'shopping around', especially those consumers with relatively low credit scores
tied to.the high-interest 'subprime' market. However, it is not collective solidarity
271
which is prescribed - indeed risk pricing and its effect of burdening the individual
through specifically tailored interest rates with the costs of the individualised risk
that they represent was defended as 'only fair'. On the contrary, these consumer
campaigners sought:
legislation that requires credit bureaus and lenders to disclose a consumer's
credit score, explain deficiencies, and advise how to repair problems ... [it]
should also require that lenders disclose their matrix of rates, credit scores,
and credit tiers to anyone who requests this vital comparative-shopping
information. I I
Thus the ability of all consumers, including the marginal, to choose the most
adequate and efficient credit product to meet their needs within a free market was
posited as being constrained by the profit-oriented interests of the credit industry,
ultimately degrading consumer choice and the fulfilment of the self. Only when
consumers can become properly self-calculating as consumers, in turn energising
their ability to choose, can autonomy to be assured.
The impulse behind these legislative initatives was, of course, the protection of
consumers but, as with the FCRA, its particular emphasis was on the state providing
the means by which individuals as consumers could be rendered autonomous. As
Rose and Miller (1992) argue, legislation is crucial in creating a legal framework for
the enabling and constraining of certain groups upon which government is
dependent. Within a contemporary political rationality which forges a link between
general economic success and the unconstrained productive capacity of autonomous
consumers, these political interventions represent an acute concern of the state for
the elevation and privileging of the position of the consumer. In other words, the
state seeks to intervene, not in the interests of the collective solidarity, but to remove
self-interested industry imposed distortions and thus provide consumers with the
capacity and means by which they could secure their Own independence within the
market.
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However, most dramatic was the controversial, highly-publicised move by intemet-
based lender E-Loan to reveal the score of any consumer logging on to its website,
in direct violation of its contract with Equifax.V Despite the protests of Equifax
representatives, E-Loan persisted in revealing FICO scores until, under pressure
from Fair Isaac, Equifax exerted what it was claimed was its contractual right and
disconnected its electronic link to E-Loan - effectively leaving them without any
access to its credit referencing files and thus preventing the continued dissemination
of scores (not to mention credit) to consumers. As a consequence of this bruising
retaliation, E-Loan backed down but not before numerous emotional outbursts from
its CEO about Equifax and Fair Isaac's attempts to deliberately put 'him out of
business'. In the continuing debate about score disclosure, the E-Loan rebellion
became the rallying point for angry accusations that the credit reporting industry was
engaging in secretive practices harmful to the wellbeing of consumers. Both Equifax
and Fair Isaac defended themselves on the basis that E-Loan had broken the terms of
its contract but, more interestingly, it argued that attempts to disclose scores were
actually against the consumer interest in that the offering of raw information could
confuse consumers and easily lead them to take actions that might actually harm
their credit score. Thus the centring of consumers within the domain of government
conditioned the industry to present its defensive actions as a safeguarding of
consumer autonomy, an autonomy that could be damaged if the knowledge revealed
by the score was not accompanied by the inculcation of self-calculability, that is, an
appreciation and knowledge of the significance of the score.
E-Loan, although certainly anxious to profit from their attempts at score disclosure
in terms of establishing loyalty ties with customers, primarily justified their actions
on the basis of autonomising consumer choice, emphasising the secretive nature of
the credit scoring 'black box', the growing consumer demand for infonnation-
particularly after having been turned down for a loan on the basis of an unknown
score - and their intention to help people understand and manage their own credit.P
E-Loan's CEO Chris Larsen even interpreted that score disclosure would empower
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people to 'manage their debt in the same way they manage their assets' bringing into
sharp relief the contemporary significance of consumers as entrepreneurs of their
own lives. Thus with an emphasis on individual self-fulfilment, managing debt could
thus become a productive activity through the maximisation of one's own
. . 114consumption potentia .
From Actuarial Risk to the Consumption of Risk
Prior to 1999, Fair Isaac's commercial focus was on the provision of statistical credit
scoring services to creditors and, with the development of its bureau-based FICO
scores, came to act as an intermediary between creditors and bureaus, in doing so,
becoming more implicated within the infrastructure of consumer credit provision. Its
function as a capitalist firm was not concerned with the government of consumers in
the interests of profit but less directly, with the creation and supply of a technical
means of inscription for the actuarial management of populations of credit
consumers by lenders. Its refusal to reveal the specific weight of the different factors
within its statistical formulations, its claims as to scoring's proprietary nature and
the exercise of US trade secret and patent law in its defence were manifest
expressions of the firm's protection of its intellectual capital within a competitive
marketplace. However, Fair Isaac's persistent repudiation of demands for consumer
access and its establishment of non-disclosure contracts with creditors are instances
of its protection of its scoring algorithms, not directly from competitors but from
consumers themselves. It saw disclosure as introducing a means whereby consumers
would enhance their access to credit by manipulating, or 'gaming' their own scores-
a form of feedback pollution that would deplete the predictive ability of its model.
As Fair Isaac representative Pete McCorkell retorted at a Federal Trade Commission
conference on consumer credit scoring in 1999:
And in fact, I'm sorry to tell you this, but Fair Isaac's job is not to tell you
- how to get a better score. Our job is to produce a score that is the best
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possible predictor of your credit performance. And so we want to score your
behaviour .... We don't want to have consumers trying to alter their
behaviour in short terms ways that will, regularly, has nothing to do with
their long term credit risk. And we don't want to get into that discussion with
consumers.IS
For the finn, the problem was not so much the release of scores as an identifier so
much as attempts to alter it, in particular contexts, that would disrupt default
outcomes. In such circumstances, it perceived that if risk scores came to embody the
reflexive actions of particular consumers in meeting the specific qualifying criteria
of credit agreements rather than the naturally occurring probability of default
empirically associated with their demonstrable attributes, default rates associated
with particular score ranges would be distorted, thus diminishing the predictive
efficacy of its model in the experience oflenders. What Fair Isaac feared was not
their loss of ability to govern consumers, but the loss of profitability resulting from
the debilitation of their clients' (i.e. lenders) ability to govern consumers.
However during 2000, in the aftermath of the E-Loan saga, the state and federal
legislative manoeuvres described above and increased consumer awareness, a
discursive shift appeared in Fair Isaac's articulation of the score disclosure issue.
Contrary to its previous dismissal of a consumer right of access, it too began to
position itself more within the rubric of promoting consumer autonomy through
disclosure. However, it problematised the role of credit scores in consumer self-
government, arguing that consumer knowledge of a single abstract score provided a
fractious basis for managing one's credit use given the dynamism of scores and the
complexity of a diverse market context where creditors have different risk
acceptance thresholds and deploy different mechanisms in sanctioning credit.16 In
fact, knowledge of a score might actually lead to it being lowered if the consumer
attempted to take action to improve it without understanding the significance of their
actions. Dropping its contractual consumer non-disclosure terms with lenders, Fair
Isaac advocated the release of credit scores within the context of a lending decision:
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Fair, Isaac's view is that consumers need additional information and
individual counsel from a lender to truly understand their credit standing and
how to improve it in the eyes of the lender .... For that reasons, the contracts
between Fair, Isaac and credit reporting agencies prohibit the disclosure of
credit risk scores to consumers outside of the context of a lender IS
explanation of a credit decision [my emphasis] .17
Self-knowledge of credit scores, for Fair Isaac, was thus to be located within a
particular transaction. Where credit consumers are refused, the possibility of score
disclosure was permitted but only in a specific time-space where a lender could
intervene to firmly direct the self-governing possibilities of the consumer in light of
that score in order to access credit in the future. In bowing to the inevitability of
consumer self-government, it attempted to shape the form of calculability that this
self-government would take.
Fair Isaac, though, soon began to feel pressure from TransUnion who, in light of
their established responsibilities to ensure access of consumers to their files, the
possibilities oflegislative compulsion and the greater demands for self-calculability
by consumers, began to develop plans to create their own version of the FICO
scoring model with which to disseminate approximated scores to consumers, thus
side-stepping the Fair Isaac embargo." Faced with the alternative possibility that its
restrictions could now actually degrade or destroy the pre-eminence of FICO within
the consumer credit market just as it had previously feared that consumer disclosure
would have, Fair Isaac found itself being compelled to directly satisfy the demands
of credit consumers for credit score self-knowledge. Over a short time period, Fair
Isaac was quickly encumbered with the task of directly governing the self-
government of consumers:
We're ... seeing a variety of initiatives to meet the perceived consumer
- interest in more detailed information about their credit standing. As the
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developer of the FICO score, we're in the best position to provide the context
and explanation for a consumer's credit standing. We still think the lender
relationship is the best context for a discussion to help a consumer
understand their credit standing. The second best would be a credit
explanation from Fair, Isaac based on information in the credit report:9
In mid 2000, the company publicly released a list of the factors considered within
the FICO model and the relative weight assigned to each one within the mode1.2o In
November of that year, it unveiled its fee-charging, web-based service 'Ficoguide'.
Although primarily aimed at lenders in order to allow them to interpret a credit score
to a consumer within the context of a credit application, consumers themselves were
permitted to access it, but only if they already had secured their score and associated
'reason codes' (statutory factors listed on a credit report to explain why a score was
not greater) from a lender.i! Nevertheless, the service helped the consumer interpret
their own FICO-based creditworthiness in relative terms against the recorded
population of consumers, informed them what their score implied about the
possibilities of their defaulting on credit agreements, provided more in-depth
analysis of the reason codes as well as advisory actions on how to avoid such score-
depleting factors?2
By the beginning of 2001, Fair Isaac and Equifax announced an alliance to provide
direct consumer access to FICO scores, based on an individual's Equifax credit
report, through the internet. Like the Ficoguide before it, planned services to be
offered in addition to the score included broad interpretations of how lenders would
view the score, explanations of the four most prominent 'reason codes' which
prevented the score from being higher, how the individual consumer's score
compared across the population and generalised advice on how to improve the score
in addition to manned customer advice help lines.23 In April of that year, the service
was up and running on both companies' websites and after three months, both
companies claimed higher consumer interest with forty million visits to the
combined website service, although actual numbers of sales were not revealed."
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Soon, a flurry of companies began to offer so-called 'FICO clones' scores, scores
generated from models designed to emulate the FICO model, direct to consumers
based on their credit reports, including iPlace2s, CreditXpert (in conjunction with E-
Loan)26 and Worthknowing.corrr", each claiming to be responding to the new-found
consumer demand for personal credit information.
In responding to iPlace's action, now rivals within the consumer credit education
market, Fair Isaac accepted that such scores might be 'educational' but were not as
useful as the FICO score given that FICO was the only consumer-marketed model
actually being used by a majority oflenders. Like Oral B advertising that its
toothbrushes are the product of personal choice for dentists, Fair Isaac espoused the
superiority of its product for self-education on the basis of its 'real world fidelity',
that is, only Fair Isaac offered the means of credit self-governance based on how
consumers were governed in the market. Thus, consumer self-education acquired a
commodified form, risk scores becoming marketed for the first time to consumers as
well as lenders. However, whereas risk is deployed by lenders as part of an actuarial-
type management of a population of consumers, for consumers themselves, risk is
delivered as part of a commodity for creating and recreating the conditions for a new
subjective governance of the self.
Actuarial to Subjective Governance
Your Own Personal Risk
It has been argued that risk, as a technology, has a 'political polyvalence' which can
be invested in different political rationalities of government. Within contemporary
neo liberali . 1· d .- Ism, socia ise nsk management exemplified by such programmes as
sociallnsurance have become dismantled concomitant with the decentring of the
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social as the crucial space of government. With neo-liberalism's concentration upon
the individual as the site of rule, the rational choice actor optimising their interest as
we analysed in Chapter 2, these programmes recede in favour of what is termed
'new prudentialism' (O'Malley, 1996). Instead of risks being calculated and shared
socially, prudentialism emphasises the responsibility of individuals, households and
communities for their own risks through both minimising exposure to risk and
engagement in private risk management initiatives, often through the market. For
example, in relation to health, along with the rise of private health insurance we see
an increased emphasis on personalised, discipline-based risk minimising practices,
from anti-smoking and weight-loss campaigns to healthy eating initiatives.
Therefore, not only are populations targeted as risks but individuals become actively
engaged in managing their own risks. As O'Malley emphasises, the individual is
rendered both moral and calculating, invested with the responsibility of ensuring,
through careful strategies of self-protection, that they do not become a burden or a
liability to a society no longer sympathetic to the principle of collective security.
Within this vein, individual credit users have moved away from being solely
agglomerations of risk factors calculated and managed - 'governed at a distance'-
through predictive risk mechanisms. With a clamouring demand for score disclosure
to consumers, the same risk technologies which had formally, exclusively, been used
to govern the population actuarially became exploited for a new purpose, that of
self-governance. Increasingly, consumers have been persuaded of the need to align
themselves to a numerically expressed risk identity, as such, to be personally
responsible for the risk that they, as credit users and consumers more generally, are
constituted to be.
Through numerous avenues, the contemporary American consumer is faced with the
significance oftheir credit identity and the importance of understanding its meaning
in the living of their lives as consumers. A Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 'Facts
for Consumers' leaflet prods interest by asking, 'ever wonder how a creditor decides
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whether to grant you credit?,?8 Meanwhile, a brochure from the Consumer
Federation of America (CFA) is less oblique in confronting the consumer:
Think your grade point average is your only score that matters? Think again!
There's another score that's important as you go through life. It's called a
credit score. And whether you know it or not, someone is already keeping
track.29
The media too reflect and amplify this insistence on knowing. On a web discussion,
Washington Post personal finance guru Michelle Singletary remarks, 'despite the
system's significance, few people know about it, and those that do, little (sic)
understand it' .30 This theme of consumer ignorance finds expression in surveys as to
what consumers actually know about scoring. In one study, for instance, the CFA
find that only 34% of consumers appreciate that credit scores are a measure of
default risk." Similarly, the hosting of an interactive web quiz by Fair Isaac leads
the company to authoritatively remark that 'the financial literacy of American
consumers rates a poor grade of "D'" .32 In every case, knowledge of how the scoring
system works and contextualising one's ongoing credit use in relation to this
knowledge to understand the constitution of one's own identity is presented as a
critical means for acting upon those elements ofthe self which the model considers
in order to improve one's credit identity and thus maximise one's credit
consumption:
Understanding credit scoring can help you manage your credit health. By
knowing how your credit risk is evaluated, you can take actions that will
lower your credit risk - and thus raise your score - over time. A better score
means better financial options for yoU.33
As scoring becomes ubiquitous within the consumer credit market, as it comes to be
used for more products such as mortgage credit and to increasingly determine the
interest rate paid by consumers, an enhanced credit identity helps open up the
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possibility of choosing more credit products, expediting applications for new credit
and lowering the effective cost of consuming it.
Through its website service, Fair Isaac acts to align the individual with the
conception of a credit risk identity articulated as a risk score through helping to
inculcate a knowledge within the credit user as to how credit scoring works, how the
statistical model is constructed and how it assimilates and articulates information to
produce a specific credit identity in terms ofrisk.34 As FICO scores are produced
through credit bureau data, the individual is firstly familiarised with the content of
what a credit report contains, namely:
• identifying information which conjoins the living individual and their actions
with their virtual identity
• trade line information which reports types of credit used currently and in the
past; the duration of the accounts; balances; current status and the nature and
extent of any delinquencies
• inquiries: date and type of reported applications by the individual for new
•
credit
public record / collection: publicly recorded court judgements for debts and
defaulted amounts referred by lenders to collection agenciea."
Essentially, for the individual, their credit identity is constructed as an amalgam of
their previous use of credit, their attempts to use credit and significant failures to
commit to repaying credit accounts outstanding.
Beyond this, the credit user is enlightened with the five categories through which the
FICO score model interprets this information in cohering individual scores: payment
history, that is, the extent to which the individual is deemed to have repaid amounts
on time; amounts owed as well as number, type and spread across different credit
accounts; overall length of credit history as well as the age of specific accounts, the
nature-of recently acquired credit and requests for new credit and, finally, the
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balance or 'mix' of credit types held by the individual. 36 As well as the categories
themselves, Fair Isaac denotes the specific emphasis placed on each category within
the FICO model- with payment history at 35% being the most important factor and
credit mix, at 10%, the least (see figure 4.1).
Payment
Amounts Owed
Figure 4.1 FICO Weights. Source: Fair Isaac37
Striking a cautionary note, the company attests to the uniqueness of each individual
credit user and the fact that this weighting, relevant for the whole population of
credit users, may differ depending on the specific credit history of the individual.
However, it is not just informing the individual of their characteristics and
weightings which is important. Fair Isaac cautions the credit user as to what is not
considered within the model, including amongst other things: discriminatory
attributes such as race, gender, religion and other such factors legislatively
prohibited under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act; income; specific interest rates on
credit accounts held and 'any information that is not proven to be predictive of
future credit performance' .38
Although credit identity is positioned as an outcome of individual actions in the past,
the interpretation of it through a risk score implies its function as a norm, a
relativistic attribution generated within the context of a population, requiring that the
individual understand the significance of their credit identity against the group. As
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Ewald (1990) suggests, the function of a quantified risk as norm attains its meaning
not against absolute standards but only as part of a population distribution. Giving
expression to an individual as a risk score only makes sense against the expression
of other individuals as risk scores and the extent to which it is higher or lower than
these. The credit user is thus instructed not just as to how an individualised score is
created but the meaningfulness of the scale upon which scores are posited and how a
FICO as an individualised risk attribution stacks relative to the incidence of risk
across the population (see figure 4.2).
National distribution of FICO sCOntS
FICO $url ,.. ,.
Figure 4.2 National Distribution of FICO scores. Source: Fair Isaac_39
This relativistic understanding of one's own credit identity is central for the process
of aligning individuals to it is so that they will come to act upon themselves in order
to enhance it. Through a self-consciousness as to their position within the hierarchy
of consumers, the individual is presented with their current score collegiate and the
attendant possibilities for credit consumption associated with it, collegiates to aspire
to with their greater consuming potentials and ones to avoid with diminished
domains of choice. Therefore in a score's function as a norm, the individual is
directed to a personalised 'ethic of improvement' :40
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Save the Smart Way
As you improve your FICO® scores,
you pay less when you buy on credit -
whether purchasing a home loan, cell
phone, a car loan, or signing up for
credit cards. For example, on a
$150,000 30-year, fixed-rate
mortgage:
Your YourYour Interest MonthlyFICO®Score Rate Payment
760 - 850 5.37% $840
700 -759 5.59% $861
680 - 699 5.77% $877
660 - 679 5.99% $898
640 - 659 6.42% $940
620 - 639 6.96% $994
In terms of understanding themselves as risks, credit consumers are engendered to
acknowledge the scientific rationalism of scoring: its empirical derivation, its
reliance on factual credit records, its mathematical formulation, its rigorous testing
to ensure 'the most accurate picture of credit risk possible using credit report data',
and its use of permitted characteristics statistically proven to be predictive of
default.t' In addition to its rationality, scoring is also presented as being 'fair',
excluding potentially discriminatory attributes, holistically assessing the information
in the credit report to ensure an adequate reflection of the individual. It is these very
characteristics of scoring which are depicted as having helped make possible the
dynamic contemporary market embodying instant credit, where personal feelings
and non-relevant characteristics are excluded, where all information is judiciously
balanced and weighed up, where more credit is available at lower rates credit; all of
which makes it easier for people to enjoy more liberal credit use. In asserting the
scientific credentials of scoring, it implies that the regulation of the selfby risk
where individuals have not done so before is, in itself, a rational and appropriate
practice. More generally, staking its centrality to the credit market and the greater
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availability of credit to individuals makes one's score understood as a fundamental
necessity to acknowledge and adhere to in order to maximise ongoing consuming
potential
Disciplining the Self
The alignment of an individual to their credit identity as a FICO score implies the
disciplining of the self, one's actions in the use of credit, in relation to time. To
sustain and to increase the possibility of choice through the improvement of one's
score, the credit user is persuaded of the need to keep current on credit payments, to
keep balances low on revolving credit accounts like credit cards, to pay-off debt
rather than circulate it around; ultimately, against the structuring of time, the credit
user is to exert a rigid regimen of the self to ensure their repayments and credit use
are smooth, controlled and to term. In disciplining themselves in this manner, the
individual is uniquely responsibilised for their past actions, the consequences of
which cannot be evaded - '[n]ote that closing an account doesn't make it go away. A
closed account will still show up on your credit report, and may be considered by the
score,.42 However, the past is not an albatross - the transformation of the self,
possible through acting in light of one's credit identity, always implies the
possibility of transcendence in the present. The receding past fades in statistical
significance to be replaced by the interpretation of more recent 'good' behaviour in
the conduct of credit.
Against this ethic, 'base manipulation' through such actions as wilfully opening and
closing accounts to quickly increase of one's score is to be avoided. For instance, the
credit user is advised, 'don't close unused credit cards as a short term strategy to
raise your score' while almost in the same breath, the advice is 'don't open a number
of new credit cards that you don't need, just to increase your available credit. This
approach could backfire and actually lower your score' .43 Although the credit user is
to be ealculating, such calculation cannot herald easily exploitable technicalities.
285
Rather, the injunction is a moral one: to pay one's bill on time, to 'get current and
stay current', not to take on too much or unneeded credit. In the actuarial
management of credit default through risk by lenders, various characteristics and
attributes are technically perceived to be related to a probabilistic default outcome
which the creditor can deploy to profitably target a certain segment of borrowers.
We have seen, for example, how some lenders utilised developments in scoring
technologies to actively market high-interest credit facilities to the so-called 'sub-
prime' market, composed of relatively risky credit users, in order to avoid the
competitive saturation of the 'prime' market. In this context, no moral claims are
made for the 'rightness' of 'wrongness' of particular attributes, only the exploitation
of profitable opportunities. However, in the government of subjective self-
management, individual conduct is moralised, not against a universal truth or belief
but in relation to the extent that it contributes towards a depletion or bolstering of
one's identity and thus an inhibition or enhancement of one's self-narrativising
potential through credit. Shifting, relativised statistical relationships between
variables and outcomes thus become immute moral precepts.
In analysing in what he sees as the critical role of moralisation within practices of
government, Hunt (1999) argues that morality frequently invokes a 'utilitarian'
claim that such conduct being deemed bad or unworthy, has a wider personal or
social harm attached to it. So it is for the contemporary credit user, whose lack of
self-mastery invokes a future eroded of opportunities to consume. But there is a
wider social implication here too, for if the economy and growth are built around
personal consumption and credit use increasingly facilitates this consumption, then
the agglomeration of undisciplined credit use and the shrinking of credit provision
might be seen to have wider, far-reaching social consequences for national
prosperity. Certainly, its opposite is perceived to be true by credit bureau Equifax:
'[t]he more we enlighten, enable and empower individuals to better manage their
financial health ... the more we foster consumer confidence and economic
growth' .44
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Ironically, within this process ofmoralised governance, the centrality of credit to
contemporary economic activity and lived experience casts the traditional suspicion
of credit on its head:
Have credit cards - but manage them responsibly. In general, having
credit cards and instalment loans (and making timely payments) will raise
your score. People with no credit cards, for example, tend to be higher risk
than people who have managed credit cards responsibly.Y
A demonstration of no or limited credit use implies a higher level of individual risk
than that by disciplined, well-managed credit use so that morality itself is adjudged
not through one's use of credit but one's conduct in the use of credit. An interesting
example of this understanding is the joint venture between Fair Isaac and a
Californian credit counselling organisation to incorporate the former's services to
help those who 'want to rebound from credit problems' .46 In this understanding, it is
not credit use which is the problem for the dangerously indebted, nor is prohibition
the answer; rather it is a lack of self-mastery which is problematised and
professional guidance through an identity conscious restoration of one's self-
mastery, the solution.
In being governed to maximise their personal consuming possibilities, the credit user
grapples with uncertainty in the management of their FICO identity. Unlike the
actuarial operationalisation of risk, there are no formulas to follow to ensure a
calculated outcome within the future. As we saw above, mere calculation alone can
in fact imply a destructiveness of identity and the degradation of consumer choice.
However, such uncertainty does not represent an abandonment of government but
rather a particular form for its realisation. Guided by expertise in the continuous
exercise of foresight, prudence through the calculable exercise of self-discipline and
moral responsibilisation for their credit use, the individual is empowered to adapt
themselves to the changing environment of consumer goods and the ever-shifting
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play of needs and desires to fulfil the obligation of continuously choosing to
consume. Thus rather than encouraging endless, hedonistic consumption, consumers
are nurtured to be moral in their credit use and consumption more generally in a
fashion which encourages sustainability of choice. In other words, for consumers,
the 'right way to live' within a consumer society is to be able to maximise
consumption over the course oftime - requiring strict limits on the credit use ofthe
present.
Identity and the Self
In discussing what he terms the contemporary 'reflexivity' of modernity, Giddens
(1991) and Beck (1992) argue that social acti vi ty, freed from the binding constraints
of tradition, is permanently engaged in the exercise of self-questioning as to its
nature and purpose, a context within which the idea of a distinctive individualised
identity emerges. Rather than one's existence in the world being fixed, preordained
by caste, lineage or faith, an individual's sense of identity in late modernity is a fluid
construct, sustained and recreated dynamically through the individual's continuous
reflexive action upon it. In this sense, identity is self-referential and reflexive, for
with the decline of established sources of meaning, it becomes the product of the
individual's observation and analysis of themselves and their accumulated diverse
actions. Identity assumes a coherent trajectory spanning a past mined for meaning
yet simultaneously to be escaped and a future of possibility and promise to be
attained within the world. It becomes the particular responsibility of the individual
whose constant endeavours constitute it as a coherent and convincing narrative from
which, in tum, the individual draws meaning in an individualised world.
As discussed in Chapter 2, such a reflexive project of the self, rather than being
merely an effect brought about by late modernity, can be viewed as the means by
which the contemporary individual is governed under neo-liberalism. With
individual autonomy being located as the conduit of government, the concept of
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enterprise, as a mode of activity, comes to pervade the way in which the individual
is governed to govern themselves. Through his or her own endeavour, ability, drive
and ability, the individual is to make an enterprise of their own life, to create a
fulfilling independent identity for themselves through the free expression of their
consumption choices and the choosing of marketed guidance provided through the
psy-sciences and their affiliates (Rose, 1996a; see also O'Malley, 2004). Identity is a
willed project of the self, etched out through the expression of choice yet those
choices taken exist as a product, the inevitable expression of an inner authentic self.
The conception of enterprise undermines old binary divides between production and
consumption for consumption is now longer the destructive hedonism described by
Bell, undermining the acetic puritan ethic which culturally underpins the capitalist
accumulation process. On the contrary, the contemporary individual is directed with
the responsibility of producing a worthwhile life for themselves, not simply through
what they consume now but through their whole array of consuming choices within
and throughout their life. To sustain this obligation, the individual must regulate
their own freedom, sustaining and widening their consuming possibilities through a
refined, all-embracing self-control.
In Weber's ([1930] 1976) analysis, he portrayed ascetic Puritanism as the key
cultural impetus behind the rise of the capitalistic accumulation where asceticism
and deferred gratification impel a maximised accumulation of capital and realisation
of profit. Elias (1994) by contrast, countered that rationality should not be
understood as the progressive displacement of ideal types but rather as a measure of
the degree to which short-term affects are subsumed by longer-term considerations
as a consequence of long term changes in the structure of society towards greater
interdependency. He argued that while, for instance, court rationality and bourgeois
rationality had differing social dynamics, the former valuing prestige and honour,
the latter money and capital, both were united by individuals' transcendence of
emotions, desires and momentary inclinations of the present in favour of a foresight
towards greater future goals reflective of their situational interdependency (1994:
484). From this perspective, credit use and its active self-government represents a
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'rational' form of action where long term considerations of maximising ongoing
future credit consumption outweigh short term urges to exploit one's present credit
opportunities in the entrepreneurial fulfilment of the self. However, such
entrepreneurialism is not merely an unintended consequence of a blind process of
social change but, as we have seen, is actively grafted within the individual as a
desirable way ofliving one's life. Nevertheless, it effectively makes the
contemporary credit user no less foresighted, calculating, dispassionate and self-
disciplined - 'rational' - than their forebears.
In line with Giddens's argument, a FICO identity is made salient for the individual
as a unifying thread accumulating their past and current actions into a cohesive sense
of self; an identity which has a dynamism and a sense of movement, and for which
the individual is responsibilised for. In certain ways, the individual is encouraged to
view such it as intrinsic to themselves, as something which can be acted upon to
unlock their 'true credit potential', an authentic subjective state which must be given
expression to. However, a FICO identity is more complex for it also exists externally
to the individual, captured within the records of the credit bureau, the formulation of
the scoring technology and the dynamic shifts within the population of consumers. It
also exists not merely as the outcome of choice but in tum, as a determiner of
choice; created through the self-narrativising credit choices of the consumer
interpreted through a shifting technological infrastructure, such an identity serves to
define the boundaries and limitations of future consumption possibilities.
A FICO identity thus embodies a measurement of the entrepreneurial abilities of the
credit user; universal in ambition, it embraces all consumers in their instrumental
management of credit. As an identity, it is individualised and unique to each credit
user, not sought for its own intrinsic fulfilment, for recognition from the self or from
others but rather for the possibility that it can be acted upon through action on one's
credit use towards the broader purpose of optimising one's ongoing future ability to
consume, whatever form that consumption that might take.
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Alignment to a credit identity creates the possibility for the consumer of defining
who they are through the operation of a disciplined regime of the self. It gives
expression to freedom by empowering them to choose to consume in such a way so
as to maximise future freedom to consume. However, paradoxically, they cannot
escape their dependency on that identity as it becomes essential to the maintenance
of freedom. Consumption and the formation oflifestyle are ongoing projects that
span the individual's life and so such a freedom must be continuously worked on
and safeguarded. One is increasingly conditioned toward the pursuit of a whole
panoply of actions - to repay on time, 'to get current and stay current', to keep credit
card balances low - embodying resistance to the lures of consumer desire and
restraint on the urge to self-indulgent credit use.
It is an inherent paradox of neo-liberal government that as the individual becomes
governed through their autonomy and freedom to exercise choice they become, as
Rose (1999a) remarks, 'obliged to be free', to evaluate themselves via norms, values
and choices contrived within the market and proffered within the domain of
therapeutics. For the contemporary American credit consumer, this encompasses an
obligation to deploy a calculated self-constraint over their consuming choices for in
pursing an imperative of sustaining or expanding a freedom to choose through
credit, the individual is enjoined to an ever greater exercise of unfreedom over how
they choose. The individual's FICO identity reflects the ongoing process of their
credit consumption and thus the engagement of their lives as an enterprise of the self
to maximise their capacity for self-realisation. In conditioning future choice, the
possibility of more, this identity comes to represent the entrepreneurial abilities of
the individual to themselves. It is a consumer capital that is possessed and self-
consciously invested in new credit through which it can be maintained, augmented
or diminished by an informed self-mastery in the interest of future, ongoing credit
use.
291
Self-mastery and the Significance of Time
In articulating the significance of payment history, amounts owed, length of credit
history, new credit applied for and the mix of credit as being relevant to the
construction of a FICO identity, such acts are infused with the conception of
individual self-mastery in relation to time. Time exists as a structuring agent against
which the individual's acts in their inescapable past have taken place and from
which the individual's ability to exhibit control over themselves in how they manage
credit use can be assessed. Inpayment history, has the individual repaid their
instalment loans or met the minimum balance on their credit cards as agreed every
month? Ifnot, how late were the repayments and how long ago in time were they.
Did this self-management in time disintegrate to the extent that accounts were
forwarded for collection or result in court proceedings? Or perhaps the ultimate
dissolution in one's responsibility to repay across the full gamut of credit accounts
manifested itself in the declaration of bankruptcy? If so, how long ago? As credit
agreements themselves exist as the exchange of funds over time, the measurement of
balances owed demonstrates the extent to which the individual can discipline their
use of credit over time. The absolute length of credit history is also critical in the
evaluation of risk for the longer one's demonstrable use of credit, the more
established one is as a credit consumer; in essence, credit history indicates a greater
or lesser history of self-regulation. New credit explicitly looks at the present and the
degree to which one is, in the here and now, responsibly acquiring or encumbering
oneself with credit obligations. The degree to which one's current accumulated
range of credit agreements is 'healthy' is similarly assessed in the present.
Norbert Elias (1998) presented the historical refinement of the measurement of time,
its gradual standardisation and quantified operation as an endemic characteristic of
the intensifying division of social functions and extending web of interdependencies
within and between emergent nation-states, particularly with industrialisation (see
also Thompson, 1967). Concomitantly, the greater time consciousness of individuals
in mo<!_emsocieties and their feeling and experience of time as an external
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compelling force which must be accounted within their actions reflects the tangible
reality of their dependency within a web of interdependency and the need for a
standardised means of coordinating its complexity. Therefore, the experience of a
multi-layered compulsion of time by the self-governing credit user demonstrates the
degree to which they are dependent upon a greater range of multiple organisations,
lenders, retailers, bureaus in their increasingly credit-realised consumption.
Although, as we noted above, contemporary self-governance exists not as an
accident of history but as a contrived aim of government, the responsibilisation of
the individual within the expansive market for consumer credit for their identity
encumbers them with the task of managing their actions against a tightly-woven, all-
encompassing, unyielding flow of time essential to the modem consumer credit
market.
Time is also significant in that FICO identities are designed to be dynamic. As a
marker of a consumer's self-mastery, their ability to sustain a freedom to choose, it
responds coherently to the actions of consumer choice. As they attempt to construct
a lifestyle based around consumption and as credit becomes integral to their ability
to consume, their FICO identity is presented as being dynamic. During the course of
the consumer's engagement with credit, the surveillant assemblage interlocking
consumers, lenders, bureaus, courts and other actors updates their FICO identity to
account for such instances as new credit sought or a missed credit card payment.
This dynamism is reflected, even when the consumer does not actually consume for,
as we saw, the model incorporates the passing of time, updating the duration of an
individual's credit history or the time elapsed since a repayment delinquency. In
choosing not to consume, the consumer still chooses.
The flow of time conditioning a FICO identity, reflecting ongoing consumption,
avoids locking consumers into a static characterisation. Past transgressions of
consumption self-mastery - late-payments, defaults, even bankruptcies - fade in
statistical predictive significance as they grow distant over time and so weigh less on
risk attribution. In contrast, recent strict self-management is rewarded more
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prominently. Therefore, although such a risk identity in the present is forever locked
into and shaped by the individual's actions of the past from which it is constructed
and through which consumer freedom is conditioned, the past declines in
prominence as it fades towards the horizon. Through every action, the consumer
experiences the possibility of renewing their credit identity and thus transforming
their future through actively taking responsibility for their own autonomy. As Fair'
Isaac declare:
Fallacy: A poor score will haunt me forever.
Fact: Just the opposite is true. A score is a 'snapshot' of your risk at a
particular point in time. It changes as new information is added to your bank
and credit bureau files. Scores change gradually as you change the way you
handle credit. For example, past credit problems impact your score less as
time passes. Lenders request a current score when you submit a credit
application, so they have the most recent information available. Therefore by
taking the time to improve your score, you can qualify for more favorable
interest rates.47
Loss of the Future
In being governed to adhere to a FICO identity within contemporary consumerism,
past, present and future have no form as discrete states for the consumer. The past
always exists in the present, conditioning the permanent ongoing exercise of a
choice forever cognisant of the future as a territory of choices to be made. The neo-
liberal preoccupation with the embedding of choice mediated through nurtured
markets creates a merry-go-round, with commodities and experiences as leaping,
twirling horses forever conjoined to a spinning but stationary axle of choice. Time
exists simply as the regenerated exercise of options, the present resembling the past
and the future, the present, differing only in terms of scale and degree of the choice
experi_enced.
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Under the we1farist political rationality which located the site of government in
society, a optimistic transcendent vision of the future was enjoyed, a future within
which mechanisms of security such as redistributive spending and social insurance
would help alleviate poverty and inequality, ameliorating the conditions of society.
Keynesianism denoted the possibility of national economic intervention and
management in the collective interest to ensure a softened business cycle, controlled
employment and continual, predictable incremental growth. More generally, a belief
in progress and faith in science imbued technological progress with an
unproblematic utopianism, beckoning towards the certainty of higher productivity
and enhanced living standards. Within such societies as Francois Ewald (2002)
presents it, risk was to be deployed and tamed through the mechanism of solidarity
realised through 'social contract' and a generalised strategy of 'prevention'.
Today however all have become, or are in the process of becoming, discredited.
Nco-liberal strategies have dismantled social mechanisms and the possibility of
governing through the social. In questioning the sustainability of human progress,
environmentalism, the new domain of a jaded political left, creates a dystopian
vision of a future to be avoided through the doctrine of the precautionary principle.
As the idea of the social as a unified space becomes rejected and the site of rule
becomes reoriented towards the government of autonomous individuals, their
choices and their ability to imaginatively create their own self-referential narrative of
the self, there is in Margaret Thatcher's famous aphorism, no alternative. The state,
in conjuring markets through deregulation and the transformation ofwelfarism,
increases the scope of choice for the individual so that the proliferation of choice
(and 'contestability') becomes the sole end of government. Paradoxically then,
choice is both fluid and static: although that which is to be chosen is fluid and
changing, the practice of choice itself is an exercise in the monotonous repetition of
choosing, a monotony which expands and deepens within programmatic neo-
liberalism. We have, as Giddens remarks, no choice but to choose (1991: 81).
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Thus, the ever greater availability of consumer credit permits a freedom for the
suitably equipped autonomous individual to dynamically create their lives through
what they choose to consume. However, this freedom entails a perpetual exercise of
choice, a variable capacity with which the individual is responsibilised to uphold and
protect to ensure its continuance. The vitality of the individual exhibited through the
continual inventiveness of consumption is bound to a flattened experience of time, a
reduction to the present which has become ongoing and inescapable (Beck, 1992:
135).
Credit Identity as Risk
A FICO identity is thus conceived as a formation which determines access to credit
not just in the present but also the future, prejudicing the degree and extent of the
whole domain of ongoing consumer choice. In doing so, as the individual credit user
comes to acknowledge this identity, it reveals a clearer relationship of that individual
to their future. As we will examine later, such an identity is actionable in the present
- through enlightenment as to its existence, significance and operation, the consumer
is empowered to reflexively consider their own credit use actions in light of an
identity formation which interprets those actions. In doing so, the possibility of
ongoing future choice is brought into greater resolution in the present.
A FICO identity also acts to secure the point of entry to credit consumption. For
such an identity to exist, an individual must have a credit record, an objectivised
credit identity, which is contingent on the individual having used credit in the past.
In addition, the creation of a score is dependent on minimum criteria, that a credit
account exists on record which is at least six months old and that the consumer
demonstrates actual use of at least one credit agreement within the same time
. d 48 •
peno. Although nsk scores are not absolute and are individually interpreted by
different lenders, the pervasiveness among lenders of FICO use demonstrates that
the lack of such an identity on the part of the consumer signifies a state of exclusion.
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Where contemporary freedom becomes articulated through the medium of
consumption, and credit increasingly becomes a conduit of consumption, the
absence of a FICO identity signifies, as we have seen, one's membership among the
excluded, the marginal, the 'fringe'. Unable to access mainstream forms of credit,
one is unable to consume in the proper sense; unable to given proper vent to a
continuous succession of inner wants, one is denied significant participation in the
contemporary experience of freedom.
As we analysed in the previous chapter, older notions of creditworthiness were
inexorably bound to an absolutist idea of character which intimated a broader sense
of moral meaning and understanding about the individual located within their social
context. In a certain sense, a FICO score has taken on an aspect of providing for an
understanding of the individual within a multitude of contexts beyond credit use
alone. One's credit identity and score thus broaden in scope and their understanding
diffuses within society as multiple fields of social engagement become articulated as
consumer / provider contractual marketised relationships, replacing trust or other
modes of calculation with a harmonised measurable index of consumer capital.
Within neo-liberalism, as the inculcation of choice becomes paramount in practices
of government, it becomes crucial to contrive an environment wherein the ability to
'choose between' becomes essential. League tables, for example, allow schools to be
hierarchised and compared in terms of the quality of the educational product they
offer, permitting parents as consumers of education for their children to select
between different options (Burchell, 1993). However, such government does not
emanate only from the state: 'Which', formerly the Consumers Association, recently
announced plans to produce a league rating of British government services - as one
commentator sardonically remarked, a far cry from its first magazine report in 1957
which included 'an assessment of cake mixes' .49 Similarly, credit risk becomes a
standardised index of the consumer, signifying their level of self-discipline. Thus, to
avoid tenants who may not pay the rent promptly, landlords access and assess each
potential tenant's FICO score. Employers can access the scores of job candidates
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before hiring them to positions of responsibility. Courts can incorporate the score of
a father to help determine likelihood of adherence to child support payments.
However, it is in the creation of the insurance bureau score that this diffusion has
achieved its most developed form. The 'insurance bureau' score was developed by
Fair Isaac in the early 1990s as a product for insurers to assess the calculated
probability ofloss on a premium offered over a specific time-frame. This differs
from the FICO score in that it measures not the default risk of an applicant for credit
but the future loss ratio relativity of an applicant for insurance; however, it is
calculated in a similar manner based on exactly same data: that comprising an
individual's credit identity.
In the past, the inculcation of discipline through the monotonous rhythms of the
factory, the work ethic, the physical arrangement of public space and architecture,
the moralisation and sanitisation of the family home were crucial for the
entrenchment of a self-discipline essential to liberal government which sought to
subject the worker to the rigours of the 'free' labour market (Bauman, 1998a; Rose,
1999b). Within contemporary society, a credit identity thus rearticulates a certain
sense of a polyvalent morality - it exerts a claim not just to an individual's ability to
manage credit but to their ability to manage the self, to be responsible, to exercise a
calculable self-mastery over their actions through time as they attempt to assemble a
lifestyle. In attempting to justify why a credit record is relevant to insurance cover,
Fair Isaac argue that:
when a person utilizes one's resources well to maintain a home or a car in
safe operating conditions, he or she is probably maintaining his or her
finance and credit. For instance, when the car battery, headlights, motor oil
level etc. are maintained regularly, there is less chance for an accident. Good
credit managers are usually good risk managers [my emphasisj.i"
The last sentence in particular reveals a clear connection between the conceptions of
the se~f-mastered credit user and the prudential subject as characterised by
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O'Malley. The prudential subject is both moral and calculating; appalled at the
possibility of becoming a burden or having their freedom curtailed, they take
measures to guard against risks to their wellbeing through choosing to be informed
and disciplined, through voluntary interaction with like-minded others and the
purchasing of commodities and services to offset the possibility or consequences of
such events. Against this, those who take no such defensive measures are made
responsible for their situation (O'Malley, 2004: 72-3). Likewise, the conscientious
credit consumer user is made responsible. They maintain a strict self-control over
the repayment of their credit obligations in order to sustain their ability to be a
consumer or actively seek to familiarise themselves with, and to reflexively manage,
their credit identity to enhance their future access to credit and the attendant
consuming possibilities. Foreswearance of such a rigour 0f the self inevi tab Iy
shrinks the future domain of choice. The insurance bureau score provides an
interesting linkage between credit identity and private insurance, this latter being one
of the main conduits for personal prudential protection. To minimise costs,
contemporary insurance requires not only the continual renewal of a premium but
the continuous maintenance of responsible behaviour of those insured, a
responsibility indicated through the diffusion of credit identity as a proxy for
generalised self-mastery.
Under neo-liberalism, as the focus of government increasingly centres on the
autonomy of the individual, the prudential management of risk becomes a feature of
the choices made by individuals and their families as 'active citizens' and
consumers. Within a context where freedom is conceived as autonomy of the self,
any state which compels dependence or inhibits the free exercise of choice in the
continual creation of the self through consumption is to be studiously avoided. Risk
management in a diversity of spheres, from cholesterol counting to avoid heart
attacks to mortgage insurance which pays one's bills in the event of unemployment,
experienced as lifestyle or market choices, thus become critical choices to make in
the interests of sustaining an ongoing future ability to choose freely. The neo-liberal
prud fIb·· .en ia su ject IS thus rational and knowledgeable; exercising the fundamental
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faculty of choice within a governmentally conceived context of choices, they
calculate the contingencies, avoid risky behaviour and institute the most effective
means to protect against the paralysing effects of risks. So too is the credit user to be
prudential. Conditioned to be acquainted with their credit identity and its specific
manifestation as a FICO risk, they become calculating and knowledgeable as to the
consequences of their credit use in the past and the possibilities for action in the
present for their ongoing sustenance of choice within an unfurling future to come,
not only in credit but a range of other arenas, from employment to insurance. The
risks they face are not only their own actions in the management of credit but, as we
will see, the perils of identity theft and the possibility of misrepresentation and error
within the credit reporting process itself.
FICO Identity and the Rise of Security Commodities
If the prudential subject depends on a 'governmentally contrived arrangement of
choice', how is such an arrangement formed for the reflexive credit user? What is
the economy of the choices that they are faced with? In what ways has the
contemporary credit user become able to align themselves with an objectivised
identity with which they are able to calibrate and constrain their actions? How have
the market choices that have emerged, developed in form and content? As we saw in
the first section, the credit reporting industry exhibited a strong defensiveness
around the issue of score disclosure to consumers, arguing that its use in consumer
self-management was unfeasible given its abstract construction and that such usage
would likely deplete its predictive capacity for lenders. Such a defensiveness is
indicative of the market to which the credit reporting industry was targeting - their
client-base were lenders and other credit providers seeking to manage populations of
credit users actuarially through the use of risk. Consumers were the raw material
bein - d dg measure an ordered but were certainly not consumers of scores themselves.
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Where shareholder profitability was tied to providing services to lenders, any
interference with consumers as units to be tested and rendered calculable on behalf
oflenders posed a threatening development.
However, with the agitation for score disclosure and the threat of state regulation,
the credit reporting industry became oriented to the possibility of disclosing scores
to consumers for their incorporation as part of a regime of credit self-management.
In doing so, however, it approached it as a profitable business venture. Ever since
the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1972 which compelled consumer disclosure of
credit files for a 'reasonable fee', the self-governing practices of consumers have
existed as a revenue stream for the industry. However, it was only in terms of risk
scores that it was actively sought, for the first time, to render such practices as an
explicit market opportunity:
In 2001, working with Equifax, we [Fair Isaac] began selling consumers their
FICO scores directly, via our myFICOSm Web site at www.myfico.com. Now
the same scores lenders use as a ubiquitous, affordable measure of credit risk
provide credit empowerment to individuals. With the myFICO service, we
have turned score disclosure into a revenue source, extremely positive public
response and an expansion of the Fair, Isaac brand. And we've already
given close to 1 million people the understanding they need to improve their
credit options [my emphasisj."
ANew Market
From an enterprise viewpoint then, the parlaying of the FICO score and credit
bureau information from an actuarial technology deployed in the objective
assessment of applicants for credit into a tool to be incorporated within subjective
self-government of one's own credit use represented a creative exploitation of a
business opportunity to realise profit. However, this transformation of purpose did
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not create but, on the contrary, depended on the emergence of credit users
reflexively concerned with their identity. Nevertheless, as O'Malley (1996) points
out, a prudential risk manager can only exercise risk management within a context of
proffered choices, thus the reflexive user must be located within the rise of
marketised consumer choices for the management of credit identity, what I term here
'security commodities'. These are essentially consumer services; translated from
technologies marketed to creditors they form commodities based around the
personalised release of the individual's specific FICO credit score for which the
individual concerned pays a fee. The individual thus comes to partake in the project
of self-mastery not just from knowledge as to how scoring works and the
significance of having a FICO identity but from a self-knowledge chosen and
consumed within the market, centred on what their actual FICO score is.
This transformation can be seen in the treatment of this new market of consumers -
rather than being merely objects of analysis they become implicated directly within
the capitalistic orientation of the firm. Equifax in its presentation of the consumer
market, calls it a 'new frontier' accessible through the opportunities provided by the
internet. Like target production levels for mass produced consumer goods, it cites
the 100,000 consumers purchasing its credit profile service each month. 52 In its 2001
Annual Report, it proudly points to a tripling of revenues and the 2.1 million sales of
its combined product suite. It also speaks of 'renewal rates' by customers and the
continuous levels of profitability inherent in its consumer direct service. 53 Despite
the stockholder-impressing context of these pronouncements, the material
significance of the consumer market can seen in the proportion of revenues gleaned
from the consumer market over time as a proportion of the total revenues of the
whole conglomerate, rising from 2.6% to 6.9% between 2001 and 2003.54
Meanwhile, Fair Isaac views an enormous market opportunity in the nearly three
quarters of Americans who have credit records and where 'even modest penetration
with low-cost services could yield significant results' .55 For its part, it cites an 8
million dollar increase in revenues between 2001 and 2002 and an 11.2 million
increase in the following period."
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New Opportunities, New Alliances
Such pronouncements - as described above - of exploiting new markets and
postings of unit sales and revenues indicate the novel imbricating of consumer self-
management within the strategic competitive ambitions of the firms concerned. The
conditioning of consumer self-management also creates novel relations within the
consumer credit industry as a whole. Whereas before, Fair Isaac and the national
credit bureaus were market partners, now, within their separate endeavours to
provide consumer security commodities, they are interdependent market rivals as the
former depends on the latter for information and the latter depend on the former for
the technology to formulate the actual scores.S7 However, lenders too become
enmeshed. In expanding the market reach of consumer security commodities, Fair
Isaac in particular attempt to create 'value-added partnerships' with other firms
within the credit industry - using creditors as intermediaries for its services.
Potential partners are tempted to promote its services not only by way of a
commission on the revenue generated but also the potential of encouraging new
applicants and the strengthening of relationships with their existing customer base.58
Helping consumers to feel more empowered about their credit identity is thus
intimately connected with their future use of credit products. 59 Citing its own survey
research, it suggests that 60% of the consumers purchasing their risk scores did so in
advance of a significant credit purchase such as home mortgage, mortgage
refinancing or a car loan and posits that '[l]enders who offer a link to online score
infonnation get a natural link back to their own products' .60 A similar number of
consumers are also claimed to be significantly concerned with improving their credit
scores - becoming a conduit for such security commodities for their customer base
is also a means of improving the risk profile of their credit portfolio. The FICO score
becomes not only a direct means for lenders to quantify and manage the risk it
encounters but also, indirectly, a means for consumers to manage and improve their
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own risk for the specific benefit of the lender. In essence, the scope of pressure on
the consumer towards self-management widens.
However, it is not only creditors who provide an avenue for expanding the market
reach of credit security commodities. Equifax, for example, sells such wares to
employers to be offered as a work benefit to its employees, revealing a new
dimension to how prudentialism is conceived: 'just as health insurance helps to
ensure an individual's medical well-being, products such as Score Power and
Equifax Credit Watch can help to promote financial well-being' .61 Traditionally
within the United States, health insurance and other such benefits - as we have seen,
market supplied choices for personalised protection against risk - have been offered
as part of a remunerative package to employees, particularly given the absence of an
extensive social insurance system. In offering such a benefit, an equation is made
between the prudential management of risk through insurance security commodities
and the prudential management of one's credit or FICO identity through financial
security commodities. They exist as different dimensions of the same process of
self-government to be experienced and acted upon. However, it is not only insurance
but the explicit reference to health which is pertinent for the contemporary
conceptualisation of health, not as a normal state of being but rather a project of the
self to be worked at and sustained through the negotiation of 'risks', exists as a
significant metaphor for the prudential maintenance of a credit identity.
Segmenting the Market, Expanding the Product Range
As products aimed at a consumer market, security commodities invoking a means
for consumers to manage their specific FICO identities have transformed the idea of
credit risk technology from that of a lender-focussed technique for assessing a
conceptualisation of risk to a consumer brand incorporable within an individual's arc
of consumption for the creation and maintenance of credit potential.
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As examined in Chapter 2, consumption of recent decades can be distinguished from
earlier forms by how the production of goods become linked to para-psychological
techniques to segment the population into markets of 'taste' and lifestyle. Goods,
through design and advertising, are tailored to segmented markets, to be used by
individuals for fulfilment within a broader scheme of individualised projects of the
self. The use of those traditional instruments of marketing - focus groups and
attitudinal surveys - indicate a new consumer sensibility on the part of the credit
reporting industry, particularly Fair Isaac. Through its focus group exercises, Fair
Isaac exposes the ignorance of consumers to the formulation and significance of
scoring and credit identity, a problem to which its security commodities are the
solution.f In one mass survey, the following market segments were identified
among its consumers: 'shoppers', those planning a major purchase with credit;
'credit health conscious', those with a concern for understanding or upholding their
credit identity; 'beginners and re-builders', those attempting to establish a credit
record or resolving to improve a history of credit problems.f Through such
segmentation of the market and by establishing such details that 60% want to
improve their score or that 80% have acted to improve their score'", the possibility
emerges of it being able to refine its products to meet indicative consumer needs or,
as we saw above, create new co-marketing efforts with creditors and others to extend
sales and revenues. Also, the anxieties, the desires, the failures of consumers, or
specific segments of consumers, can be appealed to through its advertising and the
feelings and possibilities, generated by its brand, tailored for maximum emotional
and profitable impact.
In the most mundane ways too, beyond these scientistic endeavours, security
commodities take on the quintessential characteristics of consumer goods. For
instance in December 2002, Fair Isaac began to offer digital gift certificates for its
product range, just in time for Christmas, 'with the option of printing a paper gift
certificate in their choice of themes to present to the recipient directly' .65 In 2001,
Equifax's 'CreditWatch' product was voted one of the year's twenty-five best new
products by Business Week magazine alongside such estimable consumer delights as
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the Apple PowerBook G4 laptop, 'Harmony' low-fat breakfast cereal and the
SkyRoll executive duffel bag.66 Finally, just like any other consumer-focussed
business, Fair Isaac even offers a summer sale on selected lines (see figure 4.3).
Cultivate Your Credit Health
Save 15% on FlCO®Deluxe and
Suze Orman's FICO®Kit Platinum
Now through May 20
Figure 4.3 FICO Sale. Source: automated electronic mail from Fair Isaac to Author.
As these companies begin to engage in the consumer market for the pursuit of profit,
the specific commodities they offer facilitating self-knowledge and self-action
become more developed and specialised, thus promising in tum, more developed
more specialised possibilities for self-knowledge and self-action for the consumer.
Interms of scope, commodities are marketed offering scores based on files held not
just by the Equifax credit bureau but, later, TransUnion67 and then an integrated
three-bureau report from Equifax, TransUnion and Expcrien.i" Additional features
are added to existing products to that, for example, consumers can view loan rates
offered for their FICO score range so that consumers 'will clearly understand the
value in dollars and cents of improving their credit standing over time' .69 This is
later enhanced to allow a detailed comparison of terms being offered by different
loans. A new 'score simulator' allows consumers to view their FICO score and than
model possible changes to it from an array of future actions:
By changing one factor at a time such as paying bills in a more timely
fashion or opening a new credit card account, individuals can create any
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number of 'what if scenarios to help them decide what specific changes to
make to their credit practices."
New specialised products also come to be marketed over time, offering specific
types self-knowledge for different purposes. The 'FICO Saver for Homebuyers',
announced in June 2003, allows the consumer to self-assess their mortgage
borrowing credentials and search out neighbourhood demographic and other
information on the property they might intend to purchase.i' In June 2004, a new
suite of products was launched by Fair Isaac offering the consumer protection
against the effects of identity theft through the ongoing self-monitoring of their
FICO score.72
The self-knowledge of a FICO risk score, its significance and strategies of self-
action also becomes mediated in different contexts, not simply offered to consumers
as a service but as a service to mortgage brokers, employers and landlords who, in
using FICO scores to judge applicants, perhaps need a means of contextualising their
decisions to those individuals.P In this case, mediated self-knowledge is marketed as
a means for these businesses to enhance business relationships with their clients.
Thus, the conduits for the government of self-government increase, arising not just
from the company providing the service but through an ever-expanding array of
other organisations steering the consumer towards credit identity self-management.
Building a Brand and 'Barking like a Big Dog'
The first attempt by Fair Isaac to advertise its 'myFICO' service, its collected range
of online security commodities, in a television campaign took place during the
American Superbowl in 2003. Within American sport and culture, the Superbowl is
a prime event, something akin to the English FA Cup final. Attracting one of the
biggest television audiences each year, somewhere around eighty-five million
viewers not to mention the most expensive advertising fees at around two million
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dollars for a thirty second slot, it is a showcase event for the advertising industry
which uses it to exhibit their creative and innovative talents for new campaigns or to
introduce new products to the market. As one advertising executive put it:
Super Bowl ads are about building brands, incenting a sales force,
encouraging distribution and making a public splash. The Super Bowl is an
example of the theory that if you are running with the big dogs you need to
bark like a big dog! 74
Fair Isaac's decision to advertise at Superbowl can be seen as part of a conscious
effort to build a brand identity for a new good across a national market.
Naomi Klein (2000) argues that branding dates back almost to the beginning of mass
consumption in the nineteenth century when the homogeneity and anonymity
imposed by competitive industrial production and the tearing down of older,
established social relations and communities implied by a nascent capitalism,
required a new means for consumers to differentiate, but also to be comfortable
with, generic products like coffee or oatmeal. In the twentieth-century, not only
products but corporations themselves acquired a brand identity, a financially
quantifiable capital embodying the 'spirit' of the company and locatable as a point
of meaning within people's lives and the broader culture. By the tum of the century,
Klein argues that a vanguard of companies such as Nike and Microsoft became
concerned not so much with selling products per se, as a packaged set of values and
meanings instantiated within products; an experience, to be incorporated within the
individual's understanding of themselves and others and their self-construction of a
lifestyle to be lived. Klein, although critical of the proliferation of what she terms
'branded space' in contemporary societies, exhibits ironically the same hyperbole of
any brand consultant in describing the supposed 'weightlessness' of brand-oriented
companies liberated from the physical constraints of production, and engaged with
by consumers 'less as the disseminators of goods or services than as collective
hallucinations' (2000: 22).
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Titled 'See How Lenders See You', aptly encapsulating the new self-surveilling role
of the consumer, the myFICO advert itself plays heavily on the idea of middle class
affluence at ease with itself. Images flash by of wide, well-kept suburban streets
flanked by trees in full summer bloom, large New England style homes with white
picket fences and smiling, prosperous-looking nuclear families of varied race
ensconced in lawns and verandas (with or without the family dog) smiling towards
the camera. The family also provides the context for the conditioning of a sense of
security, a fish-eye lens capturing a young teenager mowing a well-kept lawn or an
infant toddling from the enveloping arms of a father to a mother. Those classic
essentials of credit-based consumption are also demonstrated: a female real estate
agent, perhaps suggesting the interior decor possibilities, gestures around the
features of a sun drenched room to a smiling couple, prospective buyers casually
dressed and lovingly arm-in-arm; a prosperous looking couple delightedly approach
a beaming clean-cut young car salesman who hands the husband the keys to a brand
new sports utility vehicle sitting ready to go in the background before motioning to
shake hands with his wife. In the voiceover accompanying the images, a soothing
persuasive male voice intones 'your home, your family, your life' before cautioning
the viewer that '[w]hen making major purchases, there's a lot you have to think
about. And eventually you're going to have to think about how lenders see you ... '.
After showing us, the viewer, where to get 'the credit score lenders use to make their
decisions' as well as other helpful tools, he enjoins us to '[g]ain control of your
financial world'.
Through the images and voiceover, the advert turns on the role of the prudential
subject as one must think strategically about how to ensure access to credit for the
needs of consumption in the future. Such an individual, in protecting against risks,
does so not merely on their own behalf but on behalf of their families, for he or she
does not exist as an atomised entity but as a being located within the emotional,
intimate structure of the family, itselflocated within the voluntary, organic
structl,lres of association and community. The emphasis on family thus reveals a
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duality of prudential concerns, the family as a household whose future lifestyle
needs must be fulfilled and the future lifestyles of those adults-to-be, the children.
Within the ad, children are revealed as a specific metaphor for security - just as the
adult protects the child from stumbling in teaching them to walk, so too does the
myFICO service help ensure the security of the ongoing credit needs of the
individual and their household in inspiring responsible credit use.
However, what distinguishes the FICO brand above else is its fidelity to the 'real
world' as summed up by the working title of the advert - 'see how lenders see you'.
Against other web-based competitors producing generic, cloned scores, Fair Isaac
builds upon the fact that its security commodities for reflexive self-management are
based upon the score actuarially deployed by lenders within the credit decision-
making process itself. In the long run, the prudential individual will manage
themselves best and most rationally according to an identity based upon the means
whereby they are actually managed within the process of applying for credit. The
myFICO brand is the one that the prudent individual can trust.
Another articulation of credit risk management as consumption can be seen in the
co-branding efforts of Fair Isaac and Suze Orman in the creation of the 'Platinum
Kit' .75 Suze Orman effectively represents what Klein (2000) would term a new
breed of 'branded human', articulating a quasi-therapeutic self-help product through
numerous media conduits including a range of self-help advice books, television
slots and programmes, syndicated articles on websites and in newspapers, lectures
and a role as finance editor for 0: The Oprah Magazine. Fair Isaac present their joint
venture with her as a winning partnership, linking her 'dynamic personality' and
'positive, can-do financial messages' with their goals of 'empowering consumers'.
Indeed, as Rose (1999a; 1999b) argues, both therapeutics and consumption provide
the primary means for the realising of self-government in contemporary society.
Where, as we have seen, consumption becomes a means for the incorporation of
meaning-imbued commodities in the creation of an autonomous lifestyle, therapy in
its widest sense, represents a way of understanding and acting on the self through
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norms and vocabulary translated from the 'psy-sciences': psychology, psycho-
therapy and so on, in the restoration and enhancement of a fulfilling life. Within the
Platinum Kit, as we will explore shortly, technical means for acting on one's credit
repayments to enhance one's FICO identity are combined with so-called 'action
plans' where a software-generated version of 'Suze' provides customised, practical
advice for getting out of credit card debt or buying a home or a car.
Fulfilling Consumption
The use of security commodities, provided under the myFICO rubric, exist as
services for governing the self and one's faculty of choice in the use of consumer
credit. In the words of Valverde (1996), they enjoin a despotism of the self: in
choosing to purchase such services, one chooses not to be free in one's credit use, to
submit to acting in specific ways not prescribed but suggested through the
commodity in order to preserve one's freedom to choose. The individual willingly
submits to, in fact, happily follows such a regimen for according to Fair Isaac
'consumers want to understand rules of the game' .76 But it is not merely knowing
the rules which is important but reaping the benefits of rendering oneself docile to
them for the creation of an autonomous, fulfilling lifestyle implies not only a range
of choices now, in the present, but the whole breadth and scope of choices realisable
across a lifetime. Security commodities are imbued with an image, a brand, an
emotion; consumers are segmented through marketing techniques; lenders and
others are engaged with 'synergy' and co-branding marketing deals. These create
and propel credit self-management, the fortification of choice and the upholding of
individual autonomy, realisable through these commodity forms, as necessary or
desirous for the prudent subject.
However, such security commodities do not imply simply a securitisation of identity
and thus the freedom to choose as a defensive reaction. As O'Malley (2004) argues,
techniques of the prudential risk manager themselves can exist as an avenue for self-
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expression by the individual within the construction of their lifestyle. Eating organic
food, for example, may not simply be a reaction to the health risks threatened by
pesticides in foods but can become part of the individual's quest to establish
meaning for themselves as moral consumers seeking distinction and finding
significance in the consumption of holistic, natural, small-scale, locally produced
consumables. For the credit user, using identity security products signifies not only a
maintenance or expansion of one's choice, in credit and beyond, but as a form of
consumption imbued with its own importance. It is not simply that the consumer is
protected or their generalised consumption ability enhanced but that they should feel
benefit, a sense of fulfilment through the products.
A certain therapeutic ethos is inlaid here which, following Giddens (1991), appeals
to a biographical orientation of the individual where one's actions can only be
understood within a single living narrative of the self and its past and where the
possibility of individual fulfilment resides in giving expression to an inner
authenticity. Therefore, in Equifax's tagline, consumers are 'enabled, enlightened
and empowered,77 through the use of its products, attaining a greater sense of
knowledge and awareness about themselves as individuals upon which to act and
improve and ultimately, in Fair Isaac's words, to 'control their credit lives,78 and
'realise their true credit potential'?". In coming to reflexively act upon an array of
credit obligations in light of a FICO identity using marketed security commodities,
individuals are seen to act not only to defend or develop their credit identity within
the demands of a freedom which requires of them the discipline to continually
reproduce the conditions for the exercise of an autonomous choice. In addition, the
consumption of security commodities themselves directly contribute to the
formulation of a lifestyle by imparting the ideal of independence and the possibility
of self-control, promising the revelation of self-discovery and realisation of who one
IS.
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Securing the Self
But what is the purpose, the consequence of aligning individual consumers with
their FICO identities? As we have seen, individuals are led to see the significance of
different elements of their credit identity and how these become articulated through
a quantified score on a continuum of scores representing the whole field of
consumers, a scale denoting their ability to govern themselves in using credit.
Within the contemporary credit market where the quality of access to credit is
significantly determined through the use of actuarial FICO scoring, the ability to
understand the significance and composition of one's own score is critical. As
individual freedom expresses itself through the ability to choose and the ability to
sustain or enhance the autonomy of choice over time in relation to consumption, and
one's FICO score becomes a key technology setting and resetting the boundaries of
that choice, the self-governing individual takes on the project of sustaining and
optimising consumer choice through acting reflexively on their use of credit in light
of their own risk identity.
In this, they embrace what I call an 'ethic of improvement' to incrementally increase
their FICO attribution through the use of security commodities. As we have seen
elsewhere, the autonomous individual as the site of government under neo-liberalism
is exhorted to live their lives as an enterprise of the self, strategically accumulating
happiness and wellbeing, partially through giving expression to a sense of self from
the consumption of meaning-imbued commodities. If the individual is an
entrepreneur in such a way, then one's credit identity denotes one's consumer
capital, a resource to be carefully invested in through reflexive action, preserved and
nurtured to sustain its potency as a key to credit consumption.
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The Paradox of Empowerment
In presenting an understanding of the purpose of security commodities, the firms
concerned discursively relay their operations as one of 'empowering' the consumer:
'Consumers not only use our site to become better informed but to become
empowered to improve their credit standing' .80
'These services are the next big step in our continuing push to provide
consumers with the knowledge and tools they need to gain true credit
empowerment' .81
'Our Consumer Direct business continued to expand by using Equifax
information to enlighten, enable and empower consumers' .82
As Baistow (1994) discusses, empowerment has become a key term within
contemporary health and welfare services where it has been invoked as a key value
in the transformation of an older patronising monolithic service into a reformed,
liberating environment for localised participation and the realisation of personal
choice. Within this context, empowerment is the prized attribute of the autonomous
individual who has the understanding and behavioural skill-set to plot out the course
of their own lives. As she acutely notes, '[t]aking control of one's life, or particular
aspects of it, is not only seen as being intimately connected with the formation or
reformation of the self as empowered, it is increasingly becoming an ethical
obligation a/the new citizenry' [emphasis in original] (1994: 37). Under neo-
liberalism, the individual becomes acted upon as the site of government,
conditioning and creating a market-like context of choice for them to realise their
autonomy, an autonomy which has become the critical channel through which
government is now directed.
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Of course, as Baistow notes, empowerment is not something which is done to
oneself but, rather, something which is done to one - individuals are not governed
despite their autonomy but through it. In being empowered, consumers are to be
rendered more able to choose and thus to enjoy a greater sweep of freedom in the
future by getting 'the most lucrative return from their credit potential' .83 However, in
doing so, the individual becomes dependent on the expertise inherent to security
commodities to make this possible, becomes conditioned to act and to conduct their
credit use in particular ways which aligns the goals of the consumer credit industry
for minimum default and maximum profitability with the ambitions of consumers
for more, better, cheaper credit. The proliferation of security commodities promises
the consumer freedom through the enriching of their available choices to consume
but in a way which establishes ever stricter boundaries to, and an ever more finely
grained, all-encompassing regulation over how, they choose - a new level in the
self-despotism which, as we have seen earlier in our discussion of Valverde (1996),
is integral to liberalism.
'The One That's Right for You'
FICO identity security commodities are supplied as internet-based services on the
specialised website of Fair Isaac 'myFICO.com' and also the website of the credit
bureau Bquifax." Individual consumers access them online by inputting (obviously,
but somewhat ironically) a credit card number to which the cost is charged, their
social security number and also a specific identifying piece of information relevant
to some part of their credit identity which only they can know, for example, the
monthly repayment on the individual's mortgage loan. Like any consumer good
whose quality or performance varies by price, the array of security commodities are
differentiated by the scale and scope of the service they offer. These vary by:
• accessibility, the number of times or the duration, in days, of access
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• comprehensivity, the number of bureaus sources from which scores are
produced
• detail, the amount and richness of information relayed
• specialism, some products are specifically tailored for home buying or to
protect against fraud
• contextuality, information allowing the individual to take specific measures
to improve their score
• bolt-ons, additional services such as 'score simulators', current market
interest rate provision or debt reduction calculators
Differentially priced security commodities, selected via market choice thus facilitate
differential levels of security and benefit to the individual. In a very real sense then,
securing one's credit identity exists as a form of consumption in and off itself
irrespective of the credit consumption it allows the individual to countenance. It not
only undergirds the narrativising of a lifestyle but, in itself, represents an attempt at
narrative, creating meaning for the individual in terms of being enterprising. Fair
Isaac's premier product, the Platinum Kit boasts it will show you 'how to get ahead
and stay ahead,85, presumably of other consumers. The FICO Saver 'gives you the
inside information that mortgage industry professionals use,86, again, to get that
cheap mortgage that other individuals will not secure. Exclusively through the
security commodities supplied, the consumer is empowered with a new competitive
capacity, a more effective way of being enterprising.
Self-knowledge
As we examined earlier, the contemporary American consumer is conditioned
towards the exertion of self-governance whereby they regulate their actions of credit
use according to an understanding of the significance of their FICO identity in order
to nurture and develop their own ability to consume. In other words, they come to
govern themselves through a specific rearticulation of the means by which they are
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simultaneously governed by lenders. Security commodities further develop the
possibilities for self-governance through conjoining knowledge of the scoring
system, the realisation of its significance, with the self-knowledge of the individual's
own FICO credit identity at specific points in time. As an abstract, quantified
representation, the revelation of the score alone does not constitute self-knowledge
alone for self-knowledge depends on a contextualisation of the meaningfulness of
the score for their specific entrepreneurial ambitions.
Population. The individual's three digit FICO score, drawn from one or more of the
national bureaus, is located on the FICO scale running from 500, the highest risk to
850, the lowest. Overlaid on this scale is an additional measure indicating that
score's, and thus the individual's, percentile place within the population of US
consumers recorded by the credit bureaus. Within this context, the FICO score
becomes a norm to be understood relativistically, a means of understanding who one
is now, where one lies against one's peers but also a means of seeing where one
could be in the future if this self-knowledge is applied to one's credit use (see figure
4.4).
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Default: The individual's score is also mapped in terms of the average delinquency
probability represented by the range their FICO score falls within and how this
compares against the general population of consumers (see figure 4.5). What
'delinquency' means is also defined for the consumer, namely, loan default,
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bankruptcy or a 90 day late payment on at least one credit account in the following
two years.
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Figure 4.5 FICO Risk Distribution Source: Fair Isaac.88
Reason Codes. The score may also be contextualised according to the individual's
own actions through a statement of the 'reason codes'. These are a specific, limited
categorisation of factors within the model which most influenced the makeup of the
individual's score based on the analysis of the particular attributes presented. These
categories are divided into positive factors most enhancing the score, for example no
late payments or the demonstration of a relatively long history, and negative ones
most impacting, such as too many accounts open.
Financial Opportunities. One's FICO identity is also rendered meaningful in
financial terms so that one's potentialities and weaknesses as a consumer become
plugged into the possibilities of market place choice. On the 'myFICO loan savings
calculator' , selecting their desired standard loan type, amount required and
geographical location, a consumer is presented with FICO score ranges and
associated interest rates applicable for such loan along with the monthly payment
and the total interest payable over the life ofthe credit agreement. 89 A segmented
chart demonstrates what the individual, by dint of their risk virtuousness, avoided
paying and what in the future, through the application of an ethlc of improvement,
they could save.
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Specialist information. In relation to planning for a mortgage, for example, the
'myFICO Saver for Homebuyers' imparts specialist self-knowledge for the aspiring
homeowner.Y 'Andy' the automated mortgage coach, through an analysis of the
credit report and through the application of some judicious questions to the
individual, weighs up total debts outstanding, FICO score, income, value of home
sought, type of mortgage product desired and preferred down-payment to tell the
individual how much they are likely to be able to borrow for a home loan, at what
interest rate and for what house price value.
Moral standards. The consumer is didactically instructed on the ethicality of their
FICO identity, an identity indicative of their absolute moral aptitude as a consumer,
or even as an individual. For instance, within a brochure for one of their security
commodities, a notional consumer with a low ranking score is described in no
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uncertain terms as not having 'good' scores, as being an 'extreme risk' who will be
'paying through the nose' on an 'enormous interest rate' because of their fallibility
and is in need of' getting their act together' (see figure 4.6). Such a lack of self-
mastery damns them as an aberration within the project of responsibilised,
personalised entrepreneurialism and consigns them to the outer margins of choice.
Self-action
Beyond the generalised advice for action to improve one's FICO identity described
earlier such as 'pay your bills on time' and 'don't max out your credit cards',
security commodities offer possibilities of self-action predicated on self-knowledge
for the directing of an ethic of improvement. Knowledge of one's score and one's
position within the population demonstrates where one should be in a normative
sense. In this, the FICO score as a norm exhibits a duality of meaning. For lower
scored individuals, a norm implies the mass of the average-scored to which the
individual should aspire while among the higher-scored, it represents an aspiration
towards the highest bandwidth of scores attracting the lowest rates and the easiest
terms of access.
To these ends 'reason codes', in addition to situating self-knowledge in the present,
allow the individual to take immediate remedial action on the most critical elements
depressing their score while defending those factors, thus directing the continued
pursuit of particular actions, which boost and elevate that score. Credit coaching
facilities attached to some security commodities direct the user on a wide array of
actions with respect to their credit agreements. Specific action plans can be created
and tailored to payoff revolving balances or lower interest rates being paid on credit
cards thus raising score levels. Interactive tools allow the individual to see what they
would be able to afford in terms of buying a house or car and how to attain these
goals in the most cost-effective way. Within the 'FICO Saver for Homebuyers'
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product, aspiring homeowners can extrapolate the consequences of certain actions on
their required repayment levels for the mortgage amount they wish or are qualified
to secure such as enhancing their FICO score, increasing the down payment
percentage they are willing to offer or choosing a particular type of mortgage, such
as a fixed or variable interest rate. 92
However, it is through Fair Isaac's 'Score Simulator' that the specific future
consequences of one's actions are rendered most meaningfully in the present. 93
Through this utility, individuals are shown the likely future consequences on their
FICO score of certain individual actions they might take. These are divided into:
• Always improve your score: pay bills on time, pay down credit card balances,
pay down delinquent balances
• Might improve your score: seek new credit, transfer credit card balances
• Always harm your score: miss payments, max out credit cards
In the example shown in figure 4.7, the consumer is shown how their score would
change if they followed various close-ended actions, with everything else remaining
the same. To the individual, it demonstrates the possibilities for one's FICO identity
of following certain courses of self-action in the event that other things stay same.
Despite its appearance however, there is no specific future calculability inherent in
this projection. Rather than providing an all-encompassing predictive picture of the
future, it serves to demonstrate to the individual the inherent possibilities of certain,
isolated courses of action at certain points in time that might be taken within the
ongoing present, giving depth and meaning, but not predictability, to the
personalised ethic of improvement. In crude terms, the score simulator facility
shows what can happen, not what will happen.
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Figure 4.7 FICO Score Simulator Source: Fair Isaac."
Therefore, within the use of security commodities, the individual is oriented towards
a state of self-knowledge. Their desires and ambitions to consume through credit are
brought into alignment with an understanding of oneself as a credit user in terms of
how lenders understand it: one's risk score, one's location within the population of
credit users and the consequences of one's FICO score for the possibility and cost of
accessing credit. However, in coming to comprehend themselves as individuals with
such quantified identities, consumers are infused with a moral awareness of their
own position as consumers, understanding themselves as having a good or bad FICO
identity. For instance, in letters to a mortgage advice column syndicated within the
United States, individual consumers commented:
'My credit report is great, with a 740 FICO score. But my husband's credit
report is pretty bad, with only a 594 FICO score. ,95
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'But my FICO score is 724 so you know my credit is good. ,96
'Because he has no income, the mortgage company has contact me, as co-
signer, threatening to ruin my superb 770 FICO credit score ifI don't pay my
nephew's $8,700 of unpaid mortgage payments.t'"
My FICO score is only 590, and my wife doesn't have much credit. That's
pretty bad, isn't it? But we are now current on all our bills.98
Each consumer thus makes a value judgement as to their own FICO identity and
what it proclaims about them as a consumer. As an objective statement of
probability within an actuarial strategy of management, risk implies no judgement in
and of itself until it enters into the specific context of a decision. However
subjectively conceived, where the individual is made responsible for the
consequences of their credit actions, it can exist as a definitive means of self-
appraisement as to the exertion or the failure to exert a sustained self-mastery over
one's actions. In doing so, it allows the individual to judge the extent of their own
entrepreneurial aptitude. It is not so much acts which are judged to be intrinsically
moral or immoral but the relationship, evidenced by one's score, which the
individual has to themselves.
The imperative oflenders to directly or indirectly maximise profitability through the
marketing of consumer credit and to reduce costs through calculation of default risk
becomes translated into a way for credit users to understand themselves, and through
such understanding to act upon it, in their projects of consuming fulfilment.
Individuals, as entrepreneurs of their own lives, become also entrepreneurs of credit
consumption, attempting to optimise credit choice through ensuring that access is
possible and achievable at lowest possible cost. FICO identity is thus never fixed for
in representing and conducting the pursuit of the personalised entrepreneurial
project, it is always amenable to change. To these ends, an ethic of improvement
towards self-mastery is enjoined through the governing of self-action, a reflexively
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directed choreographing of one's FICO identity through one's credit actions in the
ongoing present. From this, it is hoped, the scope of ongoing future credit choice
may be enhanced.
The Significance of Uncertainty
A FICO score exists as a probability statement, a quantified calculation of the
likelihood that the individual will become delinquent with a certain degree of
severity on credit obligations over a certain specific timescale. However, probability
only achieves a calculable predictiveness within a large-scale context (Kavanagh,
1993; Reith, 2002, 2004a). For example, probability theory may suggest that tossing
a fair coin will produce, on average, 500 heads over 1000 tosses but it cannot reveal
what the next single toss will produce. Uncertainty is irreducible in risk.
Similarly, in deciding on applications for credit facilities, creditors use the FICO
score of any given individual only within a framework of dealing with a population
of applicants. In a certain sense, the use of risk technologies in such a manner
implies the inevitability of failure - a creditor will unavoidably encounter defaulting
credit users and experience financial losses as a result. Nevertheless, in doing so,
FICO and other risk scoring systems transform such losses into a more or less fixed
cost of doing business, like taxes or employee salaries, which, once made calculable,
can simply be offset against revenues to ensure the profitability of the finn. In the
short term and on a micro level, any given score can never tell a lender how an
individual will perform on a credit agreement ('a single toss'); rather, scoring helps
produce a calculated assessment of how a population will perform ('1000 tosses')
and generates an assessment of the necessary macro costs of default that must be
embraced to realise revenue and thus profit.
As we have analysed so far, the generation of a FICO score has come to be used as a
technique of governing the credit user to govern themselves. However, although it
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provides a generalised indicator of one's 'esteem' or reliability as a credit-user
hierarchised in relation to the wider population, it can not tell the individual whether
they themselves will default; neither can it demonstrate to them how they will
necessarily be treated by lenders given the diversity and niche marketing of the
contemporary consumer credit marketplace. Just as for the lender in relation to any
single consumer, no certainty applies to the isolated individual in relation to
themselves. Therefore, in the parlaying of FICO from a bio-political technology into
a technology of subjective self-understanding and self-management, the way in
which a FICO score comes to be interpreted and deployed changes. In the former, an
abstract actuarial conception locates the individual as an agglomeration of risk
factors historically referenced to the empirically documented reality of the
population. In the latter, an abstract identity self-consciously represents the
accumulated outcome of an individual's morally weighed and weighted credit
conduct; while located and understood relativistically in relation to other credit
users, it illuminates for the individual their own continuous process of consumption.
Paradoxically then, a risk attribution comes to act as a means for the government of
the self under conditions of uncertainty.
O'Malley (2000; 2004) argues that, rather then having been progressively eliminated
by the diffusion of statistical technologies of risk in practices of government,
uncertainty persists as a way of conceiving of the future. Analytically, he locates
'uncertainty' and 'statistical risk' not as binary opposites, but as opposite ends of a
broadly conceived continuum of risk. In fact, not only has uncertainty not been
superseded by probabilistic risk but uncertainty has come to be valorised within
contemporary neo-liberalism as a key attribute of the entrepreneurial spirit.
Entrepreneurs in common cultural parlance, are not, as O'Malley suggests, risk-
minimisers but risk-takers, approaching the future not as a source of peril to be
quantifiably ascertained and negotiated but as a domain of profitable possibility to
be exploited through adaptation and flexibility. Where statistical risk depends on the
resemblance of the possible future to the empirical past, the entrepreneur must
eschew the past and recognise future opportunities in the dynamic trajectory of the
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present through reliance on their own experience, reasoned estimation and skill.
Thus, for O'Malley, uncertainty as a specific configuration of risk, although not
formally calculable, nonetheless provides for a rational approach to the future.
O'Malley's concept of uncertainty provides a useful tool to analyse the actions of
the reflexive credit user. Scoring as a technology of risk operates according to a
sequential, episodic conception of time. The empirical performance of credit users
with regard to repayment provides a known past in light of which a specific decision
is taken in the present, generating a calculable outcome with respect to a defined
point in the future. Such a technology is also specific in that it refers default
outcomes in the past to default probabilities in the future. However, in
operationalising a specific risk score within subjective self-management, a different
conceptualisation of time is evident, one that is disorganised and fluctuating. Rather
than risk serving to interpret the past, for a decision in the present with respect to an
event in the future, risk distils the past into a coherent, cognisable ongoing identity
in the present. In doing so, risk does not pre-empt the future nor refer to a particular
future state but provides merely the medium to defend or enhance that identity
against uncertainties in the interests of securing ongoing autonomy and freedom of
choice. In this regard, risk is continual - it refers not to specific decisions taken
continuously at specific points in time but rather to a continual, shifting, changing
attribution to be diligently acted upon in the unfurling present for the benefit of an
ongoing future.
This blurring of time, or perhaps more specifically the disappearance of a
transcendent future, is evident in how risk as an identity exists as both the means and
goal - as something to be acted upon for the purpose of maintaining and developing
it, in doing so becoming a dynamic to its own continuance in an inescapable present.
Thus as an actuarial population-based technology, scoring transforms uncertainty
into calculable risk. But in its forming of a subjectively managed identity, risk is
given effect within 'technologies of uncertainty': those security commodities
described in the previous section. As O'Malley suggests, uncertainty is closely
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affiliated with liberty - unlike calculable risk which ties a vision of the future to a
repetition of the past, uncertainty implies dynamism and freedom; in contemporary
neo-liberal terms, the potentialities of creative entrepreneurialism to apply initiative,
to innovate and realise the fruits of its own vigour and resourcefulness.
The Uncertainty of the Self
But what is it that is uncertain for the individual credit user? How is uncertainty
being managed? Centrally, it is the selfwhich exists as a source of uncertainty.
Valverde argues that:
... the persistence of illiberal practices of moral governance is indicative not
of a failure to complete the liberal project but rather of a seldom noticed but
irreducible despotism in the heart of the paradigmatic liberal subject's
relation to himself (1996: 359).
What she demonstrates in her argument is that, in liberalism's dependence upon the
self-governing capacities of subjects, the individual exerts a continuous, sustained
reign of control upon themselves, a 'despotism' of the self creating and recreating
the conditions for the victory of reason over the sensuous, passions of nature. It is
not simply that the individual, with the internalisation of control imbued through
socialisation and education, becomes a free self-governing individual but that a
recidivism of unreason, an 'atavism', constantly threatens in the liberal imagination
to destroy that freedom. Similarly Reith (2004b), in her discussion of the concept of
addiction, cites how the collision of the notions of addiction as a subjective loss of
control and risk as vulnerability have created addiction as a realist threat inciting a
dense, steadfast effort of self-monitoring on the part of prudent individuals as an
inescapable obligation of their freedom.
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According to Valverde (1996, 1997; 1998), the concept of habit provides for a
particular form of self-despotism whereby the routine, monotonous, repeated
engagement of particular actions by the individual aspires to a permanent
transformation of the self. For her, habit encapsulates both the liberal aspiration to
individual autonomy as well as a pessimism as to its possibility, for the self-
government habit promises resides not in the content of one's conscious actions but
in unconscious incorporation through blind repetition.
Within an environment of consumption and the proliferation of the notion of choice,
the individual is held to be a locus of intrinsic needs, wants and desires subsumed in
passion and excited by the array of consumption before it. Pricked by such impulses,
the contemporary individual is conceived around a core of atavistic hedonism,
potentially never ending and unbounded in its desires. Within neo-liberalism,
consumption exists as a creative device for the sustained continual exercise of
autonomous choice by the individual over an extended time, allowing the inscription
ofa lifestyle as a project of the self. Desire and need are essential but just as
essential is the need for them to be channelled, controlled and managed over time to
allow for the reproduction of choice. It is not choice per se which demonstrates
one's freedom but the ability to sustain and propagate it. Without control, choice can
quickly become expended in the short-term and the sustenance of a lifestyle
breakdown thus turning consumption from a creative resource into a destructive one
and rendering the individual unfree for its pursuit. As a critical conduit in the service
of consumption, the indiscipline or inability to sustain repayments signifies just such
a lapse into destructive hedonism and becomes exhibited as the collapse of self-
mastery in time over one's credit and/or FICO identity. Thus the capricious and
aleatoric play of one's needs and desires and the manifestation of one's choices - a
new car loan, a mortgage for a bigger home, loans for college tuition fees for one's
children - are, over time, uncertainties that must be governed through one's FICO
identity. These are uncertainties of the self to which one must maintain a constant
vigilance of the self, a despotism which, as Valverde (1996) suggests, goes to the
heart of the liberal subject.
328
In many ways the vigilance of the contemporary credit user takes the form of
habitual action. In the actual use of one's credit, injunctions to pay your bills on
time, keep balances low and apply for new credit only when needed imply a need for
ongoing, time structured good habits as much as consciously considered action.
Through the reflexive management of one's score, the consumption of security
commodities to acquire one's score on a regular basis, receive updates whenever
one's score changes or renew one's subscription also embody a sense of accustomed
action whose effectiveness in instilling self-government derives as much from the
ordered repetition of reflexivity as the reflexivity itself engendered.
However, as I have attempted to demonstrate, the process of managing uncertainty is
not merely a defensive formation but an active project of maximising one's credit
potential. Through the fulfilment of one's repayment obligations or careful
applications for new credit, one can improve one's score (albeit incalculably)
thereby enhancing future freedom of choice as opposed to merely maintaining one's
quota of current freedom. Such freedom, though, is not only instrumental but
emotional. In plotting out the imagined month-by-month credit tribulations of 'Vera,
a single mother', a Fair Isaac information leaflet tells us in the ultimate month that:
Vera has steadily paid down her high credit card balance and monitored her
score. When her score has improved, Vera applies and is approved for an
excellent rate on an auto loan. She buys a used car and [eels good about how
she has managed her credit [my emphasisl.f"
It is not simply that 'Vera' has reaped the consuming benefits of self-mastery and
enjoys the sensuous thrills of automotive freedom but that she is induced to 'feel
good' about her moral elevation as a consumer and its implication as to her worth as
an individual.
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Systemic Uncertainty
However, uncertainty does not merely reside within the individual themselves but
within the technology used to generate a risk attribution. In terms of being assessed
as a credit risk, the individual can be located within a complex, shifting three
dimensional field of risk. Multiple systems and interpretations of risk are used to
actuarially govern the individual credit user therefore, in governing their own
actions, the individual must be cognisant of them and their differences. Ultimately,
this signifies the relativity of risk as a norm which is generated within a population
towards specific ends and does not correspond to anything intrinsic to the individual;
nevertheless they are made known to the individual as parallel risk circuits existing
within the beneficially competitive diversity of the credit market and which locate
the individual in specific, localisable ways.
On the first dimension, as we have analysed in Chapter 3, different types of risk
system exist. Most commonly, lenders operate their own specific application risk
system constructed on the specific population of their customer base rather than on
credit bureau records, allowing the lender to produce a more specialised risk
assessment and also incorporate additional information. The reflexive credit-user,
although not having general access to this specific risk assessment, is instructed as to
its specificity and cautioned as to the types of additional information that may be
included as well as the fact that such scores often incorporate a FICO score
assessment.P? The individual is thus made aware not just of FICO, but also its limits
and boundaries - gaining access to credit is not simply down to the information
comprising one's credit identity but other information including income or
residential neighbourhood. To govern oneself effectively through a FICO identity
thus requires knowledge of how its actuarial use within lending is distinct from, or
articulated with, the attributions generated through alternative, localised risk
systems.
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On the second dimension, different bureau-based scoring systems exist as
alternatives to FICO which work off the same data yet generate alternative scores on
different scales depending on how the model was constructed and how it interprets
attributes and characteristics. These may be marketed to and used by lenders to
generate risk attributions within the context of credit decisions as well as being
'FICO clones' aimed purely at the consumer market.i'" These alternative scores are
essentially rivals to Fair Isaac, both as suppliers of scores to lenders and to
consumers. In this second case, consumers are alerted to the fact that such devices
exist but are cautioned that 'when purchasing a credit score for yourself, make sure
to get the FICO score, as this is the score most lenders wi11look at in making credit
decisions about you' .102 In redirecting their scoring technology as a security
commodity for credit users, Fair Isaac exploit their pre-eminence among lenders to
define the real world fidelity of their consumer product and competitively
differentiate it from others. Consumers are enjoined to be rational in defining and
acting upon themselves as subjects according to a risk attribution upon which they
are most likely to be actuarially defined and acted upon. In fact, reflexively acting on
the basis of a non-FICO identity to enhance access to credit could actually prove
counterproductive. Consumers thus should be educated as to differences between
bureau scoring systems.l'"
On the third dimension, there is not simply one FICO score. Firstly, given that the
relationship between bureaus and lenders within the credit reporting assemblage is a
market one, lenders can choose which and how many bureaus they wish to share
information with. Secondly, clerical errors between lenders, bureaus and others in
reporting information about the credit conduct of individuals can lead to discrepant
information being posted on a consumer's credit record. For instance, a study by the
Consumer Federation of America presented evidence of a significant variation in the
information being held between the three national credit bureaus.l'" In its sample of
consumers, 31% experienced disparities of at least 50 FICO points between reports
while 5% experienced disparities of 100 points or more. lOS Therefore, given that an
individual's record of repayments and credit use may not be the same at all bureaus,
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the FICO model will interpret and distil potentially discrepant information to
produce differing FICO risk identities. Such inconsistencies exist, it is argued, not
despite the rational objective nature of risk scoring but because of it. Almost like the
Christian holy trinity, each credit user is composed of one FICO identity with three
distinct essences depending on whether or how their actions are recorded.
Discrepant diversity, far from being projected in a negative way, is conceived
partially as an asset of the credit reporting assemblage. Different bureaus have
different unique 'data strengths' to which the FICO model is specifically tailored,
increasing its overall predictiveness.l'" In addition, it is suggested that the
competition between each of the bureaus drives down costs and promotes innovation
so that '[b loth lenders and consumers benefit from having more than one choice' .107
However, such schizophrenia does not undermine such a project of reflexive self-
government; on the contrary, it extends the scope and reach of responsibility for the
consumer who becomes conditioned to manage three sub-identities in one. Of
course, lenders and credit bureaus act to ensure consistency in the reporting and
recording of repayments and other information but the individual themselves must
regularly examine for significant inconsistencies in their different FICO scores,
scrutinise the content of credit reports from all three bureaus and act to remedy any
non- or mis-reporting of their credit actions. lOS
There is, though, a wider, more profound, more high-profile uncertainty that haunts
the contemporary consumer, which threatens to completely usurp their ability to
consume and paralyse their capacity to pursue the obligation of choice endemic to
the contemporary consumerist project. It is to an analysis of the distinctly late-
modem risk of consumer 'identity theft' that we now tum.
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The 'Risk' of Identity Theft
Criminalisation: From Documents to Identity
Billed in the media and elsewhere as the 'fastest growing crime in America', the
'crime of the 21 st century' or the 'crime of the new millennium', identity theft
involves the use of another's personal identifying information, most commonly, to
fraudulently secure or exploit lines of consumer credit. Numerous studies document
large year on year increases in the number of occurrences, the increasing average
financial impact of each case and the escalating time required by victims to restore
their identities.l'" In the most recent of these, the 2006 Javelin Report, found that 8.9
million Americans were victims of identity theft in 2005 with a total fraud amount
recorded of$56.6 billion, or $6,383 per victim. On average, each victim spent 40
hours attempting to restore their credit identities. However, an earlier 2004 Identity
Theft survey carried out by the Identity Theft Resource Center in association with
criminologists at the University of California identified vastly greater average
financial losses of around $50,000 per victim and mean recovery man hours of 330.
The state too has, in recent years, been active in framing it as a social problem.
Senate and House committees have held numerous hearings on the phenomenon,
receiving testimony from regulators, businesses and victims and, in one case,
exploring how identity theft facilitated the September 11 attacks.'!" Yet, before the
end of the 1990s, identity theft simply did not exist as a crime in federal, state or tort
law. Statutory measures that did exist against mail or bank fraud penalised only the
fraudulent use of identification documents but not the actual use of information
about an individual themselves (Matejkovic and Lahey, 2001). In 1997, California
introduced one of the first identity theft laws under Section 530.5 of its Penal Code
which mandated that anyone who wilfully obtained another'S personal identifying
information, without authorization and for the purpose ofunla~ful use, would be
guilty; at the court's discretion, of a misdemeanour or felony (Davis, 2001; Diedrich,
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2003). Additional measures since have provided for a new judicial process that
allows identity theft victims to avoid prosecution for crimes committed in their
name, a state-wide database to assist identity theft victims in restoring their
identities, the right of a victim to access information from companies on the
fraudulent use of their data as well as being supplied with necessary 'name-clearing'
information.
In 1998, the Identity Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act (ITADA) was passed at
the federal level (Saunders and Zucker, 1999; Hoar 2001, Matejkovic and Lahey,
2001). Similarly criminalising the use of another's personal data, the act specified
penalties ranging from three to fifteen years imprisonment depending on the
financial extent of the fraud, with an upper scale of twenty-five years for repeat
offences or offences facilitating drug trafficking or acts of terrorism. In addition to
defining and providing appropriate legal sanctions, the act also mandated the Federal
Trade Commission to act as a clearinghouse for identity theft complaints. By 2001,
forty-four states had passed specific identity theft laws, with twenty-two doing so in
1999 alone (GAO, 2002).
What is significant about such legislation is the degree to which it has been
conceived around the idea of the consumer and how it impacts upon them. Whereas
previous laws concerning fraud were based around the impact of losses experienced
by firms and commercial enterprises, ITADA in particular enshrined the principle of
the consumer as primary victim. Although an individual has never been legally
liable for debts not wilfully contracted by them thus burdening businesses with its
financial impact, the act, in locating the crime around the usurpation of the
individual's information as opposed to the actual site of impact of the fraud, gave
explicit recognition to the harms caused to the consumer. The United States
Sentencing Commission was also directed, under the act, to take into account the
victim when issuing sentencing guidelines for relevant fraud cases, including the
number of victims and the amount of such loss as well as such unquantifiable effects
as the.{}amage done to the reputation and credit rating of the individual and the
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degree of difficulty experienced by the victim in restoring it (Hoar, 2001: 1431;
Matejkovic and Lahey, 2001: 226). The new legislation also amended the
Mandatory Restitution to Victims of Certain Crimes Act 1996 to allow federal courts
to order perpetrators to financially compensate victim for costs endured in the legal
restoration of their identities (Saunders and Zucker, 2001: 188).
Identities at Risk
For many observers, identity theft represents the dark side of a free-flowing,
dynamic informational economy. For instance, financial journalist Bob Sullivan
(2004) sees identity theft as the 'radioactive by-product' of instant credit, the
inevitable consequence of a system which allows endless, impulsive consumerist
desires to be instantly fulfilled. Inher testimony to a Senate Committee, Federal
Trade Commission Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras identifies the instantaneous
collection and assembly of consumer credit information as presenting a significant
security concern in terms of being a point of vulnerability for identity theft. I II
Oregon Assistant District Attorney Sean Hoar (2001), a high-profile prosecutor of
identity theft crimes, pinpoints the widespread proliferation of Social Security
Numbers as personal identifiers and the increased commercial exploitation of the
internet as major factors in increasing the possibility for private information to be
used for nefarious purposes (see also, more generally, LoPucki, 2001 and Solove,
2003).
Thus, the expansion of electronic databases and their attendant 'surveillant
assemblages', the infinite variety and diversity of choice obtainable in the credit
market, the incessant rapidity of credit approval and the widened convenience of the
internet as a means of marketing and accessing credit products, those very processes
which embody the efficiency and mass accessibility of credit for the fulfilment of
consumerist desires, are simultaneously identified as the culprits of an escalating
crime-that may undermine them. Just as it has been argued that the dynamic
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productive potential of late-modernity has given birth to an ineradicable 'risk
society' as its dark, self-destructive progeny (Beck, 1992), is seems, so too has the
vibrant contemporary consumer credit complex, integral to the project of individual
self-fulfilment, bestowed a dangerous generalised risk of identity theft that threatens
at every point to undermine an individual's continued realisation of such a project.
However, the risks of identity theft and environmental catastrophe do not merely
exhibit a superficial similarity but, perhaps, embody the permeation of a broader
'culture of fear'. Furedi (1997) argues, in the detailing of society's obsession with a
variety of risks from tampon 'toxic shock syndrome' to BSE, that their perpetual
generation is not a realist outcome of late modernity or a function of the increased
technical knowledge attuned to their conceptualisation. Rather, they are
manifestations of a free-floating cultural anxiety that becomes attached to (and
detached from) an array of phenomena and experiences, characterised by a
pessimistic expectation of adverse outcomes, a fear of change and of the future, and
a diminished expectation of human potential and achievement. For Furedi, the
heightened risk consciousness of contemporary societies reflects not the creation of
more risks or a great sensitivity towards them; it expresses, rather, the altered
relationship between the individual to society, the relentless individuation of human
experience in concert with the fragmentation of old solidarities and common
meanings which exposes individuals' diminished sense of control and their
heightened feelings of vulnerability.
However, the weakness of Furedi's analysis is to inscribe a generalised culture of
fear simply by documenting the array of its supposed manifestations. In de-reifying
risk, this has the tendency of reifying 'society' in its place, thus eliding the ways in
which cultural understandings are incorporated into everyday practices and the
specifics of how particular fears are formed, given weight and interlinked to other
elements of social life (Wilkinson, 2001: l34; Tudor, 2003). Nevertheless, in
analysing the specifics of those practices through which the individual is both
governed and governs themselves through the risk of identity theft, Furedi's
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argument provides a useful point of departure in demonstrating that the
contemporary preoccupation with risks that the individual is perceived to be in
danger of says less about the realist contents of the specific risks themselves then
how the individual is conceived and governed within society.
As we have seen, the risk of identity theft is conceived of as an incalculable systemic
risk stemming from the productiveness of the market itself, a systematic by-product
of an advanced, bureaucratic, electronically-enabled complex credit system. In
suitably foreboding terms, for instance, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) warns:
In the course of a busy day, you may write a check at the grocery store,
charge tickets to a ball game, rent a car, mail your tax returns, call home on
your cell phone, order new checks or apply for a credit card. Chances are you
don't give these everyday transactions a second thought. But someone else
may.ll2
According to the FTC, identity theft involves the fraudulent use of your personal
information in the following ways: appropriation of your credit card, the opening of
a new credit card in your name, the opening of a bank account in your name and the
running up of an overdraft or the taking out of auto or other loans with your details.
Beyond credit it can encompass such things as the creation of mobile phone
accounts in your name or even the submission of your details during an arrest. As
the number of avenues for using credit increase, as total levels of credit use increase,
as credit becomes less personalised, more automated and more mediated through
electronic channels, the fetishised risk of one's credit identity being appropriated
increases, both in terms of greater likelihood and the severity of potential damage
that can be inflicted. Such damage however is not merely material; in fact, the
individual cannot, in general, be held legally liable for debts that they did not incur
of their own volition. On the contrary, the consequences are demonstrated to be
more invasive and far reaching:
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My wallet was stolen in December 1998. There's been no end to the
problems I've faced since then. The thieves used my identity to write checks,
use a debit card, open a bank account with a line of credit, open credit
accounts with several stores, obtain cell phones and run up huge bills, print
fraudulent checks on a personal computer bearing my name, and more. I've
spent the last two years trying to repair my credit report (a very frustrating
process) and have suffered the illeffects of having a marred credit history.
I've recently been denied a student loan because of inaccurate information on
my credit report.113
In the past, impersonation and fraud in the instances described have always existed
as crimes but now they have become discursively sewn together as part of a single,
coherent albeit multi-faceted risk facing the individual. The securitization of
generalised access to credit through a single identity mechanism opens up multiple
conduits of consumption to the individual who appropriates it. Identity theft is thus
not simply an increase in the diversity of fraud in the traditional sense but, more
fundamentally, the increased cohesive risk of appropriation of an individual's
consuming capital determining their degree of ongoing choice. The record of actions
represented by the victim's credit identity reflects actions that are not of their own
making, actions concerned with maximising short term benefit oblivious to the
longer-term degradation of choice. Just as Oscar Wilde's protagonist Dorian Gray
could evade the corporeally corrupting effects of his own immorality by
externalising them on his hidden portrait, leaving him free to pander to his own base
desires, so too can the identity thief pass off the financial consequences of his or her
own indulged consumerist desires by transferring their attendant informational traces
to the portrait of the victim's credit history.
Ultimately, identity theft is the theft of the productive capacity of one's credit
identity, leading to the inhibition one's entrepreneurial potential, one's ability to
create a life for oneself through one's consuming choices. In being encumbered with
someone the consequences of some else's choices, one is left without an ongoing
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ability to choose; one is rendered unfree. It is this uncertain threat of a complete loss
of self-determination which seems to inject identity theft with such a nightmarish
quality. As a representative of Fair Isaac states:
Most people are learning that the critical damage caused by identity theft is
not so much the fraudulent charges, which in some cases are covered by the
creditors. What's most critical is the amount of time it takes to resolve
identity theft issues, and the damage it can have on your FICO credit score,
which may increase the interest rates you pay on credit cards and home
loans, and in some cases can make credit unavailable when you need it
most.114
The contemporary conception of identity theft, then, is that of a technological
rollercoaster of hyper-fast markets and light speed information assembly which help
fulfil consumerist dreams and ambitions and yet at the same time, open the
possibility of exactly their opposite. Perhaps, as Bauman (1997) argues, the fears
that haunt society are historically contingent and made to its own measure, a
projection of the quintessence of society itself with the application of a minus sign; a
reflection of the inner ambivalence towards its own order, function and purpose
which must be manifested as an external threat to be combated.
Golyadkin's Condition: Being a Victim
Mr. Golidadkin was properly astounded.
"Are you speaking to me?... l...it seems I took one little pie".
"You took eleven," the counterman objected with assurance.
"You ...as it seems to me ...you seem to be mistaken ...Truly, it
seems 1 took one little pie."
"1 was counting; you took eleven. When you take, you have to
pay; we don't give anything for free."
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Mr. Goliadkin was dumbstruck. "What is this, is some kind of
witchcraft being worked on me?" he thought.
Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Double
. However, the impact of identity theft is not felt simply as a negative state of
unfreedom but, positively, as the embrace of a particular identity, the state of being a
victim. In relation to the contemporary notion of addiction based on the affliction of
an 'incurable disease' and a 'complete and irreversible loss of control', it is argued
that the neo-liberal ideal of the autonomous individual engaged in the perpetual
creation of an identity is inverted, replaced by a static attribution based on the denial
of the possibility of future choice (Sedgwick, 1992; Reith 2004b). Similarly for the
identity theft victim, their condition is conceived as the impact of a coherent external
event with long term consequences that not only robs them of choice but around
which they might organise the ongoing experience of not being in control, of not
being able to choose, which supposedly permeates their lives. Unlike conventional
property theft, identity theft is not merely the appropriation of property with possible
emotional side-effects but is conceived as an unquantifiable, direct invasion of
privacy and one's sense of self with deep and lasting consequences (Diedrich, 2003:
383-4). In this regard, the living of an identity theft identity is not simply the
condition of a denial of material possibility but the experience of an adverse
emotional state, both through oneself and within one's personal relationships:
Identity theft is a complex problem. Therefore, it is not surprising that some
victims react as survivors of prolonged, repeated trauma, much like battered
women or prisoners of war. In fact, victims may compare the crime to rape or
torture. Some feel like they are experiencing a form of 'post-traumatic stress
disorder' for a short time. I IS
Although comparison of identity theft to imprisonment, rape or torture seems
some~hat gratuitous, it nevertheless focuses attention on how the disengagement of
one's future domain of choice from one's morally responsible actions in the past and
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a subjective loss of control that the individual is held to experience seems to
represent a fundamental denial of what it contemporaneously means to be free - a
freedom to realise an authentic self, the freedom to be fulfilled in one's life.
Witchcraft, indeed.
Like the constituted addict identity, the identity of the identity theft victim is static
and unyielding. Although the victim can act with creditors, police and bureaus to
clear the perpetrator's accounts from their credit record, it is up to the victim to
prove their innocence. Identity theft may also strike again down the line or creditors
may, though administrative error or indifference, re-report fraudulent accounts back
to the credit bureau thus reigniting the problem.i'" As such, the negative emotional
effects experienced are not just the invasion of the individual victim's sense of
privacy but the difficulties of proving their innocence to police and defrauded
creditors.117 But, even if the victim might be materially 'in the clear', they are still
positioned as being encumbered with a debilitating uncertainty which pervades their
life, disrupting their sense of security so that the normality they return to is always
provisional. With an emphasis on the subjective emotional state, the victim is
forever haunted by their experience, leaving 'loss of innocence and trust' and 'scars'
as a 'long term impact' to be endured forever. I IS In giving testimony to a Senate
subcommittee, one victim tellingly reports, '1 don't think I will ever be able to close
the books entirely on this menace's [perpetrator's] activities. I dearly wish I could,
but what I know now translates to the fact that I will always be dealing with this
alter reality I am plagued with' .119
In a recent study, the emotional topography of identity theft was explored with
victims being asked about symptoms experienced with which they were
concemed.120 Twenty-five emotional responses were charted including feelings of
denial, fear for oneself and family, anger, shame, powerlessness, loss of trust and
withdrawal from others. In addition, the trauma of identity theft was seen to impact
on one physiologically through such manifestations as 'sleep disturbances', 'new
physical illnesses or renewed illnesses', even becoming connected to other forms of
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problematic addictive behaviour: 'start or restart of unhealthy habits (i.e. alcohol,
drugs, smoking, overeating)' .Ultimately, the victim might even end up being
'chronically dysfunctional' or 'severely depressed'. Taken together, these are
adjudged by a professional psychologist to be classic symptoms of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) comparable to those of serious physical assault.121
As has been argued, a diagnosis ofPTSD locks individuals into an identity whereby
a sizeable portion of their lives is understood in terms of an event in the past, an
event which persistently conditions their lives thereby transforming the self-
determining human subject into a 'survivor' of events around them (Furedi, 2004;
Gilligan, 2006). Identity theft is invested with an emotionality around which the loss
of consuming choice is experienced; however, in accumulating such symptoms
within a medicalised label, the scope of that loss of control is extended. The victim
experiences not merely the loss of an entrepreneurial ability to narrativise their lives
through credit consumption but the loss of an emotional equilibrium necessary for a
fulfilled self and healthy relationships, an equally important component for the
meaningful living of one's life (Rose, 1996a).
From a subjective standpoint, one's credit identity, an electronically circulated
'virtual self, is created through the systematic tabulation of one's morally
responsibilised, ongoing conduct in using credit. In acting as a form of 'consuming
capital', it significantly reflects and determines one's ongoing degree of autonomous
consumer choice, one's freedom in the continuous process of self-realisation. With
identity theft, in contrast, the recorded actions constituting one's identity do not
reflect credit conduct for which the individual understands themselves to be morally
culpable; nor do they embody the consuming choices involved in the realisation of
an authentic self. In so doing, the future consuming possibilities dictated by one's
sullied credit identity are not only diminished but rendered discontinuous from this
self. As our victim above understands it, 'Heddi [the perpetrator] has robbed me of
the normal life I have strived for and entirely deserve. My life should be one in
which l, and I only, should be the only one being held responsible and accountable
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122 . f narrati . . Iffor my personal credit history ... '. The dynamic process 0 narrativismg onese
through consumption, of designing and constructing a lifestyle that is true to the self,
completely breaks down. For the victim, the past, present and future are lost.
Recovery: Re-enterprising Entrepreneurialism and 'Healing the Scars'
As a result of identity theft, however, one's personal project of entrepreneurialism
may not be so much lost as inverted. As the FTC states, '[p]eople whose identities
have been stolen can spend months or years - and thousands of dollars - cleaning up
the mess that thieves have made oftheir good name and credit record' .123 Although a
crime which mayor may not be prosecuted, it is the victim who is left with the task
of restoring their identity and rehabilitating their entrepreneurial potential.
Ironically, the difficulty experienced by victims of identity theft is not so much the
imposition of the credit charges as the difficulties experienced of negotiating with
law enforcement, creditors and credit bureaus to have those fraudulent accounts
removed from their credit files (Solove, 2003: 36).
To this end, the victim is taught to be entrepreneurial.F' Initially, they are advised to
take the following steps: to establish credit report fraud alerts, to close tampered
accounts, to file a police report and a complaint with the FTC itself. After that the
individual is conditioned to actively canvass credit bureaus, creditors, debt collectors
and the police to extricate fraudulent accounts from their credit record, being
informed of their rights, duties and obligations. Throughout, the individual is
persuaded of the value of an active, disciplined and organised approach. In dealing
with the police, the individual is enjoined to provide as much documentation as
possible, to be 'persistent' in emphasising the seriousness of identity theft as a
crime, to be a 'motivating force' in linking their case to other possible local cases-
'if there is a pattern of cases, local authorities may give your case more
consideration' .12S Before setting off on the complex process of dealing with multiple
organi.sations, the individual is also encouraged to follow up, in writing, on all phone
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calls using certified mail; to keep and systematically file copies of all
correspondence; to continuously update a written chart for all correspondence
detailing agency, contact, dates, reference numbers, comments and action points.
The entrepreneurial endeavour of maximising one's credit potential and consuming
choice, that neo-liberal obligation of the individual temporarily suspended through
identity theft, is thus replaced by an entrepreneurial project of restoring one's
identity as quickly and as expeditiously as possible through being not only informed,
methodical and prudent, but also perceptive, adaptive and innovative.
However, within the process of recovery, the victim of identity theft is enjoined not
only to act upon their credit identity but their own emotions also. A victim guide
published by the self-help group Identity Theft Resource Center with the assistance
of Charles Nelson, a clinical psychologist and director of a Californian 'Crime and
Trauma Recovery Programme', supplies expert step-by-step guidance on negotiating
the emotional 'rollercoaster' of identity recovery.F" To this end, the victim is
encouraged to act upon themselves under such headings as:
• The Moment of Discovery
• Starting the Healing Process and Regaining Emotional Balance
• Overcoming Feelings of Powerlessness
• Take Time for Yourself
•
Feelings About the Imposter( s)
Moving into Activism
Should you Consider Professional Help?
•
•
Within the process, the individual must recognise and come to terms with the
inevitable onset of an array of emotional experiences brought on by the crime. In
fact, a lack of emotional response on the part of the individual would be unusual and
perhaps a symptom of denial, itself an emotional response. The individual must deal
with these effects, either by coming to acknowledge the specific reasons for the
response, enlisting the support of family and friends who must be carefully briefed
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by the victim themselves on what they are going through, or simply acknowledging
them and moving on. However, the crime itself is conceived as merely the
beginning; much of the emotional trauma is as the result of the arduous process of
actually attempting to restore one's identity, a tribulation which can impart such
feelings as anger, impotence and frustration in the individual. Within this, it is
deemed important that the individual maintains a sense of perspective, that they take
time off for treats and exercise, learn to say 'no', do not lose sight of themselves
within the crime and so acknowledge and develop other parts of their life. As
observed by Furedi (2004) in relation to cancer or child abuse survivors, the identity
theft 'survivor' is also encouraged to incorporate their identity as a victim in a
progressive way, as a process of learning and self discovery:127
Accentuate the positives .... [S]ome victims find a gift in identity theft. They
learn how powerful they truly are. They find an assertiveness they never
exercised before. They learn how to talk with high level people and get what
they want, sometimes with a boldness they never knew they had. In addition,
they find who their true friends are.
This progressivism also relates to activism where the individual can promote self-
healing through public engagement, whether through setting up a support group, or
helping to increase general awareness and understanding of the crime. Finally,
sometimes the affective impact of the both the crime and the process of recovery can
be too much, triggering a clinically depressed state. At this point, the individual is
shown where to go to get professional help.
Prudent Prevention
Simon (1997) remarks that within contemporary Western neo-liberal societies,
individuals have become governed through crime. In other words, crime becomes a
key site, a 'compelling story' within which individual freedom is conducted by
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others and by the self through the medium of their personal autonomy. As has been
argued, the object of contemporary government is the individual and their
fundamental faculty of choice, exercised as entrepreneurial and competitive conduct
within contrived marketised contexts. Therefore, although a proliferating 'global'
crime risk potentially affecting more and more individuals, the consequences of
identity theft are experienced as being individualised, as the usurpation of one's
institutionally-mediated ability to consume.
Personalised in effect, identity theft is also understood as personalised in cause. As
the FTC report, identity thieves get your personal information by: stealing your
wallet or purse, stealing your mail including credit card offers, diverting your mail,
rummaging through your rubbish, fraudulently obtaining your credit report, trawling
for personal data maintained on the internet or hacking into your computer system,
and stealing, bribing or hacking into files held by organisations which maintain your
personal information. Therefore, vulnerability to the uncertainty of identity theft
resides with and around the individual themselves - as does responsibility for its
avoidance (c.f. Garland, 1996: 452-5). Like our contemporary understanding of
health (Greco, 1993; Cockerham, 1997; Bauman, 2000), one's credit identity is
made to be not simply a state that is either enjoyed or suffered but a continuously
recreated outcome of effort, defence and endeavour. Identity theft is an uncertainty
to be studiously avoided through strategic action of the self, a risk for the prudent
individual to negotiate and manage.
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Figure 4.8 'Identity Theft Cover-Up'. The United States Postal Service educates consumers into mail
related tactics for avoiding identity theft. Source: US Postal Service.
The state, represented by the FTC but also consumer activist groups like the Identity
Theft Resource Center (ITRC), identity theft experts in the media and self-help
books and institutional lenders prescribe a range of risk minimising measures for the
individual to take including: making sure one's records, physical or computerised,
are secure at home, at work or elsewhere; shredding junk mail credit offers; only
carrying around the credit cards you need and not one's social security number;
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paying attention to billing cycles; opting out of pre-approved credit offers and other
forms of direct mailing listS.128
Prudence, though, attaches itself not to actions alone but to the type of person one is.
For instance, the ITRC offers an 'Identity Quotient Test' for the individual to
interrogate themselves as to how risk sensitive they are.129 Set out like a self-
administered pop-questionnaire in a magazine ('How good am I in bed?', 'Am I
good friend?', 'Do I have a good work I life balance?'), it exposes potentially risky
actions through such points accumulating self-questioning statements as:
I provide my social security number (SSN) whenever asked, without asking
how the information will be safeguarded or why it is necessary for them to
have it in the first place (2 pts)
Meanwhile, each risk conscious practice is rewarded through the subtraction of one
point:
I keep an eye on my credit cards whenever they leave my hands to avoid
skimming.P"
I do not respond to Internet scams and hang up on telephone solicitors.
At the end, the individual can tot up their points and find out if their points total
makes them high risk and in need of remedial changes, whether they 'still have a
ways to go' or whether to 'keep up the good work' and not let their guard down. The
individual can thus objectively assess themselves according to the norms provided
by the experts at the ITRC, define their actions according to how risk prudent they
are and act on the self to lower one's risk. As the FTC relates, '[w]hile you probably
can't prevent identity theft entirely, you can minimise your risk. By managing your
personal information wisely, cautiously and with an awareness of the issue, you can
help guard against identity theft' .131 Academic research, too, has framed the
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seriousness of identity theft in terms of individual knowledge and action on how to
minimise its likelihood of occurrence. For instance, marketing professor George R.
Milne (2003) has carried out survey research measuring the responses of different
population groups to a range of questions assessing their 'preventative behaviours'
with respect to the risk of identity theft, highlighting key deficiencies in knowledge
to be addressed in consumer education programmes.
Faced with the ever-present, ever-growing risk of having their identity stolen, a
negative future contingency which individuals are governed to take informed,
adaptive, pre-emptive action in the ongoing present to avoid, the individual is thus
conducted to be enterprising in maintaining the integrity of their credit identity. By
implication, identity theft constitutes, to some degree, a lack of self-mastery, a moral
failure in the individual's duty to take care of themselves; the inevitable, ifnot
deserved, outcome of their own ineptitude. However, as such a label implies, the
victim's liability is limited for although such an event as identity theft is strategically
minimisable, it is nonetheless relatively incalculable and irreducibly uncertain.
Victim support groups and others, for their part, deny the sole culpability of the
individual, highlighting other factors including the poor information security
procedures of public and private organisations which maintain personal data (see
Solove, 2003) and the insufficiency of the legal deterrent on the criminal.132
Ultimately, like illness, the ravages of identity theft afflict even the most prudent and
cautious in their actions. However, in itself, the onset of identity theft does not
constitute the end of entrepreneurial action for, as we have seen, the individual must
now act to minimise its impact on their broader entrepreneurial potential. By
recognising it, by acting promptly through discipline, perseverance, foresight and
innovation the individual can quell its worst effects and attempt to realign their
objectivised identity back exclusively to their own actions. Then, they might return
to the project of ensuring the self-mastery of their own credit use, even if such a
project cannot be as it was before.
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Identity Theft and Security Commodities: Catching it Early
In order to protect against the uncertainty of identity theft, security commodities
based on a reflexive analysis of one's credit identity are marketed to the individual
as a primary tool of harm minimisation. In its promotion of identity theft awareness,
the FTC and others advocate a continuous analysis of one's credit reports at the three
national bureaus in order to ensure that they reflect only one's own details and
actions. In fact, the 2003 legislative changes to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, guided
in large part by the perceived need to improve identity theft prevention and
resolution, enshrined for the first time the right of consumers to a free annual credit
report from each of the three national credit referencing agencies. Responding to a
rhetorical question 'why do I want a copy of my credit report?', an FTC brochure
tells consumers that they need a copy in order to 'help guard against identity theft'
which might otherwise affect their ability to get' credit, insurance, or even a job' .133
However, within their portfolio of products, Fair Isaac and the bureaus offer
specialised fee-based services for the prudent individual to purchase and incorporate
within their broader practices of identity management. As Fair Isaac relate:
We wish we could tell you that having a good credit score is enough. But,
unfortunately, this doesn't mean you're safe from identity theft. It's still
important to check your FICO score and monitor your report frequently,
because ID theft can come out of nowhere and wreck your score.134
In developing a portfolio of products for consumer reflexive self-monitoring, these
firms adapt a generalised technology based on the personalised revelation and
governance of one's FICO identity and market a specialised security commodity for
satisfying an inculcated desire in consumers to prudentially avoid the damaging
effects of identity theft. Alongside the task of ensuring the self-mastery of their
credit_use so as to maximise their FICO score within an ethic of improvement as
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described earlier, the individual becomes engaged in a regimen of ongoing self-
knowledge in order spot discontinuities between their actions and those recorded by
their credit identity; an 'ethic of defence' which parallels an 'ethic of improvement'.
Like monitored burglar alarms for preventing a break-in, such services exist as
goods to be chosen and used by the prudent individual according to their particular
needs of minimising risk, with price reflecting the quality of features and thus the
scope of security offered: '[w]ith myFICO's broad Identity Theft Security product
line, people can easily select the protection level that bests fits their needs' .135 What
those needs are is down to the individual, how exposed they feel and how desirous
they are of feeling protected. Like the advertising of many other consumer goods,
from germ-killing household bleach to cholesterol-reducing dairy spreads, such
security commodities deliberately instil or amplify anxieties that the individual has
about themselves while simultaneously advocating its product as the panacea for
such concerns, incorporable within a distinctive, worthy lifestyle. As with any other
good, such security commodities are consumed not just to preserve the ongoing
exercise of choice conditioned by one's credit identity but to give purposive
expression within themselves to the lifestyle of the individual, an identifiable marker
of who they are.
Isin (2004) suggests that the concept of the rational entrepreneurial individual acting
as a prudent risk manager is only a partial characterisation of the contemporary
subject. Rather, he suggests, the entrepreneurial subject is as much neurotic as
rational. He or she acts not only to avoid risk through instrumentally conceiving and
engaging in certain courses of action but someone who is perpetually anxious,
insecure and under stress; someone who is governed not only in terms of conduct but
in the management of their own anxieties as an affective subject. Central to identity
theft security commodities is the emotional qualities that they are invested with.
They do not merely help to offset uncertainty in a technical sense, reducing the
likelihood of an event; they also make the individual feel less uncertain, less
insecure. For instance, in relation to how one of its products 'empowers' consumers
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not only to 'protecttheiridentities' but also to have 'peace of mind', Equifax
reassures that '[w]hen no change in a credit file has occurred in the month, Equifax
. d '1 f f . d' 136 SCredit Watch sends a "no news IS goo news" emai or peace 0 mm. 0 even
though no cause for alarm may be detected, such consumption still embodies
meaning and significance for the individual in terms of being prudent and feeling
secure.
With one such security commodity, Fair Isaac's 'Identity Theft Security Deluxe', the
individual is directed into a multi-layer process of self-knowledge to prevent the
onset of identity theft. 137 Beginning by an indication of the consumer's current
FICO score at a selected credit bureau, the service prompts the consumer to analyse
their report line by line for erroneous information:
Not familiar with an address?
Someone may be using your ID and sending your mail to a different address.
Didn't open one of these accounts?
Someone may have stolen your ID and opened accounts in your name. Call
the creditor immediately and find out what's going on.
Something off with an account?
If you don't recognize an account or there's an unusual balance, this could be
a red flag for ID theft.
Once the individual has assured themselves that their identity reflects who they are
at that point in time, they are inducted into a continuous regime of self-knowledge.
An alert system informs the individual instantly, bye-mail, of any changes in their
records at four-hundred different public and commercial databases, encompassing
not only credit bureaus but also utilities, property deeds, bankruptcy applications and
vehicle registration data. These changes are dated and posted on the consumer's
personal online account for them to assess. Finally, a finance 'monitor' tool
graphically represents historical changes in key variables - FICO score, total
balances, new credit inquiries, late payments and so on - for the individual to track.
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By inculcating such layers of ongoing self-knowledge, the individual is
responsibilised for ensuring their own freedom from identity theft. Such products are
not available as merely market choices within themselves but can be integrated
within a credit choice enjoyed by individual. For example, American Express offers
its cardholders 'CreditSecure' as an optional extra, allowing them access their three
credit reports plus credit score with attendant extras such as daily alerts, toll-free
customer care numbers and convenient monthly billing to their card.138 In such a
fashion, choice of credit product is oriented as part of a prudential lifestyle against
the risk of identity theft.
However, the actions which are tracked and changes indicated are merely alerts
whose import is up to the individual to determine. In addition to self-knowledge, the
prudent consumer must be able to judge for themselves when self-action is required.
Altered information may be legitimate changes reflecting actual actions by the
individual, simple clerical errors requiring correction but not indicative of danger, or
the first symptoms of a damaging incidence of identity theft. The individual,
therefore, in addition to maintaining a strict vigilance over their identity, must also
know 'when to relax' and 'when to raise the red flag'. When the individual finally
determines for themselves that their identity has been appropriated, the security
commodity prompts particular avenues for self-action: a customer helpline provides
advice on how to proceed while a range of written material is automatically
generated including a credit bureau fraud alert placement request, letters of dispute
resolution for creditors, police report instructions and an FTC complaint form.
What security commodities such as this represent is not so much an easily
purchasable, all-embracing protection as a processual, ongoing self-knowledge
permitting the individual the possibility of prompt action to protect themselves
through the means allocated for them to do so. One of the ironies of identity theft
security products, it seems, is the fact that they do not guarantee the individual
against identity theft, do not compensate the individual for its occurrence nor even
do they lower the likelihood of its occurrence. Rather, such personalised tools
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minimise risk in the sense that they minimise the harm of its occurrence; they allow
it to be caught earlier before it completely infects and paralyses the credit identity
giving expression to one's consumer freedom.
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Figure 4.9 'Some Identities Are More Valuable'. In relation to credit, this cartoon humorously (and
unintentionally) attempts to refute Garland's (1996) argument that crime affects the poor
disproportionately. It also attests to the curious similarity between the material poor and the identity
theft victim: for different reasons, both lack the capacity to engage in a regime of self-narrative
through credit consumption. Source: Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Some security commodities have evolved which take the form of insurance for
identity theft. FirstBank Insurance Agency, in association with AIG, offers a policy
from between $2 and $11 which covers costs associated identity theft resolution
including legal fees, lost wages, outstanding credit payments and administrative
expenses such as notarising documents, certifying mail and accessing credit
reports.P? Fair Isaac's product offers insurance up to $25,000 through a third-party
company as an integrated feature of the product.140 Elsewhere, MetLife's automobile
insurance subsidiary offers an identity theft resolution service to its customers as a
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feature of their automobile policies, helping victims to 'file police reports, create
fraud victim affidavits and comprehensive case files, deal with debt collectors, and
notify government agencies' .141 Rather than compensating, and thus securing, the
individual against the effects of identity theft, it acts to secure the victim of identity
theft against the financial and labour costs of restoring their identity. It thus plays a
secondary role within the broader regime of self-monitoring and self-action.
Unlike conventional insurance which has as its intention the restoration, through
compensation, of the preceding conditions of an event through their transformation
into capital (see Castel, 1991), identity theft insurance merely exists as a partial
means of restoration compensating for an event's secondary effects, those costs
associated with active restoration by the individual through their own actions.
Francois Ewald (1991) enigmatically remarked that there is no risk in reality but that
anything could be a risk depending on how the event was understood. Within the
consideration of identity theft, its direct effects are not understood to be protectable
through calculable risk for the decimation of one's credit identity represents the
destruction of one's autonomy and freedom to choose within consumption, the
negation of one's project to be an entrepreneur of one's own life and thus one's
ability to be a self-governing subject. The sovereignty of the individual within neo-
liberalism, encapsulated by one's credit identity, cannot be conceived of in monetary
terms as a state which can be compensated in the event of its loss - or at least, it is
not perceived to be efficient to do so. On the contrary, the threat posed by identity
theft is another uncertainty to be managed in an entrepreneurial way by the
responsible individual, through the foresight and self-mastery of a rigorous,
disciplined continuous self-knowledge and through prompt, dynamic self-reliant
self-action when it is understood to have occurred.
$ $ $ $
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It is hard to imagine a more vital contribution to economic growth than
financially healthy consumers .... The Equifax Difference is making a
difference in improving the credit health of millions of consumers - giving
them the opportunity to enlighten, enable and empower themselves to better
manage and protect their financial information in a credit-driven economy.142
Within the US economy today, the undoubted key to economic development is
perceived to lie in the promotion of personal consumption choices of individuals so
that the freedom of individuals to make choices, to consume branded products and
marketed experiences resides at the forefront of contemporary governmental
ambitions. Government, as Foucault (1983: 220-1) explains, is not merely the
exercise of power by the state over its dominion but any process within which the
conduct of individuals is conducted by others for certain purposes. In a fundamental
sense, government depends upon the freedom of individuals, as subjects, to take
courses of action beyond the scope of its will; in doing so, government constitutes a
moulding of the context of individual action rather than its dictation. The state, in
general, seeks greater economic growth, higher employment and prosperity for its
citizens and through the Federal Reserve, low interest rates and a sound, stable
financial and monetary system.
However, within the particular rationality of government represented by
contemporary neo-liberalism, the state attains its aims not by an interventionist
macro economic policy or through the deployment of its fiscal resources but by its
setting out of the conditions within which individuals, families and communities
entrepreneurially pursue their own consuming goals and ambitions, free of hindrance
and restraint. The state though, is not idle nor is it a bystander but rather it governs,
in the words of Rose and Miller, 'at a distance'. In terms of consumer credit, the
Federal Reserve sets out to maintain low interest rates conducive to low inflation
and economic growth while the executive and the legislature, along with state
agencies, introduce and enforce laws which promote and nurture the autonomy of
consumers to choose - from the Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibiting
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discrimination in lending to the Truth in Lending Act requiring minimum loan
advertising and disclosure standards by lenders.
Lenders, in tum, govern credit consumers towards the ends of profit - increasing
revenues and lowering costs in their quest to become more streamlined and
competitive. Apart from expanding product ranges and entering new markets, one
historical conduit of such government is the determination of creditworthiness, the
possibility of default, for deciding whether to grant an individual access to credit.
With the expansion and intensification of the market, this possibility of non-
repayment has become determined relativistically, not through the qualitative
character of the individual but through a quantified analysis of their tabulated actions
in using credit set against the actions of a field of credit users. From the 1950s,
through the proliferation of statistical technologies of credit scoring, this relativised
determination becomes articulated as quantified risk understood within the context
of a population of credit users. The predictive power of such risk technologies were
later augmented in the 1960s and 70s with the ongoing development of an
electronically mediated credit referencing assemblage allowing the inscription of
individual credit conduct to be accumulated, assembled and distributed across
broader swathes of consumers in tandem with an expanding, increasingly nationally-
focussed consumer credit market and a more geographically mobile American
populace.
Internal competition between bureaus, new bureaucratic techniques and the
incorporation of technological advances in computing power, information storage
and communications have given rise to the possibility of comprehensive, detailed,
standardised records of a cross-national population of consumers, understood to be
relevant to their future actions in using credit; objectivised identities to be quickly
assembled, updated and disseminated to lenders for use within their risk systems. By
the end of the 1980s, a new form of risk scoring system known as 'FICO' emerged
which permitted a generalised assessment of individual default risk to be made by
lenders, specified against the broader population of consumers and based exclusively
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on credit bureau data. Although not as 'accurate' as customised systems, it obviated
the expense of designing them (as well as being incorporable within them) and
greatly increased the scope for the use of risk within the consumer credit market.
Significantly, in the mid-1990s, FICO became a central feature of determining risk
within residential mortgage lending. As I have attempted to outline elsewhere, FICO
risk represents a significant development in the conception of credit risk for, rather
than being localised discontinuously within the sanctioning systems of particular
creditors, it is opened as a generalised, continuous attribution of individual
consumers against a broad, national population of consumers.
As the Foucauldian approach emphasises, individual subjectivity is created within
the relations of power represented by government:
This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which
categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him
to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize
and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which
makes individuals subjects (Foucault, 1983: 212):43
As subjects, free individuals come to think about, and act upon themselves, as
individuals through the means by which they are governed. In contemporary times,
where the individual's faculty of choice, their autonomy and enterprise are the site of
government, the individual is steered towards governing their own autonomy and
enterprising their own conduct. The legislative impulse since the 1970s has had just
that as its aim - for example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) delineated
certain rights of the consumer to check their credit record and provided specific
remedying procedures for misreporting but, in doing so, established the credit file as
the partial responsibility of the individual to uphold, helped define for individuals
the difference between legitimate and illegitimate reporting and, more broadly,
helped establish a sense of calculation in the minds of consumers as to the
constitution of creditworthiness. This was not a process which was imposed but, on
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the contrary, it met with demands for activists and consumers for a legally
enforceable right to know the content of their reports, to determine and shape their
own destiny as consumers; demands which ultimately accepted the legitimacy of
personal information gathering and dissemination where it facilitated the
individual's capacity for enterprising consumption.
The 1970s disclosure debate leading to the FCRA found harmonic resonance at the
end of the 1990s when consumer groups, media, politicians and others agitated for
score disclosure to consumers. The logic of contemporary individual self-
government makes it seem almost impossible that the outcome could have been
anything other than such disclosure as demanded. However, what distinguishes it
was that it was not legislatively imposed (although this was threatened) and that it
took the form of a commodity to be sold to consumers as a product realising a
commercial profit. Rather than a 'right' to which the credit bureaus could demand an
administrative fee as happened with credit report disclosure, score disclosure took
the form of a 'good', a good to be branded, marketed, advertised and sold on the
enterprise-inducing potential it offered consumers willing to submit themselves to it.
In light of the process of disclosure, this chapter has attempted to set out how
consumers have come to govern themselves according to a risk-based FICO identity
fabricated from and through their individualised credit identities. It has also sought
to explore the significance of this process within the contemporary American neo-
liberal rationality of government.
Crucially, as we have seen, consumers are instructed on how their actions in using
credit are interpreted to form an individualised FICO identity represented as 'their'
quantified score. In creating such an alignment, this risk score functions as a
'rational' norm by which the individual comes to judge themselves as a consumer,
becoming a mechanism for regulating their credit conduct in order to expand their
consuming potential. In governing themselves in light of their score, the individual is
confr~nted with the morality of their actions, the slow steady uncertain accumulation
of' good' actions over time being the path to self-improvement rather than any
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predictable technical expediency. Morality in this sense refers not to action but
conduct, the relationship that the individual exhibits with themselves in using credit.
Therefore, as free individuals fulfilling their lives through consumption and the
ongoing project of identity creation and personal fulfilment, conducting individuals
in the management of their risk identities becomes a means of empowering them to
become more enterprising, to equip them with the means to increase their capacity
for future choice by lowering the costs and qualifications of accessing credit. To be
enterprising requires the individual to balance the consuming needs and desires of
the present with the responsibility of sustaining an ability to consume for the
duration of their lives.
A risk identity of this kind thus come to represent, in a certain sense, the consuming
capital of the individual, reflecting the outcome of their credit conduct and in turn,
delimiting the possibilities of their future choice. As we have seen, this has
consequences not just in relation to credit but a multitude of fields where the
individual exists as a consumer. In conditioning ongoing consuming freedom, a
FICO identity indexes the degree of discrete 'unfreedoms' which the individual has,
over time, been able to exert over themselves, becoming a generalised catalogue of
their responsibilised prudence.
As we noted above, Fair Isaac Corporation and the Equifax credit bureau began,
from 2001, to supply consumers their scores as a marketed product. In doing so,
scoring became parlayed from an actuarial technology supplied to lenders to
calculably manage the default risk exposure of their loan portfolios to a consumer
product or product range for personalised consumption. This transformation
produced significant changes in how consumers were conceived and also in how the
broader credit market operated, with new alliances and formations emerging to
profitably govern the self-governing capacities of consumers. As goods, they not
only promise the possibility of enhanced consumption but represent, within
themselves, a manifestation of consumption incorporable within particular kinds of
lifestyle.
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The use of security commodities, based on the repetitive revelation of an actual
score, represents an attempt to move consumers beyond a knowledge of the
significance of their FICO identities to the sustained, personalised practice of self-
knowledge and self-action in the governing of their credit conduct. To the individual
consumer, their score alone is relatively meaningless unless contextualised as an
identity in terms of the broader population of consumers, the most pressing specific
categories of variables swaying it, the credit consuming opportunities it represents
within the market and the 'moral' plateau it is deemed to inhabit. Simultaneous to
this self-knowledge, means of self-action to direct improvement are also allotted to
the consumer: the function of the score as a population norm inducing the consumer
towards a more prosperous category while reason codes, coaching and the
generation of simulated outcomes encourage them to actively pursue particular
tactics to attain this. Although a score represents a defined, objective probabilistic
risk for a lender, its operation as an identity within subjective self-government
sheers it of this calculability - deployed within security commodities, it guides
consumer conduct only by way of uncertainty.
However, uncertainty in this sense does not represent a relative fallibility but rather
cohabits necessarily with the obligation ofthe consumer to render their life as an
enterprise of the self. Discursively, enterprise implies prudence, dynamism, flair and
adaptability to shifting conditions within which to realise opportunity; therefore, the
requirement of the consumer to make an enterprise of their lives cannot grant a
calculability or predictability to action but depends fundamentally on their flexibility
and spontaneous creativity. Enterprise is about freedom; but this freedom, as we
have seen, has as its corollary a more all-round, finely grained management of the
self. In their inducement to self-government through risk, the consumer is thus
bound within a triangle of uncertainty: an 'uncertainty from within' residing in the
individuals own unending impulses and desires to consume; a 'systemic uncertainty'
located within the multiple, shifting technologies of risk themselves and 'uncertainty
from without', the increasing, 'real' threat of identity theft posed by other renegade
consumers. Only a sustained mastery by the individual over themselves, and over
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their credit identity, provides a counter strategy for ensuring their autonomy and
freedom.
Identity theft provides a highly significant context for understanding the burden of
freedom maintained by consumers. Constructed discursively as a heightening risk
facing the individual within the dynamism and complexity of the contemporary
consumer credit market, it represents the dark side of the entrepreneurial consumer
dream. It is the freedom and diversity of choice within the modem credit market
which make it possible. On the one hand, the market opens up numerous conduits of
data vulnerability for having the potential of one's objectivised identity
appropriated, from pre-approved credit card offers in the mailbox which might be
lifted to the details-laden wallet that could be purloined. On the other, as freedom is
felt as the freedom to choose and one's ability to choose is ever more predicated on
one's credit identity, then the usurpation of one's identity represents a profound loss
of freedom. Thus it is the market itself which is held to give birth to ever greater
levels of such risk through increasing the likelihood and scope of its harm. If
freedom represents the ability to dynamically fulfil one's own life then identity theft
denotes its opposite, a static identity of an individual unable to consume and thus
subjectively crippled, who instead of being active is rendered utterly passive to the
consequences of this event. Ultimately, the victim's credit identity reflects not the
realisation of an inner authentic self but the opportunistic imposition of someone
else's.
Despite being unfree to consume however, the individual is not powerless to act.
Through a process of being governed to enterprise their own recovery and
therapeutically alleviate their subjective sense of loss, the individual is tasked with
picking up the threads of their credit identity, and their lives, and returning
themselves to the regular rank of enterprising consumers. However, prevention is
better than cure and it has become part of the obligations of the individual to exert a
prudent protection over their identity through an array of risk minimising practices,
encompassing both the prophylactic (from securing documents to opting out of
mailing lists), the impact-reducing and the varieties of self-knowledge provided
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through specialised identity security commodities. In a fundamental sense, the
contemporary freedom to shape a meaningful life for oneself through consumption,
the ambition of both the governing and the governed, is not a taken-for-granted state
which once attained can be enjoyed but rather is a process, the outcome of a
conscious, sustained and permanent engagement of individuals with themselves and
the uncertainty they are made to experience.
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Postscript: Taking Life.
Life takes ambition.
Life takes luck ...
It takes determination.
It takes confidence,
respect and talent.
Life takes joy ...
And spontaneity.
It aLso takes a little help,
that's where we come in.
So, go on.
Live life.
And remember that no
matter what it takes ...
Life takes Visa.
Figure 5.1 'Life Takes ... .' Source: TBW A Advertising Agency
In Visa's 2005 television advertising campaign, a child is shown skilfully
negotiating a series of handrails at a playground (life takes ambition), a pretty blonde
woman clumsily sends a bowling ball down an alley, achieving an unlikely strike in
the process much to the delight of her companions (life takes luck); a young man
tiredly but stubbornly consumes his way through an enormous hamburger (life takes
determination); an athletic young black woman feints a male opponent to score (life
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takes confidence) which is given the briefest but most significant of hand
acknowledgements (life takes respect); a young male office-worker warily
manoeuvres sixteen stacked cups of coffee (life takes talent); a young girl merrily
skips and weaves across a concrete landscape (life takes joy); and a young couple
walk down the aisle of a Vegas-style 'Chapel of Love' (life takes spontaneity).
These are the attributes being elicited from the contemporary neo-liberal consumer
who must undertake life as a personal journey full of purpose and meaning, a life
which both accepts and requires - in a general sense - this particular branded form
of credit.
What is intimated is that for the individual, life becomes a function of choices made
and alternatives foregone, the cumulative success of which depends on the relative
strengths demonstrated, whether inherent, honed or aleatoric. What we put in, our
own 'individual wit and muscle' as Bauman (1997: 39) puts it, determines what we
produce out, whether alone, against or in conjunction with others - with credit
serving as both the infrastructure and medium for exercising those choices. Credit
responds not only to our needs and desires but our wants, producing an immediate
outlet for their realisation within a universalised, globalised marketplace. The credit
card, the true fixed global currency, the lingua franca of consumer commerce
operates as the incarnation of our choosing potential. Embossed with our name and
unique sixteen digit number, emblazoned with our chosen provider, group or status
group, it embodies who we are in the modem consumer marketplace.
Yet, in Bauman's (2000) terminology, credit cards are liquid, always contingent and
only ever held until further notice. In the West, consumers play the 'surfing game'
and the 'credit card shuffle', effortlessly slipping from card to card for the latest
balance transfer deal and rewards offer as financial institutions covet and cannibalise
each other's market share (Manning, 2000). Yet, both Visa and its oligarchic rivals
Mastercard and, to a lesser extent American Express, represent perhaps the meta-
choice of consumer society with their pre-eminent payment networks and massive
market shares, much like how personal computer manufacturers' market wares run
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exactly the same Microsoft software. They provide the permanent cybernetic
interface of consumerism, plugging us as choosing (and chosen) subjects into the
product or experience that is to be purchased, regardless of bank or provider.
From the early days of consumer capitalism, credit has been a personalised
contingent resource enabling, often problematically, the fulfilment of certain needs
or desires. As that which is chosen within the market has proliferated, so too have
the arenas where credit can be used, the providers of credit and the credit
alternatives themselves. It seems hard to imagine that it was only in the early 1990s
that supermarket chains began to regularly accept credit cards while the successful
development of internet shopping would seem an impossibility today without their
ubiquity; and in a strange symbiosis, not only do we get our credit cards from banks
but branded, too, from the likes ofWal-Mart and Amazon.com. It seem, then, that
not only do we choose our credit card but, in doing so, we choose ourselves: credit
cards can be customised to reflect our cultural pursuits and interests, our
professional occupational group, our alma mater or favourite charity or cause; credit
cards also represent our degree of meta-choice with, in the example of American
Express, an inflation of green, gold, platinum and black cards providing a colour-
coded hierarchy of our income, credit and pecuniary potential.
In perhaps a profound cultural tum, the array of credit cards encased within the
wallets of the average American seem to have usurped the Social Security card as
the new expression of citizenship. Just as the Federal Trade Commission warns
consumers not to carry their Social Security cards for fear of identity theft, marketers
equally caution the credit card consumer about not leaving home without it. In a
neo-liberal economic and political climate of insecure, short-term job contracts,
career shifts and permanent training, credit cards provide an easily accessible
resource to smooth the bumps and troughs of income, to maintain an acceptable
standard of living and condition the pursuit of a coherent lifestyle. If the welfarist
state provided unemployment assistance grounded in work to sustain the income of
the household until it could be reengaged in labour, the credit card prolongs
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purchasing power and consumption patterns to sustain the lifestyle of the household.
Where the former came to be collectively instituted by a corporative union of the
state, capital and labour within the context of a politicised class consciousness, the
latter is offered through the logic of the market and competition, data-mining, and
segmented marketing practice as an object to be 'freely' and individually chosen on
the basis of income, credit identity and other qualifying criteria.
The contemporary consumer market is not an exclusive club; although, that is not to
say that it does not play out divisions, re-inscribe inequalities and exacerbate
exploitation nationally and across the globe. Yet never have authorities, political and
economic, been so keen to encompass everyone within its fold. In relation to credit,
the Marquette Supreme Court judgement of 1978, which helped liberalise state
interest rate ceilings and subsequent statutory deregulation, acted to streamline the
market to enhance the depth and scale of choice. The private but Congressionally-
sponsored wholesale mortgage buyer Fannie Mae has committed itself in its
'American Dream Commitment Plan' to expanding rates of homeowners hip among
minorities and lower income groups, promulgating the entrepreneurial accumulation
of real estate equity that can be borrowed and re-borrowed against. Lenders
themselves have aligned profitability to new subprime markets for mortgages, loans
and credit cards. Financial interests have also plumbed the outer 'fringe' market of
consumption through the revival of pawnshops and salary lenders on a large-scale
commercial level. Yet despite the rhetoric of 'democratisation', market involvement
is never equal nor does it ever provide a universal equality of opportunity.
Opportunity, rather, depends on the individual's resources and resourcefulness as a
consumer, their means, skill and luck in keeping a particular narrative going, their
particular ability to cherish their life as a dynamic project. Through the lender
inscription of consumer choices and attributes, the frictionless circulation of such
information, and the statistical mining of data at the level of a population to produce
calculable risk assessments, what is made available to the individuated consumer
depends on what they bring to it. This means everything: the material and cultural
resources of class with their attendant possibilities; the relative financial resources of
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an occupation well or ill-chosen; the institutional reputation of that postcode where
we choose to live and all the other basic structural divisions that circumscribe every
individual within society. More specifically, it also embodies the tactical outcome of
every credit-related, market-mediated choice made, from the taking-out of student
loans to defaulting on incurred medical bills. In this, our scale of choice is dependent
on how we manage ourselves in the consumer-rendered living of our lives, how we
balance, within ourselves, personal horizons to individual circumstances, how we
tailor the ongoing present, in light of our ever present past, in the interest of an
infinite future with its pronounced uncertainties and engaging opportunities. In short,
we are permanently assessed in our project management abilities where that project
is the conduct of our own lives.
Yet, liberal government has never assumed the liberal subject; he or she has always
had to be made, forged and fabricated with the potential to endure this responsibility.
Contemporary government, from numerous sites, articulates the problem and
pedagogically inculcates within consumers the careful regulation of personal credit
use. Lewis Mandell (2002) bemoans the failure of high-school students to grasp the
basics of credit use while the not-for-profit Jump$tart Coalition for Personal
Financial Literacy (who commissioned Mandell's research) aims to improve the
basic skills of children in the management of financial affairs. Sociologist Robert
Manning castigates the campus marketing efforts of credit card companies that
solicit students into a life of debt while American universities respond by offering
modules in personal finance. Various state agencies, lenders and personal finance
experts prompt us to keep a careful running eye on our outgoings and expenditures,
to check our credit reports and credit scores and keep a weather eye out for the
identity thief who may rummage through our trash cans to infiltrate our lovingly
arranged credit identities. Just as workers fought collectively for their rights before
the state and capital, equally consumers have fought for and have been grudgingly
granted rights to sustain their consuming endeavours, including notably the right to
due process in credit decisions, the right to receive copies of credit reports and the
Opportunity to purchase credit scores. Yet just as capital once endorsed the welfare
373
state as an essential component to its survival, commercial lenders have ultimately
come to embrace these consumer rights as self-evident necessities of a modem credit
market.
For those who breach the terms of good conduct in credit use, whose enthusiasm for
credit and consumption outstrips the disciplined requirement to sustain a regime of
repayment to the extent that they become ensnared by indebtedness, intervention is
at hand to bolster or brace the sclerotic will. Personal credit counsellors offer
subjective self-administered tests for examining and articulating the existence of a
problem; techniques are suggested for measuring the extent of the paralysing debt;
tactical advice is presented on how to manage creditors and collectors and strategic
guidance proffered on the legal process of bankruptcy; suggestions for consolidating
debt are listed; and finally, strategies are proposed for rebuilding a credit identity
and getting back on a new sustainable path. For the same effect, the consumer may
turn to the pages of self-help literature promising an elusive means for that longed-
for personal transformation. Titles like Credit Repair to Credit Millionaire, The
Guerrilla Guide to Credit Repair, and Credit After Bankruptcy: A Step by Step
Action Plan pledge the possibility of revolutionising the self, from a repressed to a
free authentic state, in small, incremental steps.
More profoundly, undisciplined credit use may become interpreted as one of
compulsion or addiction, the manifestation of a particular 'epidemic of the will'. As
two consumer researchers claim in an examination of psychologically 'compelled'
credit users, '[i]t is likely that for these people, the typical credit abuse intervention
program involving consumer counselling, education, and good budgeting skills will
not be sufficient. Clearly psychological counselling and support groups will be
critical in overcoming this problem' (Faber and O'Guinn, 1988: 106). Here, a clear
distinction is made between the poorly socialised and the pathological, requiring
differing forms of guidance and intervention. Yet, today, the addict suffers not so
much from the imposition of a deviant label as engages a voluntary identification
with a subjective state that is static and permanent; the embrace of a determined
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modality that denies the contemporary obligation to choose (Reith, 2004b: 296).
This identity is given force and weight through such peer-help groups as Debtors
Anonymous, its manual Currency of Hope and associated Twelve Step forums
providing a means by which individuals can express and rationalise their perceived
lack of control in relation to credit and habitualise a regime of abstinence. 'Eternal
vigilance is the price of recovery' .
When analysts, commentators and others question the sustainability of the national
burden of consumer debt, question the alteration of cultural values, criticise the
misery of indebtedness and poverty and the solicitation of individuals to live in the
moment, they are grappling with crucial issues. Yet, as we have seen, fears about
credit are not and cannot be disengaged from the historically specific fears that
certain groups feel towards others, whether they be other groups or society as a
whole. Today, practices of 'fringe credit' interlink with concerns about how to
govern the practices and will of the poor as much as the market; perhaps also,
concern about the growing burden of middle-class debt and the loss of a self-
determination express the anxiousness of the middle class towards their own
position and purpose or the progress of society more widely. Since the emergence of
consumer credit, such fears, manifested in discourses of excess, over-indulgence,
chaos, temptation and exploitation, have served as precursors to intervention by state
or expert. As we analysed in Chapter 1, early municipal pawnbroking regulations
sought to alleviate the position of the impoverished pawner and police the disorder
perceived to attach to the business. In the 19th century, small loan lending attracted
the attentions of philanthropists, and later the partnership of the Russell Sage
Foundation and individual state legislatures, concerned with easing the burden on
the working poor. Most recently, the 2005 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions
Act 2005 has sought to make it easier for consumers to protect themselves, and
recover from, the debilitating impact of identity theft perceived to have been
released by the dynamism of the contemporary market. Freedom to borrow, it seems,
is always warily encountered.
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In a more fundamental sense, though, and as this thesis has attempted to elaborate,
governance and control are at the heart of the credit transaction. Within the specific
confines of consumer credit transactions, lenders have always attempted to bind the
actions of the borrower against some conception of the future, whether through the
security of valuable collateral, the channelling of repayment actions within
bureaucratic procedures, the alignment of legal coercion, or some form of
assessment as to the will of the borrower under material constraints. The future, an
abstract temporal conception itself arising from the complexity and interdependency
of human action, represents a chancy state to which repayment, and thus profit, is
tied. In this, lenders attempt to tame chance through such historically diverse and
complex strategies as trusting to the relative strength of will of certain class or ethnic
groups; legally, temporally and bureaucratically binding the actions of consumers;
empirically transforming chance into risk through the statistical analysis of a
population of consumers or holding an individual's personal post-dated cheque from
which repayment can be relatively assured.
The contemporary mainstream credit market, characterised by 'democratisation' and
mass accessibility, fluidity, depth and diversity of choice - in a word, freedom - has
only been made possible by subtle yet extensive and far-reaching mechanisms of
government that shape and direct the conduct of consumers: the development of a
rhizomatic, technologically-mediated mechanism of surveillance that creates virtual
credit identities reflecting and shaping the possibilities of choice; the uncertain,
shifting rolling out of risk technologies allowing distant and unknown consumers to
be instantaneously made known and assessed; and the inculcation of moralised,
temporal habits and practices of reflexive self-government in relation to individual
credit use. What is perhaps most characteristic of the contemporary credit system
within the United States and elsewhere is the degree to which formal mechanisms of
government are embedded in the very 'soul' of the consumer. Such control over
credit use penetrates deep into the subjective state of the individual, individualised
and internalised, it embodies not only the individual's generalised injunction to self-
government but an increasing reflexivity over the means by which they are assessed
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and judged by lenders. Like Cooley's looking-glass self, the individual credit user
has come to be governed to think about and act upon their own credit use through
the means by which the population of consumers are so governed. Yet, such new
forms of governance are not perceived to be an imposition upon the individual and
their mode of conduct; on the contrary, they have been achieved under the
aspirational rubric of privacy rights, freedom and consumer empowerment.
If one wishes to see the sheer efficacy of this technological and subjective mode of
governance, one need look no further than the growing body of fringe lenders,
chains of pawnbrokers, household good rental centres and payday lenders that act as
bankers to the poor, the marginal, and the economically and consumeristically
disenfranchised. Here sophisticated, subtle, all-embracing mechanisms of control are
deliberately forsaken to target this market in favour of eye-watering triple-figure
interest rates on small-scale, short-term loans and stiff corralling methods which
compel repayment due or act to obviate loss for any single transaction. As Jack
Daugherty, the founder of Cash America pawnshops bluntly put it, 'I could take my
customers and put them on a bus and drive them down to a bank and the bank would
laugh at them. That's why they're my customers' (cited in Caskey, 1991: 88).
Lacking institutional recognition as self-governing subjects, the contemporary fringe
borrower must seemingly offer up more, in terms of both repayments and freedom,
for the privilege of a loan. It is, perhaps, only by examining this dark side of the
consumer credit market that we can truly illuminate the crafty genius of government,
airy and delicate yet resolute and ubiquitous, embodied within exchanges and flows
of the contemporary consumer credit system. Like the heddles ofa loom, it helps
secure the warp of desire for the weft of profit. Like a latter-day Huxleyan soma, it
ensnares us the more it makes us free.
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